The relationship between traumatic experiences and subsequent distress is not well understood, and little research focuses on the lived experience of psychological trauma. I draw on Louis Sass’s phenomenological taxonomy to address this lacuna. I present his differentiation between relations of phenomenological causality and implication and demonstrate that his taxonomy can be applied to experiences of trauma. Relations of phenomenological causality and implication can be identified in the genesis and constitution of post-traumatic distress. My adaptation of Sass’s taxonomy will furthermore (...) offer an extension and development of his account, applying it to the study of post-traumatic experiences and elaborating it in the process. I shall demonstrate that whether experiences occur synchronically or diachronically is not essential to their categorization in terms of phenomenological implication and causality, respectively. I will show that an alteration in perception or behavior post trauma might temporally succeed the traumatizing event while, at the same time, being implied in the experience of the event. Thereby, I demonstrate how phenomenology may contribute to a detailed understanding of experiences of trauma. Scrutiny of traumatic experiences furthermore promises to contribute to the philosophical discourse on causality, implication, and temporal experience. (shrink)

Their nursing experience and/or training may lead students preparing for the nursing profession to have less moral distress and more favorable attitudes towards a hastened death compared with those preparing for other fields of study. To ascertain if this was true, 66 undergraduates (54 women, 9 men, 3 not stated) in southeastern USA completed measures of moral distress and attitudes towards hastening death. Unexpectedly, the results from nursing and non-nursing majors were not significantly different. All the present students reported moderate (...) moral distress and strong resistance to any efforts to hasten death but these factors were not significantly correlated. However, in the small sample of nurses in training, the results suggest that hastened death situations may not be a prime reason for moral distress. (shrink)

With my research, I wish to contribute to the discussion of post-traumatic psychopathologies from a phenomenological perspective. The main question I pursue is to what extent PTSD can be understood as an intersubjective psychopathology and which implications this view might have. In this paper, I argue that the mode of perception allowing for intersubjective experience is vulnerable to disruptions through traumatic events. I begin with a short elaboration on what intersubjectivity entails before proceeding to illustrate how it can be impaired. (...) Then, I focus on the concept of empathy as a mode of perception: I propose that due to a disruption of the ability to empathize an individual suffering from PTSD may cease to experience the other as another subject that offers possibilities for interaction. The traumatized individual is thus unable to establish meaningful connections with others. I offer some implications this view might entail for thinking about trauma treatment. (shrink)

In this paper, I enquire into the nature of the influence culture has on the experience of trauma. I begin with a brief elaboration of the dominant conceptualisation of post-traumatic experiences: the diagnostic category of PTSD as it can be found in the DSM. Then, I scrutinise the nature and extent to which cultural factors may influence the phenomenology of the experience of certain events as traumatic and subsequent symptoms of post-traumatic stress. It seems that cultural circumstances alter the way (...) in which trauma is experienced; it is not clear whether there is in fact a core pathology of PTSD, as the DSM assumes, or whether the structure of the experience of trauma is too multifaceted to be summarised in one diagnostic category. Finally, I show that phenomenological enquiry promises to identify the structural similarities that would justify the delineation of a distinct diagnostic category. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Violence sells, Americans have what sometimes seems to be an insatiable appetite for it. Depictions and descriptions of violence saturate our culture. songs urge us to rape women, kill police officers, and commit suicide. Movies portray-indeed they glorifyviolence as an intrinsic element of every imaginable plot line.Despite substantial evidence that an individual’s repeated exposure to portrayals of violence is associated with significantly increased likelihood that the individual will commit aggressive acts against others, no legal regime currently regulates such portrayals either (...) on television, in music, in movies, or in video games. Neither Congress, the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, nor any state legislature has yet mustered the political will to impose substantial or systematic legal constraints upon producers or purveyors of violent images. Official censorship is rightly to be feared, but unreflective invocations of our commitment to freedom of speech provide incomplete justification for our legal regime’s apparent indifference to the possibility that media-induced violence may impose substantial costs on innocent victims. (shrink)

Violence sells, Americans have what sometimes seems to be an insatiable appetite for it. Depictions and descriptions of violence saturate our culture. songs urge us to rape women, kill police officers, and commit suicide. Movies portray-indeed they glorifyviolence as an intrinsic element of every imaginable plot line.Despite substantial evidence that an individual’s repeated exposure to portrayals of violence is associated with significantly increased likelihood that the individual will commit aggressive acts against others, no legal regime currently regulates such portrayals either (...) on television, in music, in movies, or in video games. Neither Congress, the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, nor any state legislature has yet mustered the political will to impose substantial or systematic legal constraints upon producers or purveyors of violent images. Official censorship is rightly to be feared, but unreflective invocations of our commitment to freedom of speech provide incomplete justification for our legal regime’s apparent indifference to the possibility that media-induced violence may impose substantial costs on innocent victims. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Background:Healthcare personnel in the municipal healthcare systems experience many ethical challenges in their everyday work. In Norway, 243 municipalities participated in a national ethics project, aimed to increase ethical competence in municipal healthcare services. In this study, we wanted to map out what participants in ethics reflection groups experienced as promoters or as barriers to successful reflection.Objectives:To examine what the staff experience as promoters or as barriers to successful ethics reflection.Research design:The study has a qualitative design, where 56 participants in (...) municipal healthcare participated in 10 different focus-group interviews.Ethical considerations:The data collection was based on the participants’ informed consent and approved by the Data Protection Official of the Norwegian Centre for Research Data.Results:The informants had different experiences from ethics reflection group. Nevertheless, we found that there were several factors that were consistently mentioned: competence, facilitator’s role, ethics reflection groups organizing, and organizational support were all experienced as promoters and as a significant effect on ethics reflection groups. The absence of such factors would constitute important barriers to successful ethics reflection.Discussion:The results are coincident with other studies, and indicate some conditions that may increase the possibility to succeed with ethics reflection groups. A systematic approach seems to be important, the systematics of the actual reflections, but also in the organization of ethics reflection group at the workplace. Community healthcare is characterized by organizational instabilities as many vacancies, high workloads, and lack of predictability. This can be a hinder for ethics reflection group.Conclusion:Both internal and external factors seem to influence the organization of ethics reflection group. The municipalities’ instabilities challenging this work, and perceived as a clear inhibitor for the development. The participants experienced that the facilitator is the most important success factor for establishing, carrying out, and to succeed with ethics reflection groups. (shrink)

BackgroundAs part of the research project “End-of-life Communication in Nursing Homes. Patient Preferences and Participation”, we have studied how Advance Care Planning is carried out in eight Norwegian nursing homes. The concept of ACP is a process for improving patient autonomy and communication in the context of progressive illness, anticipated deterioration and end-of-life care. While an individualistic autonomy based attitude is at the fore in most studies on ACP, there is a lack of empirical studies on how family members’ participation (...) and involvement in ACP- conversations may promote nursing home patients’ participation in decisions on future treatment and end-of-life care. Based on empirical data and family ethics perspectives, the purpose of this study is to add insights to the complexity of ACP-conversations and illuminate how a family ethics perspective may improve the quality of the ACP and promote nursing home patients’ participation in advance care planning.MethodsParticipant observations of ACP-conversations in eight nursing homes. The observations were followed by interviews with patients and relatives together on how they experienced being part of the conversation, and expressing their views on future medical treatment, hospitalization and end-of-life issues.ResultsWe found that the way nursing home patients and relatives are connected and related to each other, constitutes an intertwined unit. Further, we found that relatives’ involvement and participation in ACP- conversations is significant to uncover, and give the nursing home staff insight into, what is important in the nursing home patient’s life at the time. The third analytical theme is patients’ and relatives’ shared experiences of the dying and death of others. Drawing on past experiences can be a way of introducing or talking about death.ConclusionsAn individual autonomy approach in advance care planning should be complemented with a family ethics approach. To be open to family ethics when planning for the patient’s future in the nursing home is to be open to diversity and nuances and to the significance of the patient’s former life and experiences. (shrink)

The number of older adults incarcerated in prisons is growing significantly, and there is a great need for legal authority, processes, and resources to mitigate individual and social burdens of elder neglect and abuse within these settings. Older adults in prison may be particularly vulnerable to abuse, neglect, or exploitation. They are dependent on the carceral system for basic resources, are at risk for retaliatory actions for reporting mistreatment, and bear disproportionately high health burdens. This essay first considers standards and (...) resources for mitigating elder mistreatment in the community and residential‐care settings in contrast to the available resources in prisons. Arguing that a conceptual model of elder abuse tailored to the prison population is needed, the essay proposes a research agenda through which such a model could be developed. The model could then be used in the creation of policy for detecting and mitigating elder mistreatment of incarcerated people. The essay concludes with a call to action to address the rift in legal protections and processes that leave older adults in prison at increased risk of abuse and neglect without a clear pathway for recourse. (shrink)

In this article we critically reflect on ‘feminist research methods’ and ‘methodology’, from the perspective of a feminist research unit at a South African university, that explicitly aims to improve gender-based violence service provision and policy through evidence-based advocacy. Despite working within a complex and inequitable developing country context, where our feminist praxis is frequently pitted against seemingly intractable structural realities, it is a praxis that remains grounded in documenting the stories of vulnerable individuals and within a broader political project (...) of working towards improving the systems that these individuals must navigate under challenging social and structural conditions. We primarily do this by working with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) providing gender-based violence services in research conceptualisation, design and implementation. This raises unique and complex questions for feminist participatory research, which we illustrate through a case study of collaborative, participatory research with NGOs to improve health and criminal justice outcomes for survivors of sexual violence. Issues include the possibility of good intentions/good research designs failing; the suitability of participatory research in sensitive service provision contexts; the degree(s) of engagement between researchers, service providers (collaborators/participants) and research participants; as well as our ethical duties to do no harm and to promote positive, progressive change through personal narratives and other forms of evidence. Given the demands of our context and these core issues, we not only argue that there are no ‘feminist methods’, but also caution against the notion of a universal ‘feminist methodology’. Whilst we may all be in agreement about the centrality of gender to our research and analysis, the fundamental aims and assumptions of mainstream (Western) feminist approaches do not hold true in all contexts, nor are they without variance in mode, ideal degrees of participation and importance to social context. (shrink)

BackgroundInternationally, clinical ethics support has yet to be implemented systematically in community health and care services. A large-scale Norwegian project attempted to increase ethical competence in community services through facilitating the implementation of ethics support activities in 241 Norwegian municipalities. The article describes the ethics project and the ethics activities that ensued.MethodsThe article first gives an account of the Norwegian ethics project. Then the results of two online questionnaires are reported, characterizing the scope, activities and organization of the ethics activities (...) in the Norwegian municipalities and the ethical topics addressed.ResultsOne hundred and thirty-seven municipal contact persons answered the first survey, whereas 217 ethics facilitators from 48 municipalities responded to the second. The Norwegian ethics project is vast in scope, yet has focused on some institutions and professions whilst seldom reaching others. Patients and next of kin were very seldom involved. Through the ethics project employees discussed many important ethical challenges, in particular related to patient autonomy, competence to consent, and cooperation with next of kin. The “ethics reflection group” was the most common venue for ethics deliberation.ConclusionsThe Norwegian project is the first of its kind and scope, and other countries may learn from the Norwegian experiences. Professionals have discussed central ethical dilemmas, the handling of which arguably makes a difference for patients/users and service quality. The study indicates that large scale implementation of CES structures for the municipal health and care services is complex, yet feasible. (shrink)

Conscious recollection appears to be governed by seven principles: elaboration, organization, time‐dependency, cue‐dependency, encoding specificity, schematic processing, and reconstruction. However, these same principles may not apply to unconscious, or implicit, memory. Implicit memory is most commonly reflected in priming effects which occur in the absence of conscious recollection. Dissociations between explicit and implicit memory have been observed in patients suffering various sorts of brain damage, in other forms of amnesia, in behavioral performance of neurologically intact subjects, and in brain‐imaging studies (...) of memory. The most popular interpretation of these dissociations holds that explicit and implicit memory are mediated by separate and independent brain systems. However, there are also compelling interpretations in terms of dual processes operating on the contents of a single memory system. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Closing the Gaps in Pediatric HIV/AIDS Care, One Step at a TimeLisa V. Adams, Helga Naburi, Goodluck Lyatuu, Paul Palumbo, and C. Fordham von ReynFatuma's* doctors were completely perplexed. It was 2003 and she had returned to the DARDAR clinic in her hometown of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania three times that week with vague complaints of various pains and aches. Her doctors were considering whether these symptoms were due (...) to the initiation of her recent treatment with antiretroviral medications for her HIV infection or related to the last administration of the investigational tuberculosis (TB) vaccine that the DARDAR Health Study was evaluating. Fatuma's doctor, Dr. Lillian Mtei, consulted with Dartmouth's chief of Infectious Disease, Dr. Ford von Reyn, who happened to be in Dar that week on a site visit. Neither physician could determine the basis for her symptoms. Dr. Mtei returned to the exam room once more and this time emerged with the answer: Fatuma had just learned that her three year old daughter was HIV-infected, likely contracted from Fatuma during or shortly after she gave birth to her daughter. Fatuma believed that her HIV diagnosis was a death sentence for her daughter since antiretroviral therapy was not widely available for children.Dr. von Reyn, Dartmouth's lead clinical researcher in Africa and a father, knew too well the harsh reality of inequities in a resource-limited country. He turned to Dr. Mtei and said decidedly, "we need to do something about this."Thus the DARDAR Pediatric Program was born.Pediatric HIV: A Neglected DiseaseThe need for HIV treatment among children in Tanzania, as in most of sub-Saharan Africa, is compelling. At the end of 2009, approximately 160,000 children aged zero to fourteen in Tanzania were living with HIV (Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS [UNAIDS], 2011). Even with successful roll out of prevention of mother to child transmission programs in Tanzania, there were nearly 29,000 perinatal infections in 2009. As of December 2010, only 18% of these were enrolled in HIV treatment programs (UNAIDS, 2011; World Health Organization [WHO], 2011). Without antiretroviral therapy (ART), one-half of HIV-infected children will die before their second birthday. Since clinical research to determine efficacy and safety of new medical treatments is conducted almost exclusively in adults, provision of new medical treatments to [End Page 75] children always lags behind advances for adults. Furthermore, children are often underrepresented in programs for antiretroviral drugs for the following reasons: 1) they are not prioritized for care; 2) facilities lack infant diagnostic capabilities; 3) there is limited pediatric HIV training and consequently, a shortage of pediatric providers; and 4) pediatric antiretroviral formulations are frequently unavailable. The unacceptable delays in pediatric HIV drug development and treatment access led the international organization Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative to publish an editorial in which they referred to pediatric HIV as a "neglected disease" (Lallemant, Chang, Cohen, & Pecoul, 2011).The Tip of the Iceberg: More than Just MedicinesWith a grant from the New York-based Foundation for the Treatment of Children with AIDS, the DARDAR Pediatric Program, a joint collaboration between Geisel School of Medicine at Dartmouth and Muhimbili University of Health and Allied Sciences, began seeing patients in May 2006. It was the first dedicated pediatric HIV Care and Treatment Center in Tanzania and operates in accordance with Tanzania's National AIDS Control Programme's guidance. Testing for both children and infants (the latter of which requires a more sophisticated assay) is available.The day the clinic opened we celebrated this collaborative effort that would provide HIV-infected children in Dar es Salaam access to antiretroviral treatment. One of our first patients was a six-year-old boy whose mother, like Fatuma, was a participant in our TB vaccine trial. She had been advised to bring her son to us for HIV screening. Her son looked healthy so she was surprised and understandably distraught when his test results indicated that not only was he HIV-infected, but his CD4 percentage was very low. His mother was reluctant to have him started on antiretrovirals given his general appearance and young age—and that he was... (shrink)

Determinism seems to rule out a robust sense of options but also prevent our choices from being a matter of luck. In this way, free will seems to require both the truth and falsity of determinism. If the concept of free will is coherent, something must have gone wrong. I offer a diagnosis on which this puzzle is due at least in part to a tension already present in the very idea of free will. I provide various lines of support (...) for this hypothesis, including some experimental data gathered by probing the judgments of non-specialists. (shrink)

Now, twenty years later, this collection of fifteenessays brings her work into dialogue with those philosophical views that are at center stage today-- in critical theory, communitarianism, virtue theory, and feminism.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Poetics of PerspectiveHarvey L. HixThe Poetics of Perspective, by James Elkins; xv & 324 pp. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994, $39.95.The Poetics of Perspective does not mention that Leonardo was born more than 100 years before Galileo and nearly 200 before Newton, but doing so would underscore its thesis. According to James Elkins, our anachronistic view of perspective, invented in the Enlightenment, systematically distorts our understanding of (...) Renaissance art. Instead of “tracing the outline” of the real nature of Renaissance art, our discussions (to borrow Wittgenstein’s metaphor) merely trace “the frame through which we look at it.” The actual Renaissance view, unlike the modern idée fixe, involved no concept of a unified pictorial space. In the absence of such a concept, “Renaissance authors and artists [End Page 368] thought there were many compatible perspectives, so that their writing and painting evince a ‘pluralist’ approach in strict contrast to the monolithic mathematical perspective we imagine today” (p. xi). The Poetics of Perspective attempts, in six substantial chapters and a brief envoi, to unearth this pluralistic Renaissance approach to perspective buried beneath modern preconceptions.Elkins identifies a number of differences between the Renaissance view of perspective and modern views. For instance, no longer is perspective “charged with the religious and social meanings it had for the early Renaissance” (p. 2). Why? “Renaissance artists and writers saw many techniques where we see a single discovery” (p. 8). Renaissance artists thought of perspective as a series of rules and techniques for constructing images; modern art historians, in contrast, think of perspective on analogy with tracing a scene on a pane of glass. In contrast to the “object oriented” Renaissance notion of perspective, the modern concept is “space oriented.” For the Renaissance, perspective was “a strategy for making pictures,” but for us it has become “a sign signifying a mental state, a culture, or an expressive language” (p. 17). Renaissance perspective originated as “a construction, an intellectual accomplishment rather than as a transcription of appearances” or a “revelation of optical reality” (pp. 136–38). To its contemporaries, Renaissance perspective suggested “the complicated, unfinished, and partial” rather than “the harmonious, balanced, and whole” (p. 170). We expect a uniform accuracy of perspective through an entire painting, but Renaissance practitioners were selective in their applications of perspective to passages of particular interest or significance. All these differences taken together, Elkins says, imply that our insistence on attributing to Renaissance paintings an isotropic application of perspective based on an ideal geometry is a mistake: “we are looking for something the Renaissance artists did not supply” (p. 226).Elkins’s excellent book is a corrective for the sort of thing Lillian Schwartz does in the April 1995 Scientific American. In the middle of a series of ill-substantiated conjectures, based on computer manipulations of images and ranging from the claim that Leonardo himself was a model for the Mona Lisa to the assertion that Piero della Francesca’s Resurrection of Christ, plastered over during the seventeenth century, must have been painted “in sunset colors,” she suggests that Leonardo intended The Last Supper to “appear as an extension of the refectory” in which it was painted. She explains the quirks of the painting’s perspective (“Leonardo placed Christ and the apostles up front, tilted the floor and table, designed side walls of uneven lengths and tapestries of different sizes and spacing”) by constructing a computer simulation to show that a person entering the room from what was then the main door “would perceive the supper as taking place in the refectory.” Schwartz’s conjecture may or may not be right, but comparison with her article reveals the major strengths of Elkins’s book. In contrast to Schwartz’s hasty manipulations, The Poetics of Perspective is encyclopedic; it takes scrupulous care to meet on their own ground the many [End Page 369] texts and paintings it examines, and it follows the Wittgensteinian imperative to stop thinking and look. Whatever the promise of the new technologies available to art historians, they can never replace the sort of patient attention Elkins lavishes on the works he studies.Harvey L. HixKansas City Art InstituteCopyright... (shrink)

The burgeoning science of ethics has produced a trend toward pessimism. Ordinary moral thought and action, we’re told, are profoundly influenced by arbitrary factors and ultimately driven by unreasoned feelings. This book counters the current orthodoxy on its own terms by carefully engaging with the empirical literature. The resulting view, optimistic rationalism, shows the pervasive role played by reason, and ultimately defuses sweeping debunking arguments in ethics. The science does suggest that moral knowledge and virtue don’t come easily. However, despite (...) the heavy influence of automatic and unconscious processes that have been shaped by evolutionary pressures, we needn’t reject ordinary moral psychology as fundamentally flawed or in need of serious repair. Reason can be corrupted in ethics just as in other domains, but a special pessimism about morality in particular is unwarranted. Moral judgment and motivation are fundamentally rational enterprises not beholden to the passions. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been a wide-ranging debate about the neo-republican principle of non-domination. Neo-republicans argue that domination is a capacity for one to intentionally use arbitrary power to interfere in someone’s life. Critics of neo-republicanism argue that this definition of freedom as non-domination precludes a structural analysis of domination, which would explain and critique the ways in which societies produce structural domination unintentionally. The article focuses on capitalism’s labor process and its labor markets. It argues that critics are (...) correct to think that the neo-republican principle of non-domination has an insufficient scope, but that an alternative account of structural domination should still support the neo-republican idea that agency must be involved. Otherwise, we might simply fail to explain the social processes that reproduce structural domination. What is needed is to explain how the labor process creates incentives for agents to intentionally produce structures that have unintended, yet dominating effects, and in turn, how the intentions of agents are conditioned by their social positions. Domination is thus agential and structural. (shrink)

This article explores an under-examined theme, which is who or what is the working class and what is wrong with the situation that members of this class share. It argues that class divisions impose a unique harm for a diverse and interdependent group within capitalist societies both in spite and because of differences among group members. Class matters not just because it creates economic groups in which some are rich and others are poor, but because competition creates conditions that militate (...) against solidarity, toward cleavage and conflict. Class is a constraint on collective self-determination and, therefore, a source of domination. (shrink)

I draw on neurobiological evidence to defend the rationalist thesis that moral judgments are essentially dependent on reasoning, not emotions (conceived as distinct from inference). The neuroscience reveals that moral cognition arises from domain-general capacities in the brain for inferring, in particular, the consequences of an agent’s action, the agent’s intent, and the rules or norms relevant to the context. Although these capacities entangle inference and affect, blurring the reason/emotion dichotomy doesn’t preferentially support sentimentalism. The argument requires careful consideration of (...) the empirical evidence (from neuroimaging to psychopathology) and philosophical analysis of the commitments of rationalism versus sentimentalism in ethics. (shrink)

Is religion becoming ‘deregulated’ in secular, pluralist societies? In the public sphere in which freedom of opinion laid the foundations of democracy, no single comprehensive worldview could be allowed to dominate. The warring Christian confessions of Europe discredited the public role of religion, which gave way to Enlightenment rationalism as the regulative norm of society and the newly emerging sciences. But religion is now assuming a new status as the public sphere becomes global. The religions themselves are part of the (...) new global dynamic and the search for a global ethic. Human dignity, on which human rights must be based in global civil society, is nurtured by the narrative traditions of the religions. The God of the monotheistic faiths is thus regaining a public and political role, but there is a danger that this will turn out to be that of a legitimator of violence and a guarantor of exclusive truth claims. The mystics of these traditions teach us that God’s absence can be a mode of God’s presence. If God’s presence in the public sphere does not take the form of dominance, it could also provide a basis for dialogue with non-theistic traditions. Neither the neutral public rationality of the Enlightenment nor a universal theology is an adequate response to the need for shared values in the emerging global public sphere. We must learn to negotiate meanings and values in an ongoing process of communicative interaction and intersubjective universality. (shrink)

We chart how neuroscience and philosophy have together advanced our understanding of moral judgment with implications for when it goes well or poorly. The field initially focused on brain areas associated with reason versus emotion in the moral evaluations of sacrificial dilemmas. But new threads of research have studied a wider range of moral evaluations and how they relate to models of brain development and learning. By weaving these threads together, we are developing a better understanding of the neurobiology of (...) moral judgment in adulthood and to some extent in childhood and adolescence. Combined with rigorous evidence from psychology and careful philosophical analysis, neuroscientific evidence can even help shed light on the extent of moral knowledge and on ways to promote healthy moral development. (shrink)

Moral, social, political, and other “nonepistemic” values can lead to bias in science, from prioritizing certain topics over others to the rationalization of questionable research practices. Such values might seem particularly common or powerful in the social sciences, given their subject matter. However, I argue first that the well-documented phenomenon of motivated reasoning provides a useful framework for understanding when values guide scientific inquiry (in pernicious or productive ways). Second, this analysis reveals a parity thesis: values influence the social and (...) natural sciences about equally, particularly because both are so prominently affected by desires for social credit and status, including recognition and career advancement. Ultimately, bias in natural and social science is both natural and social— that is, a part of human nature and considerably motivated by a concern for social status (and its maintenance). Whether the pervasive influence of values is inimical to the sciences is a separate question. (shrink)

Directed duties are duties that an agent owes to some party – a party who would be wronged if the duty were violated. A ‘direction problem’ asks what it is about a duty in virtue of which it is directed towards one party, if any, rather than another. I discuss three theories of moral direction: control, demand and interest theories. Although none of these theories can be rejected out of hand, all three face serious difficulties.

This chapter discusses contemporary scientific research on the role of reason and emotion in moral judgment. The literature suggests that moral judgment is influenced by both reasoning and emotion separately, but there is also emerging evidence of the interaction between the two. While there are clear implications for the rationalism-sentimentalism debate, we conclude that important questions remain open about how central emotion is to moral judgment. We also suggest ways in which moral philosophy is not only guided by empirical research (...) but continues to guide it. (shrink)