Aus dem Inhalt: Marcelo Da Veiga: Selbstdenken und Stil bei J.G. Fichte und Goethe. - Bernward Loheide: Artistisches Fichtisieren: Zur Hoheren Wissenschaftslehre bei Novalis. - Ruth Pouvreau: Schopferische Weltbetrachtung: zum Verhaltnis von Einbildung und Erkenntnis in Texten der deutschen Romantik. - Martin Goetze: Das praktische Ich in der 'Wissenschaftslehre' und in der fruhromantischen Philosophie des Lebens.".

Over the past twenty-five years, no one has done more than J. P. Moreland to equip Christians to love God with their minds. In his work as a Christian philosopher, scholar, and apologist, he has influenced thousands of students, written groundbreaking books, and taught multitudes of Christians to defend their faith. -/- In honor of Moreland's ministry, general editors Paul M. Gould and Richard Brian Davis have assembled a team of friends and colleagues to celebrate his work. In three major (...) parts devoted to philosophy, apologetics, and spiritual formation, scholars such as Stewart Goetz, Paul Copan, Douglas Groothuis, Scott Rae, and Klaus Issler interact with Moreland's thought and make their own contributions to these important subjects. Moreland concludes the volume with his own essay, "Reflections on the Journey Ahead.". (shrink)

In this book, linguists and philosophers combine to offer a unique insight not only into Grice's contribution to philosophy of language, but on his theories of natural and non-natural meaning, implicatures and the semantic-pragmatic distinction.

After a short description of the Aristotelian examples for practical syllogisms, the essay gives an overview of the interpretations of the practical syllogism since the 1950s. These interpretations can be divided into two main groups: while the first group connects the practical syllogism with practical thinking, the second, smaller group considers it as an illustration of the causal explananation of actions. The essay closes with some remarks on the reasons for these different interpretations.

Social health disparities are increasing in most countries around the world. During the past two decades, a large amount of evidence has emerged about the health consequences of social inequalities. Despite such evidence, the concept of medical fairness, as traditionally defined by the World Medical Association, has remained unchallenged and even reinforced by some scholars who emphasize that doctors should remain neutral to the socioeconomic status of their patients when providing clinical care. The inconsistency between public health and clinical care (...) perspectives raises tension between a narrow interpretation of the ethics of justice, which stresses the importance of equality and impartiality, and the ethics of care, which highlights the importance of particularity and individuality in clinical practice. This article analyzes the concept of medical fairness using the emerging evidence that demonstrates the impact of social health disparities on clinical care. It proposes a new approach of medical fairness based on equity rather than on equality and provides a consistent ethical framework based on Paul Ricoeur’s three levels of medical judgments. This integrative framework provides a better balance between public health and clinical care in medical practice. (shrink)

This paper discusses Aristotle's notion of the practical syllogism. It is argued that the notion of ‘practical’ reasoning in the sense of reasoning which implies motion in one sense or the other is alien to Aristotle's philosophy of nature. All (at least in type) the relevant passages will be discussed. The outcome is that there are three different contexts in which it would be justified to speak of practical syllogisms: (i) human deliberation, (ii) the illustration of the triggering cause of (...) animal motion, and (iii) the teleological ex post explanationof human action. (i) is genuine, but non-deductive reasoning which does not immediately result in action/motion, whereas (ii) is not genuine reasoning, but an analogy with deductive reasoning. Finally, the relation between (i) and (ii) in Aristotle's theory of animal motion will be discussed. (shrink)

Being conscious or experiencing the world with all its vivid qualities is something humans intimately cherish. The fact that consciousness provides us with a lively phenomenology is what makes life worth living. Yet, when it comes to understanding how consciousness fits into the natural world, we feel deeply puzzled. In this context, one important claim about consciousness consists in the idea that our awareness is not only about the world but also reveals an intimate subjectivity. This aspect of phenomenal consciousness (...) is often referred to as pre-reflective self-consciousness. It is often held that this type of self-awareness is intrinsic and essential to any form of conscious experience, i.e. there is no conscious experience without also being implicitly self-conscious. Being of such importance to the nature of consciousness, the recent literature mainly discusses two ways of accounting for pre-reflective self-consciousness, its role for conscious experience and how it fits into the natural world. On the one hand, there are relational views; on the other hand, there are non-relational accounts. This paper will argue that both approaches are not sustainable as they stand, since either important aspects are lost or not sufficiently embedded in the natural world. Consequently, I will argue for an alternative that allows for both a functional and an embodied nature of pre-reflective self-consciousness. (shrink)

We start from the assumption that the real valued observables of a quantum system form a Jordan algebra which is equipped with a compatible Lie product characterizing infinitesimal symmetries, and ask whether two such systems can be considered as independent subsystems of a larger system. We show that this is possible if and only if the associator of the Jordan product is a fixed multiple of the associator of the Lie product. In this case it is known that the two (...) products can be combined to an associative product in the Jordan algebra or its complexification, depending on the sign of the multiple. (shrink)

Der Fokus auf die Sprache bestimmte die Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, die sowohl die Dekonstruktion der Metaphysik als auch den Tod des Subjekts verkündete. Der Psychoanalytiker Jacques Lacan führte das Subjekt des Begehrens wieder in den philosophischen Diskurs ein und entwickelte aus der Struktur der Sprache eine neue, symbolische Logik des Unbewussten. Die Logik des Signifikanten, deren Geschichte diese Arbeit nachzeichnet, um sie zu transzendieren, stellt die Frage nach der Dialektik von Signifikant und Begriff, Sprache und Logik, Bewusstem und Unbewusstem, (...) Ich und Subjekt, Gesetz und Begehren, Denken und Sein. Durch die Funktionen der Metonymie, der Metapher und des Stepppunktes sowie über das Schema der vier Diskurse werden die Tropen der traditionellen philosophischen Logik - Begriff, Urteil und Schluss - neu interpretiert. Das Peirce'sche Konzept der Abduktion ermöglicht es, sowohl den Borromäischen Knoten Lacans - Imaginäres, Symbolisches und Reales - wie auch die transzendentale Dialektik und Ontologie der Moderne, die auf Kants und Hegels Revolutionen der Denkungsart zurückgehen, schlusslogisch zu begründen. (shrink)

"Die Bildung muss auf die volle Entfaltung der menschlichen Persönlichkeit und auf die Stärkung der Achtung vor den Menschenrechten und Grundfreiheiten gerichtet sein.

One of many writers inspired by Laurence Sterne's Tristram Shandy, the German novelist Jean Paul Richter coined the term 'Shandean humour' in his work of aesthetic theory. The essays in this volume investigate how Sterne's humour functions, the reasons for its enduring appeal, and what role it played in identity-construction and in the representation of melancholy. In tracing its hitherto under-recognised impact both on literary writers, such as Jean Paul and Herman Melville, and on philosophers, including Hegel and Marx, the (...) collection reveals that Shandean humour is a Grenzgänger - a point of commerce not only between Anglophone and German discourses, but also between literature and philosophy.Klaus Vieweg is Professor of Philosophy at the Friedrich Schiller University of Jena; James Vigus is postdoctoral research fellow at the Department of English and American Studies, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich; Kathleen M. Wheeler is Reader in English Literature at the University of Cambridge. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Experience or Interpretation:"What You See Is Not What You Read"Klaus OttmannMuseums of modern and contemporary art are growing at an unprecedented rate. New museums are being founded and existing ones are expanding exhibition spaces and acquiring more and more works of art. Concurrently, cultural institutions compete with a growing number of art fairs, biennials, galleries, and public collection spaces.Since the 1980s the focus of museums increasingly has been (...) on education and interpretation, which among other things has created a boom for audio guides and scholarly exhibition catalogs at the expense of the unmediated experience of works of art. Perhaps what is needed are exhibitions that present art again primarily as "experience," with minimal curatorial and didactic intervention. [End Page 13]I have borrowed the title of my essay from a lecture that was given by Nicolas Serota, the director of the Tate galleries in London, in 1996. His lecture was subtitled "The Dilemma of Museums of Modern Art."But the question of the presentation of art, and specifically, that of experience vs. interpretation, by no means originated in the last decades. It is at least as old a question as modern art itself, going as far back as the nineteenth-century French intellectual dispute on the museum between the poet Paul Valéry and the novelist Marcel Proust, as recounted with a sympathetic voice by the German philosopher and cultural critic Theodor Adorno in a short essay with the minimalist title "Valéry Proust Museum."There is much to be learned from reading this small text. Paul Valéry criticized the museum of his time (the Louvre) for creating confusion in the mind of the spectator by reducing the experience to the level of information only. No one would want to listen to ten orchestras at once, he argued, yet we are forced to apprehend, at the same moment, a seascape, a portrait, and a still-life, or worse, painting styles completely incompatible with each other. He warned that excess of information would lead to impoverishment of the senses, as art was becoming a matter of education. Valéry's view could be regarded as the conservative position.Marcel Proust's view was more modernist: he regarded the museum as the best place to view art. Devoid of décor and other commonplace distractions, its galleries symbolized for him the inner spaces into which the artist withdraws to create works of art.Both Valéry and Proust emphasized that art should be enjoyed. But while for Valéry art lost its vitality in the museum and effectively "died," Proust saw an afterlife of art in the museum and in the subjective stream of consciousness of the viewer.For Adorno, both views were too one-sided and extreme. Valéry's absolute unwavering contemplation of pure art takes the risk of neutralization, unless the work can point beyond itself toward a social context. Thus, a work of art is neither an embodiment of a Platonic idea, as Valéry believed, nor is it exclusively a reflection of the soul, as Proust understood it. Rather, in Adorno's view, art is a "force field" between the art and the viewer, both passive and active.In his 1931 lectures on "Art as Experience," the American philosopher John Dewey said:The trouble with existing theories [of art] is that they start from ready-made compartmentalization, or from a conception of art that "spiritualizes" it out of connection with the objects of concrete experience. The alternative, however, to such spiritualization is not a degrading... materialization of works of fine art, but a conception that discloses the way in which these works idealize qualities found in common experience.1 [End Page 14]In my book The Genius Decision: The Extraordinary and the Postmodern Condition, I describe the creative act as an active-passive leap that the artist is impelled to make and the viewer is challenged to repeat.Wittgenstein often spoke about the inexpressible, that which is beyond the limits of language. He called it "running against the boundaries of language." It is something any poet, musician, or painter is familiar with; they all run against boundaries of language, sound, or color... (shrink)

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This is the overdue replacement of D. W. Hamlyn’s somewhat dismissive 1968 translation and commentary of the first two books of Aristotle’s De Anima. Hamlyn hardly did justice to this foundational treatise of Aristotle’s science of living beings: not only did he mistake it for a treatise on “the” philosophy of mind, he also did not bother to translate the first book apart from two snippets. Shields’s replacement is entirely free from such vices. It provides a new translation and commentary (...) on the whole argument of De Anima, and offers a much more philosophically satisfying interpretation... (shrink)

Die Physik ist das in acht Büchern überlieferte naturphilosophische Hauptwerk des Aristoteles. Sie lässt sich grob in zwei Teile gliedern: Einerseits enthält sie eine Metaphysik naturphilosophischer Grundbegriffe im Sinne einer allgemeinen Wissenschaft und Methodenlehre von der Natur, andererseits aber auch Argumentationen für eine Reihe naturphilosophischer Thesen, die nicht mehr Teil der Explikation von naturphilosophischen Grundbegriffen sind, sondern bereits Thesen im Rahmen dieser Naturwissenschaft etablieren. Den Unterschied kann man sich vielleicht anhand der unterschiedlichen Typen von Fragen klarmachen, auf die in den (...) thematischen Teilen des Werkes eingegangen wird. (shrink)

Band 1. Die anthropologische Grundlage der Kunst -- Band 2. Die gesellschaftliche Autonomie der Kunst.

Two librettos are examined, one of them baroque and the other contemporary, in which the character Socrates plays the major role. The libretto La patienza di Socrate con due moglie, written by N. Minato for A. Draghi (1680) and later reelaborated by G.P. Telemann for his opera Der geduldige Sokrates (1721), is based on an imaginary anecdote that dates back to antiquity, according to which Socrates was married to two wives, Xanthippa and Myrto. In the libretto written by E. Krenek (...) for his opera Pallas Athene weint (first production 1955), the end of the Peloponnesian War is transformed into a mirror of the fascist dictatorship of Adolf Hitler and of the time of cold war. At the center of the action is Socrates, fighting in vain against tyranny and lack of political freedom, and at the end he will be a victim of this struggle. (shrink)

Summary Die Kritik am Konzept „abgeschlossener Theorien, die im Kontext der Diskussion um die sogenannte Finalisierungs-These bisher vorgebracht wurde, erweist sich als unhaltbar. Ob die Existenz „abgeschlossener Theorien die Finalisierbarkeit der entsprechenden wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen zur Folge hat, ist eine andere Frage.

Die Frage: sind empirische Theorien falsifizierbar? ist natürlich trivialerweise zu verneinen, falls man Theorien nicht als Mengen von Aussagen, sonden z. B., wie Sneed/Stegmüller, als mengentheoretische Strukturen plus intendierte Anwendungsbereiche auffaßt. Daß die Antwort, zumindest dann, wenn man die Fragestellung auf bestimmte physikalische Theorien einschränkt, auch bei Zugrundelegung der sogenannten Aussagen-Konzeption (statement view) nicht anders lautet, ist hingegen schon weniger trivial — obgleich seit langem bekannt, spätestens nämlich seit Duhems berühmter Argumentation gegen die Möglichkeit eines experimentum crucis. Andererseits beruht eine (...) der derzeit einflußreichsten methodologischen Theorien, die von Popper, gerade auf der gegenteiligen Behauptung. Erst jüngst noch hat Popper seine Falsifizierbarkeits-Annahme, vor allem gegen Kritiken von Lakatos und Putnam, zu verteidigen versucht; die gleiche Intention verfolgen auch zwei Aufsätze von Musgrave. Es erscheint mir daher angebracht, kurz auf das Problem der Falsifizierbarkeit von empirischen Theorien zurückzukommen.Vorweg noch zwei Bemerkungen zur Terminologie: 1) Ich verwende, ohne mich auf den Versuch einer genaueren Explikation einzulassen, den Begriff (physikalische) Theorie in dem für den statement view geläufigen Sinne, wonach eine (deterministische) Theorie aus einer Menge von allgemeinen (deterministischen Natur-)Gesetzen besteht. Es sei ausdrücklich darauf hingewiesen, daß dies wenigstens partiell dem sonst üblichen Sprachgebrauch zuwider läuft: die Theorie des Planetensystems und die Mondtheorie, beispielsweise, sind keine Theorien im genannten Sinne, weil sie außer auf allgemeinen Naturgesetzen noch auf spezifischen nicht-gesetzesartigen Annahmen beruhen. Andrerseits dürfte diese Deutung des Begriffs Theorie zumindest mit derjenigen von Popper übereinstimmen. — 2) Daß eine Aussage bzw. Aussagenmenge T falsifizierbar ist, soll, wie bei Popper, bedeuten, daß Basissätze (wahre oder falsche) existieren, die zusammen mit T eine inkonsistente Satzmenge bilden; m.a.W.: falsifizierbar ist T in the simple logical sense of being logically incompatible with some basic statements. It has potential falsifiers. Basissätze sind dabei, grob gesagt, als Darstellungen von Beobachtungs-Befunden aufzufassen; Genaueres interessiert hier nur insoweit, als es sich umraum-zeitlich singuläre (Existenz-) Sätze handeln muß. Entsprechend soll schließlich T als falsifiziert gelten, wenn es wahre bzw. anerkannte oder akzeptierte Basissätze gibt, die T widersprechen. (Poppers Forderung, daß diese Basissätze ein reproduzierbares Phänomen beschreiben, also eine — allgemeine — falsifizierende Hypothese bewähren müssen, kann im vorliegenden Zusammenhang außer Betracht bleiben). (shrink)

P. Lorenzen hat unlängst eine neue Definition von "Wahrscheinlichkeit" vorgeschlagen. Es soll gezeigt werden, daß sich zumindest die in diesem Zusammenhang erhobenen Ansprüche auf "Rechtfertigung" der Normierung und der endlichen Additivität von Wahrscheinlichkeitsmaßen sowie auf "Begründung" der Anwendbarkeit in den empirischen Wissenschaften nicht aufrecht erhalten lassen.