Ernst Mayr proposed a distinction between “proximate”, mechanistic, and “ultimate”, evolutionary, causes of biological phenomena. This dichotomy has influenced the thinking of many biologists, but it is increasingly perceived as impeding modern studies of evolutionary processes, including study of “niche construction” in which organisms alter their environments in ways supportive of their evolutionary success. Some still find value for this dichotomy in its separation of answers to “how?” versus “why?”questions about evolution. But “why is A?” questions about evolution necessarily take (...) the form “how does A occur?”, so this separation is illusory. Moreover, the dichotomy distorts our view of evolutionary causality, in that, contra Mayr, the action of natural selection, driven by genotype-phenotype-environment interactions which constitute adaptations, is no less “proximate” than the biological mechanisms which are altered by naturally selected genetic variants. Mayr’s dichotomy thus needs replacement by more realistic, mechanistic views of evolution. From a mechanistic viewpoint, there is a continuum of adaptations from those evolving as responses to unchanging environmental pressures to those evolving as the capacity for niche construction, and intermediate stages of this can be identified. Some biologists postulate an association of “phenotypic plasticity” (phenotype-environment covariation with genotype held constant) with capacity for niche construction. Both “plasticity” and niche construction comprise wide ranges of adaptive mechanisms, often fully heritable and resulting from case-specific evolution. Association of “plasticity” with niche construction is most likely to arise in systems wherein capacity for complex learning and behavioral flexibility have already evolved. (shrink)

Johns and Johnson analyze the invasion of Panama in order to explore the ways in which the War on Drugs has been used as an ideological justification for a projection of U.S. state power into Latin America. They characterize the Bush Administration's reasons for the invasion as cynical ideological rhetoric which covered up strategic interests the United States had in deposing Noriega and replacing him with a more cooperative regime. The authors particularly discuss the role of media coverage, including the (...) demonization of Noriega and the immediate adoption by the corporate media of the name Operation Just Cause, in legitimating the invasion and transforming it in popular ideology as a law enforcement operation. Finally, they examine the aftermath of the invasion in the United States--Bush's popularity ratings, the distortion of civilian casualty information, the macho celebration of the war--and in Panama--the destruction of the labor and independence movements, the puppet Endara government, and the increased drug trafficking through Panama. (shrink)

Deviant causal chain problems arise in many settings. The most famous instance of the problem is the Gettier problem, but the problem also arises in the philosophy of action and perception. Usually, attempts to tackle these problems try to solve them individually. This paper takes a different approach: I propose a general solution to the problem. I begin by providing a solution to the deviant causal chain problem for skillful performance, and I argue that the solution can be extended to (...) solve the Gettier problem and the deviant causal chain problems for perception and intentional action. As I develop my solution to these problems, I also compare it with other solutions to bring out the advantages of my approach. I then explain why the solution generalizes: my solution provides us with an analysis of disposition manifestation, which is the key to ruling out deviance. I conclude by considering objections and giving my replies. (shrink)

Matter and Form explores the relationship between natural science and political philosophy from the classical to contemporary eras, taking an interdisciplinary approach to the philosophic understanding of the structure and process of the natural world and its impact on the history of political philosophy. It illuminates the importance of philosophic reflection on material nature to moral and political theorizing, mediating between the sciences and humanities and making a contribution to ending the isolation between them.

This paper develops and tests a model of fingerpointing behaviors that board members experience because of regulatory reforms. We present the partial results of a large study of 138 board members on 54 publicly traded boards in the United States. We found that recent governance reforms that mandate increased accountability of board members are associated with less board cohesion and thatlower board cohesion is associated with fingerpointing behaviors. These findings suggest that the stages of institutionalization following regulatory shock falter when (...) negative group behaviors develop under scrutiny. (shrink)

A questão sobre como e por que os jovens vêm a se radicalizar é ​​um dos temas que permeiam de modo central todos os principais escritos de Dostoiévski. Pode-se argumentar que Os Demônios oferece a expressão definitiva acerca de quais são as consequências da radicalização, uma vez que ela venha a ocorrer, mas para o caso de se procurar compreender como e por que a radicalização acontece na mente e no espírito de um jovem, é necessário voltar-se para a obra (...) seguinte de Dostoiévski, o romance O Adolescente. Neste romance, a busca de Arkadi por seu pai é, em última análise, uma busca por uma ordem que reflita uma “bela aparência”. (shrink)

In their recent book, Is Inequality Bad for Our Health?, Daniels, Kennedy, and Kawachi claim that to “act justly in health policy, we must have knowledge about the causal pathways through which socioeconomic (and other) inequalities work to produce differential health outcomes.” One of the central problems with this approach is its dependency on “knowledge about the causal pathways.” A widely held belief is that the randomized clinical trial (RCT) is, and ought to be the “gold standard” of evaluating the (...) causal efficacy of interventions. However, often the only data available are non-experimental, observational data. For such data, the necessary randomization is missing. Because the randomization is missing, it seems to follow that it is not possible to make epistemically warranted claims about the causal pathways. Although we are not sanguine about the difficulty in using observational data to make warranted causal claims, we are not as pessimistic as those who believe that the only warranted causal claims are claims based on data from (idealized) RCTs. We argue that careful, thoughtful study design, informed by expert knowledge, that incorporates propensity score matching methods in conjunction with instrumental variable analyses, provides the possibility of warranted causal claims using observational data. (shrink)

The problem of natural teleology in biology has traditionally focused on reconciling Aristotle’s efficient and final causation. In this paper, however, I emphasize the importance of formal causation in natural teleological explanations and suggest that undermining its legitimacy is a backdoor route to undermining natural teleology itself. Formal causation, I argue, represents the “phenotype” of an object, to use a familiar word from genetics. This means that formal causes specify not only intrinsic “genotypic” qualities of an object but also a (...) range of environments in which the object is “properly” to inhabit. Such environmental specificity is possible through conscious activity, but is not found anywhere in non-conscious nature. Das Problem der natürlichen Teleologie ist traditionellerweise darin gesehen worden, Aristoteles’ Wirkursache und seine Finalursache miteinander zu vereinbaren. Dagegen betone ich in diesem Aufsatz die Bedeutung der formalen Verursachung in natürlichen teleologischen Erklärungen. Wenn man ihre Legitimität untergräbt, so lege ich nahe, untergräbt man gleichsam durch die Hintertür natürliche Teleologie als solche. Ich argumentiere, dass formale Verursachung den „Phänotyp“ eines Objekts darstellt, um ein geläufiges Wort aus der Genetik zu verwenden. Dies bedeutet, dass formale Ursachen nicht nur intrinsische „genotypische“ Eigenschaften eines Objekts spezifizieren, sondern auch eine Bandbreite von Umgebungen, in denen das Objekt „im eigentlichen Sinn“ angesiedelt sein sollte. Diese Spezifizierung der Umgebung ist durch bewusste Aktivität möglich, findet sich aber nirgendwo in der nicht-bewussten Natur. (shrink)

Most people do their utmost to avoid any and every type of suffering; yet, as this experience-based article shows, Newman, early in life, came to realize from his own illnesses that physical suffering can bring the sufferer to an awareness of the presence of God and so be an important part of personal spiritual development.

The notion of homonymy has been of perennial philosophical interest to scholars of Aristotle from ancient Greek commentators to modern thinkers. Across historical periods, certain issues have remained central, such as the nature of Aristotelian homonymy, its relation to synonymy and analogy, and whether the concept undergoes change throughout the corpus. In addition, fundamental questions concerning the use of homonymy in regard to dialectical practice and scientific inquiry are raised and discussed. It is argued that there are two aspects to (...) Aristotelian homonymy, negative and positive in function, which provide complementary roles in regard to dialectic and science. (shrink)

Taking Aquinas's metaphysics of human nature as my point of departure and taking inspiration from Dante's concept of transhumanization, I sketch a metaphysics of the afterlife according to which a human person in the interim phase between death and resurrection is not a mere disembodied soul. I offer some theological reasons for thinking that our bodily human nature is essential to what we are and for thinking that we can survive the destruction of our bodies at death. I argue that (...) these claims are consistent, provided we hold that our bodily human nature, while essential to what we are, is not necessary to what we are. I argue for this distinction between essence and necessity. I then raise a mereological puzzle about the relation between a disembodied soul and the person whose soul it is, and argue that, if we are to avoid the Cartesian conclusion that this relation is identity, we must hold that a human person, even in the interim phase, is composed of a soul and something else. Drawing on Dante's concept of transhumanization, I argue that this something else is God himself or some specially created divine grace or energy. (shrink)

In Plato’s Apology of Socrates, Socrates claims that any just person who becomes involved in politics will be destroyed by the “multitude” and that the philosopher must therefore lead a private life. I argue that Socrates’ elaboration of his relation to the political community, especially in the trial of the generals of Arginusae and the arrest of Leon, raises more questions than a cursory reading can answer both with respect to the logical structure of the argument in the Apology and (...) in comparison with other Socratic formulationsof the relation of philosophy and the city. Far from demonstrating the incompatibility of philosophy and politics, Socrates in the Apology and other dialogues limns the features of a conception of political life that incorporates philosophical principles of moderation anddialectical examination into an understanding of politics directed towards the moral and intellectual development of the citizens. (shrink)

This introduction presents an overview of key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book. The book provides an exposition of the relation between Immanuel Kant's ethical and metaphysical views, with special reference to works other than the first two Critiques and the Groundwork. It shows that the categorical nature of moral obligation, yet Kantian ethics is, in a fundamental sense, a teleological ethic, concerned above all with ends of action, human fulfilment and happiness. The book outlines the development (...) of Kant's metaphysical and ethical views in a way which may illuminate some of his betterknown doctrines by tracing their origin and setting them in the wider context of his thought. It also expresses that Kant was driven both by a desire to believe in his spiritual vision and by the equally strong awareness that he could not justify it. (shrink)

In his book Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind, Paul Churchland suggests that the singular terms for prepositional attitude predicates serve an adverbial function as elements of complex predicates. This view, called monadic adverbialism, has three problems. First the monadic predicates cannot be semantic primitives because this would compromise the learnability of the language containing them. Second, the account has no way to analyze general de dicto beliefs that does not compromise the language being learnable. Third, the account requires (...) that de re behefs be treated as instances of general de dicto beliefs, which leads back to the second problem. The conclusion is that monadic adverbialism ought to be rejected. (shrink)

In his book Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind, Paul Churchland suggests that the singular terms for prepositional attitude predicates serve an adverbial function as elements of complex predicates. This view, called monadic adverbialism, has three problems. First the monadic predicates cannot be semantic primitives because this would compromise the learnability of the language containing them. Second, the account has no way to analyze general de dicto beliefs that does not compromise the language being learnable. Third, the account requires (...) that de re behefs be treated as instances of general de dicto beliefs, which leads back to the second problem. The conclusion is that monadic adverbialism ought to be rejected. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This article provides a critical introduction to an issue fo Ratio Juris concerend with two contrasting schools of legal idealism: the so-called Sheffield School (Beyleveld, Brownsword and colleagues) and the “discourse ethics” school of Habermas and Alexy. The article focusses on four issues: (1) whether a "claim to correctness" is a necessary feature of law, (2) the connection between correctness and validity, (3) Alexy's argument for a "qualifying connection" between law and morality, and its counterpart in the Sheffield School's approach, (...) and (4) Alexy's case for the "Radbruch formula": that "extreme injustice is not law”. While rejecting both versions of the case for legal idealism, I argue that both schools offer vaulable, and broadly similar, insights into what makes a legal system morally legitimate. (shrink)

Dr. Beck’s laudable aim is to bring together in a systematic way what Kant at any time and anywhere published on practical reason and to attempt to make an ordered whole of all the relevant matters. This of course has been done more than once for Kant on pure reason, but in regard to practical reason, it has been neglected. Hence the present study, though inevitably difficult in the extreme, is useful and far more than that, it is in many (...) ways illuminating. (shrink)