Against the background of a new interest in empires past and present and an inflation of the concept in modern political language and beyond, the article first looks at the use of the concept as an analytical marker in historical and current interpretations of empires. With a focus on Western European cases, the concrete semantics of empire as a key concept in modern European history is analyzed, combining a reconstruction of some diachronic trends with synchronic differentiations.

A standard account of privacy says that it is essentially a kind of control over personal information. Many privacy scholars have argued against this claim by relying on so-called threatened loss cases. In these cases, personal information about an agent is easily available to another person, but not accessed. Critics contend that control accounts have the implausible implication that the privacy of the relevant agent is diminished in threatened loss cases. Recently, threatened loss cases have become important because Edward Snowden’s (...) revelation of how the NSA and GCHQ collected Internet and mobile phone data presents us with a gigantic, real-life threatened loss case. In this paper, I will defend the control account of privacy against the argument that is based on threatened loss cases. I will do so by developing a new version of the control account that implies that the agents’ privacy is not diminished in threatened loss cases. (shrink)

In the last two decades, blame has become a core topic in ethics, philosophical moral psychology and, more recently, epistemology. This chapter aims at clarifying the complex state of the debate and at making a suggestion for how we should proceed from here. The core idea is that accounts of blame are often motivated by very different background goals. One standard goal is to provide a unifying account of our everyday blame practices. The chapter argues that there is reason to (...) think that this goal is not achievable. Another goal is to provide the tools for solving or clarifying important social or philosophical problems. The chapter suggests that this is what theories of blame should focus on. (shrink)

This paper discusses the idea that the concept of privacy should be understood in terms of control. Three different attempts to spell out this idea will be critically discussed. The conclusion will be that the Source Control View on privacy is the most promising version of the idea that privacy is to be understood in terms of control.

How do the fact that an agent is morally responsible for a certain morally objectionable action and the fact that she is an appropriate target of blame for it relate to each other? Many authors inspired by Peter Strawson say that they necessarily co‐occur. Standard answers to the question of why they co‐occur say that the occurrence of one of the facts explains that the other obtains. This article presents a third option: that they are one and the same fact. (...) There is no difference between the fact that a person is an appropriate target of blame for an objectionable action and the fact that she is morally responsible for it. This view has the advantage of being metaphysically more parsimonious and of answering, in an elegant and plausible way, an interesting question about which many standard theories of responsibility keep silent: what is it to be morally responsible simpliciter? (shrink)

This book is a breakthrough in illuminating humanism. For the first time it is presented in an intercultural perspective. It introduces Chinese, Indian, African, Islamic, and Western traditions into the intercultural discussion about basic issues of understanding the human world. By this means it recognizes different disciplinary perspectives: history, philosophy as well as religious, literary and gender studies. Special emphasis is put on the controversial relationship between humanism and religion. This complex network of argumentations is an answer to the challenge (...) of cultural orientation at the age of globalization. Humanism is brought to life as a synthesis of transcultural values and a mutual and critical recognition of cultural differences. (shrink)

For a long time the dominant view on the nature of blame was that to blame someone is to have an emotion toward her, such as anger, resentment or indignation in the case of blaming someone else and guilt in the case of self-blame. Even though this view is still widely held, it has recently come under heavy attack. The aim of this paper is to elaborate the idea that to blame is to have an emotion and to defend the (...) resulting emotion account of blame. (shrink)

Even though the idea that privacy is some kind of control is often presented as the standard view on privacy, there are powerful objections against it. The aim of this paper is to defend the control account of privacy against some particularly pressing challenges by proposing a new way to understand the relevant kind of control. The main thesis is that privacy should be analyzed in terms of source control, a notion that is adopted from discussions about moral responsibility.

In der vorliegenden Arbeit soll das komplexe Zusammenwirken von unbewusst Psychischem, biologischem Körper in der Pubertät und gesellschaftlichen Verschiebungen hin zu multiplen Genderidentitäten untersucht und differenziert werden. Ausgangspunkt ist eine Gruppe von Jugendlichen, die sich in der Spezialsprechstunde für Geschlechtsdysphorie des Universitätsklinikums Hamburg-Eppendorf vorstellen und als »Transgender« identifizieren; meist ist der Anlass der Vorstellung der Wunsch nach einer medizinischen Transition (Hormonbehandlung etc.). Der Autor versteht die frühe Adoleszenz als einen sozio-psychischen Umschlagsplatz, der per se einer psychischen und körperlichen, zumal hochgradig (...) konflikthaften Transition nahekommt. Plädiert wird für eine offene und oszillierende Haltung gegenüber den Jugendlichen – und dafür, sich Zeit zu nehmen, auch im Hinblick auf medizinische Schritte, die Teil unserer kulturellen und gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit geworden sind. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialtheorie und Philosophie Jahrgang: 3 Heft: 1 Seiten: 26-50.

ZusammenfassungEinhergehend mit den Fortschritten in der Reanimationsmedizin beschäftigen sich seit den 80er Jahren viele Studien mit der prognostischen Güte von reanimations- und patientenbezogenen Akutmarkern. Generell sollen Prognosemarker die Vorhersagbarkeit des Heilungspotenzials erlauben, sie besitzen dadurch eine Steuerfunktion für das weitere Therapiekonzept. Die Wertigkeit dieser Prädiktoren verändert sich jedoch, wenn sie als Determinanten bei Non-Treatment-Entscheidungen herangezogen werden. Dies aus zwei Gründen: 1. Nach Sichtung der Literatur und eingedenk eigener Studienresultate fehlt bislang ein 100%- sicherer Prognose-Algorithmus für Patienten im posthypoxischen Koma. 2. (...) Der komatöse Patient kann an der Beurteilung der Prognoseaussagen selbst nicht teilnehmen. Es stellt sich somit die Frage: Dürfen Prognosemarker unser moralisches Handeln an der Grenze des Lebens leiten? Die Autoren bejahen diese Frage und sehen eine adäquat moralische Handlungsoption in der Durchführung einer diskurs-pragmatischen Patientenkonferenz. Den Prognosemarkern kommt hier eine Stellvertreterfunktion im Sinne eines „stillen Patientenargumentes“ zu, wodurch die potenzielle Dialogfähigkeit des Patienten als moralisches Anspruchsobjekt gewahrt wird. Im Rahmen einer diskursiven Erörterung wird dann der Einfluss der Prognosedaten an der Entscheidung gewichtet. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungEinhergehend mit den Fortschritten in der Reanimationsmedizin beschäftigen sich seit den 80er Jahren viele Studien mit der prognostischen Güte von reanimations- und patientenbezogenen Akutmarkern. Generell sollen Prognosemarker die Vorhersagbarkeit des Heilungspotenzials erlauben, sie besitzen dadurch eine Steuerfunktion für das weitere Therapiekonzept. Die Wertigkeit dieser Prädiktoren verändert sich jedoch, wenn sie als Determinanten bei Non-Treatment-Entscheidungen herangezogen werden. Dies aus zwei Gründen: 1. Nach Sichtung der Literatur und eingedenk eigener Studienresultate fehlt bislang ein 100%- sicherer Prognose-Algorithmus für Patienten im posthypoxischen Koma. 2. (...) Der komatöse Patient kann an der Beurteilung der Prognoseaussagen selbst nicht teilnehmen. Es stellt sich somit die Frage: Dürfen Prognosemarker unser moralisches Handeln an der Grenze des Lebens leiten? Die Autoren bejahen diese Frage und sehen eine adäquat moralische Handlungsoption in der Durchführung einer diskurs-pragmatischen Patientenkonferenz. Den Prognosemarkern kommt hier eine Stellvertreterfunktion im Sinne eines „stillen Patientenargumentes“ zu, wodurch die potenzielle Dialogfähigkeit des Patienten als moralisches Anspruchsobjekt gewahrt wird. Im Rahmen einer diskursiven Erörterung wird dann der Einfluss der Prognosedaten an der Entscheidung gewichtet. (shrink)

Kaum ein anderes Thema bündelt aktuell so nachhaltig die Debatte über die Konsequenzen des unlängst ausgerufenen Anthropozäns, wie das des anthropogenen Klimawandels. Nicht nur wird die Umwelt des Menschen unabsehbaren Veränderungen ausgesetzt sein, sondern diese Veränderungen der natürlichen Umwelt sind insbesondere auch humanen Ursprungs. Anthropologie, Ökologie und Ethik werden verschaltet; die zu gewärtigenden Konsequenzen können unabsehbar sein. Damit wird der Klimawandel auch grundlegende anthropologische Folgen haben und sich etwa der epistemische Zuschnitt des Anthropos grundlegend neu definieren. Gerade aber weil Natur (...) hier konsequent humanisiert ist, kann sie auch für die Verfasstheit der Gattung bedrohlich werden und sich gegen das Humanum wenden. (shrink)

The theory of event coding by Hommel et al. proposes that feature binding is a central component of action planning. To evaluate the binding hypothesis, we consider findings from studies of action-perception interference and bimanual movements. We argue that although binding of action features may be a valuable concept, interference from partial feature overlap does not provide a parsimonious account for the observed phenomena.

As academic subject African philosophy is predominantly concerned with epistemology. It aims at re-presenting a lost body of authentic African thought. This apparently austere a-historical concern is framed by a grand narrative of liberation that cannot but politicise the quest for epistemological autonomy. By “politicise” I mean that the desire to re-cover an authentic African epistemology in order to establish African philosophy as autonomous subject, ironically re-iterates Western, enlightenment notions of the autonomous subject. Here, in the pursuit of an autonomous (...) subject the terms of historical oppression are necessarily duplicated in the terms of liberation. In this study I use the term _disfigurement_ to refer to the double-bind - peculiar to post-coloniality - in which the African subject finds itself when it has to establish and affirm a sense of _apartheid_ (in order to confirm the assumption of difference) by inventing its own autonomy in a way that ironically conflicts with an African conception of the autonomous subject. The transcendental concern with epistemological authenticity and autonomy - indicative of an oppressive desire for Western style autonomy - necessary as it may be in a post-colonial context, is placed in an ethical framework that seeks to remain faithful to the African dictum of identity and autonomy “I am _because we are_”. Whereas the first three chapters are concerned with the transcendental question ‘what is African philosophy?’, the fourth and last chapter situates the ethical framework within which this question arises in the context of the recently “completed” South African _Truth and Reconciliation Commission._. (shrink)

Global energy studies have produced a flurry of empirical analyses. However, the amount of theoretical reflection on the topic remains comparatively low. This article takes two specific limitations of the literature as its starting point: First, the often-unclear relationship between states and markets in global energy governance, and, second, the concept of energy as a material and external structure. With the aim of providing more nuanced perspectives on these issues, the article turns to the work of Niklas Luhmann and Bruno (...) Latour. Luhmann’s ideas of functional differentiation and structural coupling provide a new look at the interaction of states and markets. Latour’s symmetric anthropology allows us to rethink energy as a hybrid that is in the midst of instead of outside society. While these thinkers provide interesting ways forward for global energy studies, they also appear to be utterly incompatible. Instead of accepting this incompatibility, however, the article uses the tension between Luhmann and Latour’s work as a productive resource for further reflection on global energy governance. It develops a ‘Luhtourian’ approach, arguing that hybrid, issue-specific governance systems can emerge whenever a resistant hybrid instigates the emergence of symbolically generalized governance objects. (shrink)

Many philosophers characterize a particularly important sense of free will and responsibility by referring to basically deserved blame. But what is basically deserved blame? The aim of this paper is to identify the appraisal entailed by basic desert claims. It presents three desiderata for an account of desert appraisals and it argues that important recent theories fail to meet them. Then, the paper presents and defends a promising alternative. The basic idea is that claims about basically deserved blame entail that (...) the targets have forfeited their claims that others not blame them and that there is positive reason to blame them. The paper shows how this view frames the discussion about skepticism about free will and responsibility. (shrink)

Twenty years after the end of apartheid rule, the claim that democratic South Africa is founded on the 'spirit of law' (nomos) of our shared humanity is questionable, to say the least. Some would argue that all talk of Ubuntu (or African humanism) should be dismissed as a passing fad of an exhausted nationalism. But a different response to the present is possible, one that proceeds from a temporary suspension (epoché) of the nationalist matrix and all the dead-end questions that (...) have resulted from it, in order to reposition Ubuntu in the more cosmopolitan terms of a critical humanism that must always remain irreducible to the politics of the day. This is a project that has to return to, in order to retrace, the founding claim that a politics premised on our shared humanity is, after all, perhaps possible." -- Back cover. (shrink)

Blame skeptics argue that we have strong reason to revise our blame practices because humans do not fulfill all the conditions for it being appropriate to blame them. This paper presents a new challenge for this view. Many have objected that blame plays valuable roles such that we have strong reason to hold on to our blame practices. Skeptics typically reply that non-blaming responses to objectionable conduct, like forms of disappointment, can serve the positive functions of blame. The new challenge (...) is that skeptics need to show that it can be appropriate (or less inappropriate) to respond with this kind of disappointment to people’s conduct if it is inappropriate to respond with blame. The paper argues that current blame-skeptical views fail to meet this challenge. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Recently, many authors have argued that claims about determinism and free will are situated on different levels of description and that determinism on one level does not rule out free will on another. This paper focuses on Christian List’s version of this basic idea. It will be argued for the negative thesis that List’s account does not rule out the most plausible version of incompatibilism about free will and determinism and, more constructively, that a level-based approach to free will (...) has better chances to meet skeptical challenges if it is guided by reasoning at the moral level – a level that has not been seriously considered so far by proponents of this approach. (shrink)

Skepticism about blameworthiness says that there is good reason to doubt that, in our world, humans are ever blameworthy for their deeds. A significant problem for the discussion of this view is that it is unclear how to understand the kind of blame that should be at issue. This paper makes a new proposal. The basic idea is that the kind of blame skeptics should be skeptical about is constituted by responses that can violate the targets’ claims and by the (...) responders’ thought that the targets have forfeited this claim because of their morally objectionable actions and because of how they were when they performed them. This view identifies an important part of our everyday lives and frames discussions about skepticism about blameworthiness in a new way. (shrink)

Im Gegensatz zu dem Weltreisenden und Revolutionär Georg Forster (1754-1794) ist der Autor Forster, der Theoretiker der Wahrnehmung und der Beschreibung weniger bekannt. Der Band vereinigt Studien zu unterschiedlichen Werkgruppen Forsters, die befragt werden nach der Aneignung des 'Wirklichen' durch 'Erfahrung', 'Verstand', 'Idee', 'Bild' und 'Totaleindruck' im Spannungsfeld von Perzeption und Möglichkeitskonstruktion. Konkrete Textanalyse, Bestimmung der Wirkungsabsicht des Autors bzw. der Arbeitsverfahren des 'gesellschaftlichen Schriftstellers' eröffnen ein neues Forster-Bild.

The Top-Down Argument for the ability to do otherwise aims at stablishing that humans can do otherwise in the sense that is relevant for debates about free will. It consists of two premises: first, we always need to answer the question of whether some phenomenon (such as the ability to do otherwise) exists by consulting our best scientific theories of the domain at issue. Second, our best scientific theories of human action presuppose that humans can do otherwise. This paper argues (...) that this is not enough to establish the conclusion. The Top-Down Argument supports that humans can do otherwise in some sense. But it does not show that humans can do otherwise in the sense that is relevant for debates about free will. The paper then shows that the apparently best way to make the argument valid does not work. (shrink)

In this response we address additions to as well as criticisms and possible misinterpretations of our proposal for a second-person neuroscience. We map out the most crucial aspects of our approach by (1) acknowledging that second-person engaged interaction is not the only way to understand others, although we claim that it is ontogenetically prior; (2) claiming that spectatorial paradigms need to be complemented in order to enable a full understanding of social interactions; and (3) restating that our theoretical proposal not (...) only questions the mechanism by which a cognitive process comes into being, but asks whether it is at all meaningful to speak of a mechanism and a cognitive process when it is confined to intra-agent space. We address theoretical criticisms of our approach by pointing out that while a second-person social understanding may not be the only mechanism, alternative approaches cannot hold their ground without resorting to second-person concepts, if not in the expression, certainly in the development of social understanding. In this context, we also address issues of agency and intentionality, theoretical alternatives, and clinical implications of our approach. (shrink)

Die Editionswissenschaft, aber auch die editorisch arbeitenden Fachdisziplinen haben sich bisher nicht besonders intensiv um das spezifische Verhältnis von Kanon und Edition bemüht. Der vorliegende Band legt in einem interdisziplinären Zugriff exemplarische Studien aus der Literaturwissenschaft, der Musikwissenschaft und der Philosophie vor, die theoretische Fragestellungen der Kanonforschung mit Fällen der fachgeschichtlichen Editionspraxis verbinden, um so Konturen einer fachübergreifenden Beziehungsbeschreibung von Kanonbildung und Editionspraxis sichtbar zu machen. Dazu schlägt der Band vier Wege ein. In einer ersten, wissenschaftsgeschichtlich orientierten Rubrik werden „Aspekte (...) der Fachgeschichtsschreibung" aus philosophischer und neu- wie altgermanistischer Perspektive in den Blick genommen. Die zweite Rubrik „Ausgabentypologische Aspekte" befragt die Editionsformen in ihrem Bezug zu Kanonbildungsprozessen. Wie sich Autor-, Editor- und Leser-/Benutzer-Perspektiven auf Kanonisierungsphänomene niederschlagen, erörtert die dritte Rubrik „Produktions- und rezeptionsästhetische Aspekte". Schließlich wirft die vierte Rubrik „Wissenschaftspolitische Aspekte" ein Augenmerk auf die Auswirkungen von institutionellen, lebensweltlichen und biografischen Rahmenbedingungen auf Kanonisierungsfragen im Kontext von Editionen. (shrink)

When confronted with the question of why it is appropriate to morally blame a person for some bad action, it may seem plausible to reply that she is morally responsible for it. Some authors, inspired by Peter Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment," argue, however, that thinking this way is backwards. They believe that a person is morally responsible for some bad action because it would be appropriate to blame her for it. The aims of this paper are to present this account, (...) to highlight some of its important but often overlooked features, and to defend it against pressing objections. (shrink)

The paper contributes to the current discussion on the role of participatory methods in the context of technology assessment (TA) and science and technology (S&T) governance. It is argued that TA has to be understood as a form of democratic policy consulting in the sense of the Habermasian model of a “pragmatist” relation of science and politics. This notion implies that public participation is an indispensable element of TA in the context of policy advice. Against this background, participatory TA (pTA) (...) is defended against recent criticism of procedures of lay participation which states that pTA is lacking impact on S&T decision making, that pTA instead of opening S&T policies to new perspectives is used as a means to support mainstream S&T policy and that in pTA procedure the authentic lay perspective is systematically contorted by dominant expert knowledge. (shrink)