Corporate image is a function of organizational signals which determine the perceptions of various stakeholders regarding the actions of an organization. Because of its relationship to the actions of an organization, image has been studied as an indicator of the social performance of the organization. Recent research has determined that social performance has direct effects on the behaviors and attitudes of the organization's employees. To better understand these effects, this study develops and empirically tests a model which links corporate leaders' (...) actions, employees' perceptions of corporate image, and the employees' level of association with the organization. The effects of managing the social environment of an organization on its employees' perceptions of image, attitudes, and intended behaviors are discussed. (shrink)

All of us in the computing community understand the importance of recognizing and promoting ethical behavior in our profession. Instruction in ethics is rapidly becoming a part of most computing-related curricula, whether as a stand-alone course or infused into existing courses. Both Computing Curricula 2005 and the current discussions on Computing Curricula 2013 recognize the significance of ethics, generally considering it a core topic across the various computing disciplines. Additionally, in their criteria for the accreditation of computing programs, ABET specifies (...) that a student must attain by the time of graduation an understanding of ethical issues and responsibilities. What has been missing is a formal rite-of-passage ceremony to prompt student recognition and self-reflection on the transition from being a student to a computing professional. In 2009, seventeen faculty members and industry representatives from a wide range of institutions began to address this open problem by forming The Pledge of the Computing Professional [1], [2]. The Pledge exists to promote and recognize the ethical and moral behavior and responsibilities in graduates of computing-related degree programs as they transition to careers of service to society. The Pledge does not seek to define or enforce ethics --- this is the role of other organizations. Specifically, The Pledge is modeled after the Order of the Engineer [3] and provides a rite-of-passage ceremony at the time of graduation. (shrink)

In 2006, Bill Crain was a psychology professor and his wife, Ellen, a pediatrician. They purchased a run-down farm in upstate New York, and two years later opened Safe Haven Farm Sanctuary. It is now home to over 170 animals rescued from slaughter. In Animal Stories, Bill writes about how he and Ellen decided to start the sanctuary and tells the stories of 25 animals and their many surprising behaviors. Read about Katie, a hen who cared for a (...) little partridge; Cesar, a little goat who constantly gets into trouble; Reggie, a rooster who instilled fear in all the staff; Milo, a goat who suddenly charged the dominant Duncan to defend his mother; four rambunctious young turkeys who quietly listened to a reverent Girl Scout ceremony; Ducky, a turkey who, despite severe arthritis, walked from her barn to greet a Buddhist monk; Ethel, an elderly cow who assumes the responsibility of a matriarch; and many others. In addition to enjoying the stories, readers will learn a great deal about nonhuman animals. (shrink)

Bill Brewer presents an original view of the role of conscious experience in the acquisition of empirical knowledge. He argues that perceptual experiences must provide reasons for empirical beliefs if there are to be any determinate beliefs at all about particular objects in the world. This fresh approach to epistemology turns away from the search for necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge and works instead from a theory of understanding in a particular area.

What are the limits of the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in the relational aspects of medical and nursing care? There has been a lot of recent work and applications showing the promise and efficiency of AI in clinical medicine, both at the research and treatment levels. Many of the obstacles discussed in the literature are technical in character, regarding how to improve and optimize current practices in clinical medicine and also how to develop better data bases for optimal parameter (...) adjustments and predictive algorithms. This paper argues that there are also in principle obstacles to the application of AI in clinical medicine and care where empathy is important, and that these problems cannot be solved with any of the technical and theoretical approaches that shape the current application of AI in specific areas of clinical medicine in which care for patients is fundamental. This is important, because it generates specific risks that may be overlooked otherwise, and it justifies the necessity of human monitoring and emotional intervention in clinical medicine. Consequently, difficult issues concerning moral and legal responsibility may ensue if these in principle problems are ignored. (shrink)

The Covid‐19 crisis has accelerated a trend toward burnout in health care workers, making starkly clear that burnout is especially likely when providing health care is not only stressful and sad but emotionally alienating; in such situations, there is no mental space for clinicians to experience authentic clinical empathy. Engaged curiosity toward each patient is a source of meaning and connection for health care providers, and it protects against sympathetic distress and burnout. In a prolonged crisis like Covid‐19, clinicians provide (...) care out of a sense of duty, especially the duty of nonabandonment. We argue that when duty alone is relied on too heavily, with fear and frustration continually suppressed, the risk of burnout is dramatically increased. Even before Covid‐19, clinicians often worked under dehumanizing and unjust conditions, and rates of burnout were 50 percent for physicians and 33 percent for nurses. The Covid‐19 intensification of burnout can serve as a wake‐up call that the structure of health care needs to be improved if we are to prevent the loss of a whole generation of empathic clinicians. (shrink)

Philosophical theories of gender are typically understood as theories of what it is to be a woman, a man, a nonbinary person, and so on. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake. There’s good reason to suppose that our best philosophical theory of gender might not directly match up to or give the extensions of ordinary gender categories like ‘woman’.

Physical objects are such things as stones, tables, trees, people and other animals: the persisting macroscopic constituents of the world we live in. therefore expresses a commonsense commitment to physical realism: the persisting macroscopic constituents of the world we live in exist, and are as they are, quite independently of anyone.

A full account of the philosophy of the Greek and Roman worlds from the last days of Aristotle until 100 BC. Hellenistic philosophy, for long relatively neglected and unappreciated, has over the last decade been the object of a considerable amount of scholarly attention. Now available in paperback, this 1999 volume is a general reference work which pulls the subject together and presents an overview. The History is organised by subject, rather than chronologically or by philosophical school, with sections on (...) logic, epistemology, physics and metaphysics, ethics and politics. It has been written by specialists but is intended to be a source of reference for any student of ancient philosophy, for students of classical antiquity and for students of the philosophy of later periods. Greek and Latin are used sparingly and always translated in the main text. (shrink)

What gender are you? And in virtue of what? These are questions of gender categorization. Such questions are increasingly at the core of many contemporary debat.

It is close to current orthodoxy that perceptual experience is to be characterized, at least in part, by its representational content, roughly, by the way it represents things as being in the world around the perceiver. Call this basic idea the content view.

Over the past ten years, we have worked in a collaboration between educators and computer scientists at the University of Illinois to imagine futures for education in the context of what is loosely called “artificial intelligence.” Unhappy with the first generation of digital learning environments, our agenda has been to design alternatives and research their implementation. Our starting point has been to ask, what is the nature of machine intelligence, and what are its limits and potentials in education? This paper (...) offers some tentative answers, first conceptually, and then practically in an overview of the results of a number of experimental implementations documented in greater detail elsewhere. Our key finding is that artificial intelligence—in the context of the practices of electronic computing developing over the past three quarters of a century—will never in any sense “take over” the role of teacher, because how it works and what it does are so profoundly different from human intelligence. However, within the limits that we describe in this paper, it offers the potential to transform education in ways that—counterintuitively perhaps—make education more human, not less. (shrink)

THE PROBLEM OP KNOWLEDGE l CONCEPTIONS OF KNOWLEDGE An immediate difficulty which faces any discussion of the present kind is that there are so many ...

… in which we pass through eleven episodes in the history of cybernetics, each episode focusing on one of its perspectives on learning. We end with a coda where we define ‘cybersocial systems’ and...

The influence of Aristotle, the prince of philosophers, on the intellectual history of the West is second to none. In this book, Jonathan Barnes examines Aristotle's scientific researches, his discoveries in logic and his metaphysical theories, his work in psychology and in ethics and politics, and his ideas about art and poetry, placing his teachings in their historical context.

In Rogues, Jacques Derrida once again examines some central concepts in political theory and ethics, in the context of the post-9/11world and the present American drive to reforge global hegemony. The book is important not only for what it says about the concepts of sovereignty, unconditionality, law, and justice, but also for engaging in an extended way with the thought of Plato, Aristotle, and especially Kant. Bill Martin argues that Derrida’s thought is vitally significant for radical politics. He compares (...) Rogues, as (arguably) Derrida’s last major work (to appear before his passing in October 2004) with Sartre’s last book, Hope Now. Lastly, Martin memorializes Derrida, whom he knew as teacher and friend, as “a kind and generous man who stood for many good things,” and hereflects on the philosophical trajectory that extends from Sartre to Derrida. (shrink)

Contemporary reasoning about health is infused with the work products of experts, and expert reasoning about health itself is an active site for invention and design. Building on Toulmin’s largely undeveloped ideas on field-dependence, we argue that expert fields can develop new inference rules that, together with the backing they require, become accepted ways of drawing and defending conclusions. The new inference rules themselves function as warrants, and we introduce the term “warranting device” to refer to an assembly of the (...) rule plus whatever material, procedural, and institutional resources are required to assure its dependability. We present a case study on the Cochrane Review, a new method for synthesizing evidence across large numbers of scientific studies. After reviewing the evolution and current structure of the device, we discuss the distinctive kinds of critical questions that may be raised around Cochrane Reviews, both within the expert field and beyond. Although Toulmin’s theory of field-dependence is often criticized for its relativism, we find that, as a matter of practical fact, field-specific warrants do not enjoy immunity from external critique. On the contrary, they can be opened to evaluation and critique from any interested perspective. (shrink)

In his comments, Richard Fumerton carefully develops two fundamental concerns with my views, which he interprets sympathetically, and almost entirely correctly. Before turning to these concerns, though, I must make one point about his concise opening statement of my principal claims. As I hope is clear from my précis, perceptual experiences provide reasons for empirical beliefs not simply in virtue of sharing demonstrative content with them. The key idea is that a person cannot properly grasp the objective content of these (...) experiences—that is, he cannot actually have experiences of particular things in the mind-independent world around him—without understanding that his apprehension that things are thus and so out there is in part due to the fact that they are. He therefore recognizes the relevant content as his epistemic openness to the way things objectively are. This is clearly central to my overall position. (shrink)

Realism concerning a given domain of things is the view that the things in that domain exist, and are as they are, quite independently of anyone.

the recent announcement of the claimed births of CRISPR-edited babies has prompted both widespread condemnation and calls by leading scientists for a moratorium on any further germline genome editing for reproductive purposes. Concurrently, national and international bodies are calling for the development of robust guidelines and requirements that will identify permissible conditions under which such GGE efforts may proceed. As detailed recommendations to navigate this unique terrain are under development, we suggest an approach that begins with identifying serious concerns about (...) social exclusion and social justice that arise... (shrink)

We believe that the ordinary physical objects that we perceive continue to exist unperceived; and this is intuitively an aspect of any authentic characterization of how the world appears to us in perception. But how can experience present its objects as continuing to exist beyond that very experience of them? Here I aim to explain this phenomenon. I start with an insight from Evans (1985). Familiar attempts to implement this insight fail, in my opinion. Here I introduce, motivate, defend, and (...) elaborate an alternative approach to its implementation that, I claim, succeeds. Its key is to recognize the role of Evans’s insight in the metaphysics of perceptual experience itself. (shrink)

In 2011, Hibbard suggested an intelligence measure for agents who compete in an adversarial sequence prediction game. We argue that Hibbard’s idea should actually be considered as two separate ideas: first, that the intelligence of such agents can be measured based on the growth rates of the runtimes of the competitors that they defeat; and second, one specific (somewhat arbitrary) method for measuring said growth rates. Whereas Hibbard’s intelligence measure is based on the latter growth-rate-measuring method, we survey other methods (...) for measuring function growth rates, and exhibit the resulting Hibbard-like intelligence measures and taxonomies. Of particular interest, we obtain intelligence taxonomies based on Big-O and Big-Theta notation systems, which taxonomies are novel in that they challenge conventional notions of what an intelligence measure should look like. We discuss how intelligence measurement of sequence predictors can indirectly serve as intelligence measurement for agents with Artificial General Intelligence (AGIs). (shrink)

We perceive things in the external world as spatially located both with respect to each other and to ourselves, such that they are in principle accessible from where we seem to be. I hear the door bang behind me; I feel the pen on the desk over to my right; and I see you walking beneath the line of pictures, from left to right in front of me. By displaying these spatial relations between its objects and us, the perceivers, perception (...) places us in the perceived world: our world and the world we perceive are one. Clearly this is not achieved by our continually perceiving ourselves along with the things around us, and thus recovering our position with respect to them. Indeed I shall argue that there are serious difficulties with the suggestion that this might be the basic mechanism for perceptual self- location. Furthermore, I shall argue that our existence as an element of the objective order cannot be inferred from the raw given in sense perception. Hence it cannot even be on the right lines as an answer to the question 'What is it for perception to represent its objects as environmental to the subject?', that it should present these objects, along with the perceiving subject himself, or along with something from which his existence in the perceived world could be deduced, in the very same frame so to speak. Nevertheless it yields him an awareness of himself as there in the wings of that scene, genuinely located with respect to the action, yet somehow not normally quite getting onto the stage. And I shall argue here, that perceptual contents succeed in being self-locating in this way in.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:preface This issue of Feminist Studies explores the ways institutions—legal, governmental, medical, educational, and household—participate in the gendering of bodies and are themselves gendered. At any given historical moment, dominant and resistant meanings of “women,” “gender,” and “sexuality” are socially and politically constituted in institutions through cultural struggles. The authors in this issue discuss how birth control, assisted reproduction, transsexual transition, hegemonic masculinity, abortion, and domestic violence are each (...) articulated and contested in imperial law and economic discourses (Sreenivas), in medical procedures (Whitehead et al. and DasGupta), in university research regulations (Barnes and Munsch), and in the official practices of presidents (Mattingly ). Our authors elucidate how such institutions are gendered, not just in terms of staffing by males, females, and nongender conforming people, but also in the ways they constitute gender relations in their everyday operations. The articles point to the continuing need for institutional histories and ethnographies that are feminist in conception and design. They also provide openings into more progressive gender and sexuality politics by underscoring the contradictions within all institutions. Mytheli Sreenivas’s “Birth Control in the Shadow of Empire: The Trials of Annie Besant, 1877–1878” visits the contradictory history of institutions of reproduction control. She traces Besant’s contraception advocacy in the 1870s, reminding us of its intimate and unsavory entanglements with the politics of empire. Annie Besant is a complicated figure. South Asianists familiar with her later campaign against British colonialism in India might well be surprised by this earlier incarnation, but Sreenivas demonstrates how and why the early Besant held contradictory positions. As an individual, Besant questioned gender norms and challenged the inequality of women in marriage and divorce. She recognized sexual desire as “natural” (albeit only properly expressed via heterosexual marriage). Yet a signature feature of her political writing 504Preface was an embrace of neo-Malthusianism. Over the course of her activist life, Besant redirected her attention from poverty and women’s health in Britain to contraception as the solution to starvation and overpopulation in India. She did so in “a broader context in which a defense of empire and class-race hierarchy enjoyed far greater legitimacy than a critique of gender and sexual norms.” The repercussions of her actions were global: “Besant’s efforts rendered contraception into a sexual technology that claimed to address the economies of impoverishment in an emerging imperial world. Birth control thus emerged as both an imperial responsibility and as a demonstration of British humanitarianism in support of starving colonized populations.” Sreenivas explicates what the Besant trials reveal about the multiple histories of reproduction control and the conditions under which birth control continues to be both a technology for large-scale population control and “a vehicle for women’s reproductive freedom and gender justice.” Institutions are saturated with power, but they are also arenas where political struggles between different social groups are staged. This is especially evident in White House politics in the United States. In the late 1970s, President Jimmy Carter appointed a large number of women to bureaucratic offices. Many were feminists. Why did they fail to deliver gender justice? This is the puzzle Doreen J. Mattingly seeks to answer in “The Limited Power of Female Appointments: Abortion and Domestic Violence Policy in the Carter Administration.” The article is set in the broader context of a moment in history when the US feminist movement was moving from the streets to state bureaucracies, when women of color had broadened the movement’s mandate, and when the need for government programs to support poor women was a clearly articulated feminist goal. There was an excitement about transforming gender relations as feminists populated multiple organizations and came together to collaborate. However, two important legislative efforts—government funding for abortions for poor women and a national anti-domestic violence bill—failed. Mattingly traces the back and forth between Carter and his Assistant Secretary for Public Liaison, Margaret “Midge” Costanza, drawing on new archival sources. Mattingly’s article underscores how women in public office can be discursively valorized as symbols of change even while politically powerful men oppose meaningful policy that would provide women greater autonomy over their reproductive or violently transgressed bodies. Mattingly’s careful reconstruction... (shrink)

An account of the role and the nature of logic in imperial stoic philosophy which challenges the prevailing orthodoxy and presents a novel interpretation of this crucial period of ancient philosophy.

This chapter contains sections titled: The Possibility of Falsity The Involvement of Generality Notes References.

Wherever a government or state is concerned with the welfare of its citizens, there will probably also exist policies which compel the individual citizen to undertake or abstain from activities which affect that citizen alone. The set of theories behind such policies is collectively known as ‘paternalism’. It is not hard to understand why this term has developed strong pejorative overtones. Policies of this type appear to offend a fundamental tenet of liberal societies: namely, that the individual is best placed (...) to know what is in his or her interests. Paternalistic policies imply, and are concerned with correcting, failures of precisely this kind of judgement. And yet, at the same time, there is a popular consensus that compelling people to wear a seat belt when driving a car is a reasonable restriction of personal liberty. Paternalism may be difficult to accept in principle, but it is equally difficult to avoid in practice. Not surprisingly, the literature reveals a long heritage of debate in a wide range of academic disciplines. This debate reveals a failure to make progress in two areas in particular. First, analyses of paternalism often confuse policies which are actually concerned with correcting failures of market exchange — in particular, those concerned with insufficient or imperfect information — with those which are genuinely paternalistic. One objective of this paper will be to clarify the difference between these two kinds of policy. (shrink)

The theory of explanatory unification was first proposed by Friedman (1974) and developed by Kitcher (1981, 1989). The primary motivation for this theory, it seems to me, is the argument that this account of explanation is the only account that correctly describes the genesis of scientific understanding. Despite the apparent plausibility of Friedman's argument to this effect, however, I argue here that the unificationist thesis of understanding is false. The theory of explanatory unification as articulated by Friedman and Kitcher thus (...) emerges as fundamentally misconceived. (shrink)

Mary Kalantzis was from 2006 to 2016 Dean of the College of Education at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. Bill Cope is a Professor in the College of Education at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. They are co-authors of multiple books including Making Sense: Reference, Agency, and Structure in a Grammar of Multimodal Meaning (Cambridge, forthcoming), New Learning: Elements of a Science of Education (Cambridge, 2008, 2012), Literacies (Cambridge 2012, 2016) and e-Learning Ecologies (2017).

I aim to show that one way of testing the mettle of a theory of scientific explanation is to inquire what that theory entails about the status of brute facts. Here I consider the nature of brute facts, and survey several contemporary accounts of explanation vis a vis this subject. One problem with these accounts is that they seem to entail that brute facts represent a gap in scientific understanding. I argue that brute facts are non-mysterious and indeed are even (...) explainable by the lights of Salmon's ontic conception of explanation. The plausibility of various models of explanation, I suggest, depends to some extent on the tendency of their proponents to focus on certain examples of explananda - I ponder brute facts qua explananda here as a way of helping us to recognize this dependency. (shrink)

This paper reports an experimental investigation of presuppositions and scalar implicatures in language acquisition. Recent proposals posit the same mechanisms for generating both types of inferences, in contrast to the traditional view. We used a Covered Box picture selection task to compare the interpretations assigned by two groups of children and by adults, in response to sentences with presuppositions and ones with either ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ scalar implicatures. The main finding was that the behavior of children and adults differed across (...) inference types. This asymmetry is consistent with the traditional perspective, but poses a challenge for the more recent uniform accounts. We discuss how the latter could be amended to account for these findings, and also relate the findings to previous results on presupposition processing. Finally, we discuss an unexpected difference found between direct and indirect scalar implicatures. (shrink)

The three dialogues in this contribution concern 21st century application of life‐like robots in the care of older adults. They depict conversations set in the near future, involving a philosopher (Dr Phonius) and a nurse (Dr Myloss) who manages care at a large facility for assisted living. In their first dialogue, the speakers discover that their quite different attitudes towards human‐robot interaction parallel fundamental differences separating their respective concepts of consciousness. The second dialogue similarly uncovers deeply contrasting notions of personhood (...) that appear to be associated with respective communities of nursing and robotics. The additional key awareness that arises in their final dialogue links applications of life‐like robots in the care of older adults with potential transformations in our understandings of ourselves – indeed, in our understandings of the nature of our own humanity. This series of dialogues, therefore, appears to address a topic in nursing philosophy that merits our careful attention. (shrink)

This thesis is a systematic investigation of whether there might be conceptual room for the idea that the world itself might be vague, independently of how we describe it. This idea – the existence of so-called ontic vagueness – has generally been extremely unpopular in the literature; my thesis thus seeks to evaluate whether this ‘negative press’ is justified. I start by giving a working definition and semantics for ontic vagueness, and then attempt to show that there are no conclusive (...) arguments that rule out vagueness of this kind. I subsequently establish what type of arguments I think would be most effective in establishing ontic vagueness and provide some arguments of this form. I then highlight a potential worry for this type of argument, but argue that it can be circumvented. Finally, I consider the main ways that the opponent of ontic vagueness would be likely resist the arguments I have offered, and argue that these strategies of response are methodologically problematic. I conclude by claiming that ontic vagueness is a perfectly plausible ontological commitment. (shrink)