Janet Lee Mitchell. Conscious Evolution. Ballantine Books, 1990, 210 pages.

ABSTRACT:Regulatory focus theory is proposed as offering an explanation for the influence of ethical leadership on organizational citizenship behaviors and employee commitments. The prevention focus mindset of an employee is argued to be the mechanism by which an ethical leader influences extra-role compliance behavior as well as normative commitment, whereas the promotion focus mindset of an employee is argued to be the mechanism by which an ethical leader influences extra-role voice behavior as well as affective commitment. Moreover, leader-member exchange is (...) proposed as a moderator of the relationship of ethical leadership to regulatory focus mindsets and employee behavior and commitments. Using the data collected in two waves from 250 working adults, we tested the proposed relationships with moderated mediation bootstrap procedures. The findings generally support the hypothesized relationships and point toward important implications for ethical leadership in work settings. (shrink)

"This stunning work is without question a major contribution to Cartesian studies, to the field of early modern philosophy, and to general epistemology- ...

ABSTRACT Previous research has consistently highlighted the importance of stakeholder engagement in identifying and developing solutions to ethical challenges in genomic research, especially in Africa where such research is relatively new. In this paper, we examine what constitutes good ethical practice in research, from the perspectives of genomic research participants in Uganda. Our study was part of a multi-site qualitative study exploring these issues in Uganda, Ghana and Zambia. We purposively sampled various stakeholders including genomic research participants, researchers, research ethics (...) committee members, policy makers and community members. This paper presents the findings from in-depth interviews with 27 people with diabetes who had participated in a diabetes genomic study. Data were collected using semi-structured interviews. Manual thematic content analysis was conducted using a framework approach. Findings indicate three key requirements that research participants see as vital for genomic research to be more responsive to research participants’ needs and contextual realities: (1) de-emphasising the role of experts and institutions in the consenting process, (2) clarity about the timing and nature of feedback both of findings relevant to the health of individuals and about the broad progress of the study, and (3) more effective support for research participants during and after the study. (shrink)

Ethical reasoning is an integral part of the work of a clinical ethics consultant. Ethical reasoning has a close relationship with an individual’s beliefs and values, which, for religious adherents, are likely to be tightly connected with their spiritual perspectives. As a result, for individuals who identify with a religious tradition, the process of thinking through ethical questions is likely to be influenced by their religious worldview. The connection between ethical reasoning and one’s spiritual perspective raises questions about the role (...) that CECs’ personal religious worldviews should play in their professional lives and their consultative work. This paper offers numerous arguments critiquing the inclusion of a consultant’s own spiritual perspective in her work and has identified only limited circumstances under which such inclusion might be permissible. In particular, these arguments lead to the conclusion that a CEC’s personal beliefs should never influence her ethical analysis or development of a recommendation. Further, religious appeals should not be used in communication during decision-making conversations other than to describe the patient or surrogate’s stated perspective. There may be limited cases in which a CEC may share her spiritual worldview with a patient with the intent of building a collaborative relationship, but such situations should be approached with extreme caution. (shrink)

Background:The ability to save the life of an extremely premature baby has increased substantially over the last decade. This survival, however, can be associated with unfavourable outcomes for both baby and family. Questions are now being asked about quality of life for survivors of extreme prematurity. Quality of life is rightly deemed to be an important consideration in high technology neonatal care; yet, it is notoriously difficult to determine or predict. How does one define and operationalise what is considered to (...) be in the best interest of a surviving extremely premature baby, especially when the full extent of the outcomes might not be known for several years?Research question:The research investigates the caregiving dilemmas often faced by neonatal nurses when caring for extremely premature babies. This article explores the issues arising for neonatal nurses when they considered the philosophical and ethical questions about quality of life in babies ≤24 weeks gestation.Participants:Data were collected via a questionnaire to Australian neonatal nurses and semi-structured interviews with 24 neonatal nurses in New South Wales, Australia.Ethical considerations:Ethical processes and procedures have been adhered to by the researchers.Findings:A qualitative approach was used to analyse the data. The theme ‘difficult choices’ was generated which comprised three sub-themes: ‘damaged through survival’, ‘the importance of the brain’ and ‘families are important’. The results show that neonatal nurses believed that quality of life was an important consideration; yet they experienced significant inner conflict and uncertainty when asked to define or suggest specific elements of quality of life, or to suggest how it might be determined. It was even more difficult for the nurses to say when an extremely premature baby’s life possessed quality. Their previous clinical and personal experiences led the nurses to believe that the quality of the family’s life was important, and possibly more so than the quality of life of the surviving baby. This finding contrasts markedly with much of the existing literature in this field.Conclusion:Quality of life for extremely premature babies was an important consideration for neonatal nurses; however, they experienced difficulty deciding how to operationalise such considerations in their everyday clinical practice. (shrink)

This collection of contributions from both linguists and lawyers brings a pragmatic perspective to the linguistic basis for legal meaning and for finding a norm by which to decide a case. That is, it turns from notions of linguistic meaning as residing in the text, as literal meaning waiting to be dug out, to focus instead on how readers infer pragmatic meaning, and on the kinds of inferencing that characterise legal discourse.

This article explores the possibility that there is a parental duty to use preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) for the medical benefit of future children. Using one genetic disorder as a paradigmatic example, we find that such a duty can be supported in some situations on both ethical and legal grounds. Our analysis shows that an ethical case in favor of this position can be made when potential parents are aware that a possible future child is at substantial risk of inheriting (...) a serious genetic condition. We further argue that a legal case for a duty to use PGD for medical benefit can be made in situations in which potential parents have chosen to conceive through in vitro fertilization and know that any children conceived are at substantial risk of having a serious genetic condition. (shrink)

An evolutionary case for the existence of free will. Scientists are learning more and more about how brain activity controls behavior and how neural circuits weigh alternatives and initiate actions. As we probe ever deeper into the mechanics of decision making, many conclude that agency-or free will-is an illusion. In Free Agents, leading neuroscientist Kevin Mitchell presents a wealth of evidence to the contrary, arguing that we are not mere machines responding to physical forces but agents acting with purpose. (...) Traversing billions of years of evolution, Mitchell tells the remarkable story of how living beings capable of choice emerged from lifeless matter. He explains how the emergence of nervous systems provided a means to learn about the world, granting sentient animals the capacity to model, predict, and simulate. Mitchell reveals how these faculties reached their peak in humans with our abilities to imagine and to introspect, to reason in the moment, and to shape our possible futures through the exercise of our individual agency. Mitchell's argument has important implications-for how we understand decision making, for how our individual agency can be enhanced or infringed, for how we think about collective agency in the face of global crises, and for how we consider the limitations and future of artificial intelligence.An astonishing journey of discovery, Free Agents offers a new framework for understanding how, across a billion years of Earth history, life evolved the power to choose and why this matters. (shrink)

Health information by its nature is personal and sensitive. At the same time, significant public value has resulted from research with health records about determinants of health and effective provision of health services. In Canada, certain legislation and processes have been established to balance the individual's right to privacy and the public good associated with analysis of health information.My purpose is to describe privacy and confidentiality practices in Canada with respect to access to health data for research purposes. I provide (...) an overview of the Canadian health care system and the legislative framework used to regulate research related to health information and Canada's major national data bases. Then I describe the confidentiality and privacy policies and procedures of Statistics Canada, of the Canadian Institute for Health Information, and of health policy research organizations in three provinces. I conclude with comments on some current issues in health information in Canada. (shrink)

Our reluctance to demystify grief is a sign of the distinctive obligation and discomfort that people feel towards those who have died. These feelings, however, are instructive about the nature of grief. As a vehicle of a living person’s relation to the dead, grief is mysterious—and we are rightly reluctant to take that mystery away. But grief is not to be avoided by philosophy on that account. I defend a less Romantic view of grief, in which a grieving person’s experience (...) of “normal” grief: 1) is felt to require an objectively recognized loss; 2) is felt to be dedicated to that lost object; 3) seems to most people to be something that she ought to feel; and 4) probably ought not to be medicalized, nor consequently medicated. This view of grief affords an understanding and appreciation of this rather special and important emotion without reducing its mystery. (shrink)

Using an interpretative research approach to ethical and legal literature, it is argued that nursing in the battlefield is distinctly different to civilian nursing, even in an emergency, and that the environment is so different that a duty of care owed by military nurses to wounded soldiers should not apply. Such distinct differences in wartime can override normal peacetime professional ethics to the extent that the duty of care owed by military nurses to their patients on the battlefield should not (...) exist. It is also argued that as military nurses have legal and professional obligations to care for wounded soldiers on the battlefield, this obligation conflicts with following military orders, causing a dual loyalty conflict. This is because soldiers are part of the ‘fighting force’ and must be fit to fight and win the battle. This makes them more of a commodity rather than individual persons with distinct health care needs. (shrink)

Working in ZF + DC with no additional use of the axiom of choice, we show how to iterate the extended ultrapower construction of Spector . This generalizes the technique of iterated ultrapowers to choiceless set theory. As an application, we prove the following theorem: Assume V = LU[κ] + “κ is λ-supercompact with normal ultrafilter U” + DC. Then for every sufficiently large regular cardinal ρ, there exists a set-generic extension V[G] of the universe in which there exists for (...) some σ a set S ρ for which one can define an elementary embedding j mapping V to LD[S], where D is the filter in V[G] generated by the closed unbounded filter on ρ. Moreover, we have j = ρ, j = σ, j) = S according to LD[S]), and j = D ∩ LD[S] i s a normal ultrafilter in LD[S] on ρ. (shrink)

In his thought-provoking piece, ‘Expressivism at the Beginning and End of Life’, Philip Reed contrasts the application of the expressivist objection to the use of reproductive technologies with its application to interventions that bring about death. In the process of supporting his comparative conclusion, that ‘expressivism at the end of life is a much greater concern than at the beginning’, he makes some interesting observations and offers some convincing arguments. Further examination, however, shows that his arguments actually support conclusions far (...) beyond the modest one he intends to draw. The absurdity of these conclusions can be used to identify the flaws in Reed’s argument. Reed summarises the expressivist objection in the context of physician-assisted suicide as follows: > When we allow PAS for individuals who are terminally ill or facing some severe disease or disability, we send a message of disrespect to all individuals who face such adversities in that we imply that they are inferior or their lives are not worth living. Analogous arguments have been made about decisions to use reproductive technology to prevent the birth of people with disabilities. Reed describes a common rebuttal to the …. (shrink)

Traditionally, attempts at resolving the problem of accounting for the possibility of human freedom against the background of determinism have assumed that the options available are to: endorse determinism and deny human freedom, deny determinism in order to make room for human freedom, or find a compatibilist reconciliation. Commonly, the problem is addressed from an 'externalist' perspective. In the dissertation, the issue is refocused upon the positions of 'internalists' such as Frankfurt, Watson, Taylor, and Wolf. Their compatibilist approaches emphasize the (...) importance of first person, psychological characteristics of agents as the salient determinants of human freedom. But each of these internalist approaches are found to be wanting. Consequently, the dissertation considers an alternative internalist view, that of Spinoza. I examine in detail Spinoza's concept of freedom, as it emerges from his overall metaphysical system, and note that his compatibilism not only affirms determinism, but further holds that a certain kind of necessity is a prerequisite to any coherent account of freedom. I then proceed to show that, by comparison with the views of the aforementioned contemporary compatibilists, only Spinoza's concept of freedom can account for a 'developmental' view of human nature, one which depicts the self as engaged in a process of liberation from the sort of psychological determinism which feeds upon ignorance. (shrink)

It is undeniable that the military play an important role in nation states. That role is characterized by some authors as the use of violence on behalf of the state. In doing so, soldiers must be p...

In this essay I show that Structuralism, in order to combat the impression that it is “untenable and outmoded,” needs to be attached to a phenomenology of transcendental intersubjectivity. My argument for this conclusion is: 1) that Peter Caws is right in arguing that Structuralism needs a notion of the transcendental subject because its objects, qua intentional, presuppose such a subject; 2) the objects withwhich Structuralism is concemed are objects in the sense that Husserl speaks of objects ofthe spiritual world; (...) and, 3) the spiritual world, indeed the world in general, is constituted intersubjectively. Therefore, Structuralism needs a notion of transcendental intersubjectivity.Dans cet essai, je démontre que le structuralisme doit être rattaché à une phénoménologie de l’intersubjectivité transcendantale afin d’éviter l’impression qu’il donne d’être «intenable et démodé». J’appuie cette conclusion à l’aide des arguments suivants: 1) Peter Caws a raison d’arguer que le structuralisme a besoin d’une notion de sujet transcendantal parce que ses objets, en tant qu’intentionnels, présupposent un tel sujet; 2) les objets dont s’occupe le structuralisme sont des objets au sens oú Husserl parle d’objets du monde spirituel; et 3) le monde spirituel, enfait le monde en général, est constitué de façon intersubjective. Ainsi, le structuralisme requiert une notion d’intersubjectivité transcendantale. (shrink)

This article draws in particular on existential-phenomenological notions of “witnessing.” Witnessing, often conceived in the context of testimony, obviously involves epistemological concerns, such as how we come to know through the experiences and reports of others. I shall argue, however, that witnessing as a mode of intersubjectivity offers understandings that involve questions about how people come to be. More specifically, I want to consider the positive potential of “witnessing” to disrupt intersubjective completeness or closure, particularly as this relates to work (...) on organizing subjectivities, as well as, in the field of organization studies. (shrink)

The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted on December 13, 2006, and entered into force on May 3, 2008, constitutes a key landmark in the emerging field of global health law and a critical milestone in the development of international law on the rights of persons with disabilities. At the time of its adoption, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights heralded the CRPD as a rejection of the understanding of persons with disabilities “as objects (...) of charity, medical treatment and social protection” and an embrace of disabled people as “subjects of rights.”The text of the Convention itself, and the highly participatory process by which it was negotiated, signal a definitive break from previous international approaches that focused on disability within a medical model framework. In contrast to traditional approaches, the CRPD embraces a social model of disability, concentrating the disability experience not in individual deficiency, but in the socially constructed environment and the barriers that impede the participation of persons with disabilities in society. (shrink)