Existe una línea temática moderna que vincula el trabajo sobre las fuentes clásicas del 3er conde de Shaftesbury con el mosaico filosófico que más tarde desarrollará Johann Georg Hamann: se trata del “proyecto socrático”, que aparece en el primero bajo la idea de unas Chartae socraticae y será motivación para que Hamann recoja el testigo en sus Memorabilia socratica. Se rastrea las raíces shaftesburianas del Sócrates de Hamann –surgidas de su lectura y traducción de juventud: Sensus communis y Carta sobre (...) el entusiasmo– para delimitar. (shrink)

In this article, I analyse the theory and practice of interventions in foreign civil wars to assist rebels fighting against violently oppressive government. I argue that the indirect nature of this kind of intervention gives rise to political complications that are either absent from or less obvious in humanitarian interventions aimed chiefly at defending human rights from imminent threats. An adequate theory must therefore accommodate three additional components. First, it requires a theory of indirect warfare accounting for how the ends (...) of the interveners’ added violence relate to those of the rebels’ violence. Second, it requires a theory of indirect political leadership, paying careful attention both to the political status of the rebel leaders vis‐à‐vis the people on whose behalf they fight and to the relationship between those leaders and the interveners. Third, the peculiarities of indirect military intervention mean that the violence it introduces isn’t easily explained purely in terms of defensive goals. An adequate account needs additionally to pay attention to the role of violence in shaping new political movements and institutions. The value of such goals is less easily quantified than those of humanitarian intervention, making it harder to set upper limits on permissible ‘proportionate’ harm. (shrink)

Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller was the foremost first generation British pragmatist; he is also the most overlooked pragmatist. F. C. S. Schiller and the Dawn of Pragmatism: The Rhetoric of a Philosophical Rebel, by Mark J. Porrovecchio, provides the first comprehensive examination of his philosophical career, examining the rhetorical practices that gave rise to his pragmatic humanism and the ways those strategies led to his erasure from the intellectual history of pragmatism.

If people have a right to rebel against domestic tyranny, wrongful foreign occupation, or colonial rule, then the normative principles commonly invoked to deal with civil conflicts present a problem. While rebels in some cases might justifiably try to secure human rights by resort to violence, the three normative pillars dealing with armed force provide at best only a partial reflection of the ethics of armed revolt. This article argues that the concept of “terrorism” and the ongoing attempt to (...) define it in international law, the laws of war and their application to armed conflict, and the Responsibility to Protect all obscure as much as clarify the problem. Given the prevalence of political oppression and the occurrence of civil conflicts originating in attempts to confront it, there is therefore a pressing need to establish a place for the rights of rebellion in the international normative architecture. (shrink)

The words 'rebellion' and 'revolution' have gained renewed prominence in the vocabulary of world politics and so has the question of justifiable armed 'resistance'. In this book Christopher J. Finlay extends just war theory to provide a rigorous and systematic account of the right to resist oppression and of the forms of armed force it can justify. He specifies the circumstances in which rebels have the right to claim recognition as legitimate actors in revolutionary wars against domestic tyranny and injustice, (...) and wars of liberation against wrongful foreign occupation and colonialism. Arguing that violence is permissible only in a narrow range of cases, Finlay shows that the rules of engagement vary during and between different conflicts and explores the potential for irregular tactics to become justifiable, such as non-uniformed guerrillas and civilian disguise, the assassination of political leaders and regime officials, and the waging of terrorist war against civilian targets. (shrink)

The words 'rebellion' and 'revolution' have gained renewed prominence in the vocabulary of world politics and so has the question of justifiable armed 'resistance'. In this book Christopher J. Finlay extends just war theory to provide a rigorous and systematic account of the right to resist oppression and of the forms of armed force it can justify. He specifies the circumstances in which rebels have the right to claim recognition as legitimate actors in revolutionary wars against domestic tyranny and injustice, (...) and wars of liberation against wrongful foreign occupation and colonialism. Arguing that violence is permissible only in a narrow range of cases, Finlay shows that the rules of engagement vary during and between different conflicts and explores the potential for irregular tactics to become justifiable, such as non-uniformed guerrillas and civilian disguise, the assassination of political leaders and regime officials, and the waging of terrorist war against civilian targets. (shrink)

While the image of the slave as the antithesis of the freeman is central to republican freedom, it is striking to note that slaves themselves have not contributed to how this condition is understood. The result is a one-sided conception of both freedom and slavery, which leaves republicanism unable to provide an equal and robust protection for historically outcast people. I draw on the work of Frederick Douglass – long overlooked as a significant contributor to republican theory – to show (...) one way why this is so. Focusing the American Revolution, the subsequent republican government established new political institutions to maintain the collective interests of the whole population. The political revolution was held in place by processes of public reason that reflected the values and ideas of the people that had rebelled. The black population, however, had not been part of this revolution. After emancipation, black Americans were required to accept terms of citizenship that had already been defined, leaving them socially dominated, subject to the prejudices and biases within the prevailing ideas of public discourse. Douglass argued that republican freedom under law is always dependent on a more fundamental revolution, that he calls a ‘radical revolution in thought’, in which the entire system of social norms and practices are reworked together by members of all constituent social groups – women and men, black and white, rich and poor – so that it reflects a genuinely collaborative achievement. Only then can we begin the republican project of contestatory freedom as independence or non-domination that today’s republicans take for granted. (shrink)

For Savage (1954) as for de Finetti (1974), the existence of subjective (personal) probability is a consequence of the normative theory of preference. (De Finetti achieves the reduction of belief to desire with his generalized Dutch-Book argument for Previsions.) Both Savage and de Finetti rebel against legislating countable additivity for subjective probability. They require merely that probability be finitely additive. Simultaneously, they insist that their theories of preference are weak, accommodating all but self-defeating desires. In this paper we dispute (...) these claims by showing that the following three cannot simultaneously hold: (i) Coherent belief is reducible to rational preference, i.e. the generalized Dutch-Book argument fixes standards of coherence. (ii) Finitely additive probability is coherent. (iii) Admissible preference structures may be free of consequences, i.e. they may lack prizes whose values are robust against all contingencies. (shrink)

This article challenges the tendency exhibited in arguments by Michael Ignatieff, Jeremy Waldron, and others to treat the Law of Armed Conflict as the only valid moral frame of reference for guiding armed rebels with just cause. To succeed, normative language and principles must reflect not only the wrongs of ‘terrorism’ and war crimes, but also the rights of legitimate rebels. However, these do not always correspond to the legal privileges of combatants. Rebels are often unlikely to gain belligerent recognition (...) and might sometimes have strong moral reasons to exceed the rights of regular combatants. Where this gives rise to tensions between morality and the LOAC, a decision is needed to determine which to follow. Setting aside the idea of suppressing just war theory altogether in favour of a more purely regulatory approach to war and reforming law in the direct light of moral theory, I question the attempt by Waldron to argue that moral weight of the legal conventions at the heart of the LOAC trump any moral reasons there might be for breaching them. Even if non-combatant immunity is, as Waldron suggests, a deadly serious convention, I argue that war is justified only if pursued for the sake of deadly serious causes which may even be serious enough to oblige agents to break the law. A political theory of the ethics of war is needed to mediate between the moral and legal in such cases where they cannot be reconciled directly. (shrink)

Images of Abelard and Heloise. This chapter discusses images of Abelard and Heloise from the 12th to the 20th centuries. It observes how the controversial character of their relationship, as well as accusations of heresy made by St. Bernard have created stereotyped images of Abelard and Heloise as rebels against authority and the religious life that do not do full justice to their intellectual achievement. They were not lovers, but thinkers.

John Locke's Second Treatise of Government is a ringing defense of individual liberty and individual moral rights, including rights to private property. Locke calls for limited government, takes some steps toward promoting the moral rights of women. Locke espouses a theological ethics, and is adamant in asserting that no one acquires political obligations to obey the established authorities except by her free and voluntary consent. Locke proclaims that all normal human individuals are free and equal persons, and takes this to (...) be compatible with inequality in people's possessions and opportunities. Just this short listing of some of Locke's ideas indicates that they reverberate throughout the tradition of modern liberal political thought. This chapter discusses some themes in Locke's writing that are prominent features in one or another version of modern liberalism. The discussion highlights both insights and confusions in Locke's writing that also show up in contemporary thinking. (shrink)

How do thought and language manage to be 'about' aspects of the world? J. Robert G. Williams investigates how representation arises out of a fundamentally non-representational world, showing the explanatory relations between the representational properties of language, of thought, and of perception and intention.

One of the most important issues that distinguishes the Baghdādī branch of the Muʿtazila from the Baṣran branch is their view on ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (d. 40/661). Basra branch accepts the order of virtue of the first four caliphs as their order of coming to office, while the Baghdad branch considers the first three caliphs legitimate, but considers Ali more virtuous than them. The Baghdādī Muʿtazilīs who outspokenly defended this idea were Abū Jaʿfar al-Iskāfī (d. 240/854), Abū al-Qāsim al-Kaʿbī (...) (d. 319/931) and Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd (d. 656/1258). Among them, Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd was renowned as “the greatest scholar of the Muʿtazila” and was considered one of the last representatives of this school. He ardently defended ʿAlī's superiority in his commentary on Nahj al-Balāgha, the famous collection of Ali’s sermons, letters and wisdom sayings. In his defense, he rebutted some criticisms about ʿAlī’s political decisions from his school’s point of view. Many items of Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd’s rebuttal are worthy of analysis in terms of their content, style and approach. This article aims to present a detailed account of Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd’s aforementioned refutations. In addition to the descriptive method, the interpretative method was also employed in the article. Although Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd did not consider Ali's infallibility necessary (wājib), unlike Imamiyya, he accepted it. Therefore, he responded to the criticisms directed at Ali, starting from the point of Ali's innocence. According to Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd: (a) After the death of the Prophet, ʿAlī insisted on becoming the new leader of the Muslim community. He did not act hastily to assume the caliphate because he was not expecting any opposition to that. However, when the events took a different turn, he did not escalate the situation, rather accepted the status quo. (b) ʿAlī also did the right thing by participating in ʿUmar b. Al-Khaṭṭāb’s (d. 23/644) electoral shūrā. This was an opportunity for him to become the next caliph, and reinstitute a system in accordance with the Qurʿānic principles and sunna of the Prophet. (c) It was also not an error when ʿAlī decided to stay in Medina during the events of ʿUthmān’s murder (d. 35/656). He played an active role in dissuading the rebels from their attempt to kill ʿUthmān, but he was in no position to know that his activity would be used against him later by the Umayyads who accused ʿAlī of being complicit in ʿUthmāns’s murder. (d) ʿAlī took the caliphate after ʿUthmān because of his popularity among the people. In this way, he managed to prevent an unqualified person to occupy the seat of the caliphate. (e) When the Battle of Camel broke out, those who demanded justice and opposed ʿAlī were in error. (f) When ʿAlī became the new caliph, his decision to remove Muʿāwīya (d. 60/680) from the governorship of Syria was correct. This is because Muʿāwīya would have refused to accept ʿAlī’s leadership even had he stayed in office as a governor. ʿAlī understood that the conflict would end only through fighting, so he did not lose time in marching against Muʿāwīya. (g) During the battle he abided by the sharīʿa and allowed the Syrian army to access water. (h) It was not ʿAlī, but those defectors in his army who obliged him to end the fighting through arbitration. (i) When ʿAlī agreed to sign the Ṣiffīn ceasefire agreement and did not use his title amīr al-muʾminīn, he followed the Prophet's example since the latter also refrained from using his title during the Ḥudaybiyya agreement. (j) ʿAlī also cannot be blamed for those among his supporters, such as the poet al-Najāshī, who defected and joined the ranks of Muʿāwīya. The motivations for the defectors were either to attain worldly gains or to escape from punishment for the crimes which they had committed. (k) When Muʿāwīya managed to conquer Egypt, ʿAlī’s governors of the province, Qays b. Saʿd (d. 60/680) or Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr (d. 38/658), did nothing for which they could be blamed. (l) And finally, ʿAlī never had guards to protect him because he was never afraid of being assassinated. Although Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd took Ali's innocence as a basis while presenting these views, he did not make inconsistent comments in general and did not say things contrary to historical facts. Therefore, it is necessary to acknowledge historical value of his views in question. (shrink)

Dutch Mathematician Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer (1881-1966) was a rebel. His doctoral thesis... was the manifesto of an angry young man taking on the mathematical establishment on all fronts. In a short time he established a world-wide reputation for himself; his genius and originality were acknowledged by the great mathematicians of his time... The Intuitionist-Formalist debate became a personal feud between the mathematical giants Brouwer and Hilbert, and ended in 1928 with the expulsion of Brouwer from the editorial board (...) of the Mathematische Annalen by dictat of Hilbert. Forsaken, humiliated and disillusioned Brouwer abandoned his Intuitionist Programme and withdrew into silence just about the time when the Formalist Programme appeared to be fundamentally flawed and major opposition collapsed... This book attempts to follow the `genetic' development of Brouwer's ideas, linking the man Brouwer, his Weltanschauung, his philosophy of mathematics and his reconstruction of mathematics. Brouwer's own writings, his publications as well as his unpublished papers, are its immediate and main source of reference. It is the second volume in the new series Studies in the History and Philosophy of Mathematics, and is written for the specialist as well as for the general reader interested in mathematics and the interpretation of its status and function. (shrink)

Venkataramanaiah, V. Introduction.--Narla, V. R. Russell and his rejection of religion.--Mehta, G. L. The sceptical crusader.--Dalvi, G. R. Russell, the man.--Venkatarao, V. The nuclear war and the future of man.--Innaiah, N. Bertrand Russell's philosophy.--Subbarayudu, P. Rationality vis-a-vis faith.--Nageswar Rao, B. Russell and nuclear warfare.--Rajagopala Rao, M. Rebel in Russell.--Shankar, G. N. J. The man who revolutionised modern thought.--Maharajasri. Russell, the social scientist in the four-dimensional universe.--The life of Bertrand Russell.--Acknowledgements.--A list of principal works of Bertrand Russell.--Russell's conception of good (...) society in a democratic socialist order.--Objects. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:482 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY disorder was reLigious men's tendency to find in the Scriptures and their consciences justifications for rebelling against their sovereign. The last half of Leviathan is designed to refute these claims in detail, and this refutation is not merely tacked onto the first parts but is a logical extension of them. The argument for escaping the state of nature is that only through obedience to a (...) common power can man escape the likelihood of an early death. Once that common power is established, and so long as it can carry out its protective function, obedience to it is obligatory. When a man enters civil society, the only right he retains is to defend himself against physical death, and consequently, the only time he is entitled to disobey the sovereign is when the sovereign directly threatens him. Thus excuses for rebellion are reduced to an absolute minimum. In McNeiily's formalization however, the concept of a man's death must be replaced by the formal concept of the frustration of all one's desires. And so "whatevvr [a man] regards as the complete frustration of all his desires... he will be entitled to resist, even if such resistance puts him at war with others, including lawful authority" (p. 193). Now the incredible range of things men have believed essential to avoiding the frustration of all their desires is amply testified to in the history of religious warfare. And clearly, under this formalized interpretation, men would be entitled to rebel over the form of baptism, church government, ministerial costume, prayer, or anything else if they are convinced it is essential to their salvation. It takes little knowledge of history to see that Hobbes's espousing of a theory with such consequences has a low degree of probability indeed. Hobbes complains in Leviathan of Scriptural exegetes who "by casting atoms of Scripture, as dust before men's eyes, make everything more obscure than it is." Rather, he claims, it is "not bare words, but the scope of the writer, that giveth the true light by which any writing is to be interpreted; and they that insist upon single texts, without considering the main design, can derive nothing from them clearly'" (E. W., III, 602). This last would be too harsh to apply to McNeiity's work generally, for his "atoms" are for the most part of considerable worth in themselves. But with regard to our understanding of Hobbes's Leviathan he raises a lot of dust. PAUL J. JOHNSON CalifornM State College, San Bernardino The Enlightenment: An Interpretation. By Peter Gay. VoL I, The Rise ol Modern Paganism. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966. Pp. xviii+SSS+xv); VoL II, The Science ot Freedom. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969. Pp. xx+70S+xviii) Le grand int~rSt port~ aux ~tudcs du xvm* si~cle au cours des deux derni~res d6cades et la remise en question des principes critiques encore en vigueur it y a une dizaine d'ann~,s ont fray~ la voie h de nouveaux efforts de synth~se dent la derni~re en date, et non la moins int~ressante, est celle de Peter Gay. Ses deux substantiels volumes sent destines ~ servir de guides ~ une nouvelle g~n~ration d'~tudiants et de chercheurs, ne ffit-ce que pour la bibliographie tr~s d6taill~e et accompagn~ d'obserrations personneUes qui forme un supplement tr~s pr6cieux ~ la Bibliographie de D. C. Cabeen de 1951 et de 1968. Lo travail de Peter Gay inspire confianc~ par BOOK REVIEWS 483 Fampleur des lectures auxquelles il s'est astreint et. (shrink)

Can the straight line be analysed mathematically such that it does not fall apart into a set of discrete points, as is usually done but through which its fundamental continuity is lost? And are there objects of pure mathematics that can change through time? The mathematician and philosopher L.E.J. Brouwer argued that the two questions are closely related and that the answer to both is "yes''. To this end he introduced a new kind of object into mathematics, the choice sequence. (...) But other mathematicians and philosophers have been voicing objections to choice sequences from the start. This book aims to provide a sound philosophical basis for Brouwer's choice sequences by subjecting them to a phenomenological critique in the style of the later Husserl. "It is almost as if one could hear the two rebels arguing their case in a European café or on a terrace, and coming to a common understanding, with both men taking their hat off to the other, in admiration and gratitude. Dr. van Atten has convincingly applied Husserl's method to Brouwer's program, and has equally convincingly applied Brouwer's intuition to Husserl's program. Both programs have come out the better." Piet Hut, professor of Interdisciplinary Studies, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, U.S.A. (shrink)

Easy to understand philosophy papers in all areas. Table of contents: Three Short Philosophy Papers on Human Freedom The Paradox of Religions Institutions Different Perspectives on Religious Belief: O’Reilly v. Dawkins. v. James v. Clifford Schopenhauer on Suicide Schopenhauer’s Fractal Conception of Reality Theodore Roszak’s Views on Bicameral Consciousness Philosophy Exam Questions and Answers Locke, Aristotle and Kant on Virtue Logic Lecture for Erika Kant’s Ethics Van Cleve on Epistemic Circularity Plato’s Theory of Forms Can we trust our senses? Yes (...) we can Descartes on What He Believes Himself to Be The Role of Values in Science Modern Science Kant’s Moral Philosophy Plato’s Republic as Pol Potist Bureaucracy Schopenhauer on Human Suffering Bertrand Russell on the Value of Philosophy The Philosophical Value of Uncertainty Logic Homework: Theorems and Models Searle vs. Turing on the Imitation Game Hume, Frankfurt, and Holbach on Personal Freedom Manifesto of the University of Wisconsin, Madison Secular Society Michael’s Analysis of the Limits of Civil Protections Bentham and Mill on Different Types of Pleasure Set Theory Homework Aristotle on Virtue Nagel On the Hard Problem Wittgenstein on Language and Thought Camus and Schopenhauer on the Meaning of Life Camus’ Hero as Rebel without a Cause My Little Finger: Camus’ Absurdism Illustrated Are Late-term Abortions Ethical? Does Mathematics Assume the Truth of Platonism? The Self-defeating Nature of Utilitarianism and Consequentialism Generally What is The Good Life? Bentham and Mill regarding types of pleasures Kant’s Moral Philosophy Five Short Papers on Mind-body Dualism Tracy Latimer’s Father had the Right to Kill Her: Towards a doctrine of generalized self-defense Arguments Concerning God and Morality Goldman, Rousseau and von Hayek on the Ideal State J.S Mill on Liberty and Personal Freedom A Kantian Analysis of a Borderline Date-rape Situation Living Well as Flourishing: Aristotle’s Conception of the Good Life Three Essays on Medical Ethics: Answers to Exam Questions on Elective Amputation, Vaccination, and Informed Consent Hobbes, Marx, Rousseau, Nietzsche: Their Central Themes De Tocqueville on Egoism Mill vs. Hobbes on Liberty Exam-Essays on the Moral Systems of Mill, Bentham, and Kant Kant’s Moral System Aristotle on Virtue Plato’s Cave Allegory An Ethical Quandary Superorganisms The Tuskegee Experiment A Rawlsian Analysis Why Moore’s Proof of an External World Fails A Defense of Nagel’s Argument Against Materialism A Utilitarian Analysis of a Case of Theft The Paradox of the Self-aware Wretch: An Analysis of Pascal’s Moral Philosophy Jean-Paul Sartre: Decline and Fall of a Marxist Sell-out A One Page Proof of Plato’s Theory of Forms Plato’s Republic as Pol Potist Bureaucracy The problem of the one and the many Four Short Essays on Truth and Knowledge What is ‘the Good Life?’ The Ontological Argument Different Political Philosophies: Plato, Locke, Madison, Rousseau, Hayek, and Mill on the State What do I know with certainty? Skepticism about skepticism Neuroscience and Freewill Operant Conditioning What makes us special? Are Late-term Abortions Ethical? No Two Papers on Epistemology: Gettier and Bostrom Examination Nietzsche on Punishment God’s Foreknowledge and Moral Responsibility . (shrink)

A new way to transpose the virtue epistemologist’s ‘knowledge = apt belief’ template to the collective level, as a thesis about group knowledge, is developed. In particular, it is shown how specifically judgmental belief can be realised at the collective level in a way that is structurally analogous, on a telic theory of epistemic normativity (e.g., Sosa 2020), to how it is realised at the individual level—viz., through a (collective) intentional attempt to get it right aptly (whether p) by alethically (...) affirming that p. An advantage of the proposal developed is that it is shown to be compatible with competing views—viz., joint acceptance accounts and social-distributive accounts—of how group members must interact in order to materially realise a group belief. I conclude by showing how the proposed judgment-focused collective (telic) virtue epistemology has important advantages over a rival version of collective virtue epistemology defended in recent work by Jesper Kallestrup (2016). (shrink)

English summary: Philosophers have sought to apply laws of order, symmetry, and harmony to the observable universe. However, the mathematical work of Gregory Chaitin has shown that complexity, defined as the total absence of symmetry and order, appears everywhere, even in numbers. Complexity thus becomes the unsurpassable limit of reason, reducing the efforts of philosophers and scientists who would propose a system of values that every human should rationally admit. French description: Pour maitriser par la pensee et, - connaitre par (...) le langage l'accablante diversite du reel, les philosophies ont suppose l'existence d'un ordre sous-jacent se manifestant dans la symetrie, l'harmonie et la simplicite. Dans leurs efforts pour elucider et enoncer des lois concises regissant les rapports entre les elements constitutifs du monde observable, les scientifiques leur ont emboite le pas. Or, des recherches recentes en mathematiques de Gregory J. Chaitin, ont fait apparaitre que la complexite, definie comme absence totale d'ordre et de symetrie, se manifeste a tous les niveaux du reel, y compris dans les nombres. Irreductiblement rebelle a l'analyse, la complexite s'erige en limite indepassable de la raison, reduisant les pretentions des scientifiques et rendant irrealisable, comme l'avait deja compris Heidegger, le projet de philosophes qui, comme Platon et Kant, voulaient proposer un systeme de valeurs que tout etre humain devait rationnellement admettre. (shrink)

Strange inversions occur when things work in ways that turn received wisdom upside down. Hume offered a strangely inverted story about causation, and Darwin, about apparent design. Dennett suggests that a strange inversion also occurs when we project our own reactive complexes outward, painting our world with elusive properties like cuteness, sweetness, blueness, sexiness, funniness, and more. Such properties strike us as experiential causes, but they are really effects—a kind of shorthand for whole sets of reactive dispositions rooted in the (...) nuts and bolts of human information processing. Understanding the nature and origins of that strange inversion, Dennett believes, is thus key to understanding the nature and origins of human experience itself. This paper examines this claim, paying special attention to recent formulations that link that strange inversion to the emerging vision of the brain as a Bayesian estimator, constantly seeking to predict the unfolding sensory barrage. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.4 (2001) 721-743 [Access article in PDF] Virtue, Commerce, and the Enduring Florentine Republican Moment: Reintegrating Italy into the Atlantic Republican Debate Mark Jurdjevic Republicanism has dominated the historiographies of English and American political thought for the past two decades. 1 Its success derives principally from J. G. A. Pocock's The Machiavellian Moment, which presents a sweeping vision of an ancient Aristotelian republican (...) language that persisted for centuries in the mental landscape of the western world. Resurrected in Renaissance Florence, the language of republicanism continued to resonate powerfully in Stuart and Hanoverian Britain and colonial America. Pocock and those sympathetic to his work attributed the power and significance of republicanism to its internal discursive coherence over time; because of its deep roots in the European classical and Renaissance past, republicanism--not liberalism--provided the intellectual weapon with which the English and the Americans rebelled against the Stuart and Hanoverian monarchies. Pocock's provocative repudiation of the significance of John Locke and liberalism, as well as his suggestion that the revolutions of 1641, 1688, and 1776 were animated not by a utopian, forward-looking political ideology but by a backward-looking desire to restore a classical political order, generated a still-ongoing academic debate. 2 [End Page 721]This debate has not appreciated a crucial point: Pocock misunderstood Florentine political thought and mischaracterized its central tenets. 3 Unnecessary confusion has been generated by the lack of communication between specialists in Renaissance political thought and historians of English and early American political thought, as well as by the total dependence of English and American historians on Pocock for their understanding of "civic humanism." 4 Most historians of England and America skeptical of Pocock's argument have shown that republican language, where it did occur in England and America, differed in substantial and significant ways from the Florentine variety. 5 What they have actually shown, I hope to make clear, is that manifestations of republicanism in England and America differed only from Pocock's misunderstanding of the Florentine variety; Florentine republican language echoes strongly in the English and American republicanism that recent scholarship emphasizes.In this essay I seek to reintegrate Italy into the republican debate and, by doing so, to revitalize the argument that structural linguistic similarities pervaded the republicanism of Florence, England, and America. 6 I concentrate on the most important and contested point in English and American revisionism, the dialectical engine of TheMachiavellian Moment: the alleged incompatibility between virtue and commerce in "classical" republican theory. Pocock asserted that Florentine republicans mistrusted commerce and private wealth as corrupting forces in public life and he employed this perceived virtue-commerce antipathy as the link between his republican moments.The most leveling critiques of Pocock's republican tradition have rejected it on this point. Recent research on the relationship between commerce and virtue in the English and American republican contexts has reached a quite different conclusion: that republican theory was frequently elaborated in harmonious conjunction with a new ideology of commercial society. [End Page 722]Pocock, however, misunderstood civic humanism and the role of commerce in Renaissance republicanism. Florentine humanists believed that commerce and the private pursuit of wealth made possible the survival and integrity of the republic. Florentine republicanism of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries was the ideology of an ascendant merchant elite; it provided a political language that integrated republican virtue with the habits, values, and mentality of the merchant. We should not therefore be surprised to see republicanism flourishing in later commercial societies. Although the virtue-commerce relationship in Renaissance republicanism was precisely the opposite of Pocock's claim, it directly anticipates the commercial element of republicanism that recent English and American scholarship emphasizes.I undertake three tasks; first, I survey and compare recent work on republicanism in America, England, and Italy; second, I show how Pocock selectively read the primary and secondary sources on Renaissance Florence; third and most importantly, I analyze the economic attitudes of Niccolò Machiavelli, Francesco Guicciardini, Girolamo Savonarola, and Florentine... (shrink)

Moral philosophers tend to discriminate, explicitly or implicitly, three types of action from the point of view of moral worth. First, they recognize actions that are a duty, or obligatory, or that we ought to perform, treating these terms as approximately synonymous; second, they recognize actions that are right in so far as they are permissible from a moral standpoint and not ruled out by moral considerations, but that are not morally required of us, like the lead of this or (...) that card at bridge; third, they recognize actions that are wrong, that we ought not to do. (shrink)

The meta-problem is 'the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness' (Chalmers, 2018, p. 6). This presupposes that we think there is a problem in the first place. We challenge the breadth of this 'we', arguing that there is already sufficient empirical evidence to cast doubt on the claim. We then add to this body of evidence, presenting the results of a new cross-cultural study extending the work of Sytsma and Machery (2010).

The conservation of energy and momentum have been viewed as undermining Cartesian mental causation since the 1690s. Modern discussions of the topic tend to use mid-nineteenth century physics, neglecting both locality and Noether’s theorem and its converse. The relevance of General Relativity has rarely been considered. But a few authors have proposed that the non-localizability of gravitational energy and consequent lack of physically meaningful local conservation laws answers the conservation objection to mental causation: conservation already fails in GR, so there (...) is nothing for minds to violate. This paper is motivated by two ideas. First, one might take seriously the fact that GR formally has an infinity of rigid symmetries of the action and hence, by Noether’s first theorem, an infinity of conserved energies-momenta. Second, Sean Carroll has asked how one should modify the Dirac–Maxwell–Einstein equations to describe mental causation. This paper uses the generalized Bianchi identities to show that General Relativity tends to exclude, not facilitate, such Cartesian mental causation. In the simplest case, Cartesian mental influence must be spatio-temporally constant, and hence 0. The difficulty may diminish for more complicated models. Its persuasiveness is also affected by larger world-view considerations. The new general relativistic objection provides some support for realism about gravitational energy-momentum in GR. Such realism also might help to answer an objection to theories of causation involving conserved quantities, because energies-momenta would be conserved even in GR. (shrink)

Autonomous Knowledge: Radical Enhancement, Autonomy, and the Future of Knowing motivates and develops a new research programme in epistemology that is centred around the concept of epistemic autonomy.

A change in sense of self is an outcome commonly associated with Buddhist meditation. However, the sense of self is construed in multiple ways, and which changes in self-related processing are expected, intended, or possible through meditation is not well understood. In a qualitative study of meditation-related challenges, six discrete changes in sense of self were reported by Buddhist meditators: change in narrative self, loss of sense of ownership, loss of sense of agency, change in sense of embodiment, change in (...) self-other or self-world boundaries, and loss of sense of basic self. Changes in sense of self could be transient or enduring, positive or distressing, enhancing or impairing. These changes were also given varied appraisals, ranging from insights associated with Buddhist doctrines to psychopathologies such as depersonalization. In this study of practitioners reporting meditation-related challenges, more global changes in sense of self were associated with higher levels of impairment. These results have implications for both Buddhist meditation as well as mindfulness-based interventions. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe seminal work of David Marr, popularized in his classic work Vision, continues to exert a major influence on both cognitive science and philosophy. The interpretation of his work also co...

In the paper, the originator of the hiddenness argument, J. L. Schellenberg, responds to papers that challenge his reasoning. In his remarks he puts an emphasis on the concept of divine love and he explains why it is not only connected to the idea of the Christian God. He also clarifies his position on ultimism.

Here I reply to criticisms by Jeroen de Ridder and S. Kate Devitt to my "Collective (Telic) Virtue Epistemology".

Locke, Eden and Two States of Nature: The Fortunate Fall Revisited PHILIP VOGT TWO STATES OF NATURE, not one, figure in the political writings of John Locke. The more frequently discussed of the two, the "State of Nature" proper, is defined in the second of the Two Treatises of Government as the condition of perfect freedom abandoned by mankind upon the advent of political society.' Whether Locke viewed this "state" as a purely theoretical construct or as an actual moment in (...) human history is open to debate. 2 There is no basis, however, for doubting his belief in the literal reality of that other state of nature, the Garden of Eden. In Eden, mankind in the person of Adam-turned-rebel ob- tained its perfect, prepolitical freedom in exchange for the bliss of perfect obedience to a divinely ordained "Law of Nature." Without reference to man's tenancy of nature in both its prepolitical and prelapsarian states, Locke's discus- sion of the equilibrium struck in political society between obedience and free- dom is incomprehensible. Likewise, reference to both states is required for Valuable comments on the preliminary drafts of this article were given by Nancy Struever, Peter Vinten-Johansen, J. G. A. Pocock, Kirstie McClure, John Marshall, Carol Pech, Edward Schneider and two anonymous referees for the Journal of the History of Philosophy. 'John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett , II/ii/4. 9 While Locke.. (shrink)

Conceptual clarity is essential when engaging in dialogue to avoid unnecessary disagreement and to promote mutual understanding. In this issue devoted to clinical bioethics, the authors exemplify the virtue of careful conceptual analysis as they explore complex clinical questions regarding the essential nature of medicine, the boundaries of killing and letting die, the meaning of irreversibility in definitions of death, the argument for a right to try experimental medications, the ethical borders in complex medical billing, and the definition and modeling (...) of complex disease states. (shrink)

This short book edited by J. N. Mohanty consists of eight essays written by Ganeswar Misra from 1969 to 1984. These essays were originally published in various journals and books in India. Misra, a student of A. J. Ayer, was greatly influenced by the philosophical style of his mentor. These essays capture the philosophical views of an Indian intellectual who rebelled against the narrow Vedantic interpretation of Indian philosophy popularized by Radhakrishnan and Dasgupta.

Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 8, August 2022.

Everyone interested in Arabic and Persian literature, in Islam and in comparative religion, regrets the death of Arthur J. Arberry, Sir Thomas Adams's Professor of Arabic in the University of Cambridge. Arberry combined rare human qualities and exceptional professional attainment, and this enabled him to make a unique contribution both to learning and to mutual understanding between East and West. He had a deep sense of vocation, which he brought to his unremitting labours as a skilled editor of texts, especially (...) in the field of Islamic mysticism, and as an imaginative translator of these texts of the Koran and of Arabic and Persian poetry, and as a sympathetic interpreter of Sūfism. (shrink)

Minimally, metaphysical realists hold that there exist some mind-independent entities. Metaphysical realists also hold that we can speak meaningfully or truthfully about mind-independent entities. Those who reject metaphysical realism deny one or more of these commitments. This Element aims to introduce the reader to the core commitments of metaphysical realism and to illustrate how these commitments have changed over time by surveying some of the main families of views that realism has been contrasted with: such as scepticism, idealism, and anti-realism.