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No Problem: Evidence that the Concept of Phenomenal Consciousness is Not Widespread
Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):241-256 (2019)
Abstract
The meta-problem is 'the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness' (Chalmers, 2018, p. 6). This presupposes that we think there is a problem in the first place. We challenge the breadth of this 'we', arguing that there is already sufficient empirical evidence to cast doubt on the claim. We then add to this body of evidence, presenting the results of a new cross-cultural study extending the work of Sytsma and Machery (2010).Author's Profile
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2019-09-25
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Citations of this work
Do People Think Consciousness Poses a Hard Problem?: Empirical Evidence on the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.Rodrigo Díaz - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (3-4):55-75.
Is the Hard Problem of Consciousness Universal?David Chalmers - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):227-257.
Who knows what Mary knew? An experimental study.Daniel Gregory, Malte Hendrickx & Cameron Turner - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (4):522-545.
Does the Folk Concept of Phenomenal Consciousness Exist?Michał Wyrwa - 2022 - Diametros 19 (71):46-66.
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