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Collective (Telic) Virtue Epistemology

In Mark Alfano, Jeroen de Ridder & Colin Klein (eds.), Social Virtue Epistemology. London: Routledge (2020)

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  1. Epistemic Normativity is Not Independent of Our Goals.J. Adam Carter - 2022 - In Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup, John Turri & Blake Roeber (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd Edition. Wiley-Blackwell.
  • Group (Epistemic) Competence.Dani Pino - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11377-11396.
    In this paper, I present an account of group competence that is explicitly framed for cases of epistemic performances. According to it, we must consider group epistemic competence as the group agents’ capacity to produce knowledge, and not the result of the summation of its individual members’ competences to produce knowledge. Additionally, I contend that group competence must be understood in terms of group normative status. To introduce my view, I present Jesper Kallestrup’s denial that group competence involves anything over (...)
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  • Collective Virtue Epistemology and the Value of Identity Diversity.Brian Kim - 2022 - Social Epistemology 36 (4):486-501.
    Discussions of diversity tend to paint a mixed picture of the practical and epistemic value of diversity. While there are expansive and detailed accounts of the value of cognitive diversity, explorations of identity diversity typically focus on its value as a source or cause of cognitive diversity. The resulting picture on which identity diversity only possesses a derivative practical and epistemic value is unsatisfactory and fails to account for some of its central epistemic benefits. In response, I propose that collective (...)
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  • The value of common knowledge.Allan Hazlett - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-18.
    I articulate the question of the value of common knowledge, or the question of why common knowledge is preferred to mere widespread knowledge. I argue that common knowledge often enjoys instrumental value lacked by widespread knowledge, and present a case that suggests that common knowledge sometimes enjoys non-instrumental value lacked by widespread knowledge. But I articulate some doubts about whether we should draw that conclusion from the case.
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