When someone masters a skill, their performance looks to us like second nature: it looks as if their actions are smoothly performed without explicit, knowledge-driven, online monitoring of their performance. Contemporary computational models in motor control theory, however, are instructionist: that is, they cast skillful performance as a knowledge-driven process. Optimal motor control theory, as representative par excellence of such approaches, casts skillful performance as an instruction, instantiated in the brain, that needs to be executed—a motor command. This paper aims (...) to show the limitations of such instructionist approaches to skillful performance. We specifically address the question of whether the assumption of control-theoretic models is warranted. The first section of this paper examines the instructionist assumption, according to which skillful performance consists of the execution of theoretical instructions harnessed in motor representations. The second and third sections characterize the implementation of motor representations as motor commands, with a special focus on formulations from OMCT. The final sections of this paper examine predictive coding and active inference—behavioral modeling frameworks that descend, but are distinct, from OMCT—and argue that the instructionist, control-theoretic assumptions are ill-motivated in light of new developments in active inference. (shrink)

A. C. Cassio has recently pointed out that Μαρικς, the name which Eupolis applied to the demagogue Hyperbolus, is a transliteration of the Old Persian word. In fact, a Persian origin μαρικς was suspected long ago. The seventeenth-century English scholar Edward Bernard, whose notes were used by J. Alberti in his edition of Hesychius, connected μαρικς with the Modern Persian mardekeh, which literally means ‘a little man’ and has the connotation ‘a vile person’, ‘a scoundrel’. A. Meineke followed Bernard's derivation (...) of μαρικς from Persian, as did K. Latte in his recent edition of Hesychius. These references should be added to Cassio's citation of E. Maass' quotation of K. F. Geldner's opinion. (shrink)

In his exemplary edition of the papyrus fragments of Callimachus' Victoria Berenices, P. J. Parsons briefly considered the spelling of the name of Hercules' host, who played such a major role in Callimachus' ατιον on the founding of the Nemean games. At B iii 2 the papyrus has M[λ]ορκοϲ. On this Professor Parsons noted ‘elsewhere Mλορχοϲ: the unusual spelling, which no doubt comes from the text, reappears in Apollodorus, Bibl. 2.5.1, Nonnus, Dion. 17.52 and Stephanus of Byzantium s.v. Mολορκα ’.

The publication of a further volume in Father Copleston’s single-handed History of Western Philosophy is as notable an event as the persevering industry of his nineteenth century subjects. In this stout tome he devotes some 500 pages of text, reinforced with 50 pages of bibliography and an index, to the traditional development of empiricism in British and American thinking and to its interplay with nineteenth century idealism. On this select principle five parts divide naturally: I expounds the evolution from the (...) original utilitarianism of Bentham to the systematic positivism of Spencer, linked by two capital chapters upon J S Mill; II and III examine the portentous development of idealism in Britain and the United States respectively; IV presents the movement of pragmatism from Peirce to Dewey, while V charts the revival of realism, in revolt against idealism, particularly in the works of Moore and Russell whose three culminating chapters usher in contemporary philosophy. Such a traditional classification fails to embrace all distinguished thinkers. An epilogue briefly considers the revolutionary concepts of the nature and scope of philosophy proposed by Wittgenstein, and an appendix expounds Cardinal Newman’s earlier philosophical defence of religious belief—with this characteristic conclusion. (shrink)

In this concise volume, the author sets himself several tasks. He attempts to provide a general introduction to Nietzsche for educated readers, or for students in need of a reliable summary. Furthermore, he wishes to rescue Nietzsche from the distortions to which he has been subjected as a result of decades of controversy as well as the use and abuse of him by interested parties. Finally, he desires to depict the way Nietzsche "really was" in both his life and his (...) work. (shrink)

One can learn a great deal from this book about both anarchism and Marxism. The author prefers the latter but is fair to the former. He understands anarchism as the left-wing critique of Marxism as well as its bad conscience; he thinks anarchists asked the right questions of Marx and thus forced him to strengthen his thought; and he does not take Marx's victory or superiority as a foregone conclusion.

This volume on Nietzsche is one of a series devoted to "the ways of research" in regard to various authors of note. The editor introduces Nietzsche research by dividing it into four categories: 1) the various and increasing controversies surrounding Nietzsche's thought; 2) the growing acceptance of him as a major philosopher; 3) historical-philological problems; and, 4) the wide-spread acceptance of, and reliance on, the new edition of Nietzsche's works edited by Colli and Montinari.

Nietzsche scholarship has always been dependent on incomplete editions. Nietzsche wrote much more than he published, and his literary remains were left to posterity in disarray—and in a handwriting few people could decipher. The exploitations perpetrated by his sister added to the tangled situation, as did the rude interruption by World War II of an attempt to publish a definitive edition.

Psychiatric diagnosis and prognosis is fraught with important philosophical and conceptual problems. This chapter focuses on some epistemological issues and moral issues that arise in contemporary psychiatric practice. It examines various clinical and actuarial techniques for psychiatric diagnosis, ordered very loosely in terms of how "structured" or "automated" they are. The chapter makes the case for assessing psychiatric treatments with controlled experiments, raises several epistemological dangers that arise from relying on uncontrolled investigations, and considers some of the unique methodological and (...) ethical issues that arise when trying to assess talk therapy. (shrink)

Scientists and laypeople alike use the sense of understanding that an explanation conveys as a cue to good or correct explanation. Although the occurrence of this sense or feeling of understanding is neither necessary nor sufficient for good explanation, it does drive judgments of the plausibility and, ultimately, the acceptability, of an explanation. This paper presents evidence that the sense of understanding is in part the routine consequence of two well-documented biases in cognitive psychology: overconfidence and hindsight. In light of (...) the prevalence of counterfeit understanding in the history of science, I argue that many forms of cognitive achievement do not involve a sense of understanding, and that only the truth or accuracy of an explanation make the sense of understanding a valid cue to genuine understanding. (shrink)

Philosophers agree that scientific explanations aim to produce understanding, and that good ones succeed in this aim. But few seriously consider what understanding is, or what the cues are when we have it. If it is a psychological state or process, describing its specific nature is the job of psychological theorizing. This article examines the role of understanding in scientific explanation. It warns that the seductive, phenomenological sense of understanding is often, but mistakenly, viewed as a cue of genuine understanding. (...) The article closes with a discussion of several new paths of research that tie the psychology of scientific explanation to cognate notions of learning, testimony, and understanding. (shrink)

(2002). Philosophy of Science 72 (January), 198-208.

Open peer commentary on the article “A Moving Boundary, a Plastic Core: A Contribution to the Third Wave of Extended-Mind Research” by Timotej Prosen. Abstract: We argue that the free-energy principle (FEP) can indeed be used to articulate a conception of the boundaries of cognitive systems that meets the desiderata of third-wave extended-mind research. We point out that Markov blankets under the FEP definitionally constitute the means through which internal and external states are coupled, and so do not isolate systems (...) from their environment. We argue that the nested, multiscale boundaries of the FEP formulation are indeed plastic and open to re-negotiation. Finally, we appeal to the formulation of niche construction under the FEP to argue that the extension of cognitive boundaries in this formulation is both synchronic and diachronic. (shrink)

Scientific realists contend that theory-conjunction presents a problem for empiricist conceptions of scientific knowledge and practice. Van Fraassen (1980) has offered a competing account of theory-conjunction which I argue fails to capture the mercenary character of epistemic dependence in science. Representative cases of theory-conjunction developed in the present paper show that mercenary reliance implies a "principle of epistemic symmetry" which only a realist can consistently accommodate. Finally, because the practice in question involves the conjunction of theories, a version of realism (...) more robust than the "entity realism" of Cartwright (1983, 1989) and Hacking (1983) is required to explain the success of theory-conjunction. (shrink)

Scientific realism has been advanced as an interpretation of the natural sciences but never the behavioral sciences. This book introduces a novel version of scientific realism, Measured Realism, that characterizes the kind of theoretical progress in the social and psychological sciences that is uneven but indisputable. It proposes a theory of measurement, Population-Guided Estimation, that connects natural, psychological, and social scientific inquiry. Presenting quantitative methods in the behavioral sciences as at once successful and regulated by the world, the book will (...) engage philosophers of science, historians of science, sociologists of science, and scientists interested in the foundations of their own disciplines. Part I introduces measured realism beginning with a novel realist theory of measurement (Population-Guided Estimation, or PGE). It examines two other versions of scientific realism — minimal (Hacking) and robust (Boyd, Putnam, and Newton-Smith) — and advances measured realism as best supported by the evidence in the behavioral sciences. It also critically evaluates the anti-realist arguments of van Fraassen, Laudan, and Fine. Part II formulates and develops a version of epistemological naturalism most appropriate to measured realism. Drawing upon the realist theory of measurement developed earlier, it favorably appraises a variety of statistical methods in the behavioral sciences against selected criticisms. It concludes that traditional, narrative methods in the behavioral and social sciences are unreliable by the measures of epistemological naturalism. (shrink)

I propose to consider in this paper some points concerning the part played by reason in non-moral conduct. The place of reason in ethics is a separate issue with which I shall not be directly concerned.