One of the main lines of research in algorithmic fairness involves individual fairness (IF) methods. Individual fairness is motivated by an intuitive principle, similar treatment, which requires that similar individuals be treated similarly. IF offers a precise account of this principle using distance metrics to evaluate the similarity of individuals. Proponents of individual fairness have argued that it gives the correct definition of algorithmic fairness, and that it should therefore be preferred to (...) other methods for determining fairness. I argue that individual fairness cannot serve as a definition of fairness. Moreover, IF methods should not be given priority over other fairness methods, nor used in isolation from them. To support these conclusions, I describe four in-principle problems for individual fairness as a definition and as a method for ensuring fairness: (1) counterexamples show that similar treatment (and therefore IF) are insufficient to guarantee fairness; (2) IF methods for learning similarity metrics are at risk of encoding human implicit bias; (3) IF requires prior moral judgments, limiting its usefulness as a guide for fairness and undermining its claim to define fairness; and (4) the incommensurability of relevant moral values makes similarity metrics impossible for many tasks. In light of these limitations, I suggest that individual fairness cannot be a definition of fairness, and instead should be seen as one tool among several for ameliorating algorithmic bias. (shrink)

Fairness can be incorporated into Harsanyi’s utilitarianism through all-inclusive utility. This retains the normative assumptions of expected utility and Pareto-efficiency, and relates fairness to individual preferences. It makes utilitarianism unfalsifiable, however, if agents’ all-inclusive utilities are not explicitly specified. This note proposes a two-stage model to make utilitarian welfare analysis falsifiable by specifying all-inclusive utilities explicitly through models of individual fairness preferences. The approach is applied to include fairness in widely discussed allocation examples.

In the climate ethics debate, scholars largely agree that individuals should promote institutions that ensure the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. This paper aims to establish that there are individual duties beyond compliance with and promotion of institutions. Duties of individuals to reduce their emissions are often objected to by arguing that an individual’s emissions do not make a morally relevant difference. We challenge this argument from inconsequentialism in two ways. We first show why the argument also seems (...) to undermine the case for duties to promote institutions that the arguments’ proponents endorse. Second, we argue that individuals ought to cut emissions if they exceed their fair share of emissions entitlements and, by emitting, contribute to climate-related harm. In response to inconsequentialism, we specify the notion of ‘contribution’ via the so-called NESS theory, according to which an act is causally relevant for and contributes to an outcome if it is a Necessary Element of a Set of conditions that is Sufficient for the outcome. After refuting two objections to our approach, we conclude by discussing how to deal with possible conflicts between duties to promote institutions and to reduce one’s emissions. (shrink)

Fair trade aims at humanising the capitalist economy by serving the community, instead of simply striving for financial profit. The current fair trade sector is an excellent example of an innovation where networks based on ethical principles can help to effectively serve this market. Our analysis is based on 48 interviews amongst fair trade innovators in France and illustrates the advent of a new type of entrepreneur, one that is grounded in the social and solidarity economy (SSE). Based on a (...) service-dominant logic, these innovators aim to construct a 'new world' centred on trade relationships by integrating the role of multiple-player networks into the creation of value in the market. (shrink)

As lifestyle diseases put a heavy burden on health care expenditures, voices are raised and win in sound to hold people responsible for their unhealthy lifestyle. Most of the arguments in favour of responsibility are backward-looking. In this article, we describe the distributional consequences of these backward-looking measures and show that they are very harsh on those who regret a past unhealthy lifestyle. We demonstrate that it is possible to take policy measures which respect individual responsibility but which are (...) at the same time able to grant fresh starts to individuals who regret their past unhealthy lifestyle (which is an application of Fleurbaey (2005)). This ‘forgiving’ policy is confronted with a moral hazard problem, however. In general the regulator does not observe whether individuals really regret their past choices or they just pretend to have changed preferences in order to enjoy the compensatory measures for regretful people. In this article, we argue that the health setting offers interesting opportunities to move beyond this moral hazard problem and offer a solution through the use of redistributive instruments that are conditional on lifestyle changes. (shrink)

According to most contemporary theorists, free riding on the cooperative contributions of others is unfair. At the same time, obligations to contribute to cooperative schemes can compel conformity with conventional practices, and can do so to a degree that poses a real threat to individuality. This paper exposes this tension between fairness and individuality, and proposes a way to resolve it. The resolution depends on an alternative approach to understanding fairness—one that appeals to the relational goods fairness (...) is meant to maintain. In particular, norms of fairness protect against the interactions within a relationship becoming disrespectful. Many instances of free riding are indeed disrespectful and hence unfair. But this is not always so: one can choose to live a lifestyle that fails to return the benefits their community provides without disrespecting one's fellows. It is thus possible to free ride without being unfair, and so duties of fairness need not add to those already formidable forces that threaten to extinguish valuable individuality. (shrink)

生体仿自己生成過程，、﹒步步又﹒步、一步三位已提唱芒才、才一才可工又、多概念主、力二的『判斷力批判旁的起源是也令。力、、「二重作動可鍵概念仿導入主才一才工又仿環境二仿諸閔係旬強調主、才一卡才工又叮本性 是一明確』寸弋芒早已。 La notion d'autopoïèse, proposée par Humbert R. Maturana et Francisco J. Varela, comme processus par lequel le vivant se produit lui-même a ses racines dans la Critique de la faculté de juger de Kant. Mais il convient d'en préciser la nature en introduisant la notion clé de « double opération » et en insistant sur les rapports de l'autopoïèse avec l'environnement. The concept of « autopoiesis » as suggested by Humbert R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela as a process (...) by which life occurs, has its roots in Kant's Criticism of Judgment. But it is advisable to specify its nature by introducing the key notion of a « double opération » and by insisting on the connections between autopoiesis and environment. (shrink)

In this paper, we offer a defense of non-punitive measures as morally justified responses to crime within a framework of society as a fair system of cooperation among free and equal individuals. Our argument proceeds in three steps. First, we elaborate on the premises of our argument: we situate criminal acts within a model of society as a fair system of cooperation, identify the types of unfair disadvantages crimes bring about, and consider the social aim of the criminal justice system. (...) Next, we reject the claim defended by fair-play retributivists that fairness considerations make punishment a necessary response to criminal acts. In the last step, we demonstrate that it is rather non-punitive responses to crime that are warranted under the principle of fairness and, as such, are morally justified. We conclude the paper by rejecting two possible objections to our defense: the “responsibility gap” and the “victims’ claim to justice” objections. (shrink)

This article presents a fairness principle for evaluating decision-making based on predictions: a decision rule is unfair when the individuals directly impacted by the decisions who are equal with respect to the features that justify inequalities in outcomes do not have the same statistical prospects of being benefited or harmed by them, irrespective of their socially salient morally arbitrary traits. The principle can be used to evaluate prediction-based decision-making from the point of view of a wide range of antecedently (...) specified substantive views about justice in outcome distributions. (shrink)

Fair Governance: The Enforcement of Morals is a study of legal interference with individual preferences and will canvass the interdisciplinary literature in economics, psychology, philosophy, and law. It discusses the particular conditions necessary for the state to legally interfere with our freedom of choice, whether it be to either satisfy our individual pursuit of happiness or to prevent us from making immoral choices. Relatively few philosophers know much of the parallel literature on this central problem of ethics; while (...) many legal scholars are acquainted with the psychological literature on judgment biases, they are frequently unfamiliar with the philosophical literature on perfectionism. Francis H. Buckley carefully links these two notions of state power with recent empirical literature on judgment biases and happiness studies and surveys the literature, arguing for a nuanced form of social perfectionism, one which seeks to promote the kind of liberal nationalism found in the United States. (shrink)

Holm (2022) argues that a class of algorithmic fairness measures, that he refers to as the ‘performance parity criteria’, can be understood as applications of John Broome’s Fairness Principle. We argue that the performance parity criteria cannot be read this way. This is because in the relevant context, the Fairness Principle requires the equalization of actual individuals’ individual-level chances of obtaining some good (such as an accurate prediction from a predictive system), but the performance parity criteria (...) do not guarantee any such thing: the measures merely ensure that certain population-level ratios hold. (shrink)

Fairness, the notion that people deserve or have rights to certain resources or kinds of treatment, is a fundamental dimension of moral cognition. Drawing on recent evidence from economics, psychology, and neuroscience, we ask whether self-interest is always intuitive, requiring self-control to override with reasoning-based fairness concerns, or whether fairness itself can be intuitive. While we find strong support for rejecting the notion that self-interest is always intuitive, the literature has reached conflicting conclusions about the neurocognitive systems (...) underpinning fairness. We propose that this disagreement can largely be resolved in light of an extended Social Heuristics Hypothesis. Divergent findings may be attributed to the interpretation of behavioral effects of ego depletion or neurostimulation, reverse inference from brain activity to the underlying psychological process, and insensitivity to social context and inter-individual differences. To better dissect the neurobiological basis of fairness, we outline how future research should embrace cross-disciplinary methods that combine psychological manipulations with neuroimaging, and that can probe inter-individual, and cultural heterogeneities. (shrink)

Since the development of assisted reproductive technologies, infertile individuals have crossed borders to obtain treatments unavailable or unaffordable in their own country. Recent media coverage has focused on the outsourcing of surrogacy to developing countries, where the cost for surrogacy is significantly less than the equivalent cost in a more developed country. This paper discusses the ethical arguments against international surrogacy. The major opposition viewpoints can be broadly divided into arguments about welfare, commodification and exploitation. It is argued that the (...) only valid objection to international surrogacy is that surrogate mothers may be exploited by being given too little compensation. However, the possibility of exploitation is a weak argument for prohibition, as employment alternatives for potential surrogate mothers may be more exploitative or more harmful than surrogacy. It is concluded that international surrogacy must be regulated, and the proposed regulatory mechanism is termed Fair Trade Surrogacy. The guidelines of Fair Trade Surrogacy focus on minimizing potential harms to all parties and ensuring fair compensation for surrogate mothers. (shrink)

What is a fair distribution of resources and other goods when individuals are partly responsible for their achievements? This book develops a theory of fairness incorporating a concern for personal responsibility, opportunities and freedom. With a critical perspective, it makes accessible the recent developments in economics and philosophy that define social justice in terms of equal opportunities. It also proposes new perspectives and original ideas. The book separates mathematical sections from the rest of the text, so that the main (...) concepts and ideas are easily accessible to non-technical readers. -/- It is often thought that responsibility is a complex notion, but this monograph proposes a simple analytical framework that makes it possible to disentangle the different concepts of fairness that deal with neutralizing inequalities for which the individuals are not held responsible, rewarding their effort, respecting their choices, or staying neutral with respect to their responsibility sphere. It dwells on paradoxes and impossibilities only as a way to highlight important ethical options and always proposes solutions and reasonable compromises among the conflicting values surrounding equality and responsibility. -/- The theory is able to incorporate disincentive problems and is illustrated in the examination of applied policy issues such as: income redistribution when individuals may be held responsible for their choices of labor supply or education; social and private insurance when individuals may be held responsible for their risky lifestyle; second chance policies; the measurement of inequality of opportunities and social mobility. (shrink)

This article draws attention to the limited amount of scholarship on what constitutes fairness and equity in resource allocation to health research by individual funders. It identifies three key decisions of ethical significance about resource allocation that research funders make regularly and calls for prioritizing scholarship on those topics – namely, how health resources should be fairly apportioned amongst public health and health care delivery versus health research, how health research resources should be fairly allocated between health problems (...) experienced domestically versus other health problems typically experienced by disadvantaged populations outside the funder's country, and how domestic and non-domestic health research funding should be further apportioned to different areas, e.g. types of research and recipients. These three topics should be priorities for bioethics research because their outcomes have a substantial bearing on the achievement of health justice. The proposed agenda aims to move discussion on the ethics of health research funding beyond its current focus on the mismatch between worldwide basic and clinical research investment and the global burden of disease. Individual funders’ decision-making on whether and to what extent to allocate resources to non-domestic health research, health systems research, research on the social determinants of health, capacity development, and recipients in certain countries should also be the focus of ethical scrutiny. (shrink)

This article presents the evolutionary dynamics of three games: the Nash bargaining game, the ultimatum game, and a hybrid of the two. One might expect that the probability that some behavior evolves in an environment with two games would be near the probability that the same behavior evolves in either game alone. This is not the case for the ultimatum and Nash bargaining games. Fair behavior is more likely to evolve in a combined game than in either game taken individually. (...) This result confirms a conjecture that the complexity of our actual environment provides an explanation for the evolution of fair behavior. Key Words: evolutionary game theory • Nash bargaining game • ultimatum game • fairness. (shrink)

Extant business research has not addressed the ethical treatment of individuals with psychiatric disabilities. This article will describe previous research on individuals with psychiatric disabilities drawn from rehabilitation, psychological, managerial, legal, as well as related business ethics writings before presenting a framework that illustrates the dynamics of (un)ethical behavior in relation to the employment of such individuals. Individuals with psychiatric disabilities often evoke negative reactions from those in their environment. Lastly, we provide recommendations for how employees and organizations can become (...) more proactive in providing individuals with such disabilities equal employment opportunities for both access and accommodation in the workplace. (shrink)

Fairness is undoubtedly an essential normative concept in humans and promotes cooperation in human societies. The fact that fairness exists is puzzling, however, because it works against the short-term interest of individuals. Theories of genetic evolution, cultural evolution, and gene-culture coevolution identify plausible mechanisms for the evolution of fairness in humans. Such mechanisms include kin selection, the support of group-beneficial moral norms through ethnic markers, free partner choice with equal outside options, and free partner choice with reputation (...) as well as spite in small populations. Here, we present the results of a common-pool resource game experiment on sharing. Based on data from 37 multiethnic villages in a subsistence agricultural population in Foutah Djallon, Guinea, we show that fair behavior in our experiment increased with increasing ethnic homogeneity and market integration. Group size and kinship had the opposite effect. Overall, fair behavior was not conditional on reputation. Instead, the ability of the different village populations to support individuals’ fairness in situations lacking the opportunity to build a positive reputation varied significantly. Our results suggest that evolutionary theory provides a useful framework for the analysis of fairness in humans. (shrink)

Initial vaccine allocations for the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) will be limited. It is crucial to assess the ethical values associated with different methods of allocation, as well as important scientific and practical questions. This Viewpoint identifies three ethical values, benefiting people and limiting harm; prioritizing disadvantaged populations; and equal concern for all. It then explains why these values support prioritizing three groups: health care workers; other essential workers and people in high-transmission settings; and people with medical vulnerabilities associated with (...) poorer COVID-19 outcomes. In contrast, two other groups, people over 65 without medical vulnerabilities and participants in clinical research, present more complex ethical questions. This prioritization also encompasses valuing direct benefits to vaccinated individuals, indirect benefits to individuals protected from spread of infection, and indirect health and socioeconomic benefits to those protected from harm as health system and societal functioning improve. Vaccine allocation that recognizes important ethical values and avoids arbitrariness, waste, and corruption can ensure that the distribution of a COVID-19 vaccine is both fair and perceived as fair. (shrink)

This book addresses a range of relevant theoretical issues, including the possibility of an interpersonally comparable measure of well-being, or “utility” metric; the moral value of equality, and how that bears on the form of the social welfare function; social choice under uncertainty; and the possibility of integrating considerations of individual choice and responsibility into the social-welfare-function framework. This book also deals with issues of implementation, and explores how survey data and other sources of evidence might be used to (...) calibrate both a utility metric and a social welfare function, and whether distributive goals are ever best pursued through regulation rather than the tax system. In working through this range of theoretical and practical issues, the book draws from a wide variety of literatures, including philosophical scholarship on equality, responsibility, the nature of well-being, and personal identity over time; the social choice literature within economics; applied economic literatures concerning the measurement of inequality and poverty; legal and policy-analysis scholarship on cost-benefit analysis, environmental justice, and the choice between regulation and taxation; and the burgeoning field of “happiness studies”. (shrink)

In this article, we describe the influence of violations of community standards of fairness on subsequent ethical decision-making and emotions. Across two studies, we manipulated explanations for a common action, and we find that explanations that violate community standards of fairness lead to greater intentions to behave unethically than explanations that are consistent with community standards of fairness. We find that perceptions of justifiability mediate this relationship. We also find that individuals derive significant psychological benefits from engaging (...) in unethical behavior following perceived violations of fairness. (shrink)

Although fairness is a key moral trait, limited research focuses on participants' observed fairness behavior because moral traits are generally measured through self-report. This experiment focused on day-to-day interpersonal fairness rather than impersonal justice, and fairness was assessed as observed behavior. The experiment investigated whether a self-reported fairness trait would moderate a situational influence on observed fairness behavior, such that individuals with a stronger fairness trait would be less affected by a situational influence (...) than those with a weaker fairness trait. We used an iterated resource game in which participants could withdraw resources as they chose, and we manipulated the number of resources bogus players withdrew. The number of resources participants withdrew was the behavioral measure of fairness. Results confirmed the expected moderation of the unfairness manipulation by a fairness trait on observed behavior. Those reporting a stronger fairness trait were unaffected by the manipulation, whereas those reporting a weaker fairness trait were more strongly influenced. (shrink)

An overview and assessment of the current state of research on individual consumption of Fair Trade (FT) products is given on the basis of 51 journal publications. Arranging this field of ethical consumption research according to key research objectives, theoretical approaches, methods, and study population, the review suggests that most studies apply social psychological approaches focusing mainly on consumer attitudes. Fewer studies draw on economic approaches focusing on consumers’ willingness to pay ethical premia for FT products or sociological approaches (...) relying on the concept of consumer identity. Experimental, qualitative and conventional survey methods are used approximately equally often. Almost all studies draw on convenience or purposive samples and most studies are conducted in the USA or the United Kingdom. Several problems in current research are identified: amongst others, studies’ rather narrow theoretical focus, potential hypothetical and social desirability bias of conventional survey data, and a lack of generalizability of empirical findings. In turn, we suggest that research would benefit from both a multiple-motives and a multiple-methods perspective. Considering competing theories can help to single out key behavioral determinants of individual FT consumption. The combination of different methods such as conventional surveys and field experiments contributes to uncovering respondents’ truthful answers and improves generalizability of results. Scholars in the field of ethical consumption research should use experiments to detect causal relations proposed by theories and conduct cross-country surveys to gather insights as to how differences in market structures, cultural traits, and other path dependencies affect patterns of individual FT consumption. (shrink)

This paper considers the problem of fair allocation among individuals with unequal production skills. We introduce the concept of productivity‐adjusted average no‐envy. It is shown that equal‐income Walrasian allocations are the only surviving allocations that are productivity‐adjusted average envy‐free and efficient when the original economy is infinitely replicated. We also examine local versions of productivity‐adjusted average no‐envy and other equity concepts.

Fairness is a normative ideal that runs through sports. After all, what defines our cultural evolution in general is a conception of morality, whether thought of in the context of the state, tribe, team, or individual. Human dignity is also one of the important features of sport. Sport is reality for the better part of our nature. We find inspiration for the meaning of life in sport; dignity, social contact, rising to show the “better angel” overcoming adversity, managing (...) defeat, the wondrous sense of well-earned and arduous victory, graciousness toward others in their defeat. While human dignity and solidarity are particularly expressed in the context of the Special Olympics, adaptation, well-being, and the role of sport are important elements in the context of all sporting events. Sport remains timeless while being a lifelong activity for many. (shrink)

Fair trade (FT) is of growing interest to those carrying out research into ethical decision making. In this paper, we report findings from a recent survey of FT purchasing among 688 retail shoppers in the United Kingdom. We examined the relationship between individual differences, in terms of gender and age, and three outcome measures: purchasing, word of mouth (WOM) recommendation and social advocacy. Though age appeared to have no significant effects, we found evidence of gender difference in each outcome (...) measure. Females in our sample were more likely to purchase FT goods, to recommend them by WOM, and to advocate FT purchasing to friends and family. We discuss the implications of these findings in terms of the literature on ethical decision making and gender difference. (shrink)

Fair trade (FT) is of growing interest to those carrying out research into ethical decision making. In this paper, we report findings from a recent survey of FT purchasing among 688 retail shoppers in the United Kingdom. We examined the relationship between individual differences, in terms of gender and age, and three outcome measures: purchasing, word of mouth (WOM) recommendation and social advocacy. Though age appeared to have no significant effects, we found evidence of gender difference in each outcome (...) measure. Females in our sample were more likely to purchase FT goods, to recommend them by WOM, and to advocate FT purchasing to friends and family. We discuss the implications of these findings in terms of the literature on ethical decision making and gender difference. (shrink)

It is universally agreed that involuntary unemployment is an evil for unemployed individuals, who lose both income and the non-pecuniary benefits of paid employment, and for society, which loses the productive labor that the unemployed are unable to expend. It is nearly as widely agreed that there is at least a prima-facie case for alleviating this evil – for reasons of justice and/or benevolence and/or social order. Finally, there is little doubt that the evils of involuntary unemployment cannot be adequately (...) addressed in contemporary societies without state intervention – whether through monetary or fiscal policies, cash payments or other subsidies to the unemployed, direct provision of employment by the state, or some combination of these measures. (shrink)

This article concerns the problem of factual uncertainty in negligence law. We argue that negligence law’s insistence that fair terms of interaction be maintained between individuals—a requirement that typically manifests itself in the need for the plaintiff to prove factual or “but-for” causation—sometimes allows for the imposition of liability in the absence of such proof. In particular, we argue that the but-for requirement can be abandoned in certain situations where multiple defendants have imposed the same unreasonable risk on a plaintiff, (...) where the plaintiff suffers the very sort of harm that rendered the risk unreasonable, and where the plaintiff cannot prove which of the defendants was the but-for cause of her loss. This approach provides one way to understand the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decision in Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke. We find support for our approach in various concepts that underlie negligence liability quite generally. These underlying concepts are normative in nature, and manifest core notions of justice and fairness. We argue that approaches to the problem of factual uncertainty that appeal to such normative principles to make sense of atypical cases of causation are in no way inconsistent with the nature and structure of negligence law. Rather, the opposite is true: in taking negligence law seriously as law, such approaches are instead reflective and supportive of it. (shrink)

In order to describe the logic of morality, "contractualist" philosophers have studied how individuals behave when they choose to follow their moral intuitions. These individuals, contractualists note, often act as if they have bargained and thus reached an agreement with others about how to distribute the benefits and burdens of mutual cooperation. Using this observation, such philosophers argue that the purpose of morality is to maximize the benefits of human interaction. The resulting "contract" analogy is both insightful and puzzling. On (...) one hand, it captures the pattern of moral intuitions, thus answering questions about human cooperation: why do humans cooperate? Why should the distribution of benefits be proportionate to each person's contribution? Why should the punishment be proportionate to the crime? Why should the rights be proportionate to the duties? On the other hand, the analogy provides a mere as-if explanation for human cooperation, saying that cooperation is "as if" people have passed a contract-but since they didn't, why should it be so? To evolutionary thinkers, the puzzle of the missing contract is immediately reminiscent of the puzzle of the missing "designer" of life-forms, a puzzle that Darwin's theory of natural selection essentially resolved. Evolutionary and contractualist theory originally intersected at the work of philosophers John Rawls and David Gauthier, who argued that moral judgments are based on a sense of fairness that has been naturally selected. In this book, Nicolas Baumard further explores the theory that morality was originally an adaptation to the biological market of cooperation, an arena in which individuals competed to be selected for cooperative interactions. In this environment, Baumard suggests, the best strategy was to treat others with impartiality and to share the costs and benefits of cooperation in a fair way, so that those who offered less than others were left out of cooperation while those who offered more were exploited by their partners. It is with this evolutionary approach that Baumard ultimately accounts for the specific structure of human morality. (shrink)

Every year, hundreds of patients in England die whilst waiting for a kidney transplant, and this is evidence that the current system of altruistic-based donation is not sufficient to address the shortage of kidneys available for transplant. To address this problem, we propose a monopsony system whereby kidney donors can opt-in to receive financial compensation, whilst still preserving the right of individuals to donate without receiving any compensation. A monopsony system describes a market structure where there is only one ‘buyer’—in (...) this case the National Health Service. By doing so, several hundred lives could be saved each year in England, wait times for a kidney transplant could be significantly reduced, and it would lessen the burden on dialysis services. Furthermore, compensation would help alleviate the common disincentives to living kidney donation, such as its potential associated health and psychological costs, and it would also help to increase awareness of living kidney donation. The proposed system would also result in significant cost savings that could then be redirected towards preventing kidney disease and reducing health disparities. While concerns about exploitation, coercion, and the ‘crowding out’ of altruistic donors exist, we believe that careful implementation can mitigate these issues. Therefore, we recommend piloting financial compensation for living kidney donors at a transplant centre in England. (shrink)

The recent proliferation of new data and technologies enables increasingly finer personalization of products and prices in every domain. In insurance, this revives and enlarges old debates around fairness that have never been completely settled. We will argue that the commonly accepted “actuarial fairness” as based on the “individual cost of risk” derives in fact from a conflation: while it indicates the average cost for a group of insureds from the perspective of an insurance company—and is therefore (...) sound from a business profitability viewpoint—it is arguable whether it represents the “fair price” for the individual insured. We first show in a historical perspective the intertwinement of conceptions of fairness with knowledge, in order to point to the alternative to actuarial fairness for insurance. We then describe the intrinsic difference between the insured and the insurer when underwriting an insurance contract. Finally, we build on this distinction to discuss the meaning of fairness in insurance prices. We thus hope to re-center the debate around insurance fairness on its underlying solidarity mechanisms rather than technical and actuarial considerations. (shrink)

The concept of fairness as mutual advantage has been developed in the tradition of social contract theory. In this framework society is seen as an enterprise that coordinates the activities of its members in order to advance their interests. All acceptable social rules are in the interest of each member of society. Rules are agreed unanimously – no rules can be enforced against the interest of someone. It is assumed that individuals are basically self-interested and rational. Radical libertarianism claims (...) that individuals do not have to accept any a priori constraints on their behavior. “Libertarianism focuses on negative freedom”. (shrink)

The number of people in immediate need of anti‐retroviral treatment (ART) in the southern African region continues to significantly exceed the capacity of health systems there to provide it. Approaches to this complex rationing dilemma have evolved in different directions. The ethical concepts of fairness and equity have been suggested as a basis to guide the development of approaches to select patients for ART. This article reports the results of a case study on patient selection at a rural ART (...) clinic in Lesotho. The purpose of the study was to examine whether or not such concepts had relevance or operative value for a treatment team providing ART in rural Lesotho. The study found that while concepts of fairness and equity were relevant to the work of the treatment team, patient selection practices did not necessarily reflect what these concepts entail. The idea of fairness as a structured, formalized selection process did not figure in the approach to ART provision at the site. A less formal, ‘first‐come‐first‐served’ approach was adopted. While there was knowledge among some team members that social, economic or geographic conditions inhibit individuals and groups from gaining access to ART and that this was inequitable, it was felt that there was little they could do to try to mediate the impact of these conditions. The study's findings pose importance questions about the approach to ART programming in resource constrained settings. The findings also question the relevance of trying to achieve fairness and equity when the gap between need for care and capacity to provide it remains so large. (shrink)

Literature and Moral Feeling argued that ethics is best understood as a constraint on egocentric self-interest. That constraint is specified variously by groups or individuals who set parameters differently within common ethical principles, and who use a range of emotion-guided narrative genres to imagine and evaluate possible actions. Though it covers many ethical concerns (collectively termed “morality”), this account leaves out fairness (alternatively, justice). The following essay seeks to make up for that deficit. Framing its analysis by reference to (...) a well-known problem in Milton's Paradise Lost, it distinguishes two systems of ethical response organized around first- and third-person perspectives. Like the first-person concerns of morality, third person concerns of justice are specified by setting parameters within common principles. In treating these principles and parameters, the essay articulates cognitive and affective components of third-person ethical evaluation. These, then, help to resolve the problem with Milton's poem. That resolution, in turn, suggests further complications in the account of ethical evaluation. (shrink)

The data science era is characterized by data-driven automated decision systems (ADS) enabling, through data analytics and machine learning, automated decisions in many contexts, deeply impacting our lives. As such, their downsides and potential risks are becoming more and more evident: technical solutions, alone, are not sufficient and an interdisciplinary approach is needed. Consequently, ADS should evolve into data-informed ADS, which take humans in the loop in all the data processing steps. Data-informed ADS should deal with data responsibly, guaranteeing nondiscrimination (...) with respect to protected groups of individuals. Nondiscrimination can be characterized in terms of different types of properties, like fairness and diversity. While fairness, i.e., absence of bias against minorities, has been widely investigated in machine learning, only more recently this issue has been tackled by considering all the steps of data processing pipelines at the basis of ADS, from data acquisition to analysis. Additionally, fairness is just one point of view of nondiscrimination to be considered for guaranteeing equity: other issues, like diversity, are raising interest from the scientific community due to their relevance in society. This paper aims at critically surveying how nondiscrimination has been investigated in the context of complex data science pipelines at the basis of data-informed ADS, by focusing on the specific data processing tasks for which nondiscrimination solutions have been proposed. (shrink)

Algorithmic decision-making increasingly shapes people's daily lives. Given that such autonomous systems can cause severe harm to individuals and social groups, fairness concerns have arisen. A human-centric approach demanded by scholars and policymakers requires considering people's fairness perceptions when designing and implementing algorithmic decision-making. We provide a comprehensive, systematic literature review synthesizing the existing empirical insights on perceptions of algorithmic fairness from 58 empirical studies spanning multiple domains and scientific disciplines. Through thorough coding, we systemize the current (...) empirical literature along four dimensions: (1) algorithmic predictors, (2) human predictors, (3) comparative effects (human decision-making vs. algorithmic decision-making), and (4) consequences of algorithmic decision-making. While we identify much heterogeneity around the theoretical concepts and empirical measurements of algorithmic fairness, the insights come almost exclusively from Western-democratic contexts. By advocating for more interdisciplinary research adopting a society-in-the-loop framework, we hope our work will contribute to fairer and more responsible algorithmic decision-making. (shrink)

Algorithmic fairness is a new interdisciplinary field of study focused on how to measure whether a process, or algorithm, may unintentionally produce unfair outcomes, as well as whether or how the potential unfairness of such processes can be mitigated. Statistical discrimination describes a set of informational issues that can induce rational (i.e., Bayesian) decision-making to lead to unfair outcomes even in the absence of discriminatory intent. In this article, we provide overviews of these two related literatures and draw connections (...) between them. The comparison illustrates both the conflict between rationality and fairness and the importance of endogeneity (e.g., “rational expectations” and “self-fulfilling prophecies”) in defining and pursuing fairness. Taken in concert, we argue that the two traditions suggest a value for considering new fairness notions that explicitly account for how the individual characteristics an algorithm intends to measure may change in response to the algorithm. (shrink)

A vast stream of empirical work has revealed that coach and athlete leadership are important determinants of sport teams’ functioning and performance. Although coaches have a direct impact on individual and team outcomes, they should also strive to stimulate athletes to take up leadership roles in a qualitative manner. Yet, the relation between coach leadership behavior and the extent of high-quality athlete leadership within teams remains underexposed. Based on organizational justice theory and the social identity approach, the present research (...) tested whether perceived justice of the coach positively predicts the quality of athlete leadership. Furthermore, we examined the role of group dynamic processes within this relation. Belgian volleyball and basketball players were asked to rate the justice of their coach, their team identification, the task cohesion, and the athlete leadership quality in the team. Structural equation modeling indicated that coaches’ perceived justice positively predicted the quality of athletes’ leadership, and that this relation was established through three intermediate steps. These results suggest that fair coach behavior does not only bridge the gap between leadership and followership, it also has the potential to improve the quality of athletes’ leadership within sport teams. More specifically, findings suggest that coaches’ perceived justice cultivates a shared social identity characterized by high levels of players’ identification with their team, which in turn increased their perceptions of the team’s task cohesion. Finally, this increased task cohesion encouraged the athlete leaders to demonstrate high-quality leadership. (shrink)

Despite the reality of intersex individuals whose biological markers do not necessarily all point towards a traditional binary understanding of either male or female, the vast majority of sports divide competition into categories based on a binary notion of biological sex and develop policies and regulations to police the divide. In so doing, sports governing bodies (SGBs) adopt an imperfect model of biological sex in order to serve their particular purposes, which, typically, will include protecting the fundamental sporting value of (...) fair competition. Yet, one potential consequence of enforcing such an approach would seem to be the exclusion or marginalization of individuals whose biological development does not fit within the binary model, whether due to genetics or through a choice to undergo medical intervention to better represent a chosen gender identity. Any such exclusion or marginalization will inevitably tend to undermine another fundamental value of sport, that of inclusivity. In the context of those with differences of sex development, SGBs appear to be faced with a difficult problem: dealing with a conflict between two fundamental values of sport. Different approaches to this problem have been suggested, with some academics proposing that sports organisations, in general, ought to prioritise fairness above, while others suggest the need to ‘balance’ competing values or even to prioritise inclusion over fairness. However, it is argued that any of these approaches are, in principle, justifiable as any sport should be free to prioritise or balance its own values. What seems more important for any SGB is the need for a rational and transparent justification of regulations that pursue fair competition at the expense of inclusivity. Furthermore, where fair competition and inclusivity are fundamental values, any such justification would seem to demand adherence to some basic norms. First, the regulations should be built on (and articulate) a consistent and principled basis of what ‘fair competition’ means in a particular sport. Second, any regulations should only exclude or restrict participation to the minimum degree necessary to achieve the sense of fair competition so articulated. Third, SGBs should be transparent about what their values are and where their priorities lie so that participants and other stakeholders are able to make an informed choice as to whether they wish to participate in, support, or be associated with a particular sport. With reference to the adoption of the Eligibility Regulations for Athletes with Differences of Sex Development (the ‘DSD Regulations’) by the International Association of Athletic Federations (IAAF), this article seeks to evaluate whether the approach of the IAAF satisfied these basic requirements. (shrink)

John Taurek famously argued that, in ‘conflict cases’, where we are confronted with a smaller and a larger group of individuals, and can choose which group to save from harm, we should toss a coin, rather than saving the larger group. This is primarily because coin-tossing is fairer: it ensures that each individual, regardless of the group to which he or she belongs, has an equal chance of being saved. This article provides a new response to Taurek’s argument. It (...) proposes that there are two possible types of unfairness that have to be avoided in conflict cases, as far as possible: ‘selection unfairness’, which is the unfairness of not giving individuals an equal chance of being saved; and ‘outcome unfairness’, which is the unfairness of not actually saving them, when others are saved. Since saving the greater number generates less outcome unfa-irness than coin-tossing, it is argued that, in many conflict cases, fairness demands that we save the greater number. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that established responses to the demandingness objection fail to acknowledge an alternative explanation of the intuitive pull of this objection for a significant subset of norms being subject to it. This is the class of imperfect collective duties, which give rise to conceptually distinct objections from fairness that nonetheless permeate many clear examples of intuitively problematic moral demands. Such duties obtain where it is morally required to attain a certain outcome O, yet obtaining O (...) does not require each moral agent to do as much as they individually can but instead requires a finite amount of effort that can be variously allocated to different agents – think of classic collective action problems such as protesting against an unjust policy, lobbying a government, donating to disaster relief, or hosting refugees. -/- In such cases, our collective ability to attain O grounds a collective duty C to attain O, but this collective duty can be translated into various schemes of individual duties P to contribute towards O. Accordingly, this decomposition of C raises a problem of distributive justice. In fact, many intuitive objections to unfair distributions in such cases can be readily accounted for with the conceptual apparatus of prominent theories of distributive justice, but not by standard theories of interpersonal morality. For instance, the moral relevance of the fact that performing a composite duty P is more burdensome for agent A than for agent B can readily be explained in luck-egalitarian terms. Yet both utilitarians and contractualists could not account for this fact independently of an appeal to the demandingness objection, provided that the moral importance of the outcome attainable through P still trumps reasons against it that are due to the burden borne by the agent. -/- Put briefly, then, we need to clearly distinguish objections that morality demands _too much_ of me from objections that morality demands too much _of me_. Doing so is likely to make accepting the demandingness of morality properly construed more intuitively plausible, perhaps as mitigated by certain existing responses. (shrink)

Sea-level rise (SLR) is a threat to coastal areas and there is growing interest in how social values, risk perception and fairness can inform adaptation. This study applies these three concepts to an urban community at risk of SLR in Botany Bay, Australia. The study engaged diverse groups of residents via an online survey. Cluster analysis identified four interpretive communities: two groups value work-life balance, are concerned about SLR and would likely engage in collective adaptation. The third group value (...) everything about Botany Bay and are active in organisations that could prove to be an important outreach. The fourth group were older men, disengaged from both SLR and policy but could respond to individual consultation and targeted communication. Thus, multifarious approaches can engage diverse communities in fair decision-making and transform community-facilitated adaptation. (shrink)

While both economic and social considerations of fairness and equity play an important role in financial decision-making, it is not clear which of these two motives is more primal and immediate and which one is secondary and slow. Here we used variants of the ultimatum game to examine this question. Experiment 1 shows that acceptance rate of unfair offers increases when participants are asked to base their choice on their gut-feelings, as compared to when they thoroughly consider the available (...) information. In line with these results, Experiments 2 and 3 provide process evidence that individuals prefer to first examine economic information about their own utility rather than social information about equity and fairness, even at the price of foregoing such social information. Our results suggest that people are more economically rational at the core, but social considerations (e.g., inequality aversion) require deliberation, which under certain conditions override their self-interested impulses. (shrink)