This chapter contains section titled: “Of Personal Identity”.

Members of the Baha'i Faith have been subject to persecution in Iran since the mid‐nineteenth century. Our investigation considers how collective identity among a Pacific Northwest Community has been constructed through the contexts of continued persecution in Iran and the development of religious texts, which helped to define the religious community. The texts found within the Baha'i Faith utilize metaphors of the body to construct religious identity. Many anthropologists have theorized on the usefulness of the body as a (...) unit of study; in addition, recent attention by scholars has illustrated the intersection of the body and religion. A model is developed linking identity, consciousness, the body and experience that explains how collective identity is constructed. When considering the situation of the Baha'i community, this model has proven particularly useful in understanding how geographically disassociated people manage to construct social kinship within the context of religious persecution. In particular, American Baha'is describe the persecution of Baha'is in Iran as a collective experience, especially since the direct experience of persecution is far removed from their everyday living. Preliminary analysis of interviews with an American Baha'i, and an ex‐patriot Iranian Baha'i reveal differences in constructions of identity. (shrink)

In this volume--the first, focused study of Hume on time and identity--Baxter focuses on Hume’s treatment of the concept of numerical identity, which is central to Hume's famous discussions of the external world and personal identity. Hume raises a long unappreciated, and still unresolved, difficulty with the concept of identity: how to represent something as "a medium betwixt unity and number." Superficial resemblance to Frege’s famous puzzle has kept the difficulty in the (...) shadows. Hume’s way of addressing it makes sense only in the context of his unorthodox theory of time. Baxter shows the defensibility of that theory against past dismissive interpretations, especially of Hume’s stance on infinite divisibility. Later the author shows how the difficulty underlies Hume’s later worries about his theory of personal identity, in a new reading motivated by Hume’s important appeals to consciousness. Baxter casts Hume throughout as an acute metaphysician, and reconciles this side of Hume with his overarching Pyrrhonian skepticism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume, Strict Identity, and Time's Vacuum Michael J. Costa It is well known that Hume distinguishes between strict identity and the identity that applies to changeable objects, such as physical objects or persons. Identity judgments that we make with respect to changeable objects are based upon a number offeatures that determine how likely it is for the mind to confuse the perception of (...) such objects with the continuous perception ofan unchanging object. Strict identity can apply only to the latter (T 203-18, 253-63). Even the idea of strict identity, however, is considered by Hume to be a fiction and based at bottom on a confusion. I will concentrate here on Hume's account of the idea of strict identity, and I will try to explain the precise sense in which Hume considers this idea to be a fiction and based upon a confusion. Some very able commentators have dealt with this topic before, but none of the accounts with which I am familiar give adequate attention to the full context of Hume's account in the Treatise. They do not note the degree to which his account develops out ofand depends upon verybasic features of his system, such as his characterization of relations as complex ideas (T 13) and his theory of abstract ideas (T 17-25). Nor do the accounts note the degree to which the idea of strict identity is tied to the idea of time without change (T 64-5), and through that, to the idea of a vacuum (T 53-65).2 I shall argue that viewing Hume's account of the idea of strict identity in light of his accounts of complex and abstract ideas, his account ofthe idea ofa vacuum, and his account oftime without change makes considerable sense of it, at least as an account that it is reasonable for him to hold. I will proceed by examining each of these features in turn. Along the way I hope to make some novel and enlightening interpretative points with regard to complex ideas, abstract ideas, the idea of time, and the idea of a vacuum. I Hume tells us that simple perceptions (whether impressions or ideas) are those which admit of no distinction nor separation, whereas complex perceptions are contrary to these and may be distinguished into parts (T 2). The example that he immediately gives, however, at best clouds the distinction he has made. He says, Tho' a particular Volume XVI Number 1 MICHAEL J. COSTA colour, taste, and smell are qualities all united together in this apple, 'tis easy toperceive they are not the same, but are at least distinguishable from each other (T 2). This may make it seem that simple ideas are universals and that a mere distinction ofreason (see T 24) is enough to show that a perception is not simple; but I think that Hume did not have universals in mind at all with respect to the simple/complex distinction. Every perception-proper for Hume is a particular, an existent (T 66-7). There is, indeed, something more to a universal or abstractideafor Hume than a particular idea, but this something more is a disposition and not another idea or perception. I see no evidence that Hume intended the simple/complex distinction to apply to the dispositions connected with abstract ideas. Note that in the apple example, the ideas mentioned are of different sense modalities. They can be distinguished psychologically, and not merely as distinctions of reason. One can form a distinct idea of the colour of the apple without forming any idea of taste or smell. The shape of the apple would not be distinct in the same way. Any idea of the shape of the apple would, for Hume, also be an idea of some colour or other. This becomes important when we note that Hume characterizes space and time (indeed, all relations) as complex ideas (T 13). He does not mean that these ideas are logically analyzable; he means that any instance of these ideas is psychologically analyzable. Any instance is analyzable into idea parts that can be considered separately in mind from the other idea parts. An instance ofspace or extension... (shrink)

La interpretación estándar de la teoría humeana sobre la identidad personal suele aceptar dos tesis importantes: (T1) no existe un yo o mente dotada de simplicidad e identidad perfecta; (T2) Hume defiende una teoría metafísica específica acerca de la naturaleza del yo o de la mente, según la cual esta es solo un haz de percepciones. Se argumenta que ambas afirmaciones, son falsas. Su aceptación comprometería a Hume con una forma de dogmatismo epistémico y metafísico incompatible con su (...) filosofía experimental. The standard interpretation of Hume's theory of personal identity usually accepts two important theses: (T1) there is no self or mind endowed with simplicity and perfect identity; (T2) Hume defends a specific metaphysical theory regarding the nature of the self or of the mind, according to which it is only a bundle of perceptions. The article argues that both of those statements are false. Accepting them would commit Hume to a form of epistemic and metaphysical dogmatism that is incompatible with his experimental philosophy. A interpretação padrão da teoria humeana sobre a identidade pessoal costuma aceitar duas teses importantes: 1) não existe um eu ou mente dotada de simplicidade e identidade perfeita; 2) Hume defende uma teoria metafísica específica sobre a natureza do eu ou da mente, segundo a qual esta é só uma face de percepções. Neste artigo, argumenta-se que ambas as afirmações são falsas. Sua aceitação comprometeria a Hume com uma forma de dogmatismo epistêmico e metafísico incompatível com sua filosofia experimental. (shrink)

Paul de Rapin-Thoyras's History of England has hitherto occupied a marginal position in most accounts of eighteenth-century historiography, despite its considerable readership and influence. This paper charts the publication history of the work, its politics and style, and the methods through which Rapin's British translators and booksellers successfully proposed the work as the model for new historical enquiry, and its author as the model for a modern historical writer. It is further argued that David Hume's writings and letters relating (...) to his History of England suggest a direct and critical engagement with Rapin's work, and with the identity of the historian, as it had been constructed through Rapin's success. By focussing on the mechanisms of production and circulation, and the impact which these had on the practice of historical writing in the eighteenth century, the paper aims to demonstrate the value of applying social–historical methods to the study of historical writing. (shrink)

• But this is not all: since organisms differ from aggregates (maybe tables do too?). The difference: organisation, indeed, organisation that constitutes ‘vegetable life’.

Hume’s critique of traditional abstraction entails a result that undercuts his account of the idea of identity. To save his account of identity, Hume would have to accept abstraction as well. What links these two discussions is (1) Hume’s widely shared assumption that traditional abstraction is separating in the mind what are inseparable in reality, (2) his principle that what are different are mentally separable, and (3) his principle that we cannot conceive of the impossible. (...) Given these, it will turn out that abstraction is mentally separating something from itself, which will entail that abstraction is conceiving of something as distinct from itself. But it is impossible for something to be distinct from itself, and so it is inconceivable. Therefore abstraction is impossible. Yet consider Hume’s account of the idea of identity. On that account, to conceive of an identity is to conceive of something as one single thing viewed one way and as two distinct things viewed another. How we can take these opposing views of the same thing is a problem that I’ve termed Hume’s Difficulty concerning Identity. It will turn out that we can take the opposing views only if we can conceive of the single thing viewed one way as somehow distinct from itself when viewed the other way. That is, we must be able to conceive of something as distinct from itself. However, if we cannot conceive of something as distinct from itself when abstracting, then we cannot do it when conceiving of an identity. So traditional abstraction and Hume’s account of the idea of identity stand or fall together. (shrink)

According to Hume, the idea of a persisting, self-identical object, distinct from our impressions of it, and the idea of a duration of time, the mere passage of time without change, are mutually supporting "fictions". Each rests upon a "mistake", the commingling of "qualities of the imagination" or "impressions of reflection" with "external" impressions (perceptions), and, strictly speaking, we are conceptually and epistemically entitled to neither. Among Kant's aims in the First Critique is the securing of precisely these entitlements. (...) Like Hume, he acknowledges the correlativity of the notions of temporal duration and persisting self-identical objects (i.e., continuant substances). Unlike Hume, however, he undertakes to establish the legitimacy or objective validity of the schematized category of substance and, correspondingly, of the representation of time as a formal unity with duration as one of its modes. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:323 A DEFENSE OF HUME ON IDENTITY THROUGH TIME A durable complaint against Hume is that he blatantly begs the question in his Treatise account of our acquisition of the idea of identity through time. Green and Grose made the accusation in 1878; one hundred years later Stroud echoed the same accusation, its force and liveliness seemingly undiminished. I suggest that this accusation is based (...) on a tempting but unwarranted assumption about Humean perceptions. It is unwarranted despite Price's arguments for it. When the assumption is corrected Hume is exonerated. This defense prepares the way for a new understanding of Hume's subtle and important theory of identity. Clarifying his theory is the goal; defending him is the means. I will merely summarize the Green and Grose interpretation, saving detailed examination for Stroud's. Stroud's version seems more tightly argued for and spares one the problems of interpreting commentators from a different philosophical tradition. Green and Grose run together Hume's account of the acquisition of the idea of identity, with his account of the application of that idea to a succession of related perceptions. This fully intended confusion can be explained by their understanding of Hume's claim that "impressions are... perishing existences." (T 194) They assume that for Hume no perception (impression or idea) is a unity if it exists at an interval of time composed of a succession of times. Rather the perception is really a succession of perceptions. Their assumed interpretation makes Hume seem to them to beg the question as follows: To acquire the idea of identity through time is to acquire the idea of something 324 which is unitary and exists at a succession of times. But any impression which might give this idea is really a succession of related impressions. A succession of related impressions can convey the idea of identity only by being confused with a unitary impression which exists at a succession of times. Such confusion would be possible only for someone who already had the idea of something unitary which exists at a succession of times. So the idea of 2 identity can be acquired only if it is already had. In other words, Hume claims that an impression had for a relatively long time gives the idea of identity. Any long impression is really a succession. A succession can give the idea of identity only if it is confused with something that has identity. That confusion requires the idea of identity already. So Hume begs the question. There are gaps in this argument. But its influence has been important and its structure is clear: If we assume that perceptions are exceedingly brief, then Hume begs the question. (I will call the assumption 'the prosecution's assumption.') Stroud's argument that Hume begs the question has the same structure, or so I will argue. The role of the prosecution's assumption is not immediately apparent, but it is a crucial role. Stroud's accusation is as follows: By Hume's definition, identity is the invariableness and uninterruptedness of an object through a supposed change in time. (T 201) However, on Hume's account of acquiring the concept of identity, the acquisition involves imagining a change in time without any variation or interruption in an object. But that just ¿s, by definition, to imagine the object's identity through the change in time. So acquiring the concept of identity requires an act of imagination involving the 325 concept of identity. So, Stroud concludes, on Hume's account the concept of identity can be acquired only 3 if it is had. Hume's account begs the question. I think it is usually unwise to attribute blunders to subtle thinkers. I will not do it to Hume, nor to his commentators. I will argue that what Hume presupposes in explaining identity through time is a little different from identity through time. Thus the presupposition is not question-begging. More specifically, I will argue that Hume distinguishes three technical concepts, three ways to take up time: (i) merely occupying an interval of time, (ii) having duration for an interval of time, and (iii) being identical through an interval of time. Concept (iii... (shrink)

Hume’s understanding of the external world, particularly, his conception of objects, or what he occasionally refers to as “bodies,” is the subject of much dispute. Are objects mind-independent? Or, are they just what we see, feel, smell, taste, or touch? In other words, are objects just sense data? Or, are they ideas about sense data? Or, are objects, somehow, mind-independent, but we have ideas of them, and we receive sense data from them? In this paper, I provide some answers (...) to these questions—by way of distinguishing between the vulgar position, the philosophical position, and Hume’s position. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:59. HUME ON IDENTITY It is well-known that Hume has a quite unusual theory of personal identity. For him, personal identity is but the identity of mind. But to him mind is just a bundle of perceptions which keeps changing its constituent members; hence a mind is not something constant. In other places he also argues that mind is not a substance which (...) unites all the perceptions which a person may have. His conclusion is that cases of personal identity for ordinary people are not genuine cases of identity for him at all. This probably is a direct consequence of his unusual notion of identity. My concern then is to see what Hume takes identity to be as an idea and as a relation. The idea of identity, according to Hume, is an idea betwixt unity and number. (T 201 J1 So I want to see first how the ideas of number and unity originate. Hume says that; a single object, plac'd before us, and survey 'd for any time without our discovering in it any interruption or variation, is able to give us a notion of identity. For when we consider any two points of this time, we may place them in different lights: We may either survey them at the very same instant; in which case they give us the idea of number, both by themselves and by the object; which must be multiply 'd, in order to he conceiv'd at once, as existent in these two different points of time. (T 201)2 What is surveyed is a single object, i.e., an object which is neither interrupted nor varied. According to Price, "At this stage of [Hume's] inquiry, he ought only to be talking of sense-impressions ( 'perceptions ')," so, here instead of talking about a single object, I shall talk about a single perception, i.e., an uninterrupted, unchanged perception which persists through a certain period of time. Roughly speaking, a perception is interrupted if it is not temporally 60. continuous; it is varied, if it changes either its sensible qualities, or its spatial characteristics, viz., shape, size, pattern. But what is a single perception which is uninterrupted and unchanged? This question as stated is misleading, for it suggests that there may be a single though interrupted or varied perception. The question I am now asking is the question of individuating perceptions. It is clear that for Hume the principle of individuation of perceptions is their invariableness and uninterruptedness through a supposed variation of time. (T 201) Hence there would be no such thing as a single but interrupted or varied perception. Since Hume gives us no example of an uninterrupted and unchanged perception, let us choose an example for ourselves. Suppose we have nothing but twelve eggs in front of us, and suppose that the eggs and their immediate environment do not change during a certain period of time. Then the perception we have of these twelve eggs during this period of time would be an uninterrupted and unchanged perception. Let P be 4 this perception. What Hume wants to do is to consider two points of time t ^ and t2 in this period. Let P1 and P2 i,s the perceptions we have of the twelve eggs at t, and t2, respectively. P ^ and P2 are then two stages of the perception P. Since P is uninterrupted and unchanged, its 'content' at each point of time during this period should remain the same. As Hume puts it, we suppose the change to lie only in... time (T 203); and the change in time, when applied to an unchangeable object, 'tis only by a fiction of the imagination, by which the unchangeable object is suppos'd to participate of the changes of the coexistent objects, and in particular of that of our perceptions. (T 200-201) We now are told to survey P. and P. at once. But this can only be done at a time t- which is 61. later than both t ^ and t 2·How can we survey them after t ^ and t2? Presumably by memory we may recall P1 and P 2 at t3. Now Hume tells... (shrink)

In Part IV of Book I of Hume’s Treatise Hume frequently appeals to an identity-ascribing mechanism of the imagination. A psychological mechanism of which it is a special case, to ‘compleat the union’, is also prominent. These mechanisms belong to the imagination narrowly conceived according to a distinction in section ix of Part III. The role and significance of these mechanisms in the development of Hume’s scepticism is explored. Appreciation of their significance is also argued to (...) cast light on Hume’s refusal to locate necessity in objects and to suggest a plausible explanation of his second thoughts about personal identity. (shrink)

In Part IV of Book I of Hume’s Treatise Hume frequently appeals to an identity ascribing mechanism of the imagination. A psychological mechanism of which it is a special case, to ‘compleat the union’, is also prominent. These mechanisms belong to the imagination narrowly conceived according to a distinction in section ix of Part III. The role and significance of these mechanisms in the development of Hume’s scepticism is explored. Appreciation of their significance is also argued (...) to cast light on Hume’s refusal to locate necessity in objects and to suggest a plausible explanation of his second thoughts about personal identity. (shrink)

분석적 전통의 형이상학에서 본질을 이해하는 지배적인 방식은 본질개념을 양상 개념을 통해 환원적으로 분석하는 것이다. 이러한 양상 견해는 본질적 속성과 필연적 속성이 외연적으로 동치라는 동치논제와 본질적 속성이 필연적 속성을 통해 설명된다는 설명논제를 포함한다. 파인은 고전이 된 그의 논문에서 양상 견해에 반대한다. 그는 동치논제가 결정적 반례에 직면함을 논증하고, 설명논제와 달리, 필연적 속성이 본질적 속성을 통해 설명된다고 주장한다. 이 논문에서 필자의 목적은 파인의 비판의 초점과 다른 측면에서 양상 견해를 비판적으로 검토하는 것이다. 필자는 우선 동치논제에 대한 파인의 반례가 결정적이지 않음을 논증할 것이다. 하지만, 흄의 (...) 금언에 대한 고찰을 바탕으로, 그럼에도 불구하고 설명논제를 거부할 잠재적 이유가 있음을 논증할 것이다. (shrink)

Despite its central role in his important theories of self and external world, Hume’s account of numerical identity has been neglected or misunderstood. The account is designed as a response to a difficulty concerning identity apparently original with Hume. I argue that the problem is real, crucial, and remains unresolved today. Hume’s response to the difficulty enlists his idiosyncratic, empiricist views on time: time consists of discrete, partless moments, some of which coexist with successions of (...) others. Time is more like a wall of variously sized bricks than like a continuous line. Hume’s arguments that time (and space) are not infinitely divisible have met with literal contempt. I show that his unusual views are motivated and consistent. The topic of identity leads naturally to Hume’s account of personal identity and his later retraction--one of the most widely discussed topics in Hume scholarship. I give a new, straightforward explanation of the retraction, by arguing that Hume’s views on consciousness preclude his prior account of the self as a fiction. I then suggest that Hume’s fundamental problem for personal identity is his general difficulty concerning identity. Discussing Hume’s metaphysics raises perhaps the most central and difficult topic in Hume scholarship--how to reconcile the constructive, theoretical Hume with the skeptical Hume. The prevailing view for the last century has been that Hume’s skepticism is limited, leaving room for his theorizing. I argue, rather, that Hume is an unlimited Pyrrhonian skeptic in relevant respects, and that this interpretation of him best reconciles his two sides. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume and Davidson on Pride Pall S. krdal In reading the Treatise one has to be alive to the fact that Hume gives certain crucial words new meanings. He does not always draw the reader's attention to this and sometimes explicitly claims to be using terms with their ordinarymeaningswhen heis clearlygiving the words special technical uses by expanding or contracting their usual meanings. "Passion," "love," "hatred," "pride," (...) and "humility" have special meanings in Hume's psychological scheme. He also sometimes uses important terms with more than one meaning, as in the case of "justice." The word "justice" both is the title of Book 3, Part 2 of the Treatise, which deals with a number ofartificial virtues, and alsorefers to the much narrower concept ofthe respectfor property. The following two questions should be borne in mind: "What did Hume have to say about what he calls justice, passion, love, etc.?" and "What did Hume have to say about what we refer to by the same terms?" Thus, Books 2 and 3 of the Treatise may be described as attempting to show how unbiased evaluations are possible, in spite ofthe fact that our passions are naturally biased and judgments of virtue and vice are passions. This clearly involves a discussion of how we can do justice to our own and other peoples' qualities ofmind or character. Hume, therefore, had something very important to say about what we call justice, but his contribution to issues involving what we call justice today is obscured by his terminology. In what follows I shall be claiming that Hume's account of pride throws light upon what we call pride although he clearly was not aiming to do so. Donald Davidson, in a footnote to "Hume's Cognitive Theory of Pride," points out that there is a close similarity between his reading ofHume on pride andmy own treatment ofprideinPassionand Value. Since the two accounts were arrived at completely independently, each ofus can see the other'sinterpretation as some confirmation ofhis own. The accounts are not identical, however, and without aiming at a comprehensive comparison, I shall attempt to decide whether one or two ofthe apparent differences between our accounts indicate substantial disagreement. I shall try not to confuse the following four questions: "What did Hume thinkconstitutes pride?""Whatlesson do I, and whatlesson does Davidson think one could learn from Hume's account?" and finally, "What constitutes pride?" Davidson and I agree that a lesson is to be Volume XV Number 2 387 PALL ARDAL learned from Hume's account, but disagree about the nature of this lesson because of a disagreement about the nature of pride. Both Davidson and I think that Hume's claim that pride is a simple impression is an embarrassment to him. It does not have any immediate appeal and also leads him to clearly misrepresent the relation between pride and its object. Pride has self as its object in the sense that it is a form of self-evaluation. Hume misrepresents this relation as a causal relation between pride and the thoughtofoneself. Whenever one is proud, one's thought is drawn to oneself, but according to Hume it couldhave been otherwise. Itjust so happens that the feeling ofpride makes one think of oneself, that when you are already proud your thought turns to yourself. Hume, it is true, does not always represent the relation between the object of pride and the passion itself as contingent. Much ofwhathe says suggests the more plausible view that pride is essentially a form of self-evaluation, but the lesson we can learn from Hume we can learn in spite ofhis atomism, so let us follow Davidson and disregard the atomism, while admitting its presence in Hume's account. Davidson points out that the pride Hume is talking about is pride for a reason. I follow Hume in talking about the cause ofpride, or what makes one proud, but the two accounts seem to me to be very similar on this issue. The two accounts are alsoin agreement thatHume should have said that the proud person must see the cause of pride as having value rather than as an independent source of pleasure, but we are... (shrink)

The problem of personal identity is often said to be one of accounting for what it is that gives persons their identity over time. However, once the problem has been construed in these terms, it is plain that too much has already been assumed. For what has been assumed is just that persons do have an identity. A new interpretation of Hume's no-self theory is put forward by arguing for an eliminative rather than a reductive view (...) of personal identity, and by approaching the problem in terms of phenomenology, Buddhist psychology, and the idea of a constructed self-image. (shrink)

In the Treatise, Hume attempts to explain why we all believe that the self is a single unified entity that persists over time, a belief which Hume calls a fiction. In this paper, I demonstrate how Hume uses a type of functional explanation to account for this belief. After explicating Hume's view, I shall argue that it faces two related problems, which constitute a sort of dilemma. In the final section, I show how one of the (...) horns of this dilemma is plausibly what troubles Hume in the famous Appendix passage where he retracts his positive account of personal identity. (shrink)

Hume’s theory of personal identity is developed in response to Locke’s account of personal identity. Yet it is striking that Hume does not emphasize Locke’s distinction between persons and human beings. It seems even more striking that Hume’s account of the self in Books 2 and 3 of the Treatise has less scope for distinguishing persons from human beings than his account in Book 1. This is puzzling, because Locke originally introduced the distinction in order (...) to answer questions of moral accountability and Hume’s discussion of the self in Book 2 provides the foundation of his moral theory in Book 3. In response to the puzzle I show that Locke and Hume hold different moral and religious views and these differences are important to explain why their theories of personal identity differ. (shrink)

Descartes and Hume share at least one fundamental philosophical belief, and that is the proper mindset required in order to begin philosophizing in an orderly manner. Each holds that, once this mindset is achieved, the reader will readily accept the procedures and conclusions that follow. I propose to show that Descartes and Hume argue for the identical starting point for doing philosophy. However, despite this agreement between them, Hume rejects Descartes' teachings, even in regard to the Cogito (...) ergo Sum. I attempt to show why Hume rejects Descartes' account of the Cogito. (shrink)

In the discussion of personal identity, from his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume reaches a famous, if notorious conclusion: there is no self. We are “nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions” (T 252). My argument is that Hume's thesis on the self rests on a questionable rejection of a rival view that appears to commit the fallacy of equivocation. Along the way I identify a few possible problems with Hume's overall analysis of (...) the self. My argument is that these diffi culties center around the conceptual apparatus Hume relies on to explain and analyze consciousness. (shrink)

The thesis aims at analyzing metaphysical implications of the ordinary concept of "cause". The approach is justified through a discussion of Hume's theory of causation, accompanied by discussions about the nature of definition itself. ;Four major metaphysical problems of causation are discussed: The ontological status of cause ; the temporal relation between causes and effects ; the direction of causation ; and causal necessity . ;Through analytical discussions of the existing literatures on those problems, the thesis identifies certain metaphysical (...) assumptions to be responsible for the profound difficulties that the authors encounter, including the assumptions of a sort of Cartesian dualism of beings and activities, Leibniz' law of identity, and the Newtonian mechanical model of causation. A "particle-wave" ontology is introduced as an alternative to these assumptions, and thus provides solutions to the difficulties which otherwise cannot be solved. The dialectical nature of the ontology may not be happily accepted by philosophers of strict analytical tradition, but it finds its predecessors in the Chinese Taoist philosophy, Hegelian philosophy, Whiteheadian philosophy, and the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics. The author hopes to convince the readers that there is a paradox in the metaphysics of causation analogous to the paradox in the arithmetics revealed by Godel's theorem: We cannot have a complete metaphysics of causation without inconsistency. (shrink)

The article presents a new interpretation of Hume’s treatment of personal identity, and his later rejection of it in the “Appendix” to the Treatise. Hume’s project, on this interpretation, is to explain beliefs about persons that arise primarily within philosophical projects, not in everyday life. The belief in the identity and simplicity of the mind as a bundle of perceptions is an abstruse belief, not one held by the “vulgar” who rarely turn their minds on themselves (...) so as to think of their perceptions. The author suggests that it is this philosophical observation of the mind that creates the problems that Hume finally acknowledges in the “Appendix.” He is unable to explain why we believe that the perceptions by means of which we observe our minds while philosophizing are themselves part of our minds. This suggestion is then tested against seven criteria that any interpretation of the “Appendix” must meet. (shrink)

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The article presents a new interpretation of Hume's treatment of personal identity, and his later rejection of it in the “Appendix” to the Treatise. Hume's project, on this interpretation, is to explain beliefs about persons that arise primarily within philosophical projects, not in everyday life. the belief in the identity and simplicity of the mind as a bundle of perceptions is an abstruse belief, not one held by the “vulgar” who rarely turn their minds on themselves (...) so as to think of their perceptions. the author suggests that it is this philosophical observation of the mind that creates the problems that Hume finally acknowledges in the “Appendix.” He is unable to explain why we believe that the perceptions by means of which we observe our minds while philosophizing are themselves part of our minds. This suggestion is then tested against seven criteria that any interpretation of the “Appendix” must meet. (shrink)

Ashley and Stack couple their claim that Hume holds a logical-construction theory with the remarkable suggestion that, so understood, his views yield "... at least a recognizable facsimile of the identity most of us believe in." The highly implausible suggestion that the non-philosopher regards his self as a logical construct should be enough to provide a motive for re-examining the arguments Ashley and Stack offer for their interpretation. These arguments make use of the distinction Hume develops between (...) perfect and imperfect identity and lead, first of all, to the conclusion that, contrary to some interpretations, Hume does not refuse the self all identity, but only perfect identity, that is, identity defined as the "idea of an object, that remains invariable and uninterrupted through a supposed variation of time." Finding the self to be not such an object, Hume says it cannot be said to have such identity. It can, however, be said to have imperfect identity, constituted by the "uninterrupted progress of thought" over a succession of objects, namely our perceptions. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Locke Butler Reid Hume Kant.

In our paper we attempt an examination of Hume's positive contributions to the problem of personal identity. In contrast to Penelhum, smith and others, we argue that Hume can and does make sense of the identity of persons through time, but that this identity is not perfect in nature. We argue that Hume presents a logical construction theory of the self. We explain how such a view accounts for our identity and individuality and (...) why it conforms to the empiricist approach. (shrink)

Oxford Philosophical Texts Series Editor: John Cottingham The Oxford Philosophical Texts series consists of authoritative teaching editions of canonical texts in the history of philosophy from the ancient world down to modern times. Each volume provides a clear, well laid out text together with a comprehensive introduction by a leading specialist, giving the student detailed critical guidance on the intellectual context of the work and the structure and philosophical importance of the main arguments. Endnotes are supplied which provide further commentary (...) on the arguments and explain unfamiliar references and terminology, and a full bibliography and index are also included. The series aims to build up a definitive corpus of key texts in the Western philosophical tradition, which will form a reliable and enduring resource for students and teachers alike. David Hume's aim in writing An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding was to introduce his philosophy to a European culture in which many educated people read original works of philosophy. He gives an elegant and accessible presentation of strikingly original and challenging views about the limited powers of human understanding, the attractions of scepticism, the compatibility of free will and determinism, and weaknesses in the foundations of religion. Hume's philosophy was highly controversial in the eighteenth century and remains so today. The text printed in this edition is that of the Clarendon critical edition of Hume's works. A substantial introduction by the editor explains the intellectual background to the work and surveys its main themes. The volume also includes detailed explanatory notes on the text, a glossary of terms, a full list of references, and a section of supplementary readings. (shrink)

One of Hume's most well-known works and a masterpiece of philosophy, A Treatise of Human Nature is indubitably worth taking the time to read.

One of Hume's most well-known works and a masterpiece of philosophy, A Treatise of Human Nature is indubitably worth taking the time to read.