The Soul in Locke, Butler, Reid, Hume, and Kant

&
In Stewart Goetz & Charles Taliaferro (eds.), A Brief History of the Soul. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 105–130 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This chapter contains sections titled: Locke Butler Reid Hume Kant.

Categories

Keywords

the soul, in Locke, Butler, Reid, Hume and Kant   replacement of the soul by the mind ‐ Descartes' idea, that a soul does not give life to the body   Plato, Augustine, and Descartes' responses ‐ that a person is a rational, life‐giving soul   Aristotle and Aquinas responding, that a person ‐ human being, body infused and given life by a rational soul   Locke's view, about what we ‐ ordinarily believe about the soul   Locke's, that a thinking or rational being ‐ is a person   and a person is not a soul   consciousness, as opposed to any immaterial substance ‐ determining personal identity   Butler's view, of sameness (identity) of a person or self ‐ with the strict sameness   Hume, in finding the self ‐ saying, that which he cannot find, and different perceptions   Kant's thoughts on the soul ‐ seeming clearest to us in Kant's treatment of the soul

Reprint years

ISBN(s)

9781444395938

DOI

10.1002/9781444395938.ch4

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,296

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Immortality.Paul Edwards - 1997 - Prometheus Books.
The Soul and Contemporary Science.Stewart Goetz & Charles Taliaferro - 2011 - In Stewart Goetz & Charles Taliaferro (eds.), A Brief History of the Soul. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 152–181.
Mind, Body, Space, and Time.Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
'Person' seeks 'Man'. A very quick immersion in, and evaluation of, the philosophical debate on personal identity since Locke.Gregory7 De Vleeschouwer - 2009 - Appraisal 7 (4):25-28.
A Critique of Thomistic Dualism.William Hasker - 2018 - In Jonathan J. Loose, Angus John Louis Menuge & J. P. Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism. Oxford, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 123–131.
I See Dead People: Disembodied Souls and Aquinas’s ‘Two-Person’ Problem.Christina Van Dyke - 2012 - In John Marenbon (ed.), Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 25-45.
A Brief History of the Soul.Stewart Goetz & Charles Taliaferro (eds.) - 2011 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
An introduction to Western philosophy: ideas and argument from Plato to Popper.Antony Flew - 1989 - New York, N.Y.: Thames & Hudson.
Person, Soul, and Identity: A Neoplatonic Account of the Principle of Personality.Robert Bolton - 1994
The biblical roots of Locke's theory of personal identity.Diego Lucci - 2021 - Zygon 56 (1):168-187.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-06-15

Downloads
14 (#1,020,370)

6 months
9 (#355,374)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Charles Taliaferro
St. Olaf College

Citations of this work

Can I survive without my body? Undercutting the Modal Argument.Joshua Mugg - 2018 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 84 (1):71-92.
Consciousness and the Prospects for Substance Dualism.John Spackman - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1054-1065.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references