This is the first volume of a two-volume set containing the most important secondary literature on Hume on Religion (Volume 2, to be published in August 1996, deals with general remarks on Hume and Natural Religion). Focusing on responses to the Essay on Miracles , the material included in this volume ranges from 1751 to 1883. Authors include: T. Rutherford, William Adams, John Leland, George Campbell, Revd. S. Vince, John Hollis, Revd. James Somerville, Dr. Wately, Revd. A. C. L. D'Arblay, (...) Revd. Francis Kilvert, Malthus, Joseph Napier, Joseph Mazzini Wheeler, Sir Edmund Beckett, James McCosh, and Huxley. (shrink)
William Wollaston, a leading British moral philosopher of the eighteenth century, has fallen into obscurity primarily, I believe, for two reasons. In the first place, it is usually supposed that Wollaston's moral theory was refuted by Hume in the opening section of the third book of the Treatise of Human Nature . Secondly, Wollaston's theory, or parts thereof, have been assigned pejorative labels such as ‘odd’ and ‘strange’, which create the impression that it is not a moral philosophy which can (...) be taken seriously. In this paper I attempt to deal with the second of these reasons by setting forth what I take to be Wollaston's meaning in certain key sections of his work, The Religion of Nature Delineated , especially in so far as they help to shed light on his theories of truth and happiness, and the relation of these to his theory of obligation. Wollaston will be found to be a moral philosopher with important things to say, and therefore to be a moral philosopher with a theory worth taking seriously. If I am correct in my interpretation of Wollaston, then it can also be established that Hume has not refuted Wollaston in the opening section of Book III of the Treatise . But here my attention will be confined entirely to Wollaston's own moral theory. (shrink)
This volume presents the excellent and popular translation by Haldane and Ross of Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy , an introduction by Stanley Tweyman which explores the relevance of Descartes' Regulae and his method of analysis in the Meditations , and six articles which indicate the diversity of scholarly opinion on the topic of method in Descartes' philosopy.
Descartes and Hume share at least one fundamental philosophical belief, and that is the proper mindset required in order to begin philosophizing in an orderly manner. Each holds that, once this mindset is achieved, the reader will readily accept the procedures and conclusions that follow. I propose to show that Descartes and Hume argue for the identical starting point for doing philosophy. However, despite this agreement between them, Hume rejects Descartes' teachings, even in regard to the Cogito ergo Sum. I (...) attempt to show why Hume rejects Descartes' account of the Cogito. (shrink)
Based on the original handwritten manuscript, this book provides a new, accurate edition of Hume’s important work, faithful to his original text, marginal notes, and changes. Stanley Tweyman’s comprehensive introduction gives an interpretation of the Dialogues as a whole, as well as close analysis of each of the work’s twelve parts. Hume’s views on evil are discussed in four previously published articles, and the volume concludes with an extensive bibliography. Originally published in 1991.
Based on the original handwritten manuscript, this book provides a new, accurate edition of Hume’s important work, faithful to his original text, marginal notes, and changes. Stanley Tweyman’s comprehensive introduction gives an interpretation of the _Dialogues_ as a whole, as well as close analysis of each of the work’s twelve parts. Hume’s views on evil are discussed in four previously published articles, and the volume concludes with an extensive bibliography. Originally published in 1991.
Machine generated contents note: Selected Papers from Presentations at the Sixth Conference of the International Society for Studies in European Ideas (ISSEI), University of Haifa, Israel, 16-21 August 1998 -- An Answer to the Question 'What Is Counter-Enlightenment?' -- Graeme Garrard, Cardiff University -- Spinoza's Response to the Enlightenment Tradition -- David A. Freeman, Washburn University -- Hermeneutics, Contextualization and Historicity: From Hegel to -- Ricoeur, through the Neo-Kantians and Phenomenology -- Joseph M. de Torre, University of Asia and the (...) Pacific -- The Relationship between Memory and Reason in Kant -- Steven M. DeLue, Miami University -- Selected Papers on "The Philosophy of David Hume" Presented at the -- Tenth International Conference on the Enlightenment, University College, -- Dublin, Ireland, 25-31 July 1999 -- Hume and the First-Person Perspective in Natural Epistemology -- Peter Loptson, University of Guelph -- David Hume, Moral Painter -- Adam Potkay, College of William and Mary -- Hume Disposed -- Michael D. Garral, The Johns Hopkins University -- Rethinking Hume's Newtonian and Kant's Copernican Analogies -- Joseph Gonda, Glendon College, York University -- Hume's Motivational Naturalism and the Kantian Challenge -- John Partridge, The Johns Hopkins University -- Humean Multiculturalism -- H. A. Bassford, University College of the Fraser Valley -- Philosophical Doubts and Common Life in David Hume -- Toshihiko Ise, Ritsumeikan University. (shrink)
At the end of Book 1, Part 1, Section IV of A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume informs us that the topics in Book 1, Part 1 “may be consider’d as the elements of this philosophy”. Among the topics discussed in Part 1 of this Book is distinctions of reason, which he covers briefly toward the end of his treatment of abstract ideas. While other topics treated in this Part of Book 1 are clearly utilized in subsequent Sections, Parts, and (...) Books of the Treatise, distinctions of reason are rarely mentioned beyond his discussion of this topic toward the end of Section V11 of Book 1, Part 1 of the Treatise. My paper has several aims: First, I will attempt to show the role that distinctions of reason play in providing our awareness of space; second, I will show how Hume’s empiricist account of Geometry in the Treatise is developed through his account of our awareness space; and third, I will briefly address the altered account of Geometry in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. (shrink)
IN A PAPER RECENTLY PUBLISHED ("PHILO CONFOUNDED," BY P S WADIA IN "MCGILL HUME STUDIES"-I) THE AUTHOR ATTEMPTS TO CONNECT CLEANTHES’ TWO ILLUSTRATIVE ANALOGIES IN PART III OF HUME’S "DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION" TO HUME’S DISCUSSION OF ’MIRACLES’ IN THE FIRST "ENQUIRY". MY PAPER IS DESIGNED TO SHOW A) THAT THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THIS ALLEGED CONNECTION BETWEEN PART III OF THE "DIALOGUES" AND THE ESSAY ON MIRACLES, AND B) THAT AN APPRECIATION OF CLEANTHES’ ILLUSTRATIONS REQUIRES SEARCHING FOR THE (...) SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE WORLD AND THE ARTICULATE VOICE AND THE WORLD AND THE LIVING VEGETABLE LIBRARY WHICH LEAD CLEANTHES TO THE POSITION THAT INFERENCES ABOUT THE CAUSE OF THE VOICE AND THE LIBRARY ARE THE SAME AS ONE OUGHT TO MAKE WITH RESPECT TO THE WORLD. (shrink)
In Part 9 of David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, a series of five criticisms is presented against the Cosmological-Ontological Proof of God’s necessary existence. In essence, the Cosmological-Ontological Proof seeks to establish that that the chain of causes and effects that constitutes the world, despite being eternal, requires a cause, in virtue of the contingency of the chain and its members. The argument attempts to defend the position that, of the four possible causal explanations for the chain of causes (...) and effects -a contingent being that exists outside the chain; chance; nothing (in the Aristotelian sense of thisterm); or a necessarily existent being-only the latter can be successfully defended, leading to the conclusion that the cause of the world is a necessarily existent being. Of the five criticisms directed against this argument in Part 9 of the Dialogues, the fourth of these is the one that is most neglected in the literature: it is this criticism that I have selected for discussion in my paper. This criticism holds that since the causal chain is held to be eternal, it cannot have a cause, given that causal relations require temporal priority in the cause in relation to the effect, and that the effect be a new existent. However, since the Cosmological-OntologicalProof insists on the contingency of the causal chain as a whole and of each of its members, the fourth criticism is not regarded as a relevant criticism, inasmuch as all contingent beings require a cause in order for them to exist, and this includes the eternal causal chain that constitutes the world. In my paper, I attempt to support the fourth criticism of the Cosmological-Ontological Proof, by establishing that, in the context of this argument, the contingency of the causal chain and its members is not sufficient to establish that the chain must have a cause. (shrink)
These four volumes bring together for the first time some of the most important research on the philosophy of David Hume (1711-1776). Included topics are: Volume 1--Epistemology, Reason, Induction, Scepticism; Volume 2--Space and Time, Ontology, Causality, Personal Identity and the Self, Naturalism, Mental Activity; Volume 3--Ethics, Is/Ought, Reason and the Passions; Volume 4--Religion, Miracles, Politics, Economics, Justice as well as some miscellaneous topics. The papers have been selected for their clarity, their high quality, their originality and their lasting significance. Each (...) volume includes an extensive selected bibliography listing materials according to the topics covered in the particular volume. (shrink)
This volume presents the excellent and popular translation by Haldane and Ross of Descartes' _Meditations on First Philosophy_, an introduction by Stanley Tweyman which explores the relevance of Descartes' _Regulae_ and his method of analysis in the _Meditations_, and six articles which indicate the diversity of scholarly opinion on the topic of method in Descartes' philosopy.
I focus on two claims which Hume makes with regard to existence. The first, which appears in a single paragraph in "A Treatise of Human Nature" 1.2.6, is that existence cannot be distinguished from what we believe exists by a "distinction of reason." The second appears in the "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion" when Cleanthes criticizes Demea's a priori argument by focussing on the Humean claim, "Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent." My efforts are directed to (...) showing that, although Hume takes very little space developing each of these points, certain difficulties attend each claim--difficulties which Hume either does not (in the case of the first) or cannot (in the case of the second) address when the claim itself is being made. (shrink)