Social scientists, political scientists and philosophers debate key concepts such as democracy, power and autonomy. Contested concepts like these pose questions: Are terms such as “democracy” hopelessly ambiguous? How can two theorists defend alternative accounts of democracy without talking past each other? How can we understand debates in which theorists disagree about what democracy is? This paper first discusses the popular strategy to answer these questions by appealing to Rawls’s distinction between concepts and conceptions. According to this approach, defenders of (...) rival conceptions of, e.g. justice can disagree without talking past each other because they share the concept of justice. It is argued that this idea is attractive but limited in application and that it fails to do justice to the dynamic and normative aspects of concept formation. Reflective equilibrium is then suggested as an alternative approach. It replaces the static contrast between a conceptual ‘core’ and competing conceptions by a dynamic perspective of concept formation as a partly normative undertaking: pre-theoretic language use and commitments can provide a shared starting point for developing alternative accounts which yield different concepts of, e.g. justice. This perspective provides a new understanding of how it is possible that different theorists defend rival accounts of, e.g. justice, without talking past each other. (shrink)

Logik ist nach dem traditionellen Verständnis eine ars iudicandi, eine Kunst, die Gültigkeit von Schlüssen zu prüfen. Da mit die normalen Mittel der modernen Logik zu diesem Zweck eingesetzt werden können, müssen erst Formeln an die Stelle von Sätzen treten: umgangssprachliche Schlüsse müssen adäquat formalisiert werden. Die richtige Formel entwickelt ein theoretisches Konzept des Formalisierens und praktisch anwendbare Adäquatheitskriterien für Formalisierungen. Dabei werden zentrale Fragen der Philosophie der Logik unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Zusammenspiels von Umgangssprache und Formalismus untersucht. Die ausführliche (...) und systematische Diskussion von Formalisierungstests bietet eine wichtige Ergänzung zu den traditionellen Logiklehrbüchern. (shrink)

Innerhalb der Komplexitat der religiosen Erscheinungswelt gibt es -Religionen-, deren Zuordnung zur Religionsgeschichte moglich wird, indem unter religionswissenschaftlichen Aspekten z.B. besonders die religionssoziologischen und religionsphanomenologischen Inhalte einer von Europa ausgehenden - aber hier fast in Vergessenheit geratenen - -Religion der Menschheit- in ihrer historischen Existenz aufgezeigt werden. Dabei geht es vor allem um den Inhalt der -Positivistischen Religion- in Brasilien und um ihre religiose, kirchliche und organisatorische Prasenz.".

Does artificial intelligence (AI) exhibit consciousness or self? While this question is hotly debated, here we take a slightly different stance by focusing on those features that make possible both, namely a basic or fundamental subjectivity. Learning from humans and their brain, we first ask what we mean by subjectivity. Subjectivity is manifest in the perspectiveness and mineness of our experience which, ontologically, can be traced to a point of view. Adopting a non-reductive neurophilosophical strategy, we assume that the point (...) of view exhibits two layers, a most basic neuroecological and higher order mental layer. The neuroecological layer of the point of view is mediated by the timescales of world and brain, as further evidenced by empirical data on our sense of self. Are there corresponding timescales shared with the world in AI and is there a point of view with perspectiveness and mineness? Discussing current neuroscientific evidence, we deny that current AI exhibits a point of view, let alone perspectiveness and mineness. We therefore conclude that, as per current state, AI does not exhibit a basic or fundamental subjectivity and henceforth no consciousness or self is possible in models such as ChatGPT and similar technologies. (shrink)

The complete translation of Simmel's classic work in which he provides us with a dazzling and wide-ranging discussion of the social, psychological and philosophical aspects of the money economy.

What is neurophilosophy? Different variants of connecting neuroscience and philosophy emerged in recent years. Besides reductive, parallelistic, and neurophenomenological variants, we here focus on Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy as introduced by the author of this paper. NRNP can methodologically be characterized by the inclusion of multiple domains and various methodological strategies – this amounts to domain pluralism and method pluralism. That is combined with an iterative methodological movement between the different domains and, specifically conceptual and empirical domains resulting in concept-fact iterativity. Such (...) non-reductive neurophilosophical approach can make major contributions to both neuroscience and philosophy. Concerning the latter, we demonstrate how a non-reductive neurophilosophical approach allows taking into view a deeper neuro-ecological and spatiotemporal layer of Martin Heidegger’s Fundamental ontology and its “being in the world”. This may also require a more fundamental approach to consciousness in both its phenomenological features and neural basis – this has recently been proposed in the “Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness”. In sum, due to its particular methodological strategy, NRNP allows providing a broader more comprehensive framework to philosophical problems like subjectivity, consciousness, and mind-body problem. Moreover, NRNP may provide a novel deeper framing and reading of historical authors which may allow to connect them to current and systematic philosophical and even neuroscientific issues. ER -. (shrink)

This paper reevaluates Adorno’s theory of non-identity following from a critical examination of his reading of Hegel. The main discussion revolves around two theses central to both philosophers: 1. Conceptual thinking forms the centre of philosophical thought (identification). 2. Philosophical thought aspires to become everything (totality). The analysis of two distinct interpretations, one stricter and one more moderate, demonstrates that Adorno takes the hardline view. With the moderate view, however, not only do the limits of Hegelian philosophy become more pronounced, (...) they also reveal novel systematic connections with pivotal concepts inherent to Critical Theory – connections that have notably lacked substantial consideration within relevant research. (shrink)

It is often assumed that cosmopolitan thinkers since the Renaissance have simply adopted and refined concepts from classical antiquity. This study argues that modern European cosmopolitanism should be perceived as a unique phenomenon, distinct from Greek and Roman forms of cosmopolitan thinking. One key feature is its dynamism, or the idea of change built into modern theories of cosmopolitanism. Covering the period from the 1530s to the 1920s, this book investigates various manifestations of cosmopolitanism, including normative individualism, the dawn of (...) historical thinking, and the dynamic conceptions of law and rights and of the international community. It analyses the international legal theories of selected authors from Francisco de Vitoria to Austrian lawyers Heinrich Lammasch and Alfred Verdross. The author focuses in particular on the development of hospitality rights and the right to immigration, republicanism and cosmopolitanism, and cosmopolitan education. (shrink)

This volume is a comprehensive collection of critical essays on The Taming of the Shrew, and includes extensive discussions of the play's various printed versions and its theatrical productions. Aspinall has included only those essays that offer the most influential and controversial arguments surrounding the play. The issues discussed include gender, authority, female autonomy and unruliness, courtship and marriage, language and speech, and performance and theatricality.

The ‘extended mind’ thesis asserts that cognitive processes are not bound by the skull or even skin of biological individuals, but actively incorporate environmental structures such as symbols, tools, artifacts, media, cultural practices, norms, groups, or institutions. By distributing cognition across space, time, and people in canny ways, we circumvent or overcome the biological limitations of our brains. Human beings are creative, albeit opportunistic experts in cognitive ‘self-transcendence.’ This entry surveys discussions of EM in philosophy of mind and cognitive science (...) which point to this overarching theme. (shrink)

El concepto de segunda naturaleza promete proporcionar una explicación de cómo la naturaleza y la razón se pueden reconciliar. Pero dicho concepto está cargado de ambigüedad: se entiende como aquello que une todas las actividades cognitivas y se concibe como un tipo de naturaleza que puede ser modificada por actividades cognitivas. Se intenta investigar esta ambigüedad distinguiendo una concepción kantiana de otra hegeliana. Se sostiene que la idea de una transformación de un ser de prim- era naturaleza en un ser (...) de segunda naturaleza, que se encuentra en el corazón de la concepción kantiana, es errónea. (shrink)

-- Bd. 22. Exzerpte und Notizen (1809-1831) -- Bd. 23. Vorlesungen über die Wissenschaft der Logik -- Bd. 24. Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Natur <1-3> -- Bd. 25. Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes ; Anhang -- Bd. 26. Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des Rechts (4 v.) -- Bd. 27. Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte -- Bd. 28. Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Kunst -- Bd. 29. Vorlesungen über die Philosophie (...) der Religion und Vorlesungen über die Beweise vom Dasein Gottes -- Bd. 30. Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie -- Bd. 31. Katalog der Bibliothek Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels (2 v.). (shrink)

Translated into English for the first time in this edition, The Jena System, 1804-5: Logic and Metaphysics is an essential text in the study of the development of Hegel's thought. It is the climax of Hegel's efforts to construct a neutral theory of the categories of finite cognition as the necessary bridge to the theory of infinite, or philosophical, cognition.

Activism undertaken by CEOs has been on the rise in recent years. Research on this practice has been primarily concerned with determining the conditions under which a CEO’s public statements on sociopolitical issues are beneficial or detrimental to her firm’s business performance. We complement this instrumental perspective on CEO activism with an ethical investigation of the implications of CEO activism for the democratic process. Drawing on political philosophy, we show that the answer to the question of whether CEO activism is (...) conducive to the democratic process depends on the view of democracy that is adopted. From the perspective of liberalism, the sole requirement that an instance of CEO activism must fulfill is that it is lawful, provided that the applicable law sufficiently protects people’s essential rights. However, from the viewpoint of republicanism, this is not a sufficient condition. Besides being law-abiding, CEOs should be “civic-minded” when intervening in public debates, i.e., concerned with the quality and fairness with which those debates are conducted. Based on the literature on republicanism, we suggest four possible criteria that civic-minded CEOs can apply to gauge the democratic conduciveness of a possible public intervention: added insight, timeliness, constructiveness, and transparency. Our article complements the predominantly instrumentally oriented literature on CEO activism and contributes, more broadly, to the literature that explores the normative dimensions of corporate political involvement, as well as to a growing strand of research that draws on philosophical theory to inform business leaders’ ethical decision-making. (shrink)

In this review, Hegel responds to criticisms leveled against his philosophy by the anonymous author of Ueber die Hegelsche Lehre, oder: absolutes Wissen und moderner Pantheismus (1829). Frustrated by his interlocutor’s apparent inability to coherently interpret his work, Hegel scathingly attempts to discredit the character of the text in focus and its author’s critical capacity. He does so by showcasing examples of misrepresentation and misunderstanding in the author’s writing. Hegel contests the increasingly common charge of “pantheism” being leveled against him (...) at that time, wielded here by the anonymous author in a fairly unoriginal comparison between Hegel’s “doctrine” and Spinoza’s system. This review gives insight into the character of early theological responses to Hegel, and highlights Hegel’s polemical tendencies. (shrink)

Kant stellte seine ‘Rassenlehre’ erstmals 1775 vor; und obwohl er sie dann 1785 und 1788 weiter ausarbeitete, blieben die Grundzüge dieselben; und auch in den 1790er Jahren hat er sie im Wesentlichen nicht verändert oder gar aufgegeben. Auch hat es zu keiner Zeit irgendwelche Inkonsistenzen zwischen seiner ‘Rassenlehre’ und seiner eigentlichen Philosophie, insbesondere seiner Moralphilosophie, gegeben. Einerseits können (moralische) Unterschiede zwischen Menschen als freien Wesen (Personen) im Hinblick auf Kants Aussagen zu Rassen als solchen keine Rolle spielen, da solche Unterschiede (...) nicht angeboren, geschweige denn innerhalb einer Rasse sowie im Falle von Rassenmischung notwendig vererblich sind. Andererseits können (empirische) Unterschiede zwischen Menschen als bloßen Naturwesen (Tieren) im Hinblick auf Kants moralische Urteile keine Rolle spielen, da sie nicht zurechenbar sind. Der Vorwurf des “Rassismus” ist nur in zwei Fällen möglich: (1) Eine wissentlich falsche Aussage über Rassen erfolgt in alleiniger Diskriminierungsabsicht. Das müssten Kants Gegner beweisen. (2) Empirische Unterschiede, ob wirklich gegeben oder irrtümlich angenommen, dienen als Grundlage für rechtliche oder soziale Diskriminierung. Genau das ist mit Kant’s Moralphilosophie prinzipiell und in Bezug auf die ganze Menschheit ausgeschlossen. Die Literatur, in der Kant “Rassismus” vorgeworfen wird, zeigt einen eklatanten Mangel an systematischer, methodenkritischer und prinzipientheoretischer Sorgfalt und Textvertrautheit bei der Kant-Exegese. (shrink)

This paper develops and defends a deflationary analysis of existence claims involving psychiatric disorders. According to this analysis, a given psychiatric disorder exists if, and only if, there are people who have the disorder. The implications of this analysis are spelled out for our views of nosological decision making, and for the relationship between claims about the existence of psychiatric disorders and claims about their reality. A pragmatic view of psychiatric nosology is defended and it is argued that worries about (...) the “reality” of any given disorder have to be distinguished clearly from questions about its existence. (shrink)