Paul Moser's book defends what has been an unfashionable view in recent epistemology: the foundationalist account of knowledge and justification. Since the time of Plato philosophers have wondered what exactly knowledge is. This book develops a new account of perceptual knowledge which specifies the exact sense in which knowledge has foundations. The author argues that experiential foundations are indeed essential to perceptual knowledge, and he explains what knowledge requires beyond justified true beliefs. In challenging prominent sceptical claims that we (...) have no justified beliefs about the external world, the book outlines a theory of rational belief. (shrink)

The 'Bibliography on Propositions and Truth-Bearers' is intended to be a virtually comprehensive list of the works on propositions and truth-bearers which have appeared since the time of Frege and are relevant to the problem of propositions and truth-bearers found in the Anglo-American philosophical tradition. The bibliography lists relevant books, chapters and smaller sections of books, journal articles, and encyclopedia and dictionary entries. It includes works which are either historical or philosophical treatments of the problem o f propositions and truth-bearers. (...) In addition, it lists some important works which bear on that problem in a rather indirect but nonetheless significant manner, such as the works on intentionality and the general problem of meaning. Although a large number of the entries are concerned primarily with the ontological status of propositions and truth-bearers, many of the works are concerned also with the related semantic and epistemological issues. Thus the bibliography should be an aid to anyone working on either the ontological or the epistemological issues related to the problem of propositions and truth-bearers. (shrink)

Contains nineteen newly commissioned articles by top philosophers on various aspects of the theory of knowledge. The articles survey the field as well as make original contributions to contemporary debates.

This paper presents the case of the post-crisis discursive defence of shadow banking in the Netherlands to argue, first, that there is a need to dust off older elite theories and adapt them to post-democratic conditions where there are no widely shared ‘political formulas’ to secure mass support for elite projects. Second, that temporality should be taken more seriously; it is when stories fail that elite storytelling can be observed in practice. As new ‘political formulas’ are minted and become established, (...) elites can again hope to withdraw from the political scene and leave policy-making to the self-evidence of output legitimacy and/or the perpetuum mobile of There-Is-No-Alternative. This suggests that elite theory should replace an epochal reading of post-democracy with a more conjunctural one. (shrink)

This massive two-volume reference presents a comprehensive selection of the most important works on the foundations of mathematics. While the volumes include important forerunners like Berkeley, MacLaurin, and D'Alembert, as well as such followers as Hilbert and Bourbaki, their emphasis is on the mathematical and philosophical developments of the nineteenth century. Besides reproducing reliable English translations of classics works by Bolzano, Riemann, Hamilton, Dedekind, and Poincare, William Ewald also includes selections from Gauss, Cantor, Kronecker, and Zermelo, all translated here (...) for the first time. (shrink)

This article contains criticisms of various interpretations of Mill's argument for Utilitarianism. An attempt is made to explain how Mill conceived the rationality of his proof, and how his justification of the Principle of Utility differs from a justification of fundamental moral principles on the basis of the logic of ethical discourse.

This commentary examines Glenberg's characterization of “suppression” in light of negative priming and related phenomena. After offering a radically different slant on suppression, an attempt is made to weave this alternative version into Glenberg's provocative discussion of embodied memories.

Since the late 1980s, social scientists have argued that advanced economies have undergone a process of financial concentration that is resulting in a growing unevenness of the accessibility of capital. Households, small and medium-sized businesses as well as non-standard economic activities have increasing difficulties in finding funds. There are both sound economic and compelling moral reasons to address this issue. In order to ensure a more equal accessibility of capital, the author proposes a mandatory levy on the surpluses of mainstream (...) pension funds to fund an alternative financial infrastructure as a first step to redressing unevenness. The underlying rationale is that “financial pluralism” is the key to a more even accessibility of capital. (shrink)

Philosophers have traditionally sought objective knowledge: knowledge of things whose existence does not depend on one's conceiving of them. Philosophy After Objectivity uses lessons from debates over objective knowledge to characterize the kinds of reasons pertinent to philosophical and other theoretical views. It argues that we cannot meet skeptics' typical demands for non-question begging support for claims to objective truth, and that, therefore, we should not regard our supporting reasons as resistant to skeptical challenges.

This paper examines a nonreductive supervenience relation central to a philosophically popular version of nonreductive physicalism inspired by Donald Davidson. The paper argues that this global supervenience relation faces a serious epistemological problem that blocks its being superior to weaker, less general supervenience relations.