El objetivo de este artículo es el de explorar las principales características del ensayo como genus dicendi filosófico y cómo se cumplen en las obras de Ortega. En consecuencia, analizo en primer lugar las cuatro características principales del búsqueda de la verdad, valor cognitivo de las opiniones, rechazo del argumento de autoridad y tolerancia intelectual. Y, en segundo lugar, demuestro cómo se han tenido en cuenta en los escritos filosóficos de Ortega. ENGLISH: The aim of this paper is to (...) explore the main characteristics of the essay as philosophical genus dicendi and how they are fulfilled in Ortega’s works. Consequently, I firstly analyze the main four characteristics of the essay, namely, search for truth, cognitive value of opinions, rejection of the argument from authority, and intellectual tolerance. And secondly, I demonstrate how they have been taken into account by Ortega in his philosophical writing. (shrink)

In his 1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx famously claims that the human being is or has a ‘Gattungswesen.’ This is often understood to mean that the human being is a ‘species-being’ and is determined by a given ‘species-essence.’ In this chapter, I argue that this reading is mistaken. What Marx calls Gattungswesen is precisely not a ‘species-being,’ but a being that, in a very specific sense, transcends the limits of its own given species. This different understanding of the (...) class='Hi'>genus-character of the human being opens up a new perspective on the naturalism of the early Marx. He is not informed by a problematic speciesist and essentialist naturalism, as is often assumed, but by a different form of naturalism which I propose to call ‘dialectical naturalism.’ The chapter starts (I) by developing Hegel’s account of genus which provides us with a useful background for (II) understanding Marx’s original notion of a genus-being and its practical, social, developmental character. In the last section, I show that (III) the actualization of our genus-being thus depends on the production of a specific type of ‘second nature’ that is at the heart of Marx’s dialectical naturalism. (shrink)

The paper aims at providing an exhaustive analysis of the key concept of glory in Hobbes's works. It is argued that the meaning and role of glory are essentially the same in all Hobbes's writings. The paper claims that in Elements of Law, De Cive, Leviathan, De Homine, Behemoth and in the Correspondence the desire of glory and ambition are given by Hobbes a crucial role in the explanation of human conflict. The paper argues that the status of glory vis-a-vis (...) other passions changes radically in Leviathan and De Homine: whereas in the earlier works glory was the ultimate motivation of most (if not all) individuals, i.e. the genus of all passions; in later works it becomes a species or instance of human passions. In Leviathan no concept is raised to the central position previously occupied by glory. (shrink)

The article is concerned with the general characteristics of Aristotle’s theory of a genus-differentia definition. The authors examine the validity of the definitions in the framework of legal language and present some objections against the definitions of per genus proximum et differentia specificam as they are considered by Aristotle. At the same time, through the objections to the position of genus-differentia definition critics, it is proved that in a number of cases Aristotle’s theory is more preferable than (...) the approach offered by Herbert Hart, the proponent of analytical legal philosophy. The argument of Peter Hacker is used to reinstate Aristotle’s genus-differentia definitions. (shrink)

In his 1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx famously claims that the human being is or has a ‘Gattungswesen.’ This is often understood to mean that the human being is a ‘species-being’ and is determined by a given ‘species-essence.’ In this chapter, I argue that this reading is mistaken. What Marx calls Gattungswesen is precisely not a ‘species-being,’ but a being that, in a very specific sense, transcends the limits of its own given species. This different understanding of the (...) class='Hi'>genus-character of the human being opens up a new perspective on the naturalism of the early Marx. He is not informed by a problematic speciesist and essentialist naturalism, as is often assumed, but by a different form of naturalism which I propose to call ‘dialectical naturalism.’ The chapter starts (I) by developing Hegel’s account of genus which provides us with a useful background for (II) understanding Marx’s original notion of a genus-being and its practical, social, developmental character. In the last section, I show that (III) the actualization of our genus-being thus depends on the production of a specific type of ‘second nature’ that is at the heart of Marx’s dialectical naturalism. (shrink)

This essay is concerned with the applicability in modern conceptual jurisprudence of a particular methodology for defining concepts, namely, per genus proximum et differentiam specificam. We explicate the origin of this method and how it was applied by Aristotle, Porphyry, and Boethius, arguing that H. L. A. Hart’s views about the “open texture” of language, which is context-sensitive, call into question the applicability of this methodology in modern conceptual jurisprudence.

In his 1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, Marx famously claims that the human being is or has a ‘Gattungswesen.’ This is often understood to mean that the human being is a ‘species-being’ and is determined by a given ‘species-essence.’ In this chapter, I argue that this reading is mistaken. What Marx calls Gattungswesen is precisely not a ‘species-being,’ but a being that, in a very specific sense, transcends the limits of its own given species. This different understanding of the (...) class='Hi'>genus-character of the human being opens up a new perspective on the naturalism of the early Marx. He is not informed by a problematic speciesist and essentialist naturalism, as is often assumed, but by a different form of naturalism which I propose to call ‘dialectical naturalism.’ The chapter starts (I) by developing Hegel’s account of genus which provides us with a useful background for (II) understanding Marx’s original notion of a genus-being and its practical, social, developmental character. In the last section, I show that (III) the actualization of our genus-being thus depends on the production of a specific type of ‘second nature’ that is at the heart of Marx’s dialectical naturalism. (shrink)

There is a remarkable difference between Plato scholarship and Aristotle scholarship. Despite Xenophon’s Memorabilia, Socrates was the ironic philosopher par excellence, and Plato’s own writing style quite obviously preserved, or even further enhanced, this distinguished quality of his teacher. Although Plato himself left no doubt that Socrates’ questioning and irony was no play, but rather quite literally a matter of life and death, Plato had recourse to playfulness in his presentation of such deadly matters, be it only in order to (...) cope with his own mourning for Socrates and to express, as well as hide, his bitter sarcasm, scorn, and anger for those people who finally sentenced Socrates to death. Teaching, learning, and interpretation often have an aspect of assimilation. Thus, there is a large tribe whose members—sometimes playfully, sometimes less so—claim that studies on Plato should adopt the peculiar quality of the object of their studies. Even some of the members of the other tribe of Plato scholarship, the Vlastonians, sometimes cannot avoid doing so, and one can gratefully acknowledge that they often perform this half-voluntary exercise in a graceful manner. None of this can be found in scholarship on Aristotle. Aristotle’s texts, which were almost exclusively notes for lectures, are for the most part extremely sober. So, too, is the scholarship on Aristotle. The division of playfulness and labor within Plato scholarship itself, as well as between research on Plato and Aristotle, is certainly very fruitful and by no means unreasonable. Still, a certain playfulness in Reiner Schürmann’s thinking has always waited for an echo in Aristotle studies; for a response to one aspect of his wide-ranging interests. In this paper, I will first comment upon some fragments of one of Aristotle’s dialogues. This will be followed by a few general remarks on the notions of τί ἦν εἶναι and οὐσία. Thereupon, I will address aspects of Metaphysics VII:4-6, in which Aristotle discusses the notion of τί ἦν εἶναι. Finally, in light of the preceding sections of this paper, I will take up Reiner Schürmann’s interpretation of Aristotle’s notion of ἀρχή. (shrink)

This article makes several conceptual proposals for a closer analysis of recognition more or less in line with Axel Honneth's account of recognition: (1) a proposal as to the genus of recognitional attitude and recognition, (2) a sketch of an analytical scheme intended to be heuristically useful for analysing the different species of recognitional attitude and recognition, (3) some proposals as to the precise contents of self-conceptions involved in each species and subspecies of recognition, and (4) suggestions as to (...) the relation of the species of recognitional attitude to social settings and concrete personal relationships as well as to the totalities of attitudes instantiated in these settings and relationships. A guiding idea is that the somewhat mechanistic Meadian vocabulary of 'urges' and 'internalizations' of Honneth's original formulations should be replaced with formulations where recognition is consistently conceptualized as consisting of attitudes with propositional or judgmental content. (shrink)

Any arbitrarily complicated non-oriented graph, that is a graph of arbitrarily large genus, can be encoded in a cut-free proof. This unpublished result of Statman was shown in the early seventies. We provide a proof of it, and of a number of other related facts.

I shall endeavor to show that every physical theory since Newton explains without drawing attention to causes–that, in other words, physical theories as physical theories aspire to explain under an ideal quite distinct from that of causal explanation. If I am right, then even if sometimes the explanations achieved by a physical theory are not in violation of the standard of causal explanation, this is purely an accident. For physical theories, as I will show, do not, as such, aim at (...) accommodating the goals or aspirations of causal explanation. This will serve as the founding insight for a new theory of explanation, which will itself serve as the cornerstone of a new theory of scientific method. (shrink)

Those who in the past tended to say that being is a genus, coupled their assertion with the belief that the genus is univocal, thus making being univocal—a position which can easily be overturned. Others failed to distinguish between being as meaning essence, and so divisible into the ten categories, and being as meaning existence. The consequence was that they restricted the Divine Being to a genus of being, thereby denying God’s transcendence. As far as I know, (...) the theory which combines the two doctrines that the genus is analogical and that the being which is held to be a genus is only essence, has never been propounded. It merits investigation. (shrink)

WE wish to call into question the basic objection to the generic status of being: and here we mean by ‘being’, not the act of existence, but essence. It is objected that whereas being contains all its differences, the genus does not do so. This objection is unsupported by the evidence and therefore fails. A concomitant objection that being is analogical and that the genus is univocal also fails, since the genus is itself analogical. The strange thing (...) is that St. Thomas agrees that the genus contains its differences and that it is analogical; yet Thomists deny that being is a genus. St. Thomas compares the relation of being to the categories with that of the genus to the species. He says that the difference is not outside the genus, but is rather a determination of it. He says that the genus is equivocal, not purely so but as being analogical. It is evident, therefore, from what he says, that being as meaning essence, is the supreme genus. (shrink)

Those who in the past tended to say that being is a genus, coupled their assertion with the belief that the genus is univocal, thus making being univocal—a position which can easily be overturned. Others failed to distinguish between being as meaning essence, and so divisible into the ten categories, and being as meaning existence. The consequence was that they restricted the Divine Being to a genus of being, thereby denying God’s transcendence. As far as I know, (...) the theory which combines the two doctrines that the genus is analogical and that the being which is held to be a genus is only essence, has never been propounded. It merits investigation. (shrink)

In Metaphysics B 3 Aristotle sets out a famous argument for the thesis that being is not a genus. In his commentary on Metaphysics B, Syrianus criticizes this argument and explains in what sense being is to be regarded as a genus. I reconstruct both Syrianus’ criticisms and his own view. I bring out ways in which they can help us rethink key assumptions of Aristotle’s ontology and shed light both on Syrianus’ critical attitude towards Aristotle and on (...) some of Syrianus’ main views in metaphysics. (shrink)

Intrigued by the possible paths that the evolution of religious capacity may have taken, the authors identify a series of six major building blocks that form a foundation for religious capacity in genus Homo. Homo neanderthalensis and Homo sapiens idaltu are examined for early signs of religious capacity. Then, after an exploration of human plasticity and why it is so important, the analysis leads to a final building block that characterizes only Homo sapiens sapiens, beginning 200,000–400,000 years ago, when (...) all the other cognitive and neurological underpinnings gradually came together. Because the timing of cognitive evolution has become an issue, the authors identify the time periods for these building blocks based on findings from modern cognitive science, neuroscience, genomic science, the new cognitive archaeology, and traditional stones-and-bones archaeology. The result is a logical, and even a likely story 55–65 million years long, which leads to the evolution of religious capacity in modern human beings. (shrink)

There is a broad consensus in the literature that in the section on ‘The Genus’ in theScience of Logic, Hegel argues that any living being must exist among other instances of its kind, with which it reproduces to create future generations, and out of which it was itself produced. This view is not only hard to motivate philosophically, it also seems to contradict many things Hegel says elsewhere in his system about the details of living nature, especially concerning the (...) reality of spontaneous generation. After an examination of the secondary literature on ‘The Genus’, I offer an alternative view of this section, which I call ‘the Modal Reading’. The Modal Reading sees the language of pluralities in ‘The Genus’ as really Hegel's peculiar way of articulating certain modal features of thoughts about the living: to grasp a living individual as living, we need to distinguish not only between this individual and its environment, but also between the things this individual actually does and other possibilities which it does not actualize. The Modal Reading has a logical motivation insofar as it articulates what is needed to think of a living being as living, but it also avoids saddling Hegel with the problematic entailments he is usually read as taking on in this section. A further upshot of the Modal Reading is that approaching Hegel in this way provides us with a way to see Hegel as defending a non-nominalistic alternative to essentialist accounts of living kinds. Finding a way to read ‘The Genus’ which coheres with Hegel's views elsewhere in his system thus shows Hegel to have been an especially subtle and penetrating thinker, with continuing relevance for the philosophy of biology. (shrink)

In this third and last article on the evolution of religious capacity, the authors focus on compassion, one of religious expression's common companions. They explore the various meanings of compassion, using Biblical and early related documents, and derive general cognitive components before an evolutionary analysis of compassion using their model. Then, in taking on neural reuse theory, they adapt a model from linguistics theory to understand how neural reuse could have operated to fix religious capacity in the human genome. They (...) present a teaching tool on “Religious Capacity in Action,” and develop an example of compassionate decision making in very early Homo sapiens in North Africa. They round out their analysis of compassion by exploring theory in neuroscience on a standard decision-making model, and investigate what goes on in the human brain when a values-based decision is made. (shrink)

Mr. Slattery’s article of a year ago presents an opportunity for the following: some remarks ordered to clarifying the distinction between the expression and the signification of a genus; some remarks on what it means to say that the differences of a genus lie outside that genus, and that the differences of a genus are appropriate to, or belong per se to, the genus; and a remark to show that the species and the difference are (...) not the same. (shrink)