"Fritsche's book, which is closely researched, carefully argued, and philologically rigorous, will become an indispensable point of reference for further debates on Heidegger's ambiguous political and ethical legacy."—Richard Wolin, author of The Politics of Being "Unquestionably, Fritsche has a highly unusual command of the Heideggerian idiom, which he uses to very good effect."—Tom Rockmore, author of On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy.

ABSTRACTIn the Black Notebooks, Heidegger ascribes in 1938/9 to the Jewish race an “empty rationality and calculative ability,” in his view the cause of its “worldlessness.” To assess this characterisation, I present Heidegger’s theories of history as a decline in Being and Time and in his later history of Being. For this purpose, I discuss his notions of Rechnen, Machenschaft, and Geviert, several existentialia from Being and Time, and Heidegger’s identification of modern machination and modern technology. Furthermore, I examine Heidegger’s (...) attitude toward the Jews and the Holocaust. I present his alignment of the unconcealment of modernity and the Jewish race, and compare his theory of machination with the texts “Positionality” and “The Question concerning Technology”. Heidegger’s notes about the Jews in the Black Notebooks after 1944 confirm that he tried “to silence Auschwitz silently,” as I already argued in a paper from 1995. (shrink)

According to Trawny, Heidegger’s Black Notebooks show that he turned away from any National Socialism in 1938 and that his thinking could be “contaminated” by National Socialism and anti-Semitism only between 1931 and 1944/1945. However, in this paper it is argued that already in Being and Time Heidegger had made a case for National Socialism; that he discovered in 1938 the “true” National Socialism, and that Trawny’s main criterion regarding Heidegger’s anti-Semitism is false. Heidegger’s case is compared with Max Scheler, (...) who, because of Hitler, turned from the right to the centre. In addition, alternatives to Trawny’s detailed interpretations of three of Heidegger’s anti-Semitic remarks are offered, it is shown that Trawny misconstrues Heidegger’s anti-Semitism, and the anti-Semitic aspects of Heidegger’s history of Being are presented. (shrink)

Presque tous les interprètes considèrent qu’il va de soi qu’en Physique Β, 1, 192b8-193a9, Aristote présente ce qui constitue le cœur de sa propre théorie de la nature et des choses naturelles, par opposition à d’autres théories dont il avait connaissance. La question de savoir si, avec ses deux définitions, il renvoie à un principe actif, à un principe passif ou à quelque chose d’autre, a par ailleurs fait l’objet de discussions. Dans cet article, je cherche à montrer qu’en 192b8-193a9, (...) il ne met pas en place sa propre théorie, mais ne fait que préparer le terrain pour le déploiement d’une théorie, et qu’à l’évidence il renvoie à un principe actif, moteur. En outre, je montre comment il élabore au cours de Physique Β sa réponse à la question principale d’une théorie de la nature et des choses naturelles au niveau le plus général, et en quoi cette réponse est constitutive pour sa biologie. (shrink)

In a paper entitled “Emmanuel Faye: The Introduction of Fraud into Philosophy?”, Thomas Sheehan accuses Faye of committing many blunders in Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy. In this paper, I address what is according to Sheehan himself the most important part of his paper, namely his charges against Faye’s interpretation of Heidegger’s Being and Time. I show that they are all wholly unfounded. All the aspects of Being and Time that Sheehan addresses speak not only not against Faye (...) but rather even for Faye. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that, inPolitics I, Aristotle uses the method of his biological investigations and nine principles regarding causation and the working of nature known from his physics, psychology, and biology to demonstrate that the barbarians are natural slaves. His procedure is in line with his general way of thinking.

Malgré leurs divergences, les interprètes sont en général d’accord sur le fait que pour Aristote, le lieu est bidimensionnel et peu significatif du point de vue de l’ontologie. Dernièrement, ces présupposés ont cependant été remis en question par Casey et Lang. Dans cet article, c’est la position traditionnelle qui est défendue, et j’argumente en faveur de l’idée qu’Aristote développe sa théorie du lieu à partir du point de vue d’une mécanique du mouvement spatial et des outils nécessaires à un corps (...) organique pour son mouvement dans l’espace – et non à partir d’une théorie de la localisation des corps. Pour finir, la méthodologie aristotélicienne est comparée avec la physique contemporaine depuis Descartes. (shrink)

There is a remarkable difference between Plato scholarship and Aristotle scholarship. Despite Xenophon’s Memorabilia, Socrates was the ironic philosopher par excellence, and Plato’s own writing style quite obviously preserved, or even further enhanced, this distinguished quality of his teacher. Although Plato himself left no doubt that Socrates’ questioning and irony was no play, but rather quite literally a matter of life and death, Plato had recourse to playfulness in his presentation of such deadly matters, be it only in order to (...) cope with his own mourning for Socrates and to express, as well as hide, his bitter sarcasm, scorn, and anger for those people who finally sentenced Socrates to death. Teaching, learning, and interpretation often have an aspect of assimilation. Thus, there is a large tribe whose members—sometimes playfully, sometimes less so—claim that studies on Plato should adopt the peculiar quality of the object of their studies. Even some of the members of the other tribe of Plato scholarship, the Vlastonians, sometimes cannot avoid doing so, and one can gratefully acknowledge that they often perform this half-voluntary exercise in a graceful manner. None of this can be found in scholarship on Aristotle. Aristotle’s texts, which were almost exclusively notes for lectures, are for the most part extremely sober. So, too, is the scholarship on Aristotle. The division of playfulness and labor within Plato scholarship itself, as well as between research on Plato and Aristotle, is certainly very fruitful and by no means unreasonable. Still, a certain playfulness in Reiner Schürmann’s thinking has always waited for an echo in Aristotle studies; for a response to one aspect of his wide-ranging interests. In this paper, I will first comment upon some fragments of one of Aristotle’s dialogues. This will be followed by a few general remarks on the notions of τί ἦν εἶναι and οὐσία. Thereupon, I will address aspects of Metaphysics VII:4-6, in which Aristotle discusses the notion of τί ἦν εἶναι. Finally, in light of the preceding sections of this paper, I will take up Reiner Schürmann’s interpretation of Aristotle’s notion of ἀρχή. (shrink)

In Being and Time, Division One, Chapter 4, Heidegger develops the structures “Being-with and Dasein-with [Mitsein and Mitdasein]” and “what we might call the ‘subject’ of everydayness—the ‘they’”. In the last section of the chapter, Section 27, Heidegger presents six characters of the ‘they’, namely, “distantiality, averageness, levelling down, publicness, the disburdening of one’s Being, and accomodation”. The meaning of the last five characters is relatively unproblematic. For instance, by “averageness” Heidegger obviously wants to indicate that the ‘they’ establishes a (...) set of behavioural patterns as normal and ‘natural’. For example, at certain junctures of their lives, individual Daseine have to choose, or are able to choose, among several options within a given set of options. However, the entire set of options as such has already been adopted by them in a self-evident way and without much thought. The ‘they’ forces this choice by suppressing other possibilities and other ways of handling given possibilities. Thus, the respective averageness results from a screening process in which the ‘they’ constantly rules out other possibilities or prevents them from emerging in the first place. Heidegger calls this “the ‘levelling down’ [Einebnung] of all possibilities of Being”. However, the first character, distantiality, seems more difficult to understand. In the English translation, Heidegger characterizes it thus. (shrink)

The kairos is the decisive moment in the course of an event; often a disease or battle. Prior to the kairos different forces interact or fight with each other in changing constellations and with changing fortunes. The kairos, however, is the moment of final decision. If, in the case of a disease, at that moment the “powers of life” prevail, the patient will survive and recover. If, to the contrary, the “powers of death” predominate, the patient will die. The art (...) of medicine consists in recognizing the kairos and supporting the powers of life. In a way, it is only in the kairos that humans have responsibility. They can, and must, influence the course of events. In a strict sense, they cannot but have responsibility, for there is no neutrality in the kairos. The physician must be faithful to his commitment to the powers of life and must not defect to the powers of death. To do nothing is already defection, for it strengthens the powers of death by not supporting and thus weakening the powers of life. It also happens that, in paying heed to the demands of the powers of life in the kairos, some realize that they have been on the wrong side and return to the powers of life. In the kairos, a mixture is cleansed and is reduced to an either-or; either life or death, either socialism or fascism. No longer is there the possibility for a neither-nor, in-between, or balance of the opposites. Several authors experienced the 1920s in Germany as a kairos situation and called upon individuals to take their stand in the either-or. Others recognized that it was precisely the call for the either-or that destroyed life, and they called for a balance of the opposites. One of them was the late Max Scheler, after he himself had propagated the politics of either-or, the politics of decision. Another one was Scheler’s successor in Frankfurt, Paul Tillich. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 63 Heft: 5 Seiten: 913-940.

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 64 Heft: 1 Seiten: 163-163.

One of the common denominators linking the many different strands and schools of philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century is an appreciation of, and reflection on, difference and translation. Each translation is a unique challenge. It is difficult to translate one theory into the conceptual framework of another, or to translate one performative game or text from one language into another. Heidegger provides a striking example of some of the problems associated with translation. His extensive use of (...) abstract nouns as subjects of sentences, his reference to idiomatic, or more or less archaic, words, his ability to unfold the meanings supposedly implicit in a word through the addition of various prefixes and suffixes, or, conversely, his penchant for tracing back different words to the same root, combined with his complicated, often somewhat convoluted, syntax and grammar, make it difficult to translate his texts. The wealth of possible connotations, associations, and references to other words and passages in his work and in everyday language simply cannot be preserved in any translation. In this paper, I will present an example of these problems in relation to four passages in the German texts and the English translations respectively. In the first section I will take my example from Being and Time, and in the second section from “The Question Concerning Technology” and “Building Dwelling Thinking.” In the third section this will be followed by a note on Heidegger’s notion of Gelassenheit which will draw together the preceding three passages. Thereafter, in the fourth section I will comment on some notions in “The Question Concerning Technology,” and in the fifth section I will discuss the passage from “The Question Concerning Technology” in the context of the entire essay. In these two sections, i.e. the fourth and the fifth, I will make a suggestion concerning the notorious question of “Heidegger and Auschwitz,” which in some sense is my only concern in the entire paper. Following this, in the sixth section I will address a passage in An Introduction to Metaphysics. In the seventh section, I will present a passage in the as yet untranslated lecture course on Hölderlin, given in the summer semester of 1942, and a short text of Heidegger’s, Der Feldweg, published in 1953, concluding with some summarizing remarks in the eighth and final section. (shrink)

After having shown that time is neither identical with nor set apart from change, Aristotle concludes that time is some aspect of change. Following this, he sets forth two definitions. Time is “that which is determined [on both sides] by the now”. A few lines later, one finds what has usually been taken to be the binding, or even the only, definition of time: “a number of motion in respect to the before and after ”, with the subsequent explanation that (...) ‘number’ here does not mean the number with which we count, but rather the number being counted or the countable number. Over the long history of commentary and interpretation, there have been several controversial points concerning these definitions, three of which I shall discuss in this paper. For Aristotle, number is a discrete quantum. Motion, on the other hand, and along with it time, are continuous quantities. How, then, can we think discreteness and continuity as united in time? Furthermore, what does ‘number’ mean, and what is the cause of that specific number which time is? Aristotle says that time as some motion or change is only within the changing thing itself, yet time is equally everywhere and with everything. How, then, can it be thought that there are, in fact, many different changes, but of all these changes only one time? (shrink)