Given many meanings that the school has adopted for each person, we have found the need to provide some reflections on the subject, supported in a philosophical perspective, in order to enlarge the debate on the values of the school for teachers and students, especially. This brief paper aims to make a cut about the value that the figure of the object "school" has adopted for teachers and students. We refer to the school, involving only the institutions of the levels (...) from elementary to secondary school, not including the institutes or other levels. The work has as scientific foundations philosophical contributions of authors like Herbart, Wittgenstein, MacIntyre, Deleuze, Aristotle, Dewey, Foucault, and orientations coming from the linguistics of Saussure, which supports us in the understanding and management of language. (shrink)

Background: The present study compared the effects of a traditional resistance training and resistance training combined with cognitive task on body composition, physical performance, cognitive function, and plasma brain-derived neurotrophic factor levels in older adults. Methods: Thirty community-dwelling older adults were randomized into TRT and RT+CT. Exercise groups performed a similar resistance training program, twice a week over 16 weeks. Cognitive Training involved performing verbal fluency simultaneously with RT. Exercise sessions were performed 2-3 sets, 8-15 repetitions at 60-70% of 1-repetition (...) maximum. Body composition, physical function, cognitive performance, and BDNF levels were assessed before and after intervention period. Results: The physical performance was similarly improved in response to both TRT and RT+CT. However, exclusive improvements on cognitive function and BDNF levels were observed only after RT+CT. Conclusion: The RT program associated with a cognitive task, improved physical and cognitive performance in healthy older adults. (shrink)

Com este artigo, procurámos expor a dinâmica que assiste à Filosofia do Conhecimento de Francisco Vieira de Almeida (1888-1962), Professor da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa de 1915 a 1958, por um lado, apresentada como acesso privilegiado à prática filosófica, por outro, entendida como exercício de sistematização que recusa a fixação num sistema, por fim, atravessada pela intenção de promover a osmose entre o conhecimento de «tipo-filosofia» e o de «tipo-ciência», surpreendendo a gestualidade dessa ética do (...) filosofar naquela que é tida, consensualmente, como sua obra-prima, Pontos de Referência, publicada em 1961. As sinuosidades particulares de uma tal pragmática, resistindo deliberadamente a todo o esforço de circunscrição, levaram-nos a cruzar um primeiro nível de leitura, orientado para evidenciar os traços gerais, e um segundo, ocupado com problemas de teor mais específico. (shrink)

A teoria psicossomática aristotélico-tomista acerca das paixões constitui o fundamento principal da visão dos jesuítas nos séculos XVI e XVII. Tal conhecimento reflete-se na forma como o teólogo e pregador jesuíta Antonio Vieira (1608-1697) serviu-se de tais teorias, na arte da pregação, para mover os afetos, persuadir a razão e convencer os ouvintes. Desse modo, apresentamos os elementos essenciais que caracterizam a teologia da pregação, no período da Escolástica Barroca a partir do sermão das chagas de São Francisco. (...) Neste sermão o padre Antonio Vieira reconhece em Francisco de Assis a segunda estampa de Cristo crucificado. Além disso, discute as questões das paixões da alma na sua relação com os sentidos humanos e apresenta a unio mystica como expressão da conversão. Assim, no âmbito de uma espiritualidade que, como aquela dos jesuítas, valoriza o conhecimento de si mesmo, o sermão permite notar como se articulam no discurso o elemento psicológico e cognitivo, os aspectos da memória e da imaginação, dos afetos e da inteligência com a finalidade de converter e persuadir. (shrink)

A teoria psicossomática aristotélico-tomista acerca das paixões constitui o fundamento principal da visão dos jesuítas nos séculos XVI e XVII. Tal conhecimento reflete-se na forma como o teólogo e pregador jesuíta Antonio Vieira (1608-1697) serviu-se de tais teorias, na arte da pregação, para mover os afetos, persuadir a razão e convencer os ouvintes. Desse modo, apresentamos os elementos essenciais que caracterizam a teologia da pregação, no período da Escolástica Barroca a partir do sermão das chagas de São Francisco. (...) Neste sermão o padre Antonio Vieira reconhece em Francisco de Assis a segunda estampa de Cristo crucificado. Além disso, discute as questões das paixões da alma na sua relação com os sentidos humanos e apresenta a _unio mystica _como expressão da conversão. Assim, no âmbito de uma espiritualidade que, como aquela dos jesuítas, valoriza o conhecimento de si mesmo, o sermão permite notar como se articulam no discurso o elemento psicológico e cognitivo, os aspectos da memória e da imaginação, dos afetos e da inteligência com a finalidade de converter e persuadir. (shrink)

Através de uma leitura densa das fontes hagiográficas jesuítas que celebraram a vida de um jesuíta napolitano, Marcelo Mastrilli (1603-1637), procuro mostrar que as visões e narrativas proféticas foram importantes lugares de comunicação social, memória colectiva e mobilização política. O reposicionamento profético foi uma linguagem específica da tecnologia do eu, a partir da qual o sujeito fabricava a sua própria identidade, dentro e contra os limites externos da autoridade e das instituições. Marcelo Mastrilli – que viajou pela Itália, Espanha, Portugal, (...) Goa, Malaca, Filipinas e Japão – construiu a sua própria subjectividade e acção através de uma visão profética de São Francisco Xavier. Logo que a sua experiência pessoal foi impressa, atingindo um público mais vasto, mobilizou outros actores a imitá-lo, citá-lo, ou a fazer uso dele nos seus percursos individuais e sociais. O que se podia transportar de um continente para outro não eram, claro, visões pessoais mas a sua corporização numa série de textos e imagens materiais. E a verdade é que mesmo depois da sua morte, em 1637, as suas visões foram retomadas pelo padre António Vieira e integradas no seu discurso legitimador da dinastia de Bragança e do papel que os jesuítas aí desempenhavam. (shrink)

How can science be brought to connect with experience? This book addresses two of the most challenging problems facing contemporary neurobiology and cognitive science. Firstly, understanding how we unconsciously execute habitual actions as a result of neurological and cognitive processes that are not formal actions of conscious judgment but part of a habitual nexus of systematic self-organization. Secondly, attempting to create an ethics adequate to our present awareness that there is no such thing as a transcendental self, a stable subject (...) or soul. The author combines researches in cognitive science and phenomenology with two representatives of what he calls the 'wisdom traditions': Confucianism and Buddhist epistemology. (shrink)

_Dialectic and Dialogue_ seeks to define the method and the aims of Plato's dialectic in both the "inconclusive" dialogues and the dialogues that describe and practice a method of hypothesis. Departing from most treatments of Plato, Gonzalez argues that the philosophical knowledge at which dialectic aims is nonpropositional, practical, and reflexive. The result is a reassessment of how Plato understood the nature of philosophy.

Being in a mood—such as an anxious, irritable, depressed, tranquil, or cheerful mood—tends to alter the way we react emotionally to the particular objects we encounter. But how, exactly, do moods alter the way we experience particular objects? Perceptualism, a popular approach to understanding affective experiences, holds that moods function like "colored lenses," altering the way we perceive the evaluative properties of the objects we encounter. In this essay, I offer a phenomenological analysis of the experience of being in a (...) mood that illustrates the limitations of the colored lens metaphor and demonstrates the basic inadequacy of the perceptualist account of moods. I argue that when we are in a mood, it is common to experience a kind of "emotional disconnection" in which we perceive evaluative properties that would normally elicit strong emotional reactions from us, but nonetheless we find that, in our present mood, we remain emotionally numb to these perceptions. Such experiences of "seeing but not feeling" are difficult to understand from within the perceptualist paradigm. Building on the work of Martin Heidegger, I sketch an alternative, phenomenological analysis of moods that can better account for experiences of emotional disconnection. On this alternative account, being in a mood does not merely alter the content of our perceptions but, rather, alters the way we interpret the overall significance of what we perceive, relative to a certain situational context. (shrink)

Introduction: What is to be gained from a confrontation between Plato and Heidegger? -- Heidegger's critical reading of Plato in the 1920s -- Dialectic, ethics, and dialogue -- Heidegger's critique of dialectic in the 1920s --Ethics and ontology -- Ethics in Plato's sophist -- Heidegger and dialogue -- Logos and being -- The tensions in Heidegger's critique -- The guiding perspective of Plato as undermining the ontic/ontological distinction -- Heidegger on Plato's forms -- Conclusion: The relation between being and Heidegger (...) on Plato's truth and untruth in the 1930s and 1940s -- From the 1931-32 and 1933-34 courses on the essence of truth to "Plato's doctrine -- Of truth" : Heidegger's transformation of Plato into platonism through the interpretation of the sun and cave analogies of the republic -- The courses on the essence of truth from WS 1931/32 and WS 1933/34 -- Plato's truth in the beitråge of 1936-38 -- Plato's doctrine of truth in 1940 -- The end of truth : the 1964 retraction -- Conclusion: The end of truth? -- The dialogue that could have been : Hidegger on the Theaetetus -- The Theaetetus interpretation in Die Grundbegriffe der antiken philosophie (SS 1926) -- The interpretation of the Theaetetus in the Vom Wesen der wahrheit course of 1931-32 and 1933-34 -- Conclusion: Heidegger's orthodoxy -- The 1942 interpretation of Plato in the myth of the (Republic book 10) -- The Roman versus the Greek conception of truth saying in the myth of ER -- Purging the myth of ER : the ontologizing of ethics and politics -- The Greek experience of the open : a saying that points and hints versus the "Leap" -- Conclusion: Leaping beyond Plato -- Opportunities for a dialogue with Plato in the late Heidegger -- Calculative thinking, meditative thinking, and the practice of dialogue -- Heidegger's critique of logos in the 1930s -- Dialogue as bringing to speech the unsaid -- Plato's dialectic or Hegel's? -- A saying beyond assertion -- Plato's dialogues and Heidegger's leap -- Heidegger and the dialogue form -- Redefining hermeneutics -- Back to the beginning with dialectic and dialogue -- Conclusion: Dialectic versus sophia again -- 7 dialectic and phenomenology in "Zeit und Sein" : a pivotal chapter in Heidegger's confrontation with Plato -- From dialectic and hermeneutics to phenomenology -- The Auseinandersetzung with Plato. (shrink)

Increased concern for the environment has increased the number of investment opportunities in mutual funds specialized in promoting responsible environmental attitudes. This article examines the performance and risk sensitivities of US green mutual funds vis-à-vis their conventional peers. We also analyze and compare this performance relative to other socially responsible investing (SRI) mutual funds. In order to implement this analysis, we apply a CAPM-based methodology and find that in the 1987–2009 period, environ- mental funds had lower performance than conventional funds (...) with similar characteristics. However, if we focus on a more recent period (2001–2009), green funds achieved adjusted returns not significantly different from the rest of SRI and conventional mutual funds. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia by Bernard Suits is one of the most influential works in the philosophy of sport. In the book, Suits investigates two fundamental issues in general p...

The study of Plato's dialogues has traditionally oscillated between two paradigms: one that portrays the dialogues as treatises expounding doctrines and one that sees them as purely skeptical, rhetorical, or literary. This collection of new essays by twelve noted Plato scholars illustrates the fruitfulness of breaking away from those paradigms, which have divided Platonic scholarship and led it to a number of dead ends. While the essays are diverse in their approaches, each seeks to find a 'third way' to understand (...) Plato, reading him as neither a dogmatist nor a skeptic but as a philosopher capable of reconciling the content and form of his writings. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is analyzing to which extent the multiverse hypothesis provides a real explanation of the peculiarities of the laws and constants in our universe. First we argue in favor of the thesis that all multiverses except Tegmark’s “mathematical multiverse” are too small to explain the fine tuning, so that they merely shift the problem up one level. But the “mathematical multiverse" is surely too large. To prove this assessment, we have performed a number of experiments with (...) cellular automata of complex behavior, which can be considered as universes in the mathematical multiverse. The analogy between what happens in some automata (in particular Conway’s “Game of Life") and the real world is very strong. But if the results of our experiments can be extrapolated to our universe, we should expect to inhabit—in the context of the multiverse—a world in which at least some of the laws and constants of nature should show a certain time dependence. Actually, the probability of our existence in a world such as ours would be mathematically equal to zero. In consequence, the results presented in this paper can be considered as an inkling that the hypothesis of the multiverse, whatever its type, does not offer an adequate explanation for the peculiarities of the physical laws in our world. (shrink)

El presente artículo propone una lectura del Eutidemo de Platón a partir de la escena que tiene lugar en el prólogo del diálogo, en el cual un personaje misterioso critica a Sócrates y a los hermanos erísticos por la conversación que acaba de tener lugar. Defenderé que esta figura anónima esconde a Isócrates, quien en Contra los sofistas y Encomio de Helena había atacado a todos los discípulos de Sócrates por dedicarse a un tipo de actividad intelectual a su juicio (...) volcada a la pura disputa y sin utilidad para la vida cívica. Propondré que el Eutidemo constituye una respuesta a dicha crítica, en tanto que los dos modelos protrépticos de la obra le permiten a Platón distinguir su forma de emplear la dialéctica de la de otros de sus condiscípulos, principalmente los megáricos, así como sentar las bases de su proyecto filosófico-político fundado en el concepto de conocimiento. (shrink)

This essay discusses Jorge Portilla’s phenomenological analysis of values and freedom in his essay, “The Phenomenology of Relajo.” Portilla argues that genuine freedom requires seriousness and sincerity; it requires wholehearted participation in cultural practices that one finds truly valuable. To support his argument, Portilla examines the ways that values and freedom are undermined when cultural practices are disrupted and break down as a result of the antics of the so-called "relajiento," a kind of “class clown” figure in Mexican culture who (...) refuses to take anything seriously. Carlos Sánchez has criticized Portilla's rejection of the relajiento, suggesting that the relajiento’s disruptive behavior may be a liberatory act of defiance against the legacy of colonialism. I argue, however, that Portilla was right to see the relajiento’s behavior as counterproductive in the fight for liberation from oppression. (shrink)

In the recently published 1924 course, Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie, Martin Heidegger offers a detailed interpretation of Aristotle's definition of kinesis in the Physics. This interpretation identifies entelecheia with what is finished and present‐at‐an‐end and energeia with being‐at‐work toward this end. In arguing against this interpretation, the present paper attempts to show that Aristotle interpreted being from the perspective of praxis rather than poiesis and therefore did not identify it with static presence. The paper also challenges later variations of Heidegger's (...) interpretation, in particular his account of dunamis in the 1931 course on Metaphysics Theta, which insists that its mode of being is presence‐at‐hand. By arguing that this reading too is untenable, the paper concludes that Aristotle's metaphysics is not a metaphysics of presence and that his texts instead point toward a possibility of metaphysics ignored by the attempts of Heidegger and others to overcome it. (shrink)

En este trabajo me propongo comparar el patrón argumentativo de los sofistas del siglo V a. C. tal como son retratados en la obra de Platón con el de los erísticos del _Eutidemo_. Defenderé que ninguno de estos sofistas es presentado por Platón como experto en dialéctica refutativa, actividad discursiva que caracteriza a la erística. Por el contrario, el retrato platónico de Pródico, Hipias, Gorgias y Protágoras los muestra como incapaces, desinteresados u hostiles a la argumentación de tipo dialéctica.

Heidegger’s recently published 1932 seminar on Plato’s Phaedrus arguably represents his most successful dialogue with Plato, where such dialogue is characterized by both the deepest affinity and the most incisive opposition. The central thesis of Heidegger’s interpretation is that the Phaedrus is not simply a logos about eros, but rather an attempt to show that eros is the very essence of logos and that logos is thereby in its very essence dia-logue. Heidegger is thus here more attuned than ever before (...) to the erotic and dialogical character of philosophy while at the same time concerned with how this conception of philosophy can lead to the eclipse of being and truth. (shrink)

RESUMEN Una interpretación extendida del Eutidemo sostiene que la práctica erística de la cual Platón busca distanciarse en el diálogo constituye una referencia velada a la dialéctica desarrollada por el socrático Euclides y sus seguidores megáricos. No obstante, los expertos reconocen que la segunda demostración erística pone en boca de Eutidemo y Dionisodoro dos posiciones que fueron defendidas por Antístenes, según las cuales no es posible decir falsedades ni contradecir. Este trabajo busca analizar las refutaciones de dicha sección y confrontarlas (...) con los testimonios sobre Antístenes a fin de evaluar hasta qué punto nos encontramos en presencia de los mismos argumentos. Defenderé que si bien las refutaciones del Eutidemo poseen una inspiración antisténica, principalmente respecto de las tesis que buscan sostener, las mismas se basan en una serie de supuestos ambiguos que responden más a los lineamientos de la práctica erística que a los fundamentos del pensamiento antisténico. Argumentaré, asimismo, que esta diferencia podría explicarse a partir del hecho de que el Eutidemo puede ser leído como una respuesta al Encomio de Helena de Isócrates, en donde este ataca a los socráticos por dedicarse a la erística y al desarrollo de doctrinas paradójicas, entre las cuales incluye las tesis de Antístenes. ABSTRACT A widespread interpretation of the Euthydemus claims that the Eristic practice from which Plato seeks to distance himself in the dialogue constitutes a veiled reference to the dialectics developed by the Socratic Euclid and his Megarian followers. However, experts acknowledge that the second Eristic demonstration puts two positions in the mouth of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus which were defended by Antisthenes, according to which it is not possible to say falsehoods nor to contradict. This work seeks to analyze the refutations of this section and compare them with the testimonies about Antisthenes in order to evaluate to what extent they are the same arguments. I will defend that although the refutations of the Euthydemus have an Antisthenic inspiration, mainly with respect to the theses they seek to support, these are based on a series of ambiguous assumptions that correspond more to the principles of Eristics than to the grounds of Antisthenic thought. I will also argue that the difference could be explained by the fact that the Euthydemus can be understood as a response to Isocrates ’ Encomium of Helen, where he attacks the whole Socratic circle for devoting to Eristics and to the development of paradoxical doctrines, including the theses of the Antisthesis. (shrink)

This work proposes an interpretation of Euthydemus 283c-288b taking into account the problem of the false in the Sophist. My hypothesis will be that the second eristic demonstration of the Euthydemus can be understood as a representation of Sophist 236d-239b: while in this passage there it is the Stranger is the one who states what the sophist would say to defend himself from the seventh definition, in which he is accused of producing falsehoods, in the Euthydemus two sophists are who (...) use the notions of non-being and falsehood to refute such accusation. The work has three parts. Firstly, I shall analyze Sophist 236d-239b and contextualize it within the framework of the seventh definition. Secondly, I focus on the characterization of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus as sophists. Finally, I analyze the three arguments that organize the second demonstration of the Euthydemus, trying to understand its structure and its role in the drama of the dialogue. (shrink)

Unemployment is not only an economic problem, but a complex axiological one, the understanding of which cannot be envisaged without dealing with all the social, economic, political and institutional causes. Unemploy ment in Spain is so high (18% of Active Population). That its solution needs other ways out than those sustained by traditional economicist approaches based mainly on neoliberal economic growth. To be more specific, Spain suffers from three axiological desequilibria (more unemployment, less public services and infraestructures, and less tax (...) preasure) which adequate integrationand optimization could solve, not the problem wholely, but at least, by bringing Spain into line with the European rate. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dialectic as "Philosophical Embarrassment":Heidegger's Critique of Plato's MethodFrancisco Gonzalez (bio)Philosophie ist ein Ringen um die Methode.(GA58, 228)Hans-Georg Gadamer has expressed the following debt to the thought of Martin Heidegger: "The philosophical stimuli I received from Heidegger led me more and more into the realm of dialectic, Plato's as well as Hegel's."1 It is therefore surprising to discover that Heidegger himself did not see his thought as leading him into (...) the realm of dialectic. On the contrary, in Being and Time we find a curt and unexplained dismissal of dialectic, specifically Plato's, as a "genuine philosophical embarrassment" (Verlegenheit).2 This dismissal is repeated in the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics course of WS 1929/30 where Heidegger asserts that "all dialectic in philosophy," and thus that of Hegel as well as Plato, "is only the expression of an embarrassment."3 Only with the publication of Heidegger's earlier lecture courses from the 1920s, are we in a position to understand and evaluate this surprising dismissal. We are also in a better position to understand why even the later Heidegger failed to reassess his rejection of dialectic, despite the existence of strong incentives for doing so: incentives recognized not only by Heidegger's students but, as will be shown, by Heidegger himself. What will emerge are not only the oft-observed limitations of Heidegger as an interpreter of Plato, but also, and more importantly, their source in certain limitations of Heidegger's own thinking. [End Page 361]1. Heidegger's Critique of Dialectic in the 1920sHeidegger's most detailed account of Plato's dialectic, and thus the one that best explains his curt dismissal of dialectic in later works, is to be found in the Sophist lectures of 1924/25.4 This account begins with a description of the pervasiveness and potential obstructiveness of. Though ordinarily and most immediately pervades all forms of disclosing (GA19, 196), "[a]ccording to its original sense and original facticity, is not at all disclosing (aufdeckend), but is, if one may speak in an extreme way, precisely concealing (verdeckend)" (197).5 In other words, is initially and for the most part "idle talk" (Gerede), the kind of speech that is bandied about concerning anything whatsoever and that "has the facticity of not allowing the things themselves to be seen, but producing instead a self-satisfaction in resting content with what 'one says'" (197). Thus speech at first presents itself as self-sufficient and autonomous; one hangs onto what is said without being directed beyond it to the things themselves.This tendency of to conceal is a theme to which Heidegger returns repeatedly in the courses of the 1920s. In a course from WS 1923/24 he argues that deception has its origin in the very facticity of language.6 In the unpublished course from SS 1924 ("Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie"), the one that immediately preceded the Sophist lectures, Heidegger characterizes language as the proper domain of "Das Man" (18, 22) and describes the dominance of as leading to Gerede (7, 112).7 Heidegger therefore claims that because the Greeks lived in speech they were also imprisoned by it, with the result that a tremendous effort was needed for them to overcome their imprisonment and thus make science possible (41, 106 ).In the Sophist lectures, Heidegger assigns to dialectic an important role in this effort. Given both the pervasiveness and the concealing character of, philosophy, in its attempt to disclose the things themselves, must both begin with and break through it by means of a "speaking for and against" (Für- und Gegensprechen) that destroys the autonomy and self-sufficiency that has in Gerede and in this way "leads more and more to the matter under discussion and lets it be seen" (GA19, 197). What is needed, in short, is dia-lectic: a speaking that passes through speech.Already, however, one can see the tension that characterizes dialectic on Heidegger's account. Though dialectic is a, a speaking, it seeks to be more. Its aim is to disclose the things themselves of which it speaks, to see these things in a "pure seeing" uncontaminated by the... (shrink)

The twenty-first century presents a major challenge for civil engineering. The magnitude and future importance of some of the problems perceived by society are directly related to the field of the civil engineer, implying an inescapable burden of responsibility for a group whose technical soundness, rational approach and efficiency is highly valued and respected by the citizen. However, the substantial changes in society and in the way it perceives the problems that it considers important call for a thorough review of (...) our structures, both professional and educational; so that our profession, with its undeniable historical prestige, may modernize certain approaches and attitudes in order to continue to be a reliable instrument in the service of society, giving priority from an ethical standpoint to its actions in pursuit of the public good . It possesses important tools to facilitate this work (new technologies, the development of communications, the transmission of scientific thought.···); but there is nevertheless a need for deep reflection on the very essence of civil engineering: what we want it to be in the future, and the ability and willingness to take the lead at a time when society needs disinterested messages, technically supported, reasonably presented and dispassionately transmitted. (shrink)

Everyone has heard of "the invisible hand," the famous metaphor used by Adam Smith (1723-1790) in The Wealth of Nations. Although he uses the expression only once in the book, it has given rise to controversy that has lasted for over two centuries. -/- The famous expression has been understood, in (at least) two very different ways. In one way by most of academia, and in a very different way by Keynes, Noah Chomsky and more lately by Mark Blaug (in (...) the second edition of The New Palgrave, 2008). -/- In the standard textbook interpretation, it is considered a poetical name for "the price mechanism" and presented as an argument in favor of laisser-faire and free trade. In this paper we recall the less well-known interpretation (of Keynes, Blaug and Chomsky), showing that Smith was more reserved towards laisser-faire than is commonly believed and that by "invisible hand" he did not mean the price mechanism. (shrink)

Faced with the impossibility of saying Being directly given that all language is language of beings, Heidegger proposes an overcoming of logic in favor of what he calls Sigetik: a way of addressing Being in and through silence, i.e., without asserting anything of Being. After considering what such a Sigetik actually involves and how it is possible, this paper asks why Heidegger rejects the alternative of that indirect saying of Being that he identifies with dialectic. It is then argued both (...) that Heidegger's arguments against dialectic are not compelling and that the Beiträge itself, in mostly failing to achieve and sustain the Sigetik it prescribes, cannot fully escape some form of dialectic. Sigetik may prove a lure more threatening to philosophical questioning than the dialectic it seeks, unsuccessfully, to overcome. (shrink)

En este artículo se expone una reflexión desde la propuesta teórica de Charles Taylor sobre la construcción de la identidad individual como una narración social frente a la crítica de Amartya Sen, quien propone la identidad como resultado solo de la elección personal. Se argumenta que las criticas que Amartya Sen hace a los argumentos de Taylor son infundadas, ya que la perspectiva de Charles Taylor se centra más en el carácter fundamentalmente constructivo, narrativo y dialógico de la identidad que (...) en la pérdida de la libertad y la mera aceptación acrítica de la identidad asumida. Se concluye que la identidad como narración social desde la perspectiva teoría de Taylor sí da cabida a la capacidad de elegir de los individuos y a la consideración de las identidades múltiples y múltiples lealtades identitarias, pero se hace notar la importacia del contexto social y del grupo por encima de la elección personal en el momento en que una persona contruye su identidad, ya que les da valor a los bienes externos como la comunidad cultural y lingüística a la que la pertenece y que hacen posible la inteligibilidad y la narracción de lo que somos y de quiénes somos. This paper presents Charles Taylor's theoretical proposal of construction of identity confronted to the criticism of Amartya Sen who conceives identity as a result of personal choice. It is argued that the critiques that Amartya Sen makes to the arguments of Taylor are groundless given that the perspective of Charles Taylor focuses more on the fundamentally constructive nature of identity than on the loss of freedom and the mere uncritical acceptance of the assumed identity. Taylor's theory does has space for the ability to choose and the consideration of multiple identities but it draws attention to the importance of social and group context when a person builds his identity and it assigns a higher value to the external goods that define the way people live in contemporary societies, such as the cultural and linguistic community, than to personal choice. (shrink)

The present paper uses the theme of dialectic and dialogue to begin unraveling the similarities and differences between the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur and H.G. Gadamer. Ricoeur is shown to distance himself from Heidegger by insisting on a dimension of explanation and distanciation (which he sometimes identifies with Plato's `descending dialectic') that cannot be reduced to, or absorbed by, understanding and appropriation. This same move, however, leads him to reject Platonic dialogue, with the attendant prioritizing of oral conversation over the (...) written text, as a model for hermeneutics. Ricoeur therefore sees in Gadamer's recourse to such a model a regression to the problematic position of Heidegger. Yet the conception of philosophy as dialectical and dialogical which Gadamer finds in Plato is capable of responding to Ricoeur's objections. Where the fundamental difference between the hermeneutics of Ricoeur and Gadamer emerges is in the question of whether experience is fundamentally dialectical and whether language is inherently dialogical. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article discusses the complexity in ironic echoic mention from the perspective of Cognitive Linguistics. It builds on the scenario-based approach to irony where ironic meaning is treat...