Stanford University Press (1999)

Abstract
How can science be brought to connect with experience? This book addresses two of the most challenging problems facing contemporary neurobiology and cognitive science. Firstly, understanding how we unconsciously execute habitual actions as a result of neurological and cognitive processes that are not formal actions of conscious judgment but part of a habitual nexus of systematic self-organization. Secondly, attempting to create an ethics adequate to our present awareness that there is no such thing as a transcendental self, a stable subject or soul. The author combines researches in cognitive science and phenomenology with two representatives of what he calls the 'wisdom traditions': Confucianism and Buddhist epistemology.
Keywords Ethics  Knowledge, Theory of
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Call number BJ1012.V3813 1999
ISBN(s) 0804730326   0804730334   9780804730327
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Context-Switching and Responsiveness to Real Relevance.Erik Rietveld - 2012 - In Julian Kiverstein & Michael Wheeler (eds.), Heidegger and Cognitive Science. Palgrave-Macmillan.
Emotion and Ethics: An Inter-(En) Active Approach. [REVIEW]Giovanna Colombetti & Steve Torrance - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):505-526.

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