In her fifth dystopian novel, The Heart Goes Last, Margaret Atwood portrays North America in the not so far future, in the wake of a global economic crisis. Parts of the country are in the state of complete chaos, subjected to a ruthless gang rule. The solution to the system's breakdown comes in the form of the socio-economic experiment that requires from its participants relinquishing their freedom as every other month they will spend in prison. The seemingly preposterous experimental project (...) enables Atwood to explore principal questions about the limits of our freedom in the times of an economic crisis or a neoliberal model of economy. The satirical form the novel takes, especially towards its end, helps the writer to decry people's over-willingness to give away their freedom and civil liberties in exchange for happy, uninterrupted consumption. The following article aims to demonstrate that the notion of freedom and free will permeate The Heart Goes Last, which is, in that respect, a politically and socially engaged satire. (shrink)

The new lesson for banking sector came on March 10th 2023, when the bank, which had $212bn of assets, failed with spectacular speed, making it the biggest lender to collapse since the global financial crisis of 2007–2009. By loading up on long-term bonds, Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) had taken an enormous unhedged bet on interest rates staying low. That bet went wrong, leaving the bank insolvent. The analysis of selected reports, data in conjunction with the analysis of financial documents are (...) to indicate the areas of threats related to the privileged treatment of government bonds in banks’ balance statements. As a result of the analysis, the negative consequences of the accumulation of government bonds in banks’ balance sheets and their preferential treatment as zero-riskand background of series of events unfavorable for the bank were indicated. The collapse has been presented as an example of a misguided strategy. The new reality teaches that safe securities, such as government bonds, can no longer be considered as safe. The result of the analysis is to show the possibility of the prediction of not enough liquid assets to satisfy deposit withdrawals and confluence of events caused higher risk. (shrink)

A growing body of research is exploring corporate communication in relation to corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities on social media (SM). Nonetheless, while these studies have shown that SM communication may be an effective tool for reaching and engaging various stakeholders, how the design of corporate CSR communication engenders trustworthiness has yet to be examined. To address this gap, we suggest that SM communication may include important signals related to trust; thus, we investigate whether companies use sources of trustworthiness (reputation, (...) performance, and appearance) while communicating with stakeholders and the response of the latter to such communication. Our empirical analysis is based on a database containing over 66,000 CSR-related messages from eight companies focusing on communication extracted from Twitter. These data are coded according to three sources of trustworthiness and two dimensions of CSR communication (social and environmental). Our findings indicate that all three attributes of trustworthiness are used by companies in their CSR social media communication. We also document how corporate efforts to use CSR communication that engenders trustworthiness influence stakeholder engagement. Our study therefore contributes to the literature on trust in relation to CSR by illustrating the importance of signaling that includes different sources of trustworthiness or their combination in corporate communication. By analyzing how the various trust attributes included in CSR communication affect SM reactions, we also identify which attributes lead to greater stakeholder engagement overall, particularly for the two analyzed dimensions of CSR communication. (shrink)

Fred Feldman's fascinating new book sets out to defend hedonism as a theory about the Good Life. He tries to show that, when carefully and charitably interpreted, certain forms of hedonism yield plausible evaluations of human lives. Feldman begins by explaining the question about the Good Life. As he understands it, the question is not about the morally good life or about the beneficial life. Rather, the question concerns the general features of the life that is good in (...) itself for the one who lives it. Hedonism says (roughly) that the Good Life is the pleasant life. After showing that received formulations of hedonism are often confused or incoherent, Feldman presents a simple, clear, coherent form of sensory hedonism that provides a starting point for discussion. He then presents a catalogue of classic objections to hedonism, coming from sources as diverse as Plato, Aristotle, Brentano, Ross, Moore, Rawls, Kagan, Nozick, Brandt, and others. One of Feldman's central themes is that there is an important distinction between the forms of hedonism that emphasize sensory pleasure and those that emphasize attitudinal pleasure. Feldman formulates several kinds of hedonism based on the idea that attitudinal pleasure is the Good. He claims that attitudinal forms of hedonism - which have often been ignored in the literature -- are worthy of more careful attention. Another main theme of the book is the plasticity of hedonism. Hedonism comes in many forms. Attitudinal hedonism is especially receptive to variations and modifications. Feldman illustrates this plasticity by formulating several variants of attitudinal hedonism and showing how they evade some of the objections. He also shows how it is possible to develop forms of hedonism that are equivalent to the allegedly anti-hedonistic theory of G. E. Moore and the Aristotelian theory according to which the Good Life is the life of virtue, or flourishing. He also formulates hedonisms relevantly like the ones defended by Aristippus and Mill. Feldman argues that a carefully developed form of attitudinal hedonism is not refuted by objections concerning 'the shape of a life'. He also defends the claim that all of the alleged forms of hedonism discussed in the book genuinely deserve to be called 'hedonism'. Finally, after dealing with the last of the objections, he gives a sketch of his hedonistic vision of the Good Life. (shrink)

There is growing interest in teaching computational thinking to preschool children given evidence that they are able to understand and use CT concepts. One of the concepts that is central in CT definitions, is the concept of control structures, but it is not clear which tools and activities are successful in teaching it to young learners. This work aims at providing a comprehensive overview of tools that enable preschool children to build programs that include control structures, and analyzing empirical evidence (...) of the usage of these tools to teach control structures to children between 3 and 6. It consists of three parts: systematic literature review to identify tools to teach CT to young children, analysis of tools characteristics and the possibilities that they offer to express control structures, and SLR to identify empirical evidence of successful teaching of control structures to young children using relevant tools. This work provides an understanding of the current state of the art and identifies areas that require future exploration. (shrink)

The paper provides an analysis and interpretation of selected literary texts by Ewa Lipska, with particular focus on poems: 11 września 2001 [September 11th, 2001] and Kopalnia [The Mine]. In these metapoetic poems, Lipska makes use of jewellery imagery in order to emphasise the processuality of an act of creation, its ethical ambivalence, and its complex sources. The offered interpretations refer, among other things, to theses by Carl Gustav Jung and Pierre Marc de Biasi. Analysing the way in which the (...) poet uses motifs of gemstones and metaphors with a jewel – and also demonstrating strategies of the literary refining of poems – the author of this paper challenges the hypothesis of the end of the ‘goldsmith convention’ in contemporary Polish poetry. (shrink)

Philosophers, accounted wise in their generation and even beyond their generation, have enthroned the unchanging and sung the praises of fatality and acquiescence. But there is a voice even more authoritative than that of the sages—the voice of the LifeShaper himself. Perched on the height of the human soul, he has set two watchmen, more sagacious and knowing than the Metaphysicians who weave words “About it and about” in the taverns beneath; their names are Wonder and Surprise. Wonder spies out (...) novelty, and Surprise discerns change. Wonder arises at that which is beyond expectation; Surprise at that which is contrary to expec tation. What could completely surpass expectation save the completely novel? What could so drastically dismantle expectation save the hurricane onset of change? (shrink)

There have been many significant publications on Kazimierz Twardowski. Jacek Jadacki intends to add to this list another book _Rozum i wola. __Kazimierz Twardowski i jego wpływ na kształt kultury polskiej XX wieku_. In the review it is appraised whether it can be called “a companion to...”. It provides introductory information that can help readers better understand the role of Twardowski in Polish philosophy and culture. Updated findings by contemporary scholars are also included. The quality of the articles is guaranteed (...) by such authors as J. Woleński, R. Kleszcz, A. Brożek and J. Jadacki. However, new authors are also present as well as less common topics like Twardowski’s influence on the Polish School of Philosophy of Medicine and his roles as political scientist, educational theorist, and historian of Ancient philosophy. The authors manage to convince the reader that Twardowski is “a classic” worth knowing, in consequence the book can be treated as a “companion to Twardowski”. It also inspires readers to further investigate the works and accomplishments of the Lvov philosopher. (shrink)

Between 11–14 February 2021 the first international Philosophical Workshop organized by The Lvov–Warsaw School Research Center and Kazimierz Twardowski Philosophical Society of Lviv took place in the on–line version due to the ongoing COVID–19 pandemic. The working languages of the event were Polish, Ukrainian and English. The coordinators’ goal was to refer to the tradition of seminar of Kazimierz Twardowski, who was not only a distinguished philosopher but also a great educator, to stimulate interest and support for the young generation (...) of researchers into the heritage of the Lvov–Warsaw School. It is claimed that due to Twardowski’s unprecedented didactical engagement he managed to upbring dozens of Professors like Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Stefan Baley, Leopold Blaustein, Tadeusz Czeżowski, Izydora Dąmbska, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, tanisław Leśniewski, Jan Łukasiewicz, Władysław Witwicki. (shrink)

Within the context of service inquiries, and the specialized inferential logic associated with the particularized activities there is a gap in the orientations of customers and service representatives. Specifically, one problem that arises in customer service encounters is that customers and service representatives appear to arrive at different understandings of what constitutes a relevant response to a service inquiry. By examining one type of customer service context, calls to an electronic repair facility, this article offers a conversation analytic account of (...) how customers use formulations to collaboratively achieve a mutually agreed upon answer to their service inquiry and close the gap in the underlying logics that emerge in these calls. (shrink)

In this paper I will address a few of the many questions that fall under the general heading of “the ethics of belief.” In section I I will discuss the adequacy of what has come to be known as the “deontological conception of epistemic justification” in the light of our apparent lack of voluntary control over what we believe. In section II I’ll defend an evidentialist view about what we ought to believe. And in section III I will briefly discuss (...) apparent conflicts between epistemic considerations and moral or other considerations. (shrink)

When citizens are pulled over by police for traffic violations, they often volunteer accounts for their driving conduct. These accounts convey important character qualities about the citizen, as well as exigencies that motivate officer response. We use the method of conversation analysis to show that where a citizen positions an account in the course of an encounter is subject to different interactional-organizational constraints, which in turn afford citizens different resources for self-presentation. We also show that officers are sensitive to citizens’ (...) accounts and respond to them in differentiated ways. In addition to being a resource for self-presentation, citizens’ volunteered accounts are a resource for motivating and shaping police action. (shrink)

Fred Feldman is an important philosopher, who has made a substantial contribution to utilitarian moral philosophy. This collection of ten previously published essays plus a new introductory essay reveal the striking originality and unity of his views. Feldman's version of utilitarianism differs from traditional forms in that it evaluates behaviour by appeal to the values of accessible worlds. These worlds are in turn evaluated in terms of the amounts of pleasure they contain, but the conception of pleasure involved (...) is a novel one and the formulation of hedonism improved. In Feldman's view pleasure is not a feeling but a propositional attitude. He also deals with problems of justice that affect standard forms of utilitarianism. The collection is ideally suited for courses on contemporary utilitarian theory. (shrink)

Disagreement is common: even informed, intelligent, and generally reasonable people often come to different conclusions when confronted with what seems to be the same evidence. Can the competing conclusions be reasonable? If not, what can we reasonably think about the situation? This volume examines the epistemology of disagreement. Philosophical questions about disagreement arise in various areas, notably politics, ethics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion: but this will be the first book focusing on the general epistemic issues arising from informed (...) disagreement. Ten leading philosophers offer specially written essays which together will offer a starting-point for future work on this topic. (shrink)

Analytic description, according to members of the Lvov-Warsaw School like Czeżowski, Ajdukiewicz, Ossowska, Tarski is a powerful and an indispensable tool, not only in philosophy but also in any natural science – in psychology especially. It should be equally respected together with empirical analysis and even it is recommended that it should precede any further research. Therefore the book Analiza i konstrukcja: o metodach badania pojęć w Szkole Lwowsko-Warszawskiej [Analysis and construction: on the methods of researching concepts in the Lvov-Warsaw (...) School] can be recommended to philosophers as well as scientists. (shrink)

The present paper focuses on the use of deliberately misleading or unintentionally misinformative phrases related to the so called “Polish concentration camp” issue. This problem has been gaining increasing attention in the Polish media and political sphere. In the article I present the background of the problem including the current legal situation, as well as a linguistic analysis of a selection of problematic collocations. I attempt to maintain an objective stance and refrain from passing any emotional judgement on the issue, (...) providing, at the same time, an in-depth analysis of the linguistic data. I frame the present paper within the cognitive linguistics methodology. I combineGilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner’s (2002)Conceptual Integration TheorywithKerstin Norén and Per Linell’s (2007)concept ofmeaning potentialsin order to account for the emergent and modifiable nature of meanings of complex expressions. (shrink)

W niniejszym artykule zaprezentowana została wizja mądrości praktycznej w ujęciu Paula Ricoeura. Głównym celem rozważań było sprawdzenie, na ile jego propozycja umożliwia dokonanie oceny zjawisk wpływających negatywnie na zdolności krytyczne człowieka. Omawiane zagadnienie przedstawiono w świetle poglądów innych współczesnych myślicieli, takich jak Alasdair MacIntyre czy Charles Taylor. Przeprowadzone analizy wykazały, że mądrość praktyczna kreuje wizję dobrego życia, buduje więzi przyjaźni, domaga się teleologicznego sposobu urzeczywistniania idei sprawiedliwości. Konfrontacja wątków podjętych przez Ricoeura ze specyfiką kultury liberalizmu neutralnego pozwoliła na stwierdzenie, że (...) współcześnie ograniczeniu uległa możliwość kwestionowania własnych sądów moralnych, co jest podstawową umiejętnością phrónimos – człowieka rozsądnego. (shrink)

The purpose of the article is to present the appropriate ethical attitudes of local government employees which affect the efficiency of the administration. Local government employees who are exclusively competent and honest are able to properly execute their goals within strictly defined procedures and tasks. The article focuses on a brief analysis of the concept of ethics, employees of local government, as well as an analysis of ethics in terms of its impact on the quality of services.

In this paper I will address a few of the many questions that fall under the general heading of “the ethics of belief.” In section I I will discuss the adequacy of what has come to be known as the “deontological conception of epistemic justification” in the light of our apparent lack of voluntary control over what we believe. In section II I’ll defend an evidentialist view about what we ought to believe. And in section III I will briefly discuss (...) apparent conflicts between epistemic considerations and moral or other considerations. (shrink)

My conclusion will be that, more often than we might have thought, suspension of judgment is the epistemically proper attitude. It follows that in such cases we lack reasonable belief and so, at least on standard conceptions, knowledge. This is a kind of contingent real-world skepticism that has not received the attention it deserves. I hope that this paper will help to bring this issue to life.

We argue that the growing prevalence of statistical machine learning in everyday decision making – from creditworthiness to police force allocation – effectively replaces many of our humdrum practical judgments and that this will eventually undermine our capacity for making such judgments. We lean on Aristotle’s famous account of how phronesis and moral virtues develop to make our case. If Aristotle is right that the habitual exercise of practical judgment allows us to incrementally hone virtues, and if AI saves us (...) time by taking over some of those practical judgments, or if its pattern recognition capacities are very good at learning that kind of behavior – we risk innovating ourselves out of moral competence with the introduction of AI. (shrink)

Several years ago I came across a marvelous little paper in which Hector-Neri Castaneda shows that standard versions of act utilitarian l ism are formally incoherent. I was intrigued by his argument. It had long seemed to me that I had a firm grasp on act utilitarianism. Indeed, it had often seemed to me that it was the clearest and most attractive of normative theories. Yet here was a simple and relatively uncontrover sial argument that showed, with only some trivial (...) assumptions, that the doctrine is virtually unintelligible. The gist of Castaneda's argument is this: suppose we understand act utilitarianism to be the view that an act is obligatory if and only if its utility exceeds that of each alternative. Suppose it is obligatory for a certain person to perform an act with two parts - we can call it 'A & B'. Then, obviously enough, it is also obligatory for this person to perform the parts, A and B. If act utilitarianism were true, we appar ently could infer that the utility of A & B is higher than that of A, and higher than that of B (because A & B is obligatory, and the other acts are alternatives to A & B). (shrink)

Spatial metaphors of affect display remarkable consistencies across languages in mapping sensorimotor experiences onto emotional states, reflecting a great degree of similarity in how our bodies register affect. At the same time, however, affect is complex and there is more than a single possible mapping from vertical spatial concepts to affective states. Here we consider a previously unreported case of spatial metaphors mapping down onto desirable, and up undesirable emotional experiences in Mlabri, an Austroasiatic language of Thailand and Laos, making (...) a novel contribution to the study of metaphor and Cognitive Linguistics. Using first-hand corpus and elicitation data, we examine the metaphorical expressions: klol jur ‘heart going down’ and klol khɯn ‘heart going up’/klol kɔbɔ jur ‘heart not going down’. Though reflecting a metaphorical mapping opposite to the commonly reported happy is up metaphor, which is said to link to universal bodily correlates of emotion, the Mlabri metaphors are far from idiosyncratic. Rather, they are grounded in the bodily experience of positive low-arousal states, and in that reflect an emic view of ideal affect centered on contentment and tranquility. This underscores the complexity of bodily experience of affect, demonstrating that cultures draw on the available sensorimotor correlates of emotion in distinct ways. (shrink)

Abstract According to the Deprivation Approach, the evil of death is to be explained by the fact that death deprives us of the goods we would have enjoyed if we had lived longer. But the Deprivation Approach confronts a problem first discussed by Lucretius. Late birth seems to deprive us of the goods we would have enjoyed if we had been born earlier. Yet no one is troubled by late birth. So it’s hard to see why we should be troubled (...) by its temporal mirror image, early death. In a 1986 paper, Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer appealed to a version of Derek Parfit’s “Bias toward the Future”; they claimed that early death deprives us of future goods that we care about, while late birth deprives us of past goods that we don’t care about. In this paper I show that the Brueckner–Fischer principle is open to several possible interpretations, but that it does not solve the Lucretius problem no matter how we understand it. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9766-6 Authors Fred Feldman, Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, Amherst, MA 01003, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116. (shrink)

It is now medically possible for a baby to have two biological mothers. A fertilized ovum from one woman can be implanted into a second woman for gestation in her uterus. In fact, there have been several such cases. The ova donor is the mother in the genetic sense: her genetic material,along with that of the sperm donor,appears in the developing baby. The uterine hostess is the birth mother: she gestates the fetus and gives birth to it. In essence, the (...) two female reproductive functions, genetic and gestational, can be and have been divided from each other. Our current conception of biological maternity has lagged behind these technological marvels and still assumes that both functions will be performed by the same woman. At a time when two "biological mothers" can and do make claims for the same child,each on the ground that she is the "true mother", it is crucial to examine our concepts of biological maternity and their relation to our social policies about maternity in these cases. In this paper I will argue that the best social and legal policy would involve a prima facie preference for the claims of the gestational mother over the claims of the genetic mother for custody of the child in a contest (if there is no question of parental unfitness on either side). That is, in any dispute, presumption should be in favor of the gestational mother. This argument is made independent of considerations about pre-birth and pre-conception contracts, because the issues raised about the roles of gestational and genetic maternity are substantial in themselves and have obvious implications about the acceptability of such contracts.Rather, I argue that a revision of our concept of biological maternity which emphasizes the importance of gestation and which would prefer the claims of the gestational over the genetic mother would have positive benefits for both women and newborns. (shrink)

Some puzzles about happiness -- Pt. I. Some things that happiness isn't. Sensory hedonism about happiness -- Kahneman's "objective happiness" -- Subjective local preferentism about happiness -- Whole life satisfaction concepts of happiness -- Pt. II. What happiness is. What is this thing called happiness? -- Attitudinal hedonism about happiness -- Eudaimonism -- The problem of inauthentic happiness -- Disgusting happiness -- Our authority over our own happiness -- Pt. III. Implications for the empirical study of happiness. Measuring happiness -- (...) Empirical research; philosophical conclusions -- The central points of the project as a whole. (shrink)

The amount of biomedical research being conducted around the world has greatly expanded over the past 15 years, with particularly large growth occurring in low- and middle-income countries. This increased focus on understanding and responding to disease burdens around the world has brought forth a desire to help LMIC institutions enhance their own capacity to conduct scientifically and ethically sound research. In support of these goals the Johns Hopkins-Fogarty African Bioethics Training Program has, for the past six years, partnered with (...) three research institutions in Africa to support research ethics capacity. Each partnership began with a baseline evaluation of institutional research ethics environments in order to properly tailor capacity strengthening activities and help direct limited institutional resources. Through the course of these partnerships we have learned several lessons regarding the evaluation process and the framework used to complete the assessments. We believe that these lessons are generalizable and will be useful for groups conducting such assessments in the future. (shrink)

A new theory of how the brain constructs emotions that could revolutionize psychology, health care, law enforcement, and our understanding of the human mind Emotions feel automatic, like uncontrollable reactions to things we think and experience. Scientists have long supported this assumption by claiming that emotions are hardwired in the body or the brain. Today, however, the science of emotion is in the midst of a revolution on par with the discovery of relativity in physics and natural selection in biology--and (...) this paradigm shift has far-reaching implications for us all. Leading the charge is psychologist and neuroscientist Lisa Feldman Barrett, whose theory of emotion is driving a deeper understanding of the mind and brain, and shedding new light on what it means to be human. Her research overturns the widely held belief that emotions are housed in different parts of the brain and are universally expressed and recognized. Instead, she has shown that emotion is constructed in the moment, by core systems that interact across the whole brain, aided by a lifetime of learning. This new theory means that you play a much greater role in your emotional life than you ever thought. Its repercussions are already shaking the foundations not only of psychology but also of medicine, the legal system, child-rearing, meditation, and even airport security. Why do emotions feel automatic? Does rational thought really control emotion? How does emotion affect disease? How can you make your children more emotionally intelligent? How Emotions Are Made answers these questions and many more, revealing the latest research and intriguing practical applications of the new science of emotion, mind, and brain. (shrink)

Evidentialism is the thesis that a person is justified in believing a proposition iff the person's evidence on balance supports that proposition. In discussing epistemological issues associated with disagreements among epistemic peers, some philosophers have endorsed principles that seem to run contrary to evidentialism, specifying how one should revise one's beliefs in light of disagreement. In this paper, I examine the connection between evidentialism and these principles. I argue that the puzzles about disagreement provide no reason to abandon evidentialism and (...) that there are no true general principles about justified responses to disagreement other than the general evidentialist principle. I then argue that the puzzles about disagreement are primarily puzzles about the evidential impact of higher - order evidence – evidence about the significance or existence of ordinary, or first- order, evidence. I conclude by arguing that such higher - order evidence can often have a profound effect on the justification of first- order beliefs. (shrink)