A translation of a dialogue between Evelyne Grossman and Jacob Rogozinski on Artaud, Deleuze, and the status of the ego.

John Evelyn (1620-1706) is best remembered for Sylva - his magnum opus - and his Diary . Alongside Pepys' diary, Evelyn's is as well known now as anything else written in their time. A connoisseur of architecture, painting, music, coins, and sermons, Evelyn was renowned for his practical knowledge on horticulture and arboriculture, and he was one of the original Fellows of the Royal Society. His Diary begins with an account of his early life and travels in Europe. In addition (...) to his own jottings of events, Evelyn drew on contemporary newspapers and pamphlets. (shrink)

"-Barbara Ehrenreich, Mother Jones "This book represents the expression of a particular feminist perspective made all the more compelling by Keller's evident commitment to and understanding of science.

An edition of the letters of Erasmus, regarded as one of the greatest humanist writers. All 12 volumes of this work have been reissued, complete with their scholarly apparatus of commentary and notes, as well as plates.

Distinguishing intentional behavior from accidental behavior is a crucial component of social cognition and a major developmental achievement. It has often been assumed that developmental changes in intentional reasoning result from a gradual sophistication in the ability to discern intentions in action. We take issue with this notion, demonstrating that data from cognitive, developmental, and social psychology are more consistent with the hypothesis that it is instead a gradual sophistication in the ability to understand accidents that drives developmental change.

ABSTRACT Human cloning has been simultaneously a running joke for massive worldwide publicity of fringe groups like the Raelians, and the core issue of an international movement at the United Nations in support of a treaty to ban the use of cloning techniques to produce a child (so called reproductive cloning). Yet, even though debates on human cloning have greatly increased since the birth of Dolly, the clone sheep, in 1997, we continue to wonder whether cloning is after all any (...) different from other methods of medically assisted reproduction, and what exactly makes cloning an ‘affront to the dignity of humans.’ Categories we adopt matter mightily as they inform but can also misinform and lead to mistaken and unproductive decisions. And thus bioethicists have a responsibility to ensure that the proper categories are used in the cloning debates and denounce those who try to win the ethical debate through well‐crafted labels rather than well‐reasoned argumentations. But it is as important for bioethicists to take a position on broad issues such as human cloning and species altering interventions. One ‘natural question’ would be, for example, should there be an international treaty to ban human reproductive cloning? (shrink)

In _Beyond Prejudice_, Evelyn B. Pluhar defends the view that any sentient conative being—one capable of caring about what happens to him or herself—is morally significant, a view that supports the moral status and rights of many nonhuman animals. Confronting traditional and contemporary philosophical arguments, she offers in clear and accessible fashion a thorough examination of theories of moral significance while decisively demonstrating the flaws in the arguments of those who would avoid attributing moral rights to nonhumans. Exposing the traditional (...) view—which restricts the moral realm to autonomous, fully fledged "persons"—as having horrific implications for the treatment of many humans, Pluhar goes on to argue positively that sentient individuals of any species are no less morally significant than the most automomous human. Her position provides the ultimate justification that is missing from previous defenses of the moral status of nonhuman animals. In the process of advancing her position, Pluhar discusses the implications of determining moral significance for children and "abnormal" humans as well as its relevance to population policies, the raising of animals for food or product testing, decisions on hunting and euthanasia, and the treatment of companion animals. In addition, the author scrutinizes recent assertions by environmental ethicists that all living things or that natural objects and ecosystems be considered highly morally significant. This powerful book of moral theory challenges all defenders of the moral status quo—which decrees that animals decidedly do not count—to reevaluate their convictions. (shrink)

What do biologists want? If, unlike their counterparts in physics, biologists are generally wary of a grand, overarching theory, at what kinds of explanation do biologists aim? A history of the diverse and changing nature of biological explanation in a particularly charged field, "Making Sense of Life" draws our attention to the temporal, disciplinary, and cultural components of what biologists mean, and what they understand, when they propose to explain life.

Nocebo effects occur when an adverse effect on the patient arises from the patient's own negative expectations. In accordance with informed consent, providers often disclose information that results in unintended adverse outcomes for the patient. While this may adhere to the principle of autonomy, it violates the doctrine of “primum non nocere,” given that side-effect disclosure may cause those side effects. In this article we build off previous work, particularly by Wells and Kaptchuk and by Cohen :3–11.[Taylor & Francis Online], (...) [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar]), to suggest ethical guidelines that permit nondisclosure in the case when a nocebo effect is likely to occur on of the basis of nonmaleficence. We accept that that autonomy vis-à-vis informed consent must be forestalled, but salvage much of its role by elaborating a practical clinical approach to postencounter follow-up. In doing so, we reconcile a clinically practicable process of determining conditions of disclosure with long-standing ethical commitments to patients. (shrink)

The essays included here represent Fox Keller's attempts to integrate the insights of feminist theory with those of her contemporaries in the history and philosophy of science.

Complex environmental problems require well-researched policies that integrate knowledge from both the natural and social sciences. Epistemic differences can impede interdisciplinary collaboration, as shown by debates between conservation biologists and anthropologists who are working to preserve biological diversity and support economic development in central Africa. Disciplinary differences with regard to 1) facts, 2) rigor, 3) causal explanation, and 4) research goals reinforce each other, such that early decisions about how to define concepts or which methods to adopt may tilt research (...) design and data interpretation toward one discipline’s epistemological framework. If one of the contributing fields imposes a solution to an epistemic problem, this sets the stage for what I call disciplinary capture. Avoiding disciplinary capture requires clear communication between collaborators, but beyond this it also requires that collaborators craft research questions and innovate research designs which are different from the inherited epistemological frameworks of contributing disciplines. (shrink)

That Cicero as a young didactic poet embraced the traditions of Hellenistic hexameter poetry is well recognized. Those traditions encompass various forms of wordplay, one of which is the acrostic. Cicero's engagement with this tradition, in the form of an unusual Greek-Latin acrostic at Aratea 317–20, prompts inquiry regarding both the use of the acrostic technique as textual commentary and Cicero's lifelong concerns regarding translation.

In this powerful critique, the esteemed historian and philosopher of science Evelyn Fox Keller addresses the nature-nurture debates, including the persistent disputes regarding the roles played by genes and the environment in determining individual traits and behavior. Keller is interested in both how an oppositional “versus” came to be inserted between nature and nurture, and how the distinction on which that opposition depends, the idea that nature and nurture are separable, came to be taken for granted. How, she asks, did (...) the illusion of a space between nature and nurture become entrenched in our thinking, and why is it so tenacious? Keller reveals that the assumption that the influences of nature and nurture can be separated is neither timeless nor universal, but rather a notion that emerged in Anglo-American culture in the late nineteenth century. She shows that the seemingly clear-cut nature-nurture debate is riddled with incoherence. It encompasses many disparate questions knitted together into an indissoluble tangle, and it is marked by a chronic ambiguity in language. There is little consensus about the meanings of terms such as nature, nurture, gene, and environment. Keller suggests that contemporary genetics can provide a more appropriate, precise, and useful vocabulary, one that might help put an end to the confusion surrounding the nature-nurture controversy. (shrink)

Il s’agit d’étudier dans ce volume non pas juste une classe de mots, mais une fonction, qui a fait l’objet de grandes divergences théoriques quant à ses délimitations, sa définition exacte, et dont le concept même n’est pas utilisé par toutes les écoles de linguistique. Le but de ce volume est de faire le point sur les facteurs de divergence, sur les concepts limitatifs ou concurrents à celui de détermination, afin de voir si certaines...

L’alternance entre N2’s N1/N1 of N2/N2N1 est généralement expliquée en France par le recours au modèle de la grammaire métaopérationnelle, selon lequel c’est la « soudure » entre les référents de N2 et N1 qui détermine le choix de structure. Le modèle est mis à mal par l’analyse des occurrences du corpus : il est inapte à rendre compte de leur emploi, et sur un plan plus général, il ne remplit pas les principaux critères scientifiques de validité : universalité, raisonnement (...) non circulaire, réfutabilité et pouvoir de prédiction. L’article propose une autre explication de l’alternance en question, élaborée dans un cadre théorique qui rejette l’idée de l’existence systématique d’un invariant sémantique. L’hypothèse avancée est que le choix de structure, en dehors des cas de spécialisation fonctionnelle, se fait principalement selon la fonction de N2. De plus, il est suggéré que s’opère aujourd’hui une poussée du schéma N2N1 et une baisse de productivité du génitif, en cohérence avec le déclin historique du système casuel de l’anglais. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt beschäftigt sich in ihren Schriften mit konkreten Erfahrungen in der Welt. Ihr Verständnis von Politik definiert sich durch Phänomenalität und entsteht als Handeln zwischen den Menschen. Die Verfasserin zeigt, dass Arendts Denken auch für aktuelle politikdidaktische Fragestellungen wegweisend ist.

Es gibt Gegenstände, von denen gilt, daß es dergleichen Gegenstände nicht gibt. Dieser Satz hat dem Österreicher Alexius Meinong nicht nur Berühmtheit, sondern auch vernichtende Urteile beschert. Hindern konnten sie ihn jedoch keinesfalls daran, die weltweit bekannte Schule der Grazer Gegenstandstheorie zu etablieren. Wertphilosophische, erkenntnistheoretische sowie psychologische Schriften und die Gründung des ersten experimentalpsychologischen Laboratoriums in Österreich komplettieren das Schaffen dieses Philosophen. Meinongs Lebensgeschichte ist die Verquickung der Geschichte seiner Publikationen und der akademischen Aktivitäten seiner kleinen Schule von Schülern. Platz (...) für private Belange schien in jenem Leben, das sich nahezu vier Jahrzehnte in der steiermärkischen Universitätsstadt Graz abspielte, kaum zu sein. Eine äußerst starke Sehschwäche, die Meinong vor Kollegen, Freunden und sogar seiner Frau auf ungewöhnliche Weise zu verbergen suchte, lastete schwer auf ihm. In der ersten vollständigen Biographie Meinongs zeichnet Evelyn Dölling das leidenschaftliche Ringen dieses Denkers um höchste wissenschaftliche Präzision nach. Aus der Recherche des umfangreichen Nachlaßmaterials sowie der zahlreichen Korrespondenzen (8 300 Briefe) entsteht ein Bild von Meinongs Familienleben und seinen Beziehungen zu Freunden, wie man es so bislang nicht kannte. (shrink)

Two decades of critique have sensitized historians and philosophers of science to the inadequacies of conventional dichotomies between theory and practice, thereby prompting the search for new ways of writing about science that are less beholden than the old ways to the epistemological mores of theoretical physics, and more faithful to the actual practices not only of physics but of all the natural sciences. The need for alternative descriptions seems particularly urgent if one is to understand the place of theory (...) (and, in parallel, the role of modeling) in contemporary molecular biology, a science where, until now, no division between theory and experiment has obtained, and where distinctions between representing and intervening, and more generally, between basic and applied science, are daily becoming more blurred. Indeed, the very division between theory and experiment threatens to slight the extensive and sophisticated theoretical analyses (and even modeling) on which experimental work in contemporary molecular biology so often depends. My aim in this paper is to find a way of talking about theoretical practices in biology that is directly rooted in the mix of conceptual and material work that biologists do. As an example of such theoretical practices, I choose for the focus of my analysis the development of a model for gene regulation out of the experimental work of Eric Davidson and his colleagues at Cal Tech. (shrink)

Recent observations of power-law distributions in the connectivity of complex networks came as a big surprise to researchers steeped in the tradition of random networks. Even more surprising was the discovery that power-law distributions also characterize many biological and social networks. Many attributed a deep significance to this fact, inferring a “universal architecture” of complex systems. Closer examination, however, challenges the assumptions that (1) such distributions are special and (2) they signify a common architecture, independent of the system's specifics. The (...) real surprise, if any, is that power-law distributions are easy to generate, and by a variety of mechanisms. The architecture that results is not universal, but particular; it is determined by the actual constraints on the system in question. BioEssays 27:1060–1068, 2005. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

‘‘COGNITIVE ECOLOGY’’ is a fruitful model for Shakespearian studies, early modern literary and cultural history, and theatrical history more widely. Cognitive ecologies are the multidimensional contexts in which we remember, feel, think, sense, communicate, imagine, and act, often collaboratively, on the fly, and in rich ongoing interaction with our environments. Along with the anthropologist Edwin Hutchins,1 we use the term ‘‘cognitive ecology’’ to integrate a number of recent approaches to cultural cognition: we believe these approaches offer productive lines of engagement (...) with early modern literary and historical studies.2 The framework arises out of our work in extended mind and distributed cognition.3 The extended mind hypothesis arose from a post-connectionist philosophy of cognitive science. This approach was articulated in Andy Clark’s Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again, and further developed by Susan Hurley and Mark Rowlands, among others.4 The distributed cognition approach arose independently, from work in cognitive anthropology, HCI (Human-Computer Interaction), the sociology of education and work, and science studies. The principles of distributed cognition were articulated in Hutchins’s ethnography of navigation, Cogni- tion in the Wild,5 and developed by theorists such as David Kirsh and Lucy Suchman.6 These models share an anti-individualist approach to cognition. In all these views, mental activities spread or smear across the boundaries of skull and skin to include parts of the social and material world. In remembering, decision making, and acting, whether individually or in small groups, our complex and structured activities involve many distinctive dimensions: neural, affective, kines-. (shrink)

Among Bryan Norton’s most influential contributions to environmental philosophy has been his analysis and evaluation of democratic processes for environmental decision-making. He examines actual cases of environmental decision-making in their legal, political, ethical and scientific contexts, and, with contextual constraints and goals in mind, he theorizes concerning what they accomplish and how they can be improved. Informed by the political theories of both John Dewey and Jürgen Habermas, Norton’s pragmatist approach holds that appropriate democratic decision procedures will generate broadly defensible (...) decisions. Thus, his view of environmental decision-making is based in—and requires—inclusive, democratic, empirical inquiry. While accepting these criteria, I examine how, in practice, it is difficult to identify when these conditions have been adequately met. I investigate the limitations of Norton’s proceduralist approach through a case study in community-based forest management in a New York State urban old-growth park. I argue that Norton’s procedural priorities are too rigid given the contextual constraints of local decision-making. While they are useful for guiding an ideal, high standards sense of the decision-making process, less rigid Deweyan considerations of social learning and community engagement often provide sufficient guidelines for evaluating success. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to intervene in debates about the digital and, in particular, framings that imagine the digital in terms of epochal shifts or as redefining life. Instead, drawing on recent developments in digital methods, we explore the lively, productive and performative qualities of the digital by attending to the specificities of digital devices and how they interact, and sometimes compete, with older devices and their capacity to mobilize and materialize social and other relations. In doing so, (...) our aim is to explore the implications of digital devices and data for reassembling social science methods or what we call the social science apparatuses that assemble digital devices and data to ‘know’ the social and other relations. Building on recent work at CRESC on the social life of methods, we recommend a genealogical approach that is alive to the ways in which digital devices are simultaneously shaped by social worlds, and can in turn become agents that shape those worlds. This calls for attending to the specificities of digital devices themselves, how they are varied and composed of diverse socio-technical arrangements, and are enrolled in the creation of new knowledge spaces, institutions and actors. Rather than exploring what large-scale changes can be revealed and understood through the digital, we argue for explorations of how digital devices themselves are materially implicated in the production and performance of contemporary sociality. To that end we offer the following nine propositions about the implications of digital data and devices and argue that these demand rethinking the theoretical assumptions of social science methods: transactional actors; heterogeneity; visualization; continuous time; whole populations; granularity; expertise; mobile and mobilizing; and non-coherence. (shrink)

Les communications du colloque sur "La fonction critique de l'Art" qui s'Est déroulé à l'Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour, les 28, 29 et 30 novembre 2007 sous l'Impulsion d'Evelyne Toussaint, témoignent d'Une volonté d'eclairer la production d'Artistes qui ont pris position sur des questions politiques, sociales, économiques ou esthétiques. Sans céder à certains jugements qui se révèlent souvent comme autant de témoignages de méconnaissance, de distraction, d'emballements rhétoriques ou de volonté d'emprise, résistant aux arbitrages qui les (...) inciteraient à opter exclusivement pour l'esthétique relationnelle, la micropolitique, le détournement, le documentaire, l'art contextuel ou l'art autonome, de nombreux artistes se moquent, en effet, de l'injonction qui lescontraindrait à dissocier œuvre sensible et œuvre critique. (shrink)

Philosophers increasingly engage in practical work with other disciplines and the world at large. This volume draws together the lessons learned from this work--including philosophers' contributions to scientific research projects, consultations on matters of policy, and expertise provided to government agencies and non-profits--on how to effectively practice philosophy. Its 22 case studies are organized into five sections: I Collaboration and Communication II Policymaking and the Public Sphere III Fieldwork in the Academy IV Fieldwork in the Professions V Changing Philosophical Practice (...) Together, these essays provide a practical, how-to guide for doing philosophy in the field--how to find problems that can benefit from philosophical contributions, effectively collaborate with other professionals and community members, make fieldwork a positive part of a philosophical career, and anticipate and negotiate the sorts of unanticipated problems that crop up in direct public engagement. Key features: Gives specific advice on how to integrate philosophy with outside groups. Offers examples from working with the public and private sectors, community organizations, and academic groups. Provides lessons learned, often summarized at the end of chapters, for how to practice philosophy in the field. (shrink)

Field philosophy is a method of philosophical practice. As such, it is open or neutral with regard to topic and content, to the social location of collaborators, and to the type of outcome or produ...

Assistive technology has great potential to contribute to health, functioning, and quality of life. To date, as exemplified in the Canadian context, variations and inequities in access to assistive technology are evident; the development of legislation, policies, and programs has not kept up with the increasing use of assistive technology. In this article, we apply ;Daniels’s (2008) theory of just health to argue that equitable access to assistive technology funding and services is necessary for justice. In doing so, we offer (...) theoretical guidance for the development of legislation, policies, and programs to guide such access in health and social services. (shrink)

Our focus in this article concerns Leibniz’s views on evil. Our goal is to examine which are the consequences of his conception of moral agency for the moral psychology of the genuinely evil person. For Leibniz, moral failure is an epistemic error since it involves some false practical judgement. Moral maxims may be represented in blind or symbolic cognitions, but then moral agents can misrepresent the evil consequences of their behaviour. Finally, we discuss Leibniz’s view on habits that may help (...) virtuous persons strive for perfection but also enable evil persons to continue sinning. (shrink)