Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is not a mere egology, but gets its concrete accomplishment only as a phenomenology of 'transcendental intersubjectivity'. However, the subjective centers of any transcendentality and thus of every constitution — even of intersubjectivity itself — have to be such unities as Leibniz' 'monads', that is, individually concrete subjects producing all their representations of one another completely out of themselves, respectively. Thus the problem arises, how the genuine transcendental status of each monadic subject in all its constitutive achievements (...) could be maintained so that they develop their own intentional lives in a universal mutual accordance, without presupposing again a supra-monadic ground for their 'harmony', i.e. a higher-levelled ordering unity. I shall argue that th peculiar Husserlian 'transcendental monadology' is inevitably bound to this intrinsic paradox which can at best be reduced to a mere postulate but never be resolved. (shrink)

In as far as every philosophy appears at a certain point in time it later inevitably becomes a historical fact. If its content is then to be recognizable, if it is to be reclaimed as philosophy in the present, then we ourselves must have a philosophical conception of history and, furthermore, a conception of philosophy's own historicity. Only since Kant has modern metaphysics expressly and methodically developed such a conception within its systematic claim to truth. Moreover, for the presentday philosophy (...) and its relationship to a completed metaphysics such a conception is indispensable - under the presupposition that the history of philosophy is to be taken seriously as philosophy. (shrink)

The intention of my comments is mainly to draw attention to a necessary distinction between that prereflective cogito of post‐metaphysical subjectivity that is analysed in Westphal's paper and the subject of the cogito that can be identified and verified as the very principle of modern philosophy from Descartes to Hegel, namely, as the subject of reason. This means first of all to step back from the conviction, taken as self‐evident, that the subject of reason — and thereby the truth claims (...) of that entire philosophical epoch — are illusionary, that is, without any right of their own. Instead we should be ready to ask how it is brought about philosophically that the subject is “shattered,” “humiliated,” “declared forfeit,” etc. My thesis is that post‐metaphysical subjectivity with its contaminated opacity can be made understandable in principle out of the endogenous crisis of the fully developed “absolute” subject of reason, if this crisis is carried out and decided as the transformation of the subject from its absolute to its decentered status. (shrink)

In this paper I attempt to analyze the basic tension in Kant's philosophy of right, i.e. within the conceptual framework of his Transcendental Idealism. Right as the embodiment of laws of freedom applicable to mortal-rational agents bridges the gap between their noumenal character and empirical-natural existence. How can this gap be bridged? A priori juridical laws are not sufficient to provide a complete classification for the empirical realm, exhausting all possible positive rights. Furthermore, according to Kant, Right must be basically (...) justifiable by reason. Yet this justification is merely a necessary condition for obligation. In order to develop any real obligation, it must be complemented by a non-deducible, empirical-positive aspect . Hence only as a result of actually exercising individual freedom does the mutual necessitation to recognize individual freedom for all arise. The historical-factual formation of civil social orders, though subject to a priori foundation, is thus unavoidably marked by contingency. Nonetheless, because of its a priori character, the idea of a society of free individuals becomes the standard of critique for every empirical instantiation of a civil social order. Recht als Inbegriff der Gesetze der Freiheit endlich-vernünftiger Subjekte leistet eine Vermittlung zwischen dem noumenalen Wesen und der emprisch-naturalen Existenz dieser Subjekte. Wie ist diese Vermittlung möglich? Eine vollständige Einteilung des Empirischen unter Rechtsgesetzen a priori ist unmöglich. Was Recht ist, ist nach Kant zwar nur in der Vernunft begründbar, aber dieser Grund bleibt nur notwendige Bedingung, zu der stets eine nicht deduzierbare, empirisch-positive Seite hinzukommen muß, um tatsächliche Verbindlichkeit zu erhalten : Erst aufgrund einer faktischen Ausübung der Freiheit entsteht die wechselseitige Nötigung, die individuelle Freiheit als Freiheit aller anzuerkennen. Die historisch-faktische Gestaltung von Rechtsgemeinschaften bleibt somit auch unter der Bedingung apriorischer Begründung mit unaufhebbarer Kontingenz behaftet; doch zugleich gewinnt die Idee einer Gemeinschaft freier Individuen kraft ihrer Apriorität eine kritische Funktion gegenüber jeglicher empirischer Instanz. (shrink)

On November 21, 1994, Werner Marx passed away peacefully in the place he loved so well, his apartment in the Schloß in Bollschweil. Professor Marx was born in 1910 in Mulheim, Germany. He studied law and philosophy in Berlin, Freiburg, and Bonn before completing his state examination and doctorate in law in 1933. In the same year, he was removed from civil service and from an apprentice judgeship by the Nazis. After this, he emigrated first to Palestine and then in (...) 1938 to New York, where he took up academic studies again. After receiving an M.A. in economics, he completed the Ph.D. in philosophy, working with Kurt Reizler and Karl Löwith at the German University in Exile, later to become the New School for Social Research, and writing a dissertation on Aristotle’s ontology. During this period, he renewed his interest in Hegel and German Idealism, and also in Heidegger’s critique of the tradition and attempts to make “another beginning” in philosophy. Marx began teaching at the New School in 1949. After the appearance of his classic study, Heidegger and the Tradition, he was named successor to the Husserl-Heidegger chair in philosophy and director of Philosophical Seminar I in Freiburg, which he held from 1964 until his retirement in 1979. He also served as Director of the Husserl-Archives in Freiburg until his death. (shrink)

When the original Dutch version of this book was presented in 1971 to the University of Leiden as a thesis for the Doctorate in philosophy, I was prevented by the academic mores of that university from expressing my sincere thanks to three members of the Philosophical Faculty for their support of and interest in my pursuits. I take the liberty of doing so now, two and a half years later. First and foremost I want to thank Professor G. Nuchelmans warmly (...) for his expert guidance of my research. A number of my most im portant sources were brought to my attention by him. During the whole process of composing this book his criticism and encouragement were carried out in a truly academic spirit. He thereby provided working conditions that are a sine qua non for every author who is attempting to approach controversial matters in a scientific manner, conditions which, however, were not easily available at that time. In a later phase I also came into contact with Professors L. M. de Rijk and J. B. Ubbink, with both of whom I had highly stimulating discussions and exchanges of ideas. The present edition contains some entirely new sections, viz. 1-9, IV-29, V-9, V-20, VII-14 (iii), (iv), VII-17 (i), VIII-22, IX-17, IX-19, X-9 and XI-8. Section X-9 was inspired by a remark made by Professor A. (shrink)

This book is a guide to the poetics of the two Greek fountainheads of Western literary theory. Part I traces the development of Plato's great themes of inspiration and imitation but makes no attempt to reduce his disparate statements to a system. Part II demonstrates that Aristotle's Poetics embodies a powerful theory of literature that answers Plato's objections to poetry as an emotionally powerful, and therefore dangerous, communication of false opinion. Originally published in 1987. A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- (...) UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value. (shrink)

Else Margarete Barth (1928-2015) was een Noors-Nederlandse filosoof.0Else Barth vond dat filosofie in dienst zou moeten staan van de combinatie van medemenselijkheid en helder, geïnformeerd denken en discussiëren. Barth was ervan overtuigd dat zorgvuldig redeneren en debatteren noodzakelijk is voor het verbeteren van menselijke relaties. Met logica als wapen bestreed ze vaagheid en vooroordelen. Om logica van betekenis te maken voor het praktische leven, verbond ze het met analytisch onderzoek naar ideeën die rondwaren in wetenschap en politieke cultuur. Haar (...) bijzondere belangstelling ging daarbij uit naar anti-argumentatieve en anti-parlementaire houdingen en denksystemen die, vaak ten faveure van een hoger doel, minachting voor (groepen) individuen legitimeren of zelfs aanmoedigen. Met haar pleidooi voor een 'empirische logica' leverde Barth een originele bijdrage aan de Europese wijsbegeerte, die ook voor de huidige tijd relevant is.0'Empirische logica' is een selectie uit Barths werk. De bundel bevat voorbeelden van toegepast empirisch-logisch onderzoek, naar de logische grondslagen van het Duitse idealisme bijvoorbeeld, die volgens Barth dezelfde zijn als die van de klassieke homeopathie, naar het denken van de Noorse nazi Quisling, maar ook naar de onevenredige aandacht voor 'gemiddelden' in de sociale wetenschappen, die tot stigmatisering leidt. In beschouwende stukken reflecteert de auteur onder meer op het belang van cultuur-georiënteerd logica-onderwijs en zoekt ze een verklaring voor de kloof tussen logica en politiek. Ten slotte zijn essays0opgenomen die Barth schreef over filosofen die haar inspireerden: Bertrand Russell, Evert Willem Beth en Arne Naess. (shrink)

The contributions in the first part Re-modelling logic of this volume take account of formal logic in the theory of rational argumentation.

– The purpose of this paper is to discuss how the use of information technology in schools can influence students’ democratic comprehension., – First, two different ideas of democracy are introduced and how these ideas are linked to cognitivistic and social constructivistic learning theories, respectively, is illustrated. Next, a case study is described, where Engeström’s mediational triangle is used for analysing how the use of interactive whiteboards (IWB) influences the teaching of democracy in a fifth-grade school class., – The paper (...) lists a set of preconditions and recommendations for a use of IWB as support for students’ experience of democracy as a way of living., – As the paper focuses on research design and development of didactical designs, future research and articles can further study the effects of the didactical designs and the democratic comprehension supported hereby. The paper is set in a Danish school context., – It is argued that the IWB can be used as support for developing the students’ democratic comprehension by focusing on and, if necessary, changing the elements of the activity system, e.g. the rules and the roles concerning the use of the IWB., – The paper’s linkage of democratic ideas, learning theory and information technology is relevant for researchers. Teachers can use the paper, as it offers didactical principles for using information technology as support for students’ democratic comprehension. (shrink)