The book makes a direct contribution to the connection between phenomenology and cognitive science.

This collection presents the English-language reader for the first time with essays that are representative of Bernstein's much-neglected revisionist period, 1901-1921. Bernstein himself suggested that this later work included significant new elements, indicating further progress in his liberal-socialist theory. Bernstein's later work acquires additional significance in light of the events of 1989, which have discredited not only Marxism-Leninism, but revolutionary Marxist theory in general, thus making the reevaluation of Bernstein's revisionism a worthwhile experience.

"Allerdings, das ist eine grosse Frage, der ich zu sehr ausgewichen bin, die Evidenz des Ich als ein Identisches, das also doch nicht in dem Bündel bestehen kann." (Husserl, 1907) Bekanntlich verwirft Husserl in den Logischen Untersuchungen die Auffassung, "dass die Beziehung auf das Ich etwas zum we sentlichen Bestande des intentionalen Erlebnisses selbst Gehöriges sei'',! und bildet um 1907, nach Einführung der phänomenolo gischen Reduktion, "die Beziehung auf das Ich zu unterlassen, oder von ihr zu abstrahieren" geradezu die Bedingung, (...) ein "reines Phänomen im Sinne der Phänomenologie" 2 zu gewinnen. Und bekanntlich heisst es demgegenüber in den Ideen von 1913: "Unter den allgemeinen Wesenseigentümlichkeiten des tran szendental gereinigten Erlebnisgebietes gebührt eigentlich die erste Stelle der Beziehung auf das,reine' Ich",3 und revidiert Husserl in der zweiten Auflage der Logischen Untersuchungen von 4 1913 seine Stellungnahme zur Frage des reinen Ich. Weniger bekannt ist bisher, wie Husserl auf seinem Denkweg von der einen zur anderen Stellungnahme zum Problem des Ich gekommen ist. Was bewegte ihn, das "Ich" in die phänomeno logische Problematik einzubeziehen? Zu vermuten war, dem Wandel in der Stellung zum Problem des Ich liege ein Wandel im Verständnis der Phänomenologie selbst zugrunde. Welche Phänomene motivierten, auf dem phänomenologischen Boden selbst, die Einbeziehung des Ich? Vor allem dieser Frage gehen wir, unter Berücksichtigung des Nachlassmaterials des Husserl Archivs (Leuven), in unserer Studie nach. (shrink)

In this paper I explore possibilities of bringing post-positivist philosophies of empirical science to bear on the dynamics of mathematical development. This is done by way of a convergent accommodation of a mathematical version of Lakatos's methodology of research programmes, and a version of Kuhn's account of scientific change that is made applicable to mathematics by cleansing it of all references to the psychology of perception. The resulting view is argued in the light of two case histories of radical conceptual (...) innovations. (shrink)

This is an EXACT reproduction of a book published before 1923.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

"Like Hanslick, Professor Payzant is both musician and philosopher; and he has brought the knowledge and insights of both disciplines to this large undertaking." --Gordon Epperson, _Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism_.

In the context of «reassessing the relationship between explanation and phenomenology», the paper discusses the question in what ways Husserlian phenomenology as a descriptive science of consciousness has an explanatory potential in consciousness studies. It takes a very limited approach to the wide-ranging themes that may come to mind on this topic. At the center is an exploration of consciousness as an explanandum in its own right, building on Husserl's reflective-eidetic analyses of conscious experiences. It will concentrate on explicating acts (...) of intuitive representification ( anschauliche Vergegenwärtigungen) as intentional modifications of perception, making up higher, radical novel levels of intentionality. Acts of remembering, imagining, depicting something, as well as iterations and combinations of such acts, will serve as examples. A formal notation will be used with the intention to make the reflection-based theoretical language of phenomenology more precise and easier to survey. (shrink)

This paper consists in a study of the development of Husserl’s thought on the notions of phantasy and image consciousness. It shows how, following a first phase in which he still identified phantasy with image consciousness, Husserl gradually began to distinguish the two and define what is proper to each in an increasingly precise manner. The paper then shows how Husserl came to view pure phantasy as a modification of perception. Concerning image consciousness, it shows how the status of the (...) image-object and the nature of its reference to the image subject evolved throughout Husserl’s thought. The problems raised by this model are also discussed, in particular when it comes to cases where there is no image subject, e.g. in theatre. Finally, the paper shows how the development of these concepts in Husserl’s work involves a new conception of the notion of “phantasm” – one that goes hand in hand with rejection of the ‘content of apprehension-apprehension’ scheme. (shrink)

This article considers the affinities in the socio-political thought of Emmanuel Levinas and Richard Rorty. The writings of both display considerable concern for the suffering of others. Both authors note the importance of a self-critical subject becoming more aware of its own injustice as very important for recognizing our responsibilities to others. Furthermore, both stress the importance of recognizing the other outside of the usual, objectifying categories, since it is the uniqueness of the other that reminds us of our responsibility (...) for the other. Both writers view the liberal state as the best political forum in which to realize a fuller recognition of and responsibility towards the other, a form of state in which the ethical constantly interrupts the political. Rorty and Levinas disagree, however, on the legitimacy of not responding to the other. Key Words: Critchley • irony • justice • Levinas • liberal state • other • responsibility • Rorty • sentimental education. (shrink)

Was passiert, wenn jemand zeigt, dass die Dreifaltigkeit der Ausgangspunkt der Freiheitsgeschichte der Menschheit ist? Dass in ihr das Risiko grundgelegt ist, das in jeder Begegnung eingeschlossen ist? Dass sie das Netz ist, das jede menschliche Liebe unterfangt? Und dass sie schliesslich die ausserste Spannung auszieht, von der Fulle des Seins zum Nichts und zum Tod? Plotzlich ruckt dann die Dreifaltigkeit mitten ins Zentrum des Verstehens von Menschheitsentwicklung und Kultur, von Gottinnigkeit ebenso wie von Gottesferne. Nichts Geringeres unternimmt die vorliegende (...) Arbeit des Franziskaners P. Eduard Prenga. Den wesentlichen Bezugspunkt bildet dabei der italienische Theologe Piero Coda, der an der Papstlichen Lateran-Universitat sein Lehrer war. Der Mensch in seiner Geschichtlichkeit ist das Ziel der sich schenkenden Liebe Gottes, so wie sie im Neuen Testament bezeichnet wird: agape. Deshalb offenbart dieser sich selbst. Diese Offenbarung stellt die Theologie vor die Frage: Wie kann die Dreieinigkeit gedacht und ins Menschliche "uber-setzt" werden? Die vorliegende Studie unternimmt den Versuch einer Antwort, indem sie vom trinitatstheologischen Denken des italienischen Theologen Piero Coda ausgeht und zu Edmund Husserls Phanomenologie der Intersubjektivitat und Interpersonalitat gelangt. Dabei ist sie sowohl trinitarische Ontologie als auch trinitarische Phanomenologie. (shrink)

There is widespread agreement among philosophers that we refer to, think or talk about non-existent objects in much the same way as we refer to, think or talk about other objects. This paper explores the case of objects of fiction in the perspective of Husserlian philosophical phenomenology. In this perspective, everything objective is dealt with as object of some consciousness and as presenting itself in subjective modes. Within the scope of this paper, the focus of the descriptive analysis will be (...) on showing in some detail how conscious experiences of intentionally referring to something fictive in pre-linguistic intuitive acts of imagining something are to be articulated with regard to the object of consciousness, i.e. noematically, and with regard to the intentional act, i.e. noetically. Special attention will be given to the reflective finding of some consciousness being intentionally implied and thereby modified in the very performance of an intentional act of representifying (vergegenwärtigen) something in fiction and to the question of identity and individuation of objects in fiction. It will be argued that modifications occurring in representificational consciousness, which Husserl called ‘as-if’ or ‘quasi’ modifications, provide the key for understanding the phenomenology of fictional intentionality and reference. (shrink)