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Continental Philosophy > Phenomenology > Edmund Husserl > Husserl: Philosophy of Mind > Husserl: The Self > Husserl: Self-Awareness
Husserl: Self-Awareness
About this topic
| Summary | Characteristically for Husserlian phenomenology, whatever we can legitimately say about the self is closely paralleled by an account of the data and workings of self-awareness. On the one hand, Husserl speaks about the self (“the monad”) as the experienced totality of one’s life. Within it, we can abstractively distinguish constitutive levels, all the way down to the pre-egological flow of time-consciousness, quite unlike our ordinary experiences of ourselves. On the other hand, Husserl’s later account of intentional acts involves the idea of an ego-pole, an aspect of intentional experiences, conceived as the opposite of an object-pole. In our intentional lives, the ego-pole is the source and center of performance and activity, including the action of predication. One way in which we can be aware of our selves is by regarding them reflectively, as in phenomenological reflection. However, for Husserl, the primary self-awareness is pre-reflective. In Husserl-scholarship, this pre-reflective self-awareness has been identified with the absolute flow of time-consciousness. |
| Key works | A classic treatment, Held 1966 discusses the “living present” as the original mode of subjective life. Marbach 1974 explores the reasons that led Husserl, in Ideas I, to abandon his earlier view that there is only an empirical self, and to introduce the idea of a pure I. Marbach also discusses this Husserlian notion in relation to ideas in contemporary psychology, as well as Kant’s views. Zahavi 1999 engages with a variety of approaches to self-awareness, drawing attention to the promise of the phenomenological, especially the Husserlian, approach, with an emphasis on the idea of a pre-reflective self-awareness. Carr 1999 investigates subjectivity in the transcendental tradition, especially Kant and Husserl, upholding the idea and the tradition against Heideggerian and other criticisms. With a view to accounting for the possibility of intersubjectivity from the standpoint of Husserl’s transcendental idealism, Mensch 1988 grounds intersubjectivity in a pre-individual “primal subjectivity”. Lotz 2007 studies affectivity and subjectivity, as well as Husserl’s phenomenological method, based on Husserl’s later texts, arguing that Husserl’s views are rooted in a central concern with concrete human activities and experiences. Taguchi 2006 explores the notion of an “original I” (Ur-Ich), considered as a phenomenological topic. |
| Introductions | Bernet et al 1993, Ch. 8, Moran 2005, Ch. 7 |
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- Zahavi, Husserl and Heidegger on I, You and We: For-Meness or Ownness?Joshua Soffer - manuscriptZahavi offers a model of ‘I’, You and We consciousness that is grounded in the transcendentality of a minimal pre-reflective self-awareness , which he calls ‘for-meness’. Zahavi’s formulation of transcendental self-belonging as ‘for me-ness’ relies on the notion of a felt non-changing self- identity accompanying all intentional experiences. Zahavi’s treatment of the subject and object poles of experience as, respectively, self-inhering internality and externality, makes of self-awareness an alienating opposition between a purely self-identical felt for-meness and an external object, a (...)
- Husserl’s Notion of the Pure I.Andrija Jurić - 2023 - Filozofska Istrazivanja 43 (1):75-98.The author analyses the second phase of the development of Husserl’s phenomenological egology and the transition from nonegological to egological phenomenology. Accepting the necessity of the pure I as a phenomenological residue of the transcendental epoché, a non-constituted transcendence in immanence and the source of the evidence of the ‘I am’, it is analysed in its main aspects – such as, among others, the I-pole and I-substrate of habitualities – and in its traits and roles it plays in the stream (...)
- Kinesthesis and Self-Awareness.Gediminas Karoblis - 2023 - In Saulius Geniusas (ed.), Varieties of Self-Awareness: New Perspectives from Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, and Comparative Philosophy. Springer Verlag. pp. 85-99.It is remarkable that the phenomenological tradition always treated Husserl’s concept of kinesthesis as instrumental, and extremely rarely as a primary topic. For this reason, Husserl’s own confusion regarding this concept has not been addressed properly. According to Dorion Cairns, in early July 1932 Husserl reversed his concept of kinesthesis several times. Moreover, Husserl’s accounts provided in the Ding und Raum lectures of 1907 and Ideas II are different in this regard. Husserl’s late manuscripts also provide evidence for his updated (...)
- Husserlian Shadows in Plato’s Cave: Layers of Contingency and Fictional Variations on Self-Awareness.Claudio Majolino - 2023 - In Saulius Geniusas (ed.), Varieties of Self-Awareness: New Perspectives from Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, and Comparative Philosophy. Springer Verlag. pp. 3-25.By highlighting an often-neglected detail of Plato’s allegory of the cave, this essay puts to the test the conceptual resources of Husserl’s understanding of self-variation and weighs its relevance with respect to the concept of self-awareness. After a methodological introduction, a reminder of the relevant passages of Plato’s Republic, and a survey of the manner in which Husserl articulates self-variation and self-awareness, it shows which of these layers are revealed by the Platonic fiction of the cave and how fictions in (...)
- Abstraction and Self-Alienation in Mannheim and Husserl.Iaan Reynolds - 2023 - In Andrej Božič (ed.), Thinking Togetherness: Phenomenology and Sociality. Institute Nova Reijva for the Humanities. pp. 31-44.In this paper, I explore the approaches to methodological abstraction and self-alienation developed respectively in Karl Mannheim’s early sociology of intellectuals and in Edmund Husserl’s late transcendental phenomenology. In Mannheim’s early and experimental works, the resistance to abstraction and alienation is located in a stratum of intellectuals able to meaningfully combine diverse cultural currents in a social process of cultivation (Bildung). In Husserl, to contrast, this resistance is grasped as a constant crisis in the methods of pursuing philosophical truth. While (...)
- Self-Consciousness without an “I”: A Critique of Zahavi’s Account of the Minimal Self.Lilian Alweiss - 2022 - Research in Phenomenology 52 (1):84-119.This paper takes Zahavi’s view to task that every conscious experience involves a “minimal sense of self.” Zahavi bases his claim on the observation that experience, even on the pre-reflective level, is not only about the object, but also has a distinctive qualitative aspect which is indicative of the fact that it is for me. It has the quality of what he calls “for-meness” or “mineness.” Against this I argue that there are not two phenomena but only one. On the (...)
- Modes of Self-Awareness: Perception, Dreams, Memory.Saulius Geniusas - 2022 - Husserl Studies 38 (2):151-170.I contend that the well-established phenomenological distinction between reflective and pre-reflective self-awareness needs to be further supplemented with more refined distinctions between different modes of pre-reflective self-awareness. Here I distinguish between five modes, which we come across in perception, lucid dreams, non-lucid dreams, daydreams, and episodic memory. Building on the basis of a phenomenological description, I argue that perception entails the pre-reflective self-awareness of the perceiving ego; non-lucid dreams implicate the pre-reflective self-awareness of the dreamed ego; in the case of (...)
- The Essential Indexical and Self-Consciousness: ‘I’, ‘Now’, and ‘Here’ as Aspects of Self-Consciousness.Andrija Jurić - 2022 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 35 (2):31-52.This paper aims to analyse egocentric indexicals ‘I’, ‘now’, and ‘here’ as different aspects of the same self-conscious or self-referential act emphasising the underlying phenomenological structure of the essential indexical ‘I’. What makes an indexical essential is not its indexicality but the egocentric mental state indicated by its use. Therefore, interpreting them only in the confines of language severely limits the scope of the investigation. First, I will define the pure use of ‘here’, ‘now’, and ‘I’, which will consequently lead (...)
- A Husserlian Critique of Pannenberg’s Understanding of Subjectivity.Kyung Phil Kim - 2022 - Philosophia Reformata 87 (1):49-70.I argue that Wolfhart Pannenberg’s view of human subjectivity presupposes a metaphysics of eternity that both contracts and expands the human subject. For this purpose, Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology is a useful criterion. Pannenberg rejects substantialist theories of subjectivity that give priority to the agency of the ego over the passivity of the self. Following Friedrich Schleiermacher, Pannenberg thinks self-reflection must be grounded on a symbiotic totality of life, and he views essences, even of subjectivity, as determined by that totality. In (...)
- What is Time Like?Mark Sultana - 2021 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 26 (2):329-344.In this paper, which is situated in the broad stream of the confluence between analytic philosophy and phenomenology, I shall attempt to articulate the relation between self-consciousness and time consciousness. I shall show that the primary meaning of time entails a self-conscious being, and that time and change are related, but in an analogous way. Different forms of life—with concomitant different forms of self-consciousness—are qualitatively different in their capability of experiencing the flow of time. In making this claim, I shall (...)
- Selbstgefühl als lebendige Gegenwart. Husserl und Schelling über die ursprüngliche Zeitkonsitution.Yicai Ni - 2020 - Annales de Phénoménologie -Nouvelle Série 19:25-43.Das Problem der zeitlichen Konstitution ist für das Verständnis der genetischen Gründe der Subjektivität ganz wesentlich. Die zeitliche Konstitution selbst geht jedoch bereits über die Grenze des gegenständlichen Bewusstseins in das dunkle Vorbewusstsein hinaus. In den C-Manuskripten (1929-1934) lokalisiert Husserl die zeitliche Konstitution auf eine angemessene Weise im Bereich des Vorbewusstseins, aber seine Argumentation, sie als das anonyme Phänomen der „lebendigen Gegenwart“ zu interpretieren, ist nicht überzeugend genug. In dem vorliegenden Beitrag soll darauf hingewiesen werden, dass Schelling im System des (...)
- Intersubjectivity and Self-awareness in Husserl and Patočka.Jakub Čapek - 2019 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 33 (3):512-526.According to some phenomenological accounts of intersubjectivity, self-awareness precedes and makes possible our understanding of others. Consequently, an "egological account of consciousness" is a precondition for a viable theory of intersubjectivity.1 While Edmund Husserl embraces this assumption of the primacy of self-awareness, Jan Patočka seems to elaborate the opposite stance. As Patočka puts it, in the "contact and in the mirror of the other we encounter ourselves, for the first time."2 Is self-awareness a precondition for an intersubjective encounter, or is (...)
- What has Transparency to do with Husserlian Phenomenology?Chad Kidd - 2019 - ProtoSociology 36:221-242.This paper critically evaluates Amie Thomasson’s (2003; 2005; 2006) view of the conscious mind and the interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction that it adopts. In Thomasson’s view, the phenomenological method is not an introspectionist method, but rather a “transparent” or “extrospectionist” method for acquiring epistemically privileged self-knowledge. I argue that Thomasson’s reading of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction is correct. But the view of consciousness that she pairs with it—a view of consciousness as “transparent” in the sense that first-order, world-oriented experience is (...)
- Embodiment and Self-Awareness – Evans, Cassam and Husserl.Lilian Alweiss - 2018 - Philosophy 93 (1):31-51.In recent years there has been a general attempt – inspired by P. F. Strawson – to naturalise Kant's notion of the transcendental self. The argument being that self-consciousness should refer to neither a kind of noumenal nor mental self but that the self-conscious subject must conceive of itself as an embodied entity, a person among persons that regards itself as an element of the objective order of the world. While Kant does not make room for the notion of an (...)
- The Phenomenon of Ego-Splitting in Husserl’s Phenomenology of Pure Phantasy.Marco Cavallaro - 2017 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 48 (2):162-177.Husserl’s phenomenology of imagination embraces a cluster of different theories and approaches regarding the multi-faced phenomenon of imaginative experience. In this paper I consider one aspect that seems to be crucial to the understanding of a particular form of imagination that Husserl names pure phantasy. I argue that the phenomenon of Ego-splitting discloses the best way to elucidate the peculiarity of pure phantasy with respect to other forms of representative acts and to any simple form of act modification. First, I (...)
- Representation and Regress.Maiya Jordan - 2017 - Husserl Studies 33 (1):19-43.I defend a Husserlian account of self-consciousness against representationalist accounts: higher-order representationalism and self-representationalism. Of these, self-representationalism is the harder to refute since, unlike higher-order representationalism, it does not incur a regress of self-conscious acts. However, it incurs a regress of intentional contents. I consider, and reject, five strategies for avoiding this regress of contents. I conclude that the regress is inherent to self-representationalism. I close by showing how this incoherence obtrudes in what must be the self-representationalist’s account of the (...)
- Sartre’s Case for Nonthetic Consciousness: The Ground of the Cartesian Cogito’s Certainty and the Methodological Basis for Phenomenological Ontology.Curtis Sommerlatte - 2017 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 99 (4):405-442.Sartre’s phenomenological view of consciousness gives primacy to the thesis that all consciousness is nonthetically aware of itself, i.e., pre-reflectively aware of itself but not as an object. Few commentators, however, have explained Sartre’s grounds for holding this thesis, despite his view that the thesis’s truth underwrites the certainty of the Cartesian cogito and thereby the method of Sartre’s own phenomenological ontology. I document three lines of support for the thesis, the most promising of which consists in a proof by (...)
- Das „Problem“ der Habituskonstitution und die Spätlehre des Ich in der genetischen Phänomenologie E. Husserls.Marco Cavallaro - 2016 - Husserl Studies 32 (3):237-261.Der vorliegende Aufsatz behandelt zwei Bereiche, deren Zusammenhang in der aktuellen Husserlforschung zu Unrecht in Vergessenheit geraten zu sein scheint: Zum einen konturiere ich den Habitusbegriff und das damit verbundene Problem der Habituskonstitution im Spätwerk E. Husserls. Zum anderen dient das Ergebnis dieser ersten Untersuchung dann als Grundlage für die Frage nach dem Wesen des Ich in der genetischen Phänomenologie. Die Untersuchung besteht aus drei Teilen: Zuerst stelle ich, um die Bedeutung des Begriffs „Habitus“ zu klären, Ingardens Interpretationsalternativen der Habituskonstitution (...)
- Intentionality and Normativity.Maxime Doyon - 2016 - Philosophy Today 60 (1):207-221.The paper is organized around two ideas that come out in Steve Crowell’s Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger and that I discuss critically in turn. The first concerns the reach of Crowell’s claim according to which the connection between intentionality, meaning and normativity is necessary in all forms of intentional experience. I make my point by considering the case of imagining experiences, which are—I argue—meaningful, intentional, but not necessarily normative in any relevant sense. The second question is about (...)
- Nerve/Nurses of the Cosmic Doctor: Wang Yang-ming on Self-Awareness as World-Awareness.Joshua M. Hall - 2016 - Asian Philosophy 26 (2):149-165.In Philip J. Ivanhoe’s introduction to his Readings from the Lu-Wang School of Neo-Confucianism, he argues convincingly that the Ming-era Neo-Confucian philosopher Wang Yang-ming (1472–1529) was much more influenced by Buddhism (especially Zen’s Platform Sutra) than has generally been recognized. In light of this influence, and the centrality of questions of selfhood in Buddhism, in this article I will explore the theme of selfhood in Wang’s Neo-Confucianism. Put as a mantra, for Wang “self-awareness is world-awareness.” My central image for this (...)
- Kant’s and Husserl’s agentive and proprietary accounts of cognitive phenomenology.Julia Jansen - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):161-172.In this paper, I draw from Kantian and Husserlian reflections on the self-awareness of thinking for a contribution to the cognitive phenomenology debate. In particular, I draw from Kant’s conceptions of inner sense and apperception, and from Husserl’s notions of lived experience and self-awareness for an inquiry into the nature of our awareness of our own cognitive activity. With particular consideration of activities of attention, I develop what I take to be Kant’s and Husserl’s “agentive” and “proprietary” accounts. These, I (...)
- The interactive Now: A second-person approach to time-consciousness.Stephen Langfur - 2016 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 47 (2):156-182.Husserl offers insight into the constituting of the self-aware ego through time-consciousness. Yet his account does not satisfactorily explain how this ego can experience itself as presently acting. Furthermore, although he acknowledges that the Now is not a knife-edge present, he does not show what determines its duration. These shortfalls and others are overcome through a change of starting point. Citing empirical evidence, I take it as a basic given that when a caregiver frontally engages an infant of two months (...)
- Bodily Schemata and Sartre's I and Me: Reflection and Awareness in Movement.Jodie McNeilly - 2016 - Performance Philosophy 2 (1):83-98.Philosophers have faced the problem of self or inner awareness since the self, itself, became something to be known and/or understood. Once dancers ‘let go of the mirror’ they too began to face the problem and limits to bodily awareness, developing specific reflective practices to obtain access to their inner bodily selves. But for the phenomenologist, reflection requires an active process of perception, which problematises our grasping of the so-called hidden, organising structures of movement that are unable to be perceived. (...)
- How is a Phenomenological Reflection-Model of Self-Consciousness Possible? A Husserlian Response to E. Tugendhat’s Semantic Approach to Self-Consciousness.Wei Zhang - 2016 - Husserl Studies 32 (1):47-66.The problem of self-consciousness has been an essential one for philosophy since the onset of modernity. Both E. Tugendhat and the Heidelberg School represented by D. Henrich have reflected critically upon the traditional theory of self-consciousness, and both have revealed the circular dilemma of the “reflection-model” adopted by the traditional theory. In order to avoid the dilemma, they both proposed substitute formulas, each of which has its advantages and disadvantages. Husserl also paid particular attention to the traditional theory of self-consciousness (...)
- Brentano or Husserl? Intentionality, Consciousness, and Self-consciousness in Contemporary Phenomenology of Mind.Federico Boccaccini - 2015 - Archivio Di Filosofia (3):189-202.
- Intencionalidad, pasividad y autoconciencia en la fenomenología de Husserl.Francesco de Nigris - 2015 - Ideas Y Valores 64 (157):215-250.A pesar de los matices y variaciones de significado, el concepto husserliano de intencionalidad no deja de estar al servicio de la idea clásica de la verdad como adaequatio, finalmente adaptada al orden monádico de la conciencia trascendental. Veremos, sin embargo, que en los análisis de Husserl sobre la conciencia interna del tiempo se manifiesta toda la dificultad para interpretar intencionalmente la esfera pasiva de la conciencia, peligrando la peculiar vocación a la verdad de la misma intencionalidad. Intentaremos, mediante las (...)
- On the Border of Self-Appearance. Self-Affection and Reflection in the Remembering in Kant and Husserl.Guillermo Ferrer - 2015 - HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology 4 (2):87-98.
- Does Consciousness Necessitate Self-Awareness? Consciousness and Self-Awareness in Sartre's "The Transcendence of the Ego".Daniel R. Rodriguez-Navas - 2015 - In Sofia Miguens, Sofia Magueys & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Pre-reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 225-244.I offer a close reading of the first part of Sartre's The Transcendence of the Ego, arguing that contrary to widely held interpretation, one of Sartre's main goals in that text is to defend the view that consciousness does not necessitate self-awareness, that not all conscious states need be, ipso facto, states of self-awareness. In addition, I explain that this view about the conceptual relationship between consciousness and self-awareness has important methodological implications. One of the standard strategies for accounting for (...)
- Ich-jetzt-hier: ein Beitrag zur Theorie des Selbsterlebens.Elke Steckkönig - 2015 - Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber.Alles Bewusstsein ist auch Selbstbewusstsein -- so lautet die Grundthese, der Elke Steckkonig in diesem Buch nachgeht. Doch was ist das fur ein Bewusstsein, wenn das Subjekt sich seiner selbst gewahr wird? Weder Identifikation noch (Selbst-) Reflexion sind geeignete Konzepte, um die gesuchte Form von Selbstbewusstsein als Seiner-selbst-inne-Sein zu analysieren. Die Autorin gelangt zu einer Positivbestimmung des Selbstbewusstseins im subjektiv wertenden Selbsterleben, indem sie sich auf fruhromantische Uberlegungen zum "Selbstgefuhl" sowie auf aktuellere sprachanalytische Uberlegungen beruft und den phanomenalen Aspekt des (...)
- Peter R. Costello: Layers in Husserl’s Phenomenology. On Meaning and Intersubjectivity: University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2012, 240 pp., US-$60 , ISBN 9781442644625. [REVIEW]Joona Taipale - 2015 - Husserl Studies 31 (2):169-173.Around the 1920s, Husserl increasingly began to integrate temporality into his phenomenological analyses. As a consequence, many topics that he had thus far considered in terms of a static structure were re-introduced as involving inner dialectics, a multi-layered depth-dimension to be unveiled by further studies. Establishing a novel, genetic-phenomenological approach motivated certain important shifts of focus in his account of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. For one, whereas Husserl had earlier discussed the experiencing subject as a self-identical pole, introducing temporality into the (...)
- Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame.Dan Zahavi - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.Dan Zahavi engages with classical phenomenology, philosophy of mind, and a range of empirical disciplines to explore the nature of selfhood. He argues that the most fundamental level of selfhood is not socially constructed or dependent upon others, but accepts that certain dimensions of the self and types of self-experience are other-mediated.
- Searching for the Self: Early Phenomenological Accounts of Self-Consciousness from Lotze to Scheler.Guillaume Frechette - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (5):1-26.Phenomenological accounts of self-consciousness are often said to combine two elements by means of a necessary connection: the primitive and irre- ducible subjective character of experiences and the idealist transcendental constitution of consciousness. In what follows I argue that this connection is not necessary in order for an account of self-consciousness to be phenomenological, as shown by early phenomenological accounts of self- consciousness – particularly in Munich phenomenology. First of all, I show that the account of self-consciousness defended by these (...)
- The Problem of Time and Reflexivity in Husserl.A. Krioukov - 2013 - HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology 2 (2):50-60.
- The You-I event: on the genesis of self-awareness.Stephen Langfur - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):769-790.I present empirical evidence suggesting that an infant first becomes aware of herself as the focal center of a caregiver's attending. Yet that does not account for her awareness of herself as agent. To address this question, I bring in research on neonatal imitation, as well as studies demonstrating the existence of a neural system in which parts of the same brain areas are activated when observing another's action and when executing a similar one. Applying these findings, I consider gestural (...)
- Me, myself and I: Sartre and Husserl on elusiveness of the self.Pierre-Jean Renaudie - 2013 - Continental Philosophy Review 46 (1):99-113.In his early essay on transcendence of the ego, Sartre attempted to follow Husserl’s Logical Investigations and to draw the consequences of his phenomenological criticism of subjectivity. Both authors have emphasized the elusiveness of the self as a result of intentionality of consciousness. However, Sartre’s analysis of ego led him quite far from Husserl’s philosophical project, insofar as it was somehow already raising the question about the moral nature of the self, and was thus establishing the basis of the conception (...)
- A grasp from afar: Überschau and the givenness of life in Husserlian phenomenology.Andrea Staiti - 2013 - Continental Philosophy Review 46 (1):21-36.In this paper I explore the issue of how our personal life is given to us in experience as a whole to be actively shaped and determined. I examine in detail Husserl’s analysis of the kind of experience responsible for this achievement, which he terms Überschau and which thus far has never been addressed by scholars of phenomenology. First, I locate Überschau in the context of self-determination and highlight the difference between the unthematic pre-givenness of life in the phenomenon of (...)
- Introduction: intersubjectivity and empathy.Rasmus Thybo Jensen & Dermot Moran - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):125-133.
- Bewusstsein, Intentionalität und mentale Repräsentation. Husserl und die analytische Philosophie des Geistes.Thomas Szanto - 2012 - De Gruyter.Until now, a systematic new evaluation of transcendental phenomenology that gives due attention to the analytic philosophy of mind has been lacking, despite several recent studies in this area. With an emphasis on Husserl’s anti-representationalist theory of the intentionality of consciousness, the present study demonstrates phenomenology’s descriptive and explanatory potential and presents it as a serious interlocutor not only for the philosophy of mind and cognition but also for contemporary language philosophy and epistemology.
- Revisiting the Zahavi–Brough/Sokolowski Debate.Neal DeRoo - 2011 - Husserl Studies 27 (1):1-12.In 1999, Dan Zahavi’s Self Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation initiated a critique of the standard interpretation of the distinction between the second and third levels of Husserl’s analysis of time-constituting consciousness. At stake was the possibility of a coherent account of self-awareness (Zahavi’s concern), but also the possibility of prereflectively distinguishing the acts of consciousness (Brough and Sokolowski’s rebuttal of Zahavi’s critique). Using insights gained from Husserl’s Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis rather than the work on time-consciousness, this paper (...)
- Self-Consciousness and Otherness: Hegel and Husserl.Saulius Geniušas - 2011 - Santalka: Filosofija, Komunikacija 16 (3).Countless differences between Hegel and Husserl notwithstanding, there is a common element in both of their accounts of the genesis of otherness. According to both, only if one delves into the interiority of self-consciousness, can one account for the rudimentary appearance of the Other. Following the Hegelian and Husserlian variants of such a strategy, this paper argues that: at the primitive levels of self-consciousness, subjectivity is intersubjective through and through; an irreducible distance separates the Other from the self, due to (...)
- Freedom, Responsibility and Self-Awareness in Husserl.Thomas Nenon - 2011 - Phainomena 76:161-182.e following essay is organized around eighteen theses concerning the relationship between freedom, responsibility and self- awareness that I believe are both correct and consistent with specic doctrines and the overall positions advanced in Husserl’s published writings. e eighteen theses are not meant to represent a deductive argument. Most of them are not unique to Husserl or phenomenological philosophy, but I’m not aware of any other thinker who has hat brought all of them together as does Husserl.
- Objects and Levels: Reflections on the Relation Between Time-Consciousness and Self-Consciousness.Dan Zahavi - 2011 - Husserl Studies 27 (1):13-25.The text surveys the development of the debate between Zahavi and Brough/Sokolowski regarding Husserl’s account of inner time-consciousness. The main arguments on both sides are reconsidered, and a compromise is proposed.
- Die Konkretion des transzendentalen Ego. Husserls genetische Phänomenologie des Selbst.David Espinet - 2010 - In Philippe Merz, Andrea Staiti & Frank Steffen (eds.), Geist-Person-Gemeinschaft: Freiburger Beiträge zur Aktualität Husserls.Remove from this listExport citation
Bookmark - Husserlian Self-Awareness and Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors.Peter Hadreas - 2010 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (1):43-51.The goal of the paper is to offer a model of self-awareness that fits the testimony of both good and bad responders to selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), of which fluoxetine (Prozac; Lilly, Indianapolis, IN) is probably the most well known. After a review of troubling current uncertainties concerning how and for whom SSRIs are therapeutic, it is argued that SSRIs, as a rule, lessen the emotionality of SSRI subjects in favor of an increased cognitive and volitional orientation. Traditional empiricist (...)
- Inner (Time-)Consciousness.Dan Zahavi - 2010 - In D. Lohmar & I. Yamaguchi (eds.), On Time - New Contributions to the Husserlian Phenomenology of Time. Springer. pp. 319-339.In the introduction to Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, Husserl remarks that “we get entangled in the most peculiar difficulties, contradictions, and confusions” (Hua X, 4) the moment we seek to account for time-consciousness. I think most scholars of Husserl’s writings on these issues would agree. Attempting to unravel the inner workings of time-consciousness can indeed easily induce a kind of intellectual vertigo. Let us consequently start with some of the basic questions that motivated Husserl’s inquiry.$79.20 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct downloadExport citation Bookmark 19 citations
- Ist das Erleben Teil des Erlebten?Andrea Borsato - 2009 - Phänomenologische Forschungen (2009):37-59.If the inner consciousness of a mental state is a part of the mental state itself, then one is forced to admit an 'inner consciousness of the inner consciousness'. This counterintuitive consequence can however be avoided, if we conceive of the inner consciousness of the mental state as a 'mode of giveness' of the state itself. This paper discusses Brentano's theory of inner consciousness from the point of view of Husserl's philosophy.
- Innere Wahrnehmung und innere Vergegenwärtigung.Andrea Borsato - 2009 - Koenigshausen-Neumann.
- Problem samouchwytności ciała – Husserl i Sartre.Katarzyna Gurczyńska-Sady - 2009 - Diametros 21:14-29.The topic of the article is the way in which a human being can grasp its own body. The confrontation between Husserl's and Sartre's philosophy about meeting Another is my way of showing the radical change in our understanding of the problem of how we know our own body. According to Husserl both our psyche and body are given to us immediately. The body of Another is given to us by means of our own body. The psyche of Another is (...)Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- S. taguchi, Das problem Des 'ur-ich' bei Edmund Husserl: Die frage nach der selbstverständlichen 'nähe' Des selbst. [REVIEW]Søren Overgaard - 2009 - Husserl Studies 25 (1):89-95.
- Immanence, Self-Experience, and Transcendence in Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein, and Karl Jaspers.Dermot Moran - 2008 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2):265-291.Phenomenology, understood as a philosophy of immanence, has had an ambiguous, uneasy relationship with transcendence, with the wholly other, with the numinous. If phenomenology restricts its evidence to givenness and to what has phenomenality, what becomes of that which is withheld or cannot in principle come to givenness? In this paper I examine attempts to acknowledge the transcendent in the writings of two phenomenologists, Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein (who attempted to fuse phenomenology with Neo-Thomism), and also consider the influence (...)
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