This study aimed to synthesize literature data on male judo combat time in international competitions between 2010 and 2019. The search was carried out from May 8th to June 11th, 2021, in electronic databases using the following keywords: AND. After the selection process, 8 articles were included in the systematic review and 7 in the meta-analysis. These studies analyzed 2,562 international male judo combats over the years 2010 to 2019. We observed that the average male judo combat time changed after (...) each rule change. There was a significant difference between combats that ended up to the regular time and those that needed overtime. There were differences between 60kg and +100kg categories and the others in 2011-2012. However, no significant difference was found between the combat time by weight division after the 2017 rule changes, although there are still differences in relation to the end of the combats. There were significant changes in the male judo combat time with each rule change, and the data from the included studies point to a trend of homogeneity in the combat time spent between the weight divisions over the years, and an increase in the occurrence of Golden Score. More studies need to be carried out to identify the new temporal behaviors of athletes. (shrink)

Putnam and others have argued that semantic externalism extends to artifactual kind words such as “pencil” or “doorstop”. I first show that, even with natural kinds, externalism applies to words for ground level kinds. The issue then arises of which categories of artifacts should be identified as kinds in the relevant, restricted sense. I argue that, though there are natural taxonomies of artifactual categories at least some of which have well-defined ground levels, even words for such kinds do not appear (...) to have externalist semantics, as they do not support ignorance or error arguments. Some think that membership to any kind is determined by objective features. Against this, I argue that the makers’ productive intentions are often crucial in selecting which pattern of features counts as constitutive of a kind. Though externalists may insist that membership to a kind is ultimately determined by sharing objective features, the resulting version of externalism can hardly be distinguished from internalism. (shrink)

Different notions of analysis have been both theorized and put to use in early analytic philosophy. Two of them stand out: connective analysis and analysis as paraphrase. The latter played a central role in the development of analytic philosophy from Frege to Quine and beyond. With the advent of formal semantics of natural language in the 1970s, paraphrase came to be characterizable as translation into a formal “target language”. While I claim that the method cannot achieve its original philosophical aims, (...) I insist that, in spite of them, it is far from being a theoretically empty operation and that it lives on in some contemporary philosophical enterprises. (shrink)

There are two prevalent accounts of semantic normativity: the prescriptive account, which can be found in some of Wittgenstein’s remarks, and the regularity account, which may have been Sellars’s view and is nowadays defended by some antinormativists. On the former account, meanings are norms that govern the use of words; on the latter, they are regularities of use which, in themselves, do not engender any prescriptions. I argue that only the prescriptive view can account for certain platitudes about meaning, which (...) motivate the very idea of semantic normativity. After some preliminary clarifications about the form that alleged semantic norms should take in order to be prima facie plausible, I argue—against some antinormativists—that whatever normativity is involved in the meaning of words cannot be brought back to a general norm of truth as distinct from specifically semantic norms, for semantic norms already involve a norm of truth. Next, I examine what I take to be the strongest objection to semantic normativity, namely the identification of meaning with use: as use is just a bunch of facts, it cannot be attributed any normative import. Nowadays, this view has been defended by Paul Horwich. After criticizing Horwich’s claim that meaning, though not normative in itself, has unmediated normative implications, I propose a different view of the relation between use and meaning, on which meaning is not quite identical with use but is grounded on use. I propose as a model the idea of a hyperconformist social system: a system in which customs, and only customs, generate norms. I suggest that language is such a system, and describe two reasons why it is plausible for language to work like that. Finally, I analyze statements of meaning on the model of Ruth Millikan “pushmi-pullyu” representations, i.e. as having both descriptive and normative import. I point out that, however, there are exceptions to meaning’s being grounded on use, as there are cases in which semantic norms are dictated by authorities of several kinds. Lastly, I briefly discuss the suggestion that meaning supervenes on use, showing that, aside from its inherent difficulties, it does not explain why meaning would supervene on use. (shrink)

This review of mine includes an illuminating footnote by former NDPR editor, Jc Beall, who arrogantly refused to say what the inaccuracy is supposed to be.

Our research has found that companies which have diverged from traditional management in order to adopt strategies which include ethics, cooperation and a joint vision of management obtain a greater added value. The new challenges of competitiveness require a position of active cooperation between firms and their suppliers, which should be considered as collaborators rather than adversaries. An active cooperation management may well allow the company to improve the quality of its products and its image, speed up delivery to its (...) clients and make its production and trading more agile, thus enhancing the perception the client has of the product. An improved ethical quality in our dealings, generating trust, improving communication and establishing long-term relationships with joint added value, results in higher competitiveness and greater creation of wealth. (shrink)

When involved in a disagreement, a common reaction is to tell oneself that, given that the information about one’s own epistemic standing is clearly superior in both amount and quality to the information about one’s opponent’s epistemic standing, one is justified in one’s confidence that one’s view is correct. In line with this natural reaction to disagreement, some contributors to the debate on its epistemic significance have claimed that one can stick to one’s guns by relying in part on information (...) about one’s first-order evidence and the functioning of one’s cognitive capacities. In this article, I argue that such a manoeuvre to settle controversies encounters the problem that both disputants can make use of it, the problem that one may be wrong about one’s current conscious experience, and the problem that it is a live possibility that many of one’s beliefs are the product of epistemically distorting factors. I also argue that, even if we grant that personal information is reliable, when it comes to real-life rather than idealized disagreements, the extent of the unpossessed information about one’s opponent’s epistemic standing provides a reason for doubting that personal information can function as a symmetry breaker. (shrink)

To verify the occurrence of a singular instance of testimonial injustice three facts must be established. The first is whether the hearer in fact has an identity prejudice of which she may or may not be aware; the second is whether that prejudice was in fact the cause of the unjustified credibility deficit; and the third is whether there was in fact a credibility deficit in the testimonial exchange. These three elements constitute the facts of the matter of testimonial injustice. (...) In this essay we argue that none of these facts can be established with any degree of confidence, and therefore that testimonial injustice is an undetectable phenomenon in singular instances. Our intention is not to undermine the idea of testimonial injustice, but rather to set limits to what can be justifiably asserted about it. According to our argument, although there are insufficient reasons to identify individual acts of testimonial injustice, it is possible to recognize recurrent patterns of epistemic responses to speakers who belong to specific social groups. General testimonial injustice can thus be characterized as a behavioral tendency of a prejudiced hearer. (shrink)

The claim that truth is mind dependent has some initial plausibility only if truth bearers are taken to be mind dependent entities such as beliefs or statements. Even on that assumption, however, the claim is not uncontroversial. If it is spelled out as the thesis that “in a world devoid of mind nothing would be true”, then everything depends on how the phrase ‘true in world w’ is interpreted. If ‘A is true in w’ is interpreted as ‘A is true (...) of w’ (i.e. ‘w satisfies A’s truth conditions’, the claim need not be true. If on the other hand it is interpreted as ‘A is true of w and exists in w’ then the claim is trivially true, though devoid of any antirealistic efficacy. Philosophers like Heidegger and Rorty, who hold that truth is mind dependent but reality is not, must regard such principles as “A if and only if it is true that A” as only contingently true, which may be a good reason to reject the mind dependence of truth anyway. (shrink)

Ernesto Laclau es un reconocido teórico político precursor del postmarxismo. Si bien reside en Inglaterra hace varios lustros, su vinculación con Argentina y América Latina sigue siendo muy importante. Su libro Hegemony and Socialist Strategy de 1985 (aparecido en español en 1987 con el título Hegemonía y Estrategia Socialista) co-escrito con Chantal Mouffe tuvo un gran impacto en el pensamiento de la intelectualidad de izquierda identificada con un proyecto de radicalización de los ideales ..

Through the explorations of excellent scholars, this book provides a new understanding of Plato's _Theaetetus_, an absolute masterpiece which contains fundamental insights – about the nature of human cognition, perception, rationality – which are still at the centre of the contemporary debate.

With the triumph of capitalism at the end of the Cold War, the 1990s witnessed the emergence of an optimistic sentiment grounded in the idea of limitless progress. However, as Fisher (2020) asserts, this sentiment was called into question by the crises of the early 21st century, giving rise to a melancholic outlook on the future. This new phase of capitalism has generated a series of existential-themed products in popular culture, albeit with a despairing tone regarding the direction of society. (...) The issue at hand aims to analyze popular culture through a Sartrean existential prism, seeking to understand how the cultural industry creates clichés inspired by historical existentialism, producing what we will refer to as “vulgar existentialism,” in contrast to Sartre’s historical existentialism. Our hypothesis unfolds in two parts: 1- Vulgar existentialism promotes a hedonistic rebellion that does not threaten the system, reducing the crisis to a “neutralized” form of conduct; 2- Such conduct is sustained by an imaginary rooted in popular culture productions that manifest melancholy and fatalism in relation to attempts at radical societal transformation. (shrink)

Resumen: El artículo busca observar el hecho religioso mapuche, a partir de la reflexión de Rudolf Otto respecto de lo numinoso y lo santo. Para ello se utiliza su metodología de análisis fenomenológico aplicada a los conceptos de mysterium, tremendum y fascinans o las dimensiones del temor, incorporadas en la cultura mapuche. Se concluye que el análisis de estos diversos momentos de la experiencia santo-numinoso en la vida religiosa del mapuche, permite constatar el dinamismo existente en la idea religiosa del (...) mapuche, lo que a su vez representa adecuadamente la relación entre el hombre religioso y lo santo.: This article seeks to observe the Mapuche religious fact, starting from Rudolf Otto’s reflection on the numinous and the holy. For this, it uses its methodology of phenomenological analysis applied to the concepts of mysterium, tremendum and fascinans or the dimensions of fear, incorporated in the Mapuche culture. It is concluded that the analysis of these different moments of the saint-numinous experience in the religious life of the mapuche, allows to verify the dynamism existing in the religious idea of ​​the mapuche, which in turn represents adequately the relationship between religious man and the Holy. (shrink)

Se ha tratado de desprestigiar al postmodernismo y no se ha valorado su gran contribución a la cultura universal. El postmodernismo empieza a desarrollarse cuando el ser humano se da cuenta que no tan solo sus órganos de los sentidos pueden engañarlo, sino que también su intelecto, razón y sus facultades superiores más preciadas. Las caídas del positivismo y del racionalismo le abrieron la puerta, apoyado por la insuficiencia de la ciencia y la filosofía para entender el universo. La nomología (...) (legalidad) ha tenido que resignarse frente a la ideografía (procesos irrepetibles e irreversibles) para entender el desarrollo universal. La antinomia del mentiroso, el teorema de Gödel, los procesos caóticos, la impredecibilidad, la incertidumbre, son parte de sus elementos sustantivos. El postmodernismo ha condenado a los ideologismos nomológicos o raciales que terminaron en las masacres de la Revolución Francesa, el Nazismo y las dos Guerras Mundiales, entre otros. (shrink)

This paper describes a method for analyzing a corpus of descriptions collected through micro-phenomenological interviews. This analysis aims at identifying the structure of the singular experiences which have been described, and in particular their diachronic structure, while unfolding generic experiential structures through an iterative approach. After summarizing the principles of the micro-phenomenological interview, and then describing the process of preparation of the verbatim, the article presents on the one hand, the principles and conceptual devices of the analysis method and on (...) the other hand several dimensions of the analysis process: the modes of structural unfolding of generic structures, the mutual guidance of the processes of structural and experiential unfolding, the tracking of analysis processes, and finally the assessment of analysis results. (shrink)

cal basis of consciousness. We continue by discussing the relation between spatiotem- One of the outstanding problems in the cog- poral patterns of brain activity and con- nitive sciences is to understand how ongo- sciousness, with particular attention to pro- ing conscious experience is related to the cesses in the gamma frequency band. We workings of the brain and nervous system. then adopt a critical perspective and high-.

O inconsciente, a grande descoberta freudiana, foi o responsável por toda a composição da teoria psicanalítica. Como toda teoria, passou por adaptações de acordo com as descobertas de Freud, que se via na necessidade de reestabelecer as regras e os meios de funcionamento do aparelho psíquico. Através das antinomias pulsionais, das topologias relativas ao inconsciente e, em particular, da melancolia como pivô entre tópicas, mostraremos como Freud possibilita pensar não só as consequências da perda objetal, mas como esta influencia na (...) composição do Eu. Elegendo-a como fundamental à instauração da segunda tópica, advogaremos que é a partir da melancolia que Freud nos permite compreender o Eu como descentrado e despossuído por uma “cena outra” que o coloca numa situação perpetuamente deficitária. Do advento da segunda tópica, defenderemos que Freud foi capaz de desvelar um Eu que é, também, inconsciente. (shrink)

Dos estudos que Merleau-Ponty dedica à noção de corpo, este projeto versará sobre os modos como a relação entre sexualidade e existência pode ser compreendida à luz de uma reinterpretação ontológica e fenomenológica da psicanálise freudiana. Com efeito, a partir de Três Ensaios sobre e Teoria da Sexualidade, veremos, num primeiro instante, como os atos humanos não são determinados apenas por um inconsciente falho e involuntário; dado que as produções do inconsciente do outro influem sobre as fontes do inconsciente subjetivo (...) (e vice-versa), em Freud o teor destes atos possuiriam antes uma significação pulsional de ordem sexual e conflitiva que se estenderia da infância (onde é predominantemente polimorfa, perversa e autoerótica) à vida adulta (onde coloca-se à serviço da função reprodutora, sob o primado da zona genital) e que, objetiva e causal, deveria ser medida e direcionada para mantermos, em termos de economia libidinal, o controle de nossa vida sexual frente a ordem social. No entanto, haveria, aí, algo censurável, pois, se o analista – ao refletir sobre sua pratica – serve-se de uma teoria formulada em terceira pessoa e se distancia do discurso produzido em primeira pessoa pelo consulente, a sexualidade seria antes uma força biológica que, distante, determinaria as ações humanas. Assim, se desejamos devolver a vida mental ao mundo da vida sem, contudo, perder o aspecto essencialmente sexual de nossos desejos e paixões, será em Maurice Merleau-Ponty onde estes atos não serão mais objetos de contemplação, e sim vivências que, em carne e osso, expressam a maneira pela qual co-pertencemos a um mundo inter-humano. Para este, o corpo – nem puramente objetivista, nem puramente subjetivista – remete à nossa forma ampla de inserção no mundo da vida: na junção entre natureza e liberdade, é potência exploratória e é por ele que o ser vai ao mundo. E se assim o for, a partir de obras como A Estrututra do Comportamento, Fenomenologia da Percepção, O Visível e o Invisível, etc., o mesmo só pode ser compreendido a partir da relação que mantem com outras realidades sensíveis, para além de uma experiência para mim. Será preciso, portanto, considerar a afetividade e a sexualidade como modos de ser que evidenciam nossa relação com as coisas (partes constituintes do nosso trato com o mundo), sem apresentar-se independente da infraestrutura existencial humana. Partindo da própria estrutura psicanalítica, a obra de Merleau-Ponty revelará, na sexualidade, uma atmosfera que não é nem transcendência da vida humana, nem imagem de representações conscientes ou inconscientes, mas coextensiva à vida. Evitando certos pressupostos segundo os quais a sexualidade – seguindo uma causalidade própria – determinaria as demais esferas da vida, veremos que grande parte dos problemas descritos pela psicanalise não remetem necessariamente à uma estrutura sexual, mas estão antes ligados à atitude geral de ser no mundo, que envolve sempre o campo sexual. Posta de bases fenomenológicas, veremos, portanto, que a reinterpretação de Merleau-Ponty acerca da sexualidade não apenas devolve o ser a sua vivência de mundo, como dissolve a ideia de uma identidade estática e objetiva, pois esta, sendo corpo no mundo em relação com a alteridade, será sempre implícita e misteriosa. (shrink)

This article analyzes the notion of malaise resulting from the tension impulses between individuals and cultures, according to the results achieved by Freud's psychoanalytic reflexes. Despite certain moments in his work, it is possible to envision a certain possibility of emancipation of the individual through reflection or clinical analysis itself, or the psychoanalyst does not fail to notice a certain entropy present not only in the human being, but in the whole being alive. It is a movement within the organism (...) itself that leads to its exhaustion, meeting its demand in decline. (shrink)

Dos estudos que Maurice Merleau-Ponty dedica à noção de corpo, este artigo versa sobre os modos como a questão da sexualidade pode ser compreendida. Com efeito, dentro desta perspectiva, o corpo não se confunde com aquilo que se pode pensar dela a partir de uma perspectiva tanto objetivista quanto subjetivista, mas diz respeito à nossa forma ampla de inserção no mundo da vida. Na junção entre natureza e liberdade, o corpo não é da ordem do “eu penso”, mas do “eu (...) posso” – é potência exploratória. Assim, ser corpo é estar amarrado a certo mundo; é só por ele que o ser vai ao mundo. Todavia, se assim o for, o mesmo só pode ser compreendido a partir da relação que mantem com outras realidades sensíveis, para além de uma experiência para mim. Deste modo, será, pois, preciso passar a considerar a afetividade e a sexualidade como partes constituintes do nosso trato com o mundo. Enquanto modo de ser que evidencia nossa relação com as coisas, sem apresentar-se, contudo, independente da infraestrutura existencial humana, revisitaremos, portanto, O Corpo como Ser Sexuado presente na Fenomenologia da Percepção e veremos como este a) nos abre para o outro, b) revela o nosso estilo de ser e c) nos mostra a promiscuidade entre existência e vida sexual. (shrink)

Resumen: Una de las formas más comunes y menos estudiadas de parcialidad judicial subjetiva es la disminución de la credibilidad otorgada a un testigo debido a un prejuicio identitario implícito del agente judicial. En la epistemología social, este fenómeno ha sido estudiado bajo la rúbrica de la injusticia testimonial. En este ensayo mostramos que para determinar la ocurrencia de un caso de injusticia testimonial en el derecho se deben cumplir tres condiciones que son imposibles de verificar empíricamente y que están (...) basadas en presupuestos psicológicos que han sido puestos en duda en años recientes. Sin la posibilidad de verificar estas condiciones, estamos frente a un tipo de parcialidad judicial indetectable. En su lugar, ofrecemos una nueva forma de entender la injusticia testimonial en el derecho como un fenómeno más general que describe una tendencia comportamental prejuiciosa recurrente por parte de un agente judicial. Entendida de este modo, la injusticia testimonial es completamente verificable. -/- Abstract: One of the most common and least studied forms of subjective judicial partiality is the credibility deficit suffered by a witness due to an implicit identity prejudice in a judicial agent. Social epistemologists have studied this form of partiality under the rubric, “testimonial injustice.” In this essay we argue that to verify the occurrence of a singular instance of testimonial injustice in law three facts must be established, none of which can be established with any degree of confidence. Furthermore, all of them are based on psychological suppositions that have been recently discredited. Without the possibility of establishing these facts, we end up with an undetectable form of subjective judicial partiality. In its place, we offer a new way of understanding testimonial injustice in law as a general phenomenon that describes a recurrent pattern of prejudiced behavior in a judicial agent. Under this characterization, testimonial injustice becomes empirically verifiable. (shrink)

The present paper has two, interrelated objectives. The first is to analyze the different senses in which arguments are characterized as persuasive in the extant writings of Sextus Empiricus. The second is to examine the Pyrrhonist’s therapeutic use of arguments in the discussion with his Dogmatic rivals – more precisely, to determine the sense and basis of Sextus’ distinction between therapeutic arguments that appear weighty and therapeutic arguments that appear weak in their persuasiveness.

In this article, I draw upon the ‘post-Kantian’ reading of Hegel to examine the consequences Hegel’s idea of God has on his metaphysics. In particular, I apply Hegel’s ‘recognition-theoretic’ approach to his theology. Within the context of this analysis, I focus especially on the incarnation and sacrifice of Christ. First, I argue that Hegel’s philosophy of religion employs a distinctive notion of sacrifice (kenotic sacrifice). Here, sacrifice is conceived as a giving up something of oneself to ‘make room’ for the (...) other. Second, I argue that the idea of kenotic sacrifice plays a fundamental role in Hegel’s account of Christ. Third, I conclude by sketching some of the consequences of Hegel’s idea of a God who renounces his own divinity for an idealistically conceived metaphysics. My main thesis is that the notion of incarnation is conceived by Hegel as the expression of a spirit that advances only insofar as it is willing to withdraw and make room for the other. A kenotic reading of the Hegelian notion of the incarnation is also useful in terms of a clarification of the dispute between ‘left Hegelians’ and ‘right Hegelians’ concerning the status of the idea of God in Hegel’s philosophy. (shrink)

En este paper ofrezco una lectura global de _De Anima _III 4 de Aristóteles, en la que pretendo develar la rigu­rosa estructura argumentativa del capítulo. Así, mues­tro que el capítulo exhibe el típico patrón aristotélico de investigación filosófica: el estableci­mien­to de los pro­blemas básicos que han de ser resueltos, el camino dia­léctico para la postulación de una hipótesis, la deri­va­ción, a partir de ella, de las características indivi­dua­li­zantes relevantes del objeto (algunas de las cuales son ya manifiestas y explicadas _como_ (...) derivables de la hipó­tesis), y la emergencia de _aporiai_ que _prima_ _facie_ pare­cen invalidar la hipótesis pero que finalmente po­si­bili­tan una comprensión más profunda de ella. Pro­curo cla­rificar la progresión especulativa del capí­tu­lo al consi­derar incialmente el _Principio de Actuali­dad_ como sub­yacente a su _Modelo de Asimilación_ de la cog­nición (S conoce F _si y solo si_ el principio cognitivo de S deviene F debido a un objeto conocido O que es F en acto). Aristóteles, además, deriva la no-mezcla a partir de la carencia de límites (_Asunción de Ilimita__­ción_), que es una carac­terística manifiesta del _nous_. De la no-mezcla deriva la _Separabilidad_ (estas im­plica­cio­nes se clarifican en la primera _aporia_), de la Se­pa­rabi­li­dad deriva la _Espontaneidad_ y de la Esponta­neidad la _Autointelección_ del _nous_ (clarificada en la segunda _aporia_). Aunque examino el capítulo completo, me en­foco específicamente en el valor teórico y meto­doló­gico de la introducción y discusión de las dos _aporiai_. (shrink)

Resumen: Durante la Reconquista de Alberto Blest Gana puede ser leída como una novela en donde el secreto y el poder se entrelazan de manera profundamente significativa. Esta interrelación se constituye en el soporte de la narración, en cuyo desarrollo se entretejen los acontecimientos históricos, las intrigas amorosas y la descripción de costumbres sociales. En el despliegue de la novela hallamos inscritas las preocupaciones políticas y éticas de su autor.: Durante la Reconquista by Alberto Blest Gana can be read as (...) a novel in which a secret and power are intertwined in a profoundly significant manner. This interrelationship is constituted in the narrative support, in which the development of historical events, amorous intrigues and social customs are all interwoven. In the unfolding of the novel we can find the inscription of the political and ethical concerns of the author. (shrink)

Durante la Reconquista de Alberto Blest Gana puede ser leída como una novela en donde el secreto y el poder se entrelazan de manera profundamente significativa. Esta interrelación se constituye en el soporte de la narración, en cuyo desarrollo se entretejen los acontecimientos históricos, las intrigas amorosas y la descripción de costumbres sociales. En el despliegue de la novela hallamos inscritas las preocupaciones políticas y éticas de su autor.