Classic studies of explanation, such as those of Hempel and Bromberger, took it for granted that an explanation-seeking question of the form "Why P?" should be understood as asking about the proposition P. This view has been recently challenged by Bas van Fraassen and Alan Garfinkel. They acknowledge that some questions have the surface form "Why P?", but they hold that a correct reading for why-questions should take the form "Why P (rather than Q)?", where Q is a contrasting alternative. (...) This contrast theory is discussed here. It is argued that, properly understood, the contrast theory and the propositional approach can and should give equivalent readings to why-questions. (shrink)

Practical guidance and theoretical explanations for Buddhist meditations.

Memoirs and papers presented at a conference held on the occasion of the 90th birthday of the Mongolian philosopher Ts. Balkhaajav.

Memoirs, papers about Academician Ch. Jugder, famous philosophy scholar.

Trilingual edition of Agvaanbaldan's work. Included original Tibetan and Mongolian and English translations.

The compatibility of evolution with Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics is defended in response to Fr. Michal Chaberek’s thesis of incompatibility. The motivation and structure of Darwin’s theory are reviewed, including the roles of secondary causality, randomness and necessity. “Randomness” is an analogous term whose evolutionary use, while challenging, is fully compatible with theism. Evolution’s necessity derives from the laws of nature, which are intentional realities, the vehicle of divine providence. Methodological analysis shows that metaphysics lacks the evidentiary basis to judge biological theories. (...) Species are entia rationis whose immutability does not conflict with the evolutionary succession of biological populations. While Darwin’s theory was unknown to Aquinas, he endorses the possibility of new species immanent in the initial state of the universe, nor does his understanding of exemplar ideas offer ground for objection. Finally, five arguments given by Fr. Chaberek are answered. (shrink)

In the past decades, reductionism has dominated both research directions and funding policies in clinical psychology and psychiatry. The intense search for the biological basis of mental disorders, however, has not resulted in conclusive reductionist explanations of psychopathology. Recently, network models have been proposed as an alternative framework for the analysis of mental disorders, in which mental disorders arise from the causal interplay between symptoms. In this target article, we show that this conceptualization can help explain why reductionist approaches in (...) psychiatry and clinical psychology are on the wrong track. First, symptom networks preclude the identification of a common cause of symptomatology with a neurobiological condition; in symptom networks, there is no such common cause. Second, symptom network relations depend on the content of mental states and, as such, feature intentionality. Third, the strength of network relations is highly likely to depend partially on cultural and historical contexts as well as external mechanisms in the environment. Taken together, these properties suggest that, if mental disorders are indeed networks of causally related symptoms, reductionist accounts cannot achieve the level of success associated with reductionist disease models in modern medicine. As an alternative strategy, we propose to interpret network structures in terms of D. C. Dennett's (1987) notion ofreal patterns, and suggest that, instead of being reducible to a biological basis, mental disorders feature biological and psychological factors that are deeply intertwined in feedback loops. This suggests that neither psychological nor biological levels can claim causal or explanatory priority, and that a holistic research strategy is necessary for progress in the study of mental disorders. (shrink)

Many social philosophers and ethicists contend that a modern society cannot remain stable merely by its citizens obeying all of its rules. Such prominent theoreticians as J. Habermas, J. Rawls, D. Gauthier or R. Rorty hold the view that the citizens of a modern society must exhibit additional anthropological qualities which are termed moral surpluses here. Christoph Lütge argues, however, that no moral surplus is immune to erosion by systematic counter-incentives and that anthropological qualities in general cannot serve as a (...) basis for ethics in the globalized world. An order ethics, which is based on weaker prerequisites, namely the characteristics of situations and their basic conditions (orders), is more likely to count on cross-cultural approval in the era of globalization. (shrink)

Is it possible to measure psychological attributes like intelligence, personality and attitudes and if so, how does that work? What does the term 'measurement' mean in a psychological context? This fascinating and timely book discusses these questions and investigates the possible answers that can be given response. Denny Borsboom provides an in-depth treatment of the philosophical foundations of widely used measurement models in psychology. The theoretical status of classical test theory, latent variable theory and positioned in terms of the underlying (...) philosophy of science. Special attention is devoted to the central concept of test validity and future directions to improve the theory and practice of psychological measurement are outlined. (shrink)

This book questions the often implicit assumption of many contemporary political philosophers that a society needs its citizens to adopt some shared basic qualities, views, or capabilities. Christoph Luetge provides an alternative view, which relies on mutual advantages as the fundamental basis of society.

Philosophical naturalists claim macroevolution shows order emerging by pure chance. This claim is incompatible with accepted physical and biological principles. The present state of the universe is implicit in its initial state and the laws ofnature. Logical principles essential to science require these laws to be maintained by a self-conserving reality identifiable as God. Further, the laws share a common dynamic with human committed intentions. Both are logical propagators seen to the intentional by theists and naturalists alike. Mechanism and teleology (...) project a single reality into different conceptual spaces. Statistically, evolution is only possible given predefined goals. For fitness to be explanatory, it must be prior to survival events, entailing immanent goals verified by convergent evolution, toolkit genes, and evolutionary stasis. Aristotle's falsifiable claims for teleology are confirmed by evolution. Evolution is not random, but fully intentional, evidencing mind in nature. (shrink)

The current research investigates how religiosity can influence unethicality in a consumption context. In particular, considering the link between extrinsic religious orientations and unethicality, this research clarifies why and when extrinsic religiosity leads to unethical decisions. Across two studies, findings show that ethnocentrism is both a mediator and a moderator of the effects of extrinsic religiosity on consumers’ ethical judgments. This is because extrinsic religiosity leads to ethnocentrism, and in-group loyalty manifested through ethnocentrism increases support for unethical consumer actions, thus (...) establishing ethnocentrism as a mediator. At the same time, different levels of ethnocentrism can also influence how extrinsic religiosity leads to supporting unethical consumption via self-righteousness, thus establishing ethnocentrism as a moderator. The findings from this research have significant implications for diverse stakeholders who have an interest in religiosity and consumer behavior. (shrink)

Various studies on the impact of religiousness on consumer ethics have produced mixed results and suggested further clarification on the issue. Therefore, this article examines the effect of religiousness, materialism, and long-term orientation on consumer ethics in Indonesia. The results from 356 respondents in Indonesia, the largest Muslim population in the world, showed that intrinsic religiousness positively affected consumer ethics, while extrinsic social religiousness negatively affected consumer ethics. However, extrinsic personal religiousness did not affect consumer ethical beliefs dimensions. Unlike other (...) studies in developed countries, materialism and long-term orientation influenced only a few of the consumer ethical beliefs dimensions in this study. To date, the study is one of the first empirical studies to explore the impact of religiousness on consumer ethics in Indonesia. The study contributes to the debate on the impact of religiousness on consumer ethics and can assist managers and public policymakers in their effort to mitigate unethical consumer activities in Indonesia. (shrink)

The story of the greatest of all philosophical friendships—and how it influenced modern thought David Hume is widely regarded as the most important philosopher ever to write in English, but during his lifetime he was attacked as “the Great Infidel” for his skeptical religious views and deemed unfit to teach the young. In contrast, Adam Smith was a revered professor of moral philosophy, and is now often hailed as the founding father of capitalism. Remarkably, the two were best friends for (...) most of their adult lives, sharing what Dennis Rasmussen calls the greatest of all philosophical friendships. The Infidel and the Professor is the first book to tell the fascinating story of the friendship of these towering Enlightenment thinkers—and how it influenced their world-changing ideas. The book follows Hume and Smith’s relationship from their first meeting in 1749 until Hume’s death in 1776. It describes how they commented on each other’s writings, supported each other’s careers and literary ambitions, and advised each other on personal matters, most notably after Hume’s quarrel with Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Members of a vibrant intellectual scene in Enlightenment Scotland, Hume and Smith made many of the same friends, joined the same clubs, and were interested in many of the same subjects well beyond philosophy and economics—from psychology and history to politics and Britain’s conflict with the American colonies. The book reveals that Smith’s private religious views were considerably closer to Hume’s public ones than is usually believed. It also shows that Hume contributed more to economics—and Smith contributed more to philosophy—than is generally recognized. Vividly written, The Infidel and the Professor is a compelling account of a great friendship that had great consequences for modern thought. (shrink)

Recent decades have seen a revived interest in super-substantivalism, the idea that spacetime is the only fundamental substance and matter some kind of aspect, property or consequence of spacetime structure. However, the metaphysical debate so far has misidentified a particular variant of super-substantivalism with the position per se. I distinguish between a super-substantival core commitment and different ways of fleshing it out. I then investigate how general relativity and alternative spacetime theories square with the different variants of super-substantivalism.

In The Elm and the Expert, Jerry Fodor tries to reconcile three philosophical positions he is presently committed to: a computational theory of mind, intentional realism and a denotational theory of meaning. One problem he faces is this: a denotational semantics, according to which the meaning of a singular term like a name is exhausted by its referent, seems to rule out there being true intentional generalizations, or generalizations which advert to the contents of a subject's mental states. That there (...) are such true generalizations is a major element in Fodor's intentional realism. Accordingly, Fodor is forced to find a way of dissolving this apparent incompatibility. This paper looks at his attempts to do so and concludes that they fail. (shrink)

Countering the claims that competition contradicts and undermines ethical thought processes and actions, Christoph Lütge successfully argues that competition and ethics do not necessarily have to oppose one another. He highlights how intensified competition can in fact work in favour of ethical goals, and that many criticisms of competition stem from an out-dated understanding of how modern societies and economies function. Illustrating this view with examples from ecology, healthcare and education, the author calls for a more entrepreneurial spirit in analysing (...) the relationship between competition and ethics. This book delivers important arguments for the ethics of innovation, using a combination of theoretical and practical evidence to support it. Researchers and scholars of economics, business, philosophy and politics will greatly benefit from the fresh interdisciplinary perspectives and thorough exploration of the complex relationship between modern competition and ethics. (shrink)

English summary: The scholarly and the public discussions about the relationship between business and ethics are dominated by numerous illusions, some of which are that ethics can be seen as restraint, that morality can survive against incentives on a sustained basis, competition must be subdued, a society needs common values, our social systems can continue to exist as they have up to now, and several others as well. Christoph Lutge debunks these illusions and shows possible alternatives for realistic business ethics (...) under modern conditions. The essays in this volume range from basic issues in ethics to application problems in business ethics and ethical problems with the internet. German description: Sowohl die wissenschaftliche als auch die offentliche Diskussion uber die Beziehungen zwischen Wirtschaft und Ethik werden von zahlreichen Illusionen beherrscht: Ethik sei als Massigung zu verstehen, Moral konne sich dauerhaft gegen Anreize behaupten, der Wettbewerb musse gezahmt werden, eine Gesellschaft benotige gemeinsame Werte, unsere sozialen Systeme konnten so wie bisher weiterbestehen und einige andere mehr.Christoph Lutge wendet sich gegen solche Illusionen und zeigt Moglichkeiten einer realistischen Wirtschaftsethik unter modernen Bedingungen auf. Die hier vorliegenden Beitrage spannen den Bogen von Grundlagenfragen der Ethik uber Anwendungsprobleme der Wirtschaftsethik bis hin zu ethischen Problemen des Internets. (shrink)

In a globalized world, business ethics continues to gain importance as a field of study. Using a novel approach that centres on economic theory and analysis, this book provides students with a comprehensive overview of the essential concepts of business ethics related to both the economy as a whole and corporate ethics of the individual company.

The Aristotelian dictum that desire is the starting point of practical reasoning that ends in action can of course be denied. Its denial is a commonplace of moral theory in the tradition of Kant. But in this essay I am concerned with that issue only indirectly. I shall not contend that rational action always or necessarily does involve desire as its starting point; nor shall I deny it. My question concerns instead the possibility of its ever beginning in desire. For (...) there is a question whether it is even possible for reasoning to begin in desire, a question arising from the nature of desire and its objects, which to my knowledge has not been articulated. If we can see how desire can provide the arche of action, then we can consider later, and from that vantage point, whether it is necessary that it should do so. It will, I think, be possible eventually to argue that if practical reasoning has the character it must have, if it can begin in desire, then its starting point can be nothing but desire. (shrink)

I argue that, contrary to folklore, Einstein never really cared for geometrizing the gravitational or the electromagnetic field; indeed, he thought that the very statement that General Relativity geometrizes gravity "is not saying anything at all". Instead, I shall show that Einstein saw the "unification" of inertia and gravity as one of the major achievements of General Relativity. Interestingly, Einstein did not locate this unification in the field equations but in his interpretation of the geodesic equation, the law of motion (...) of test particles. (shrink)

Abstract:This study explores a phenomenon that has been shown to adversely affect managers’ decisions—competitive irrationality. Managers are irrationally competitive in their decisions when they focus on damaging the profits of competitors, rather than improving their own profit performance. Studies by Armstrong and Collopy (1996) and Griffith and Rust (1997) suggest that the phenomenon is common but not universal. We examine the question of why some individuals exhibit competitive irrationality when making decisions, while others do not by focusing on four aspects (...) of moral philosophy—deontological orientation, cognitive moral development, idealism, and relativism. Results suggest that individuals high in deontological orientation, high in cognitive moral development, high in idealism, and low in relativism will be less competitively irrational than those who are not. (shrink)

I argue that recent attempts to vindicate blame have failed to fully face the vengeful feelings and angry outbursts that have led to scepticism about blame’s ethical status. This paper ende...

In this first book-length comparative study of these leading eighteenth-century thinkers, Dennis Rasmussen highlights Smith's sympathy with Rousseau's concerns and analyzes in depth the ways in which Smith crafted his arguments to defend ...

I discuss the relationship between different versions of the equivalence principle in general relativity, among them Einstein's equivalence principle, the weak equivalence principle, and the strong equivalence principle. I show that Einstein's version of the equivalence principle is intimately linked to his idea that in GR gravity and inertia are unified to a single field, quite like the electric and magnetic field had been unified in special relativistic electrodynamics. At the same time, what is now often called the strong equivalence (...) principle, related to the local validity of special relativity, can also be found in Einstein's writings, albeit by a different name and clearly separated from what he calls the equivalence principle. I discuss both the development of Einstein's thoughts on the different versions of the equivalence principle, their relationship to the relativity principle, as well as later reflections and variants proposed. (shrink)

Adam Smith is popularly regarded as the ideological forefather of laissez-faire capitalism, while Rousseau is seen as the passionate advocate of the life of virtue in small, harmonious communities and as a sharp critic of the ills of commercial society. But, in fact, Smith had many of the same worries about commercial society that Rousseau did and was strongly influenced by his critique. In this first book-length comparative study of these leading eighteenth-century thinkers, Dennis Rasmussen highlights Smith’s sympathy with (...) Rousseau’s concerns and analyzes in depth the ways in which Smith crafted his arguments to defend commercial society against these charges. These arguments, Rasmussen emphasizes, were pragmatic in nature, not ideological: it was Smith’s view that, all things considered, commercial society offered more benefits than the alternatives. Just because of this pragmatic orientation, Smith’s approach can be useful to us in assessing the pros and cons of commercial society today and thus contributes to a debate that is too much dominated by both dogmatic critics and doctrinaire champions of our modern commercial society. (shrink)

Concerns about exploiting the poor or economically disadvantaged in clinical research are widespread in the bioethics community. For some, any research that involves economically disadvantaged individuals is de facto ethically problematic. The economically disadvantaged are thought of as “venerable” to exploitation, impaired decision making, or both, thus requiring either special protections or complete exclusion from research. A closer examination of the worries about vulnerabilities among the economically disadvantaged reveals that some of these worries are empirically or logically untenable, while others (...) can be better resolved by improved study designs than by blanket exclusion of poorer individuals from research participation. The scientific objective to generate generalisable results and the ethical objective to fairly distribute both the risks and benefits of research oblige researchers not to unnecessarily bar economically disadvantaged subjects from clinical research participation. (shrink)

Sensibel für die politischen, sozialen und geistig-kulturellen Umbrüche seiner Zeit entwickelt Friedrich Schlegel in der Auseinandersetzung mit Fichtes transzendentalem Idealismus ein systemkritisches, ironisches, experimentelles und zur Poesie hin sich öffnendes Philosophiekonzept, das als frühromantischer Idealismus charakterisiert wird. Teil 1 führt anhand der Wissenschaftslehre von 1794/95 in Fichtes Philosophie ein. Die Teile 2 bis 5 verfolgen Schlegels kritische Fichterezeption und seine Konzipierung philosophischer Alternativen. Dabei legt Teil 2 Schlegels Fragmente und kleinere Prosatexte zugrunde. Teil 3 erörtert seine philosophischen Vorlesungen von 1800/01 (...) und 1804/05. Teil 4 ist den besonderen Leistungen Schlegels für ein modernes Poesiekonzept und der Bedeutung seiner programmatischen Forderung der Synthese von Philosophie und Poesie gewidmet. Dabei wird u.a. auf die Konzepte von romantischer Poesie, Transzendentalpoesie und Mythologie eingegangen. Teil 5 behandelt Schlegels Ironiekonzept als innovativen philosophischen Beitrag für ein antimetaphysisches, offenes, plurales Weltbild. (shrink)

The problem of foreknowledge and freedom presents a challenge to the defender of traditional Western theism. Nelson Pike has argued that the existence of an essentially omniscient God who possesses foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. Pike's opponents in this matter, among whom is Alvin Plantinga, argue that no incompatibility has yet been shown. I shall develop the view that neither Pike nor his opponents have conclusively settled the question whether foreknowledge and freedom are compatible. Furthermore there is a reason (...) why the issue has not been, and may never be, conclusively settled: it is an inherently paradoxical issue. To aid in demonstrating this point I shall discuss a modified version of a paradox that has come to be known as Newcomb's Problem. (shrink)

I describe how relativistic field theory generalizes the paradigm property of material systems, the possession of mass, to the requirement that they have a mass–energy–momentum density tensor T µ associated with them. I argue that T µ does not represent an intrinsic property of matter. For it will become evident that the definition of T µ depends on the metric field g µ in a variety of ways. Accordingly, since g µ represents the geometry of spacetime itself, the properties of (...) mass, stress, energy, and momentum should not be seen as intrinsic properties of matter, but as relational properties that material systems have only in virtue of their relation to spacetime structure. (shrink)

Abstract: Contemporary analytic philosophers of the “reactive attitudes” tend to share a simple conception of guilt as “self-directed blame”—roughly, an “unpleasant affect” felt in combination with, or in response to, the thought that one has violated a moral requirement, evinced substandard “quality of will,” or is blameworthy. I believe that this simple conception is inadequate. As an alternative, I offer my own theory of guilt’s logic and its connection to morality. In doing so, I attempt to articulate guilt’s defining thought (...) or proposition through an extended investigation and analysis of guilt’s many competing metaphors, which I trace from the Hebrew Bible to the New Testament to Shakespeare to contemporary vernacular. My interpretation of this literary genealogy offers a way to understand guilt’s seemingly disparate metaphors in terms of a single master-image that illuminates our self-conceptions and our relationship to morality. I conclude by making a very brief start toward a moral vindication of guilt against the backdrop of Nietzschean and Freudian analyses that explicitly call guilt’s place in a healthy social and personal life into question. I suggest that once guilt’s logic is made explicit, we can see that it makes sense of, honors, and addresses some of our deepest aspirations and needs. (shrink)

WHILE THERE IS AGREEMENT AMONG MANY (BUT NOT ALL) THEOLOGIANS AND PHILOSOPHERS THAT A MIRACULOUS EVENT SHOULD BE CONCEIVED IN OPPOSITION TO THE NATURAL ORDER, THERE IS DISAGREEMENT ABOUT WHY THIS OPPOSITION MUST BE PRESENT. IN THIS PAPER I EXAMINE ANTONY FLEW’S EXPLANATION OF HOW AND WHY MIRACLES AND NATURE ARE OPPOSED, SUGGESTING THAT HIS ACCOUNT IS, AS IT STANDS, PROBLEMATICAL AND IN NEED OF REVISION. I ARGUE THAT IF MIRACLES ARE TO BE THOUGHT OF AS SUPERNATURAL INTERVENTIONS INTO THE (...) NATURAL WORLD, AND HENCE IT IS THOUGHT APPROPRIATE TO SPEAK OF THEM AS PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE, THEN ONE MUST DEFINE THE PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE IN TERMS OF WHAT CAN BE EXPLAINED ONLY BY REFERENCE TO SUPERNATURAL FORCE, RATHER THAN IN TERMS OF WHAT IS LOGICALLY INCONSISTENT WITH LAWS OF NATURE. (shrink)

I argue that fitting resentment tracks unacceptable ‘ecological’ imbalances in relative social strength between victims and perpetrators that arise from violations of legitimate moral expectations. It does not respond purely, or even primarily, to offenders’ attitudes, and its proper targets need not be fully developed moral agents. It characteristically involves a wish for the restoration of social equilibrium rather than a demand for moral recognition or good will. To illuminate these contentions, I focus on cases that I believe demonstrate a (...) corollary thesis, namely, that strength, broadly construed, is a necessary condition of resentment-worthiness. I argue that weakness can make resentment unfitting in two ways. First, weakness may prevent a wrongdoer from shifting the balance of social power. Second, a weak wrongdoer may do social damage but be so lowly that resentment, which would represent him as excessively strong, would be inapt. Finally, I consider how accepting the ecological view might affect our theorizing about moral responsibility and the ethics of blame. (shrink)

This book is a personal history and apology, written by one of this century's most distinguished small mammal ecologists, for a life in science spent working on problems for which no final dramatic conclusion was reached. Included along the way are some important anecdotes and history about Charles Elton and the pioneering work at the Bureau of Animal Population at Oxford University, from which most of modern population ecology has grown, and insigts on the philosophy and practice of science.