this paper argues that people are entitled to keep some true facts about themselves to themselves, should they so wish, as a sign of respect for their moral and political status, and in order to protect themselves from being used as a public example in order to educate or to entertain other people. The “outing” - or non-consensual public disclosure - of people’s health records or status, or their sexual behaviour or orientation is usually unjustified, even when its consequences seem (...) to be beneficial. Indeed, the paper claims, the reasons to reject outing, as inconsistent with democratic commitments to freedom and equality, are reasons to insist on the importance of privacy to freedom of expression. While a free press is of the utmost importance to democratic government, it is not identical with the free expression of individuals and, on occasion, the former may have to be constrained in order to protect the latter. [Barendt, 2007, 231]. Hence, the paper concludes, we should distinguish the claims of individuals to publish reports about their lives – even if this necessarily involves revealing the private lives of others – from journalistic claims to publish information about the sex lives of consenting adults. I will start by briefly situating my argument within a democratic approach to privacy, before using the “outing” of Oliver Sipple to examine people’s claims to privacy and their implications for freedom of expression and of the press. I will be assuming that some forms of privacy are legitimate, in order to focus more closely on the question of what information, if any, people may keep to themselves. (shrink)

Must privacy and freedom of expression conflict? To witness recent debates in Britain, you might think so. Anything other than self-regulation by the press is met by howls of anguish from journalists across the political spectrum, to the effect that efforts to protect people’s privacy will threaten press freedom, promote self-censorship and prevent the press from fulfilling its vital function of informing the public and keeping a watchful eye on the activities and antics of the powerful.[Brown, 2009, 13 (...) January]1 Effective protections for privacy, from such a perspective, inevitably pose a threat to democratic government via the constraints that they place on the press. Such concerns with privacy must be taken seriously by anyone who cares about democratic government, and the freedom, equality and wellbeing of individuals. But if it is one thing to say that privacy and freedom of expression cannot always be fully protected, it is another to suppose that protections for the one must always come at the expense of the other. After all, the economics of contemporary politics and journalism would seem to be partly responsible for our difficulties in protecting personal privacy while sustaining robust and informative forms of public discourse. [Moore, 2010, 10 -141]2 Most newspapers are loss-making businesses and the need to reduce those losses and, if possible, to turn a profit, make investigative journalism an increasingly expensive proposition as compared to both “comment” and more or less elevated forms of gossip. At the same time, politics has increasingly become the prerogative of a narrow group of people with access to the large sums of money necessary successfully to compete for high office. In those circumstances, the need for critical scrutiny is as important as it is difficult. Revising our ideas about privacy and its protection cannot alone reduce the tensions between freedom of expression and personal privacy typical of our societies, necessary though such revision may be. Moreover, this paper can only touch on some aspects of the ways in which we need to rethink our interests in privacy, in order adequately to reflect people’s diverse interests in freedom of expression, and the important role of a free press to democratic government. Nonetheless, I hope to suggest ways of thinking about people’s claims to privacy which can be generalised fairly readily, and can help us to think constructively about the nature, causes and solutions to some important social and political problems, even if, in its nature, philosophical analysis rarely tells us what to do. More specifically, this paper argues that people are entitled to keep some true facts about themselves to themselves, should they so wish, as a sign of respect for their moral and political status, and in order to protect themselves from being used as a public example in order to educate or to entertain other people. The “outing” - or non-consensual public disclosure - of people’s health records or status, or their sexual behaviour or orientation is usually unjustified, even when its consequences seem to be beneficial. Indeed, the paper claims, the reasons to reject outing, as inconsistent with democratic commitments to freedom and equality, are reasons to insist on the importance of privacy to freedom of expression. While a free press is of the utmost importance to democratic government, it is not identical with the free expression of individuals and, on occasion, the former may have to be constrained in order to protect the latter. [Barendt, 2007, 231]. Hence, the paper concludes, we should distinguish the claims of individuals to publish reports about their lives – even if this necessarily involves revealing the private lives of others – from journalistic claims to publish information about the sex lives of consenting adults. I will start by briefly situating my argument within a democratic approach to privacy, before using the “outing” of Oliver Sipple to examine people’s claims to privacy and their implications for freedom of expression and of the press. I will be assuming that some forms of privacy are legitimate, in order to focus more closely on the question of what information, if any, people may keep to themselves. (shrink)

The most valuable political theoretical contribution made by Marx's idea of socialism is towards the resolution of the seeming opposition of mass democracy and rational government. Marx follows Hegel's redefinition of political rationalization as the actualization of the nascent self?consciousness of the existing ethical world when he uses socialism as a statement of those tendencies of bourgeois society that will create the perspectives of social awareness that allow mass democracy. This thesis is made against aspects of the interpretation (...) of Marx's relation to Hegel in Bolshevik political theory. I claim that the Bolshevik idea of socialism as the militant political intervention of the dictatorship of the proletariat develops, through Engels, a position taken with respect to Hegel's philosophy of right in Marx's Rhenish Journal articles. This idea is, however, pre?Hegelian in the sense that it is open to a democratic criticism based on the philosophy of right understood in an alternative fashion. In his writings after leaving the Rhenish Journal and up to the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts Marx makes this alternative available, and the notion of socialism he arrives at here turns on an awareness of the contradictions which make the militant political imposition of freedom impossible. Whereas for Bolshevism socialism is to be imposed on existing society, for Marx it is more the development within that society that makes possible mass democratic freedom. (shrink)

Sidney Hook on Pragmatism, Democracy, and Freedom collects twenty-five of Hook's most incisive essays in political philosophy, written throughout his lengthy career. Clustered into five main sections, the essays discuss pragmatism and naturalism, Marx and Marxism, democratic theory, democratic practice, and the defense of a free society.

The development of democracy and the development of science are not in a simple causal relationship. Rather, history shows that science can also develop in non-democratic and autocratic societies. Given the production conditions of scientific knowledge, the natural and technical sciences, for example, need well-equipped laboratories and technical equipment. Scientists in many disciplines can only do their work in institutions that provide them with access to the facilities necessary for their research. The freedom of scientific research and its (...) protection from political interference can only be guaranteed by democratic conditions. Universities continue tobe among the most important sites of knowledge production. In the humanities and social sciences in particular, the freedom of research is often threatened. The importance of freedom in the sciences can only be understood if it is related to the fundamental value of scientific freedom. It is the responsibility of universities to safeguard this value and to protect the freedom of research. They can only fulfill their task of generating and developing knowledge if the freedom of critical research is guaranteed. (shrink)

Comedy, from social ridicule to the unruly laughter of the carnival, provides effective tools for reinforcing social patterns of domination as well as weapons for emancipation. In Irony in the Age of Empire, Cynthia Willett asks: What could embody liberation better than laughter? Why do the oppressed laugh? What vision does the comic world prescribe? For Willett, the comic trumps standard liberal accounts of freedom by drawing attention to bodies, affects, and intimate relationships, topics which are usually neglected by (...) political philosophy. Willett's philosophical reflection on comedy issues a powerful challenge to standard conceptions of freedom by proposing a new kind of freedom that is unapologetically feminist, queer, and multiracial. This book provides a wide-ranging, original, thoughtful, and expansive discussion of citizenship, social manners, and political freedom in our world today. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that we need to re-address the issue of freedom as it relates to democracy and critical practice. My argument is drawn out of Derrida's deconstructive reading of Jean-Luc Nancy's The Experience of Freedom which proposes freedom in ontological terms as an experience of indeterminate openness that must be thought prior to any freedom of the self. I show how Derrida's reading of Nancy's text is itself a re-enactment of the (...) class='Hi'>freedom that Derrida finds wanting in Nancy's text, but which, by that very fact, affirms the power of critique in its capacity to think freely. The urgency of the thought of freedom is not something that can be avoided, but is itself the fact of critique in its thinking of democracy as a possibility, as something that might come about, as distinct from an already accomplished idea. To think in this way is, I argue, a matter of virtue, that is, of being free, as the virtue of critique and its capacity to act decisively, thereby bringing something forth by risking what it already is, in the absolute possibility of it not being. (shrink)

A sociologist, a historian and a legal scholar looked at the state of contemporary western societies and none of them liked what they saw. Wolfgang Streeck, Perry Anderson and Martin Loughlin share a concern for the erosion of democracy in Europe, along with the virtues that make democratic citizenship a viable basis for self-governing societies. From their differing perspectives, they decry the advance of neoliberalism, which prioritises individual aspirations at the expense of the common good.

This article re-examines the distinction between the libertarian approach and the egalitarian approach to the regulation of campaign finance. The conventional approach (as exemplified by the work of Owen Fiss and Ronald Dworkin) is to reconcile the competing values of liberty and equality. By contrast, this article advances the normative claim that democracies should seek to incorporate both the libertarian and the egalitarian approaches within constitutional law. I argue that instead of emphasizing one value over the other, the ideal position (...) is one that simultaneously recognizes the values of liberty and equality despite the irreconcilable tension between them. Rather than choosing one value over the other, or reconciling these values by redefining them, I claim that it is vital to maintain the tension between liberty and equality by instantiating the conflict in law. Democracy is better served when the law contains an explicit tension between these foundational values.After setting forth this normative framework, I then apply it to the campaign finance decisions of the Supreme Courts of the United States and Canada, respectively. I make two main claims. First, I argue that although the libertarian/egalitarian distinction is usually presented as a binary choice, the laws of a given jurisdiction often simultaneously display both libertarian and egalitarian characteristics. For this reason, I claim that the libertarian/egalitarian distinction is better conceived of as a “libertarian-egalitarian spectrum.” Second, I argue that in recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Canada, respectively, have privileged one value—liberty or equality—at the expense of the other. The U.S. Supreme Court has over-emphasized the value of liberty (most notably in itsCitizens Uniteddecision), with the result that political equality is markedly undermined. By the same token, the Supreme Court of Canada’s commitment to equality has become too one-sided in recent cases (HarperandBryan), with the result that there are significant impairments to free speech liberties. I argue that both of these approaches are detrimental to democratic participation and governance. Finally, this article offers a preliminary proposal for how courts and legislatures can allow for the conflict between liberty and equality to be instantiated in law. (shrink)

A significant share of the U.S. federal R&D budget is devoted to large-scale, complex technological systems commonly referred to as "big science. " Over the last two decades, these systems have continued to grow in size, complexity, development time, and cost. At the same time, political changes in the United States, particularly the concern over government spending and the federal budget deficit, have made it more difficult for proponents to secure and preserve support for these programs over their lifetimes. Using (...) the U.S. space shuttle and space station programs as examples, the article shows that the political requirements for obtaining approval and funding for large and expensive research and development projects create conditions that reduce the likelihood that they will succeed technologically. The problems of technology-based projects like those of the U.S. space program are in fact deeply rooted in the American political process itself. (shrink)

v. 1. Democracy and civic freedom -- v. 2. Imperialism and civic freedom.

In recent years, theorists of radical democracy have criticized the liberal pluralist model of politics, a model which views the political forum primarily as a space for bargaining and the aggregation of individual preferences. While conceding that some measure of bargaining and preference aggregation is probably an ineliminable feature of democratic politics, radical democrats have charged that this model underestimates or ignores the transformative effects of democratic political interaction. In particular, liberal pluralism does not allow for the possibility that (...) democratic politics can generate new forms of solidarity, enhance personal freedom, and inculcate virtue. (shrink)

Given the rise of religious movements during the past decade, some have argued that the basic principles of liberal democracy such as separation of church and state and principle of the public use of reason are too restrictive and ought to be rethought. I would like to argue along a Habermasian line that the principle of secular justification ought not to result in a private/public split in religious citizens’ identity if they recognize and adopt an “institutional translation proviso”. This (...) proviso requires an epistemic ability on the part of religious citizens that enables them to translate their religious beliefs and insight into secular reasons when they pass beyond the informal public sphere into governmental institutions like courts and parliaments. Citizens can express and defend their claims in the public sphere in religious terms if they cannot find secular translation for them. However, this proposal requires a complementary change in the mentality of the secular citizens that recognizes the continued existence of religious communities in diverse liberal democracies. (shrink)

"Being and Freedom is an account of ethics in Europe from the French Revolution: a phase of philosophical ethics whose influence ran far beyond philosophy, eventually dominating politics and religion in the West. Developments came from France, Germany, and Britain. This book is currently the only study that treats them together as a Europe-wide phenomenon. The first chapter covers the philosophical conflict at the heart of the French Revolution, between the individualism of the Enlightenment and two very different forms (...) of holistic ethics: the old regime's ethic of service and the radical-democracy of the Rousseauian left. Responses analysing modern freedom and democracy came from a series of French liberal thinkers. In Germany the reaction was to two revolutions seen as inaugurating modernity--the political revolution in France and the philosophical revolution of Kant. Here the fate of religion was critical; with it the metaphysics of being and freedom. The story is traced from Kant to Hegel's idealist version of ethical holism. In Britain, Enlightenment naturalism remained the prevailing framework. It took different forms: 'common sense' and the theory of the sentiments in Scotland, utilitarianism in England. From these elements came a synthesis of European themes by John Stuart Mill--comparable in range but opposed to that of Hegel. This period's ethical ideas remain the core of late modern ethics and the contested ground on which ethical disagreements take place today. The final chapter is a retrospective and assessment"--Publisher's description. (shrink)

The quest for freedom from hunger and repression has triggered in recent years a dramatic, worldwide reform of political and economic systems. Never have so many people enjoyed, or at least experimented with democratic institutions. However, many strategies for economic development in Eastern Europe and Latin America have failed with the result that entire economic systems on both continents are being transformed. This major book analyzes recent transitions to democracy and market-oriented economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin (...) America. Drawing in a quite distinctive way on models derived from political philosophy, economics, and game theory, Professor Przeworski also considers specific data on individual countries. Among the questions raised by the book are: What should we expect from these experiments in democracy and market economy? What new economic systems will emerge? Will these transitions result in new democracies or old dictatorships? (shrink)

The republican political tradition, which originated in Ancient Rome and picked up by several early-modern thinkers, has been revived in the last couple of decades following the seminal works of historian Quentin Skinner and political theorist Philip Pettit. Although educational questions do not normally occupy the center stage in republican theory, various theorists working within this framework have already highlighted the significance of education for any functioning republic. Looking at educational questions through the lens of freedom as non-domination has (...) already yielded important insights to discussions of political education. However, consideration of the existing republican educational discourse in light of the wide range of issues discussed in Pettit’s recent works reveals that it suffers from two major lacunae. First, it does not take into consideration the distinction (and deep connection) between democracy and social justice that has become central to Pettit’s republicanism. Thus, the current discussion focuses almost exclusively on education for democratic citizenship and hardly touches upon social justice. Second, the current literature thinks mainly in terms of educating future citizens, rather than conceiving of students also as political agents in the present, and of school itself as a site of non-domination. This paper aims at filling these voids, and it will therefore be oriented along two intersecting axes: the one between democracy and justice, and the other between future citizenship in the state and present citizenship at school. The resulting four categories will organize the discussion: future citizens and democracy; future citizens and social justice; present citizens and democracy; present citizens and social justice. This will not only enable us to draw a clearer line between the civic republican and liberal educational theories, but also make civic republican education a viable alternative to current educational approaches. (shrink)

Recognition and Freedom offers up-to-date discussions of Axel Honneth’s political thought by ten experts in the field. It also includes an interview with Honneth and an essay by him on education and democracy, previously unpublished in English.

Why are democracy, equality and freedom currently in such turmoil? Kitahara discusses the confusion and pessimism in Western civilization today. The author presents his theory of civilization and suggests how the enormous problems within Western civilization can be addressed by pursuing the original basis of Western civilization-individualism. The three key values of democracy, equality and freedom are then re-interpreted from the perspective of individualism, and possibilities for dealing with the problems of Western civilization are suggested. Contents: (...) PART I: PROBLEMS OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION; Western Civilization in Confusion; Democracy; Equality; Freedom; Ideology, Bureaucracy, and Technology; Culture and Biology; Culture and the Individual; PART II: A THEORY OF CIVILIZATION; The Self in the Life Space; The Manipulatory Drive; Identification and Variation; The Conditions for Civilization; The Maintenance of Civilization; The Failure of Civilization; PART III: REFLECTIONS ON WESTERN CIVILIZATION; The Contradictions; Individualism and Democracy; Individualism and Equality; Individualism and Freedom; Epilogue. (shrink)

This book investigates the relationship between liberal democracies and ontology, that is, philosophical claims about the constitution of agents and the social world. Many philosophers argue that ontology needs to be avoided in political and legal philosophy. In fact, political liberalism, a highly influential paradigm founded by the philosopher John Rawls, makes the avoidance of ontology a core ambition of its 'political, non-metaphysical' programme. In contrast to political liberalism, this book argues that attending to ontological disputes is essential to political (...) and legal philosophy. Illuminating, criticising and developing ontological arguments does not only enhance our understanding of justice, but also highlights key features of democratic citizenship. The argument is built up by bringing together three traditions of thought that have so far not been confronted with one another: political liberalism, the work of Michel Foucault, and the psychoanalytic theories of Sigmund Freud and Donald Winnicott. The book also investigates more concrete implications of ontological disputes by drawing on several case studies: a Dutch political-legal debate about greeting rituals; an American conflict about the legalisation of religious freedom; and the struggles for resilience of two American social movement groups. (shrink)

Why is democracy good, or preferable to other systems of governance and political decision-making? Democracy has been argued to incorporate or promote central values, such as equality or freedom. On the other hand, many contemporary defenses of democracy have relied on arguments that attempt to show that democracy promotes or enables some second-order good, such as the validity, justification or legitimacy of political decision-making. Recent decades have seen the rise of epistemic arguments for democracy (...) that belong to this latter type. For example, David Estlund has proposed that democracy is epistemically preferable among the societal arrangements that could be acceptable to all citizens. In turn... (shrink)

These two ambitious volumes from one of the world's most celebrated political philosophers present a new kind of political and legal theory that James Tully calls a public philosophy, and a complementary new way of thinking about active citizenship, called civic freedom. Professor Tully takes the reader step-by-step through the principal debates in political theory and the major types of political struggle today. These volumes represent a genuine landmark in political theory from the author of Strange Multiplicity, one of (...) the most influential and distinctive commentaries on politics and the contemporary world published in recent years. This first volume of Public Philosophy in a New Key consists of a presentation and defence of a contextual approach to public philosophy and civic freedom, and then goes on to study specific struggles over recognition and distribution within states. (shrink)

This article focuses on the relationship between democracy and the notwithstanding clause in s.33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. A number of scholars argue that s.33 is inherently ‘democratic’, as it is an assertion of legislative supremacy. The most influential such theory is Jeremy Waldron’s. This article offers a democracy-based critique of Waldron’s democracy-based account of the notwithstanding clause. The argument that the notwithstanding clause is necessarily ‘democratic’ ignores the constitution of the legislature through (...) elections and the risk of self-dealing by the legislative branch, adopts an idealistic view of legislatures at odds with the reality of executive dominance and party discipline, and over-relies on the assumption that the electorate will ensure retrospective accountability for misuse of s.33. Contrary to Waldron and those who have adopted his arguments in Canada in the context of the Charter, the article argues we can be democrats and have faith in the capacities of legislators and voters while still maintaining skepticism about the uses to which the notwithstanding clause may be put. In short, s.33 is not inherently democratic. The political morality of each use of the notwithstanding clause—including whether it helps or harms democracy—must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. (shrink)

The article, authored by Ukrainian and Polish social researchers, analyses normative approaches towards understanding models of democracy and their relation to civic space. Despite the existence of multiple models of democracy, they can largely be reduced to two main forms: direct and representative democracy. Deliberative democracy is posited as a third form, which, according to some scientists, combines elements of representative, direct, and participatory democracy. The analysis is based on the assessment of democracy and (...) civic space in Ukraine, utilising data from six applied international social studies, as well as the evaluation of the modern characteristics of some components of Ukrainian civic space. According to the rating of CIVICUS Monitor, Ukraine has been classified in the category of countries where the civic space is “obstructed” from 2019 to the present time (Autumn 2023). Currently, the advancement of civic space in Ukraine towards more favourable forms of freedom of association, peaceful assembly, and expression of opinion in the country are threatened by several factors simultaneously. The article also uses the results of the authors’ previous and current academic research, as well as the results of twenty years of advocacy and analytical work as public experts in Ukraine and Europe. (shrink)

This article argues that people have legitimate interests in privacy that deserve legal protection on democratic principles. It describes the right to privacy as a bundle of rights of personal choice, association and expression and shows that, so described, people have legitimate political interests in privacy. These interests reflect the ways that privacy rights can supplement the protection for people’s freedom and equality provided by rights of political choice, association and expression, and can help to make sure that these (...) are, genuinely, democratic. Feminists have often been ambivalent about legal protection for privacy, because privacy rights have, so often, protected the coercion and exploitation of women, and made it difficult to politicise personal forms of injustice. However, attention to the differences between democratic and undemocratic forms of politics can enable us to meet these concerns, and to distinguish a democratic justification of privacy rights from the alternatives. (shrink)

In this paper I focus on one of the fundamental democratic freedoms – freedom of conscience – and see to what extent Catholicism is compatible or consistent with it and, by extension, with democracy in civil or political institutions. I draw primarily on recent ecclesial statements on the issue, but also on the philosophical views of Jacques Maritain. First, I outline briefly the view of democracy and freedom of conscience that putatively undergirds modern democratic societies, as (...) well as the understanding of this freedom in Catholic thought. Next, I present the claim that there are some important differences in the way in which this freedom is described in Catholicism as distinct from dominant, secular democratic views. Third, I suggest that these differences, while real, do not sustain the claim of a radical difference in principle between freedom of conscience in recent Catholic thought and that found in documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. I conclude that not only is the Catholic approach to freedom of conscience compatible with democracy in civil institutions, but democratic government may be an important way to develop values recognized by Catholicism as fundamental. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Democracy proposes the impossible: that each citizen makes community with those they consider opponents or foes. In the increasingly embittered partisan environment animating so many democracies, this paradoxical demand justifies more attention. This article explores the challenges of democracy among polarized and divided groups by engaging the political theory of Bhimrao Ambedkar’s Navayana pragmatism. Ambedkar, an Indian political figure and thinker who felt the crushing oppression of caste discrimination, reshapes the pragmatism of John Dewey to better encapsulate (...) the importance of overcoming divisions and injustices while forging a community of shared interests. Using Ambedkar’s merging of the values of liberty, equality, and fraternity into a pragmatist vision of democracy as a habit or way of life, this article demonstrates that justice can be usefully taken as a balancing of values among agreeing and disagreeing citizens. This also leads to a recognition of the tragedy of democracy, or the fact that attending to the end and means of fraternity places limits on what one group can do to their opponents in the pursuit of freedom or equality. (shrink)

From its very beginning during the fifth century B.C. democracy, as a political regime, has maintained a constant normative nucleus; equality and freedom among its members. But it also presents notorious discontinuities in the institutional internal organization. Modern democracies are equally indebted to two traditions; on the one hand popular sovereignty, under the form of either direct democracy or republican mixed constitution, and innate subjective rights on the other. Democracy resolved the dilemmas that emerged from opposed (...) interests through two ways: representation, which enables it to incorporate them in a reduced collegiate body, within which deliberation and consensus is possible, and also through the universal election of representatives and governors by pre-established periods of time. This institutional schema is dangerously falling apart due to domestic tensions within each nation, on the one hand, and the constriction coming from the globalized economy on the other. (shrink)

An exceptional chain of events in science, technology, art and planning took place in Latin America in the 1970s. Does this wonder shed light upon our view of the basic roots of cultural, social and political blooming? This paper intends to adduce evidence on second-order cybernetics processes underlying five outstanding cases in real societies and to disclose the links between democracy and unfettering momentum for freedom and creativity. Namely, Oscar Varsavsky, national projects, styles of development, scientific and technological (...) autonomy; Stefano Varese, cultural and political autonomy of indigenous people; Mario Pedrosa, creation of the Museum of Solidarity in Chile; Stafford Beer, Cybersyn project for cybernetics and self-management in Chile; and Humberto Maturana, concepts of autopoiesis, cognition, language and multiverse. The reasoning counts with the author's direct participation in all cases. The paper sets a similarity worthy of being noticed between Allende’s Unidad Popular in Chile and Pericles’ Golden Age in Greece and outlines why these historic realms albeit far apart have lasting importance and similar historical impetus. Highlights the essential and seminal features of each stream and comes to the conclusion that effective democracy is the necessary condition for participation and creativity. Upsurges in social participation and creativity are neither frequent nor cyclical. Still, such sudden and usually large increase in ingenuity, flair and aim to improve living conditions, although limited in time, remain in our mind as a joy forever. Nowadays, the world witnesses a contrary motion towards sterile art patterns and restrained behaviour. Hence, it becomes even more important to better understand the basic roots of cultural, social and political blooming. (shrink)

The question arises whether the coherence between Democracy and the Christian vision of the person and Society as something much more essential or is it simply a matter of chance? It is only with Christianity, with its teachings on the concept of inviolable rights of the person, equality, political rights of the people, and the absolute value of relationships based on law and justice as the basis of society and based on fraternal love, created a new Vision of political (...) order which all contemporary nations aim to implement. If not for the Christian concept of democracy, the democracy that we know today, would probably have taken a different form. The Church’s support for democracy is something unquestionable. However, not every kind of democracy automatically is in keeping with the teachings of the Church. This depends on a democracy’s relation to truth and freedom. The Church supports democracy today, however it does not support one, concrete vision of the political system of the State. It respects the just autonomy of the democratic order, and it does not have a concrete reason for supporting one particular institutional and constitutional solution or another. (shrink)

One of the dominant tendencies in the history of mankind throughout the entire course of its development has been the struggle between two opposing principles-democracy and tyranny. The very concepts, born in antiquity, reflected the clash and constant rivalry of two principles in the organization of the political order of the states of antiquity. In the narrow sense democracy was understood to mean a form of the state based on the recognition that the people [narod] are the source (...) and at the same time the bearers of power, which they realize by implementing their civil rights and freedoms. Tyranny was taken to mean a form of state power that was established through force and based on one-person rule. An important peculiarity of the genesis of tyranny is the circumstance that it arose in a transitional period in the struggle of the people against the ancestral nobility and found support in the people for a struggle against the aristocratic opposition. Scholars see the social purpose of the power of tyrants in the implementation of reforms aimed at improving the situation of the demos, developing a new social hierarchy, and forming a strong state. The authors of antiquity-Plato, Aristotle, and Polybius-who drew a clear distinction between democracy and tyranny, nonetheless saw the possibility of one form of rule turning into the other. They therefore considered both these forms of rule imperfect or even as the worst of all possible forms, and instead they saw the ideal to lie in a mixed form of government that theoretically eliminates the flaws of each of the extreme or pure forms. (shrink)

Democracy is increasingly being challenged, by disengagement and by anti-pluralist movements (Levitsky and Ziblatt in How Democracies Die: What History Reveals About Our Future, Viking, New York, 2018; Wikforss in _Därför demokrati. Om kunskapen och folkstyret_ [Because of this, democracy. On knowledge and people’s rule] Fri Tanke, 2021; Svolik et al. in J Democr 34(1):5–20, 2023). This article draws upon a theoretical discussion about democracy, pluralism, and threats to democracy. Departing from Dewey, Laclau, Mouffe, Young and (...) Allen, we address democracy as an ideology that centers around pluralism, or an ever-increasing inclusion of voices from the margins as its goal. We argue that perceiving democracy pedagogically as a pluralistic ideology would support students’ democratic citizenship and equip them for a world where threats to democracy are being reported. Employing a case study on Finnish social studies textbooks, we analyze how democracy as well as threats to democracy are discursively portrayed. Our study shows that the textbooks present democracy as predominantly institutional and static. We also find that while disengagement is portrayed as a problem for democracy, anti-pluralist movements are generally not referred to as a threat. Additionally, we examine a discourse in the textbooks that connects freedom of speech with democracy in a way that favors a multitude of opinions, even antidemocratic ones, over creating space for marginalized voices. Drawing on the theoretical discussion and the results of the analysis, we argue that a focus on pluralism as the core of democracy makes the opposition between restricting hate speech and advocating for democracy redundant. (shrink)

PurposeThis paper aims to highlight the very recent cases of internet shutdown during the creation of Union territory of Jammu and Kashmir and enactment of Citizenship Amendment Act and the detention under Section 66 (A) of Information Technology Act 2000.Design/methodology/approachThis study takes up a broad explorative discussion of the challenges posed to the consolidation of democracy in India due to frequent internet shutdowns for online communication and social media usages.FindingsAs findings, it is narrated that due to politically motivated reasons, (...) India compromises its commitment to the pluralism and diversity in views, in particular, individual rights to freedom of expression and opinion, enshrined in the constitution.Originality/valueRight to freedom of speech and expression has now taken a new shape due to the emergence and availability of the internet that enriches the quality of democracy. (shrink)

Debates over the politicization of science have led some to claim that scientists have or should have a “right to research.” This article examines the political meaning and implications of the right to research with respect to different historical conceptions of rights. The more common “liberal” view sees rights as protections against social and political interference. The “republican” view, in contrast, conceives rights as claims to civic membership. Building on the republican view of rights, this article conceives the right to (...) research as embedding science more firmly and explicitly within society, rather than sheltering science from society. From this perspective, all citizens should enjoy a general right to free inquiry, but this right to inquiry does not necessarily encompass all scientific research. Because rights are most reliably protected when embedded within democratic culture and institutions, claims for a right to research should be considered in light of how the research in question contributes to democracy. By putting both research and rights in a social context, this article shows that the claim for a right to research is best understood, not as a guarantee for public support of science, but as a way to initiate public deliberation and debate about which sorts of inquiry deserve public support. (shrink)

Summary In this article, classical writings of Kurt Lewin (1890-1947) and Wolfgang Metzger (1899-1979) concerning education for democracy and tolerance are presented. Starting with a definition of „group” and the discussion of the meaning of groups for the individual life, especially the experimental studies of Kurt Lewin, Ronald Lippitt and Raph K. White in 1937/38 on different group atmospheres under the influence of „democratic” vs. „autocratic” vs. „laissez faire” leading style are presented again, in order to give an example (...) for the meaning of atmosphere influences on personal development, creativity and aggression – all topics concerning actual school situations and the daily experience of pupils and teachers. The collection of writings concerning education for democracy and tolerance include some of Lewin’s writings on minority problems and Metzger’s fundamental thougts on political education as a special application of productive thinking in Wertheimer’s sense. Some possibilities of how to change prejudices and to develop tolerance in Lewin’s and Metzger’s sense are presented. As a conclusion, some ideas for actual school life and possibilities to make pupils tolerant and able to participate actively in a democratic society are developed. (shrink)

This article argues that people have legitimate interests in privacy that deserve legal protection on democratic principles. It describes the right to privacy as a bundle of rights of solitude, intimacy and confidentiality and shows that, so described, people have legitimate interests in privacy. These interests are both personal and political, and provide the grounds for two different justifications of privacy rights. Though both are based on democratic concerns for the freedom and equality of individuals, these two justifications for (...) privacy can be distinguished because the one is principally concerned with protecting the personal freedom and equality of individuals, while the other is principally concerned with their political equivalents. Feminists have often been ambivalent about legal protection for privacy, because privacy rights have, so often, protected the coercion and exploitation of women, and made it difficult to politicise personal forms of injustice. However, interpreting the content and justification of privacy rights in light of the differences between democratic and undemocratic forms of politics can enable us to meet these concerns, and to distinguish a democratic justification of privacy rights from the alternatives. (shrink)

Lisa Hill’s response to my critique of compulsory voting, like similar responses in print or in discussion, remind me how much a child of the ‘70s I am, and how far my beliefs and intuitions about politics have been shaped by the electoral conflicts, social movements and violence of that period. -/- But my perceptions of politics have also been profoundly shaped by my teachers, and fellow graduate students, at MIT. Theda Skocpol famously urged political scientists to ‘bring the state (...) back in’ to their analyses, and to recognise that political identities, interests and coalitions cannot be read off straightforwardly from people’s socio-economic position. In their different ways, this was the lesson that Suzanne Berger, Charles Sabel and Joshua Cohen tried to teach us, emphasising the ways that political participation and conflict, themselves, can change people’s identities, their sense of what it is desirable and possible, and their ability to recognise, or oppose, the freedom and equality of others. -/- I do not therefore take it as self-evident that the poor and seemingly powerless should be politically apathetic, unwilling to vote, or incapable of imagining a political solution to at least some of the problems confronting them. Nor do I suppose that non-voters are all-of-a-piece, and that their shared interests are, inevitably, more significant, morally or politically, than those which divide them. Such assumptions seem mistaken in the case of voters, and I see no reason why they should be true of non-voters. The people we find in these categories are not predestined to be in one rather than the other; they do not always stay where they start off; and at an individual level, the reasons why people fall into one group, rather than another, are likely to be complex and sometimes unpredictable. -/- Above all I see nothing in a commitment to democratic government, understood realistically or in more idealistic terms, that requires us to treat raising turnout at national elections (once every four years or so) as of such moral or political importance that we should make it legally mandatory. Realistically, it is an open question how far the ballot box is, for most people, the path to empowerment – important though it is that people should have an equal right to vote and to stand as candidates at national elections. On a more idealistic view of democratic politics it is hard to avoid the thought that the importance of national elections to self-government, posited by proponents of compulsory voting, reflects an alienated and alienating view of democracy, in which the choice of our leaders becomes more important than the development and exercise of our own capacities to lead; and in which our awe at the power our leaders might wield is matched only by our inability to imagine less intimidating, distant and centralised forms of politics. -/- But before saying a little more about these points, and their significance for compulsory voting, I would like to dispel some misunderstandings or misrepresentations of my views in Hill’s essay. I do not believe socio-economic disparities in turnout are not worrying for democratic politics, nor do I believe that abstention is generally synonymous with consent. I do not assume that people have a right not to vote, but try to explain why moral and legal rights to abstain are an important part of democratic politics, including electoral politics. (shrink)

Over the past century, the tremendous concentration of power in the modern state has frequently been a threat to the life and liberty of individuals and social groups. Liberal democracy seeks to harness state power to the causes of individual freedom and public benefit - through such means as constitutional limits on and separation of powers, free and regular elections, and the vigilance of citizens, parliaments and media. This collection of essays offers perspectives on the difficulties of establishing (...) and sustaining a modern liberal democratic state. These themes are pursued through subjects ranging from the extreme abuses of power by Nazi regime to the misuse of power by executive government in the "WA Inc" years, from the quest for a genuinely republican Australia to the role of trust and suspicion in liberal democracy, from the alleged decline of the state in a globalizing world to the construction of a new state in East Timor, and from the importance of free scholarship to the role of deliberative polling in enhancing the democratic process. The late Patrick O'Brien, scholar, teacher, public intellectual and political activist, believed passionately in the importance of personal liberty and in the firm and transparent regulation of the exercise of power. This book celebrates O'Brien's life and intellectual engagements, and demonstrates the enduring importance of the key themes of his work. (shrink)

The main question informing this paper is whether it is possible to extend democracy beyond its liberal forms. The paper reflects upon this question with regard to its implications for the individual. For the radicalization of democracy implies a need for self-transformation, if the everyday egoism of contemporary citizens is not to thwart reasonable discussion and participation. Theorists such as Richard Rorty argue that the philosophical resources required to guide such self-transformation can be made available only by sacrificing (...) the political freedom and cultural diversity liberalism has been able to precariously establish. Other theorists insist that the thresholds of pluralism and tolerance that existing liberal democracies are struggling to maintain actually require an extension of democracy. The paper evaluates two different theoretical strategies that aim to identify potentials for democratization without falling prey to the dilemma identified by Rorty: a ‘ deliberative’ strategy explicated with reference to Jürgen Habermas and an ‘existential’ approach represented here by William Connolly. Key Words: Connolly • democracy • existential • Habermas • individual • proceduralism • Rorty. (shrink)