Why is democracy good, or preferable to other systems of governance and political decision-making? Democracy has been argued to incorporate or promote central values, such as equality or freedom. On the other hand, many contemporary defenses of democracy have relied on arguments that attempt to show that democracy promotes or enables some second-order good, such as the validity, justification or legitimacy of political decision-making. Recent decades have seen the rise of epistemic arguments for democracy that belong to this latter type. (...) For example, David Estlund has proposed that democracy is epistemically preferable among the societal arrangements that could be acceptable to all citizens. In turn... (shrink)

Scientific realism is a critical target of anti-representationalists such as Richard Rorty and Huw Price, who have questioned the very possibility of providing a satisfactory argument for realism or any other ontological position. I will argue that there is a viable form of realism which not only withstands this criticism but is vindicated on the antirepresentationalists’ own grounds. This realist position, largely drawn from the notion of the scientific method developed by the founder of philosophical pragmatism, Charles S. Peirce, will (...) further be compared with the accounts of truth and objectivity proposed by the contemporary pragmatists, Rorty, Price, and Robert B. Brandom. (shrink)

It is argued that the emergence of controversial views in discussions of theoretical medicine and bioethics is best explained by the assumption of moral realism within those discursive practices. Neither of the main alternatives of realism in contemporary meta-ethics — moral expressivism and anti-realism — can account for the rise of controversies in the bioethical debate. This argument draws from the contemporary expressivist or anti-representationalist pragmatism as advanced by Richard Rorty and Huw Price, as well as the pragmatist scientific realism (...) and fallibilism of the founder of pragmatism, Charles S. Peirce. In accordance with the fallibilist view, it is proposed that presenting controversial positions may serve epistemic purposes within bioethical debates, providing opportunities for inquiry by pointing towards problems to be solved and arguments and evidence for and against to be put forward. (shrink)

Pragmatism gained considerable attention in bioethical discussions in the early 21st century. However, some dimensions and contributions of pragmatism to bioethics remain underexplored in both research and practice. It is argued that pragmatism can make a distinctive contribution to bioethics through its concept, developed by Charles S. Peirce and John Dewey, that ethical issues can be resolved through experimental inquiry. Dewey’s proposal that policies can be confirmed or disconfirmed through experimentation is developed by comparing it to the confirmation of scientific (...) hypotheses, with a focus on the objection that the consequences of following a moral view or policy do not provide guidance on choosing among competing ethical perspectives. As confirmation of scientific hypotheses typically relies on evidence gathered from observation, the possibility of ethically relevant observation is then explored based on Peirce’s views on feelings as emotional interpretants. Finally, the connection between Dewey’s experimental ethics and democracy is outlined and compared to unfettered ethical progressivism. (shrink)

Scientific realism is a critical target of anti-representationalists such as Richard Rorty and Huw Price, who have questioned the very possibility of providing a satisfactory argument for realism or any other ontological position. I will argue that there is a viable form of realism which not only withstands this criticism but is vindicated on the antirepresentationalists’ own grounds. This realist position, largely drawn from the notion of the scientific method developed by the founder of philosophical pragmatism, Charles S. Peirce, will (...) further be compared with the accounts of truth and objectivity proposed by the contemporary pragmatists, Rorty, Price, and Robert B. Brandom. (shrink)

John Rawls argued that democracy must be justifiable to all citizens; otherwise, a democratic society is oppressive to some. In A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy (), Robert B. Talisse attempts to meet the Rawlsian challenge by drawing from Charles S. Peirce's pragmatism. This article first briefly canvasses the argument of Talisse's book and then criticizes its key premise concerning (normative) reasons for belief by offering a competing reading of Peirce's “The Fixation of Belief” (). It then proceeds to argue that (...) Talisse's argument faces a dilemma: his proposal of epistemic perfectionism either is substantive and can be reasonably disagreed about or is minimal but insufficient to ground a democratic society. Consequently, it suggests that the Rawlsian challenge can only be solved by abandoning Rawls's own notion of reasonableness, and that an interesting alternative notion of reasons can be derived from Peirce's “Fixation.”. (shrink)

"A critical investigation of modern naturalism is vitally needed for a deeper understanding of pragmatism's ability to offer enriching perspectives on contemporary philosophy of science. The kind of non-reductive naturalism so often associated with pragmatism needs to be assessed for its plausibility, as does whether a pragmatist perspective on different human ways of conceiving of the world can mediate between different points of view, especially those of natural science and common sense"-- Publisher summary.

Environmental pragmatism has faced numerous criticisms for relativism and crude instrumentalism as well as for sidestepping the fundamental concerns of environmental ethics. Recently, Andre Santos Campos and Sofia Guedes Vaz have proposed a new ‘method’ of environmental pragmatism, justificatory moral pluralism, with the aim of overcoming these criticisms. It is argued that this new approach is plagued by the traditional concerns. Instead, the pitfalls of pragmatism can be avoided by adopting the central insight of the classical pragmatists that values may (...) be revised in light of experience in a process that resembles scientific inquiry. The resulting view may not be satisfying for those who expect pragmatism to live up to its periodic promise of immediate and concrete results. Nevertheless, pragmatism presents the environmental ethicist with a range of promising tasks. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Pragmatist Ethics: A Problem-Based Approach to What Matters by James Jakób LiszkaHenrik RydenfeltJames Jakób Liszka (Ed) Pragmatist Ethics: A Problem-Based Approach to What Matters Albany: SUNY Press, 2021; 192 pp., incl. indexThere appears to be increasing interest in public discussion and debate on ethical issues in our societies motivated by concerns regarding economic growth within the limits of the environment, the development [End Page 253] of "autonomous" machines (...) and advances in artificial intelligence, and issues of justice and equality under conditions of global emergencies such as climate change. Over the past twenty years, numerous philosophers have produced important works on the ethical perspectives and social and political philosophy of the classic thinkers of the pragmatist tradition, including several volumes on John Dewey and William James, and a volume on Charles S. Peirce that James Liszka also published in 2021. However, there exist few general statements of the potential of the pragmatist approach to the topic of ethics in general. For this reason, Liszka's new book outlining pragmatist ethics is welcome. Despite its concise presentation of only about 170 pages, Liszka manages to discuss a number of pragmatist notions and views both in their historical context and in contrast and comparison with contemporary arguments, particularly ones developed in the fields of metaethics and normative ethics of the analytic tradition.As both a scholar and a philosopher, Liszka offers his own perspective on the pragmatist approach and what is unique and distinctive about it. In the introduction, the pragmatist perspective is described as beginning with an examination of actual problems to develop solutions that may reveal what would be good or better than the present, rather than aiming at the development of a concept of the good that could then be applied in particular cases. The remainder of the book can be characterised as developing this notion of ethics through the lenses of philosophical debates, both historical and contemporary, on practical reasoning, community, inquiry, and moral progress. Following the introduction, Liszka presents in the second chapter his pragmatist, problem-based ethics as a response to the "tragedy of life", in the sense of an inevitable conflict of goods and values, with the melioristic slogan "solve problems, and good will follow". In the third chapter, Liszka delves deeper into the roots of his problem-based ethics by looking at the writings of the classical pragmatists, including Peirce's maxim of pragmatism, James's account of truth as that which brings us into a satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience, Peirce's notion of the community of inquiry, and Dewey's account of democracy as the setting for solving the problems of the community. James Wallace's account of practices as potential solutions for problems provides Liszka with an important stepping stone to his conclusion, drawn at the end of this chapter, that in order to solve problems, practices must aim to attain a good end in the right way.However, this formal conclusion does not provide specific guidance on how problems should be solved. Providing such guidance is the task of practical reason, the subject of chapter four. Liszka's discussion develops pragmatist perspectives on practical reasoning based on Wallace's account, Robert Brandom's distinctions between shapes of practical reasoning, as well as Peirce's account of desire. All of these are brought to [End Page 254] bear in long-standing debates in meta-ethics. In particular, to counter subjectivism and other familiar issues with the Humean desire-belief account of moral motivation (or internalism about moral motivation), Liszka—again drawing from Wallace's notion—argues that practices are not subjective but collectively approved and institutionalised.The presence of problems indicates that something is not working within the practice in question. Pragmatists typically suggest that inquiry could be deployed to solve problems. This is why in chapter five normative science is considered. Liszka's central project is to make sense of the pragmatist stance that moral inquiries and judgments can be made scientific, and that normative claims can be tested by observing the results actually attained. Liszka argues that "the norms of practical reasoning derive their... (shrink)

Prior to the Second World War, Peirce was virtually unknown in Finnish philosophical discussions. This was not the case of pragmatism altogether. For example, James’s ideas were well received and discussed in Finland at some length around the time of his death in 1910, including the translation of several of James’s books and writings into Finnish. A central figure in this discussion was the most prominent Finnish philosopher at that time, Eino Kaila, who also founded the psychological labora...

ABSTRACT Nietzsche's texts invite perplexing questions about the justification and objectivity of his ethical views. According to the interpretation suggested here, Nietzsche does not advance a substantive normative ethics, but proposes, based on his ontological idea of will to power, an instrumentalist theory of value. He is not a realist about value—according to him, nothing is intrinsically valuable. However, things, actions, beliefs, and values can be evaluated with reference to their capacities in serving our fundamental quest for power. The central (...) advantage of this interpretation against competing readings is that it attempts to make sense of how an “objective” evaluation fits together with antirealism or nihilism about value, including how the “ethics” of will to power is to be understood alongside the metaphysical and ethical doctrine of eternal recurrence. (shrink)

The connection between emotions and ethical views or ethical inquiry has been considered intimate by a number of philosophers. Based on Peirce’s discussion on the emotional interpretants in MS 318, I will suggest that such interpretants could be exploited in ethical inquiry. I will first argue, drawing on T. L. Short’s interpretation of Peirce, that there are final emotional interpretants, and such emotional interpretants actually formed (or dynamical) can be more or less appropriate concerning the sign’s (dynamical) objects. I will (...) then explore the prospect that emotional interpretants could be harnessed for the particular cognitive purpose of ethical inquiry, concluding that normative judgments based on feelings could serve as its observational part. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s texts invite perplexing questions about the justification and objectivity of his ethical views. 1 On the one hand, Nietzsche often appears to subscribe to strong forms of antirealism or even nihilism about value. This has resulted in some classical readings such as Danto’s suggesting that, when reading Nietzsche, we are being asked “to abandon our meta-ethical beliefs (to use contemporary terms) as to the possibility of justifying whatever moral beliefs we have.” 2 On the other hand, many if not (...) most contemporary interpreters have found it plausible to search and find a “positive” ethical stance of one kind or another operative in Nietzsche’s work. Such “positive” ethics seems ill suited with .. (shrink)