"Originally published in the U.K. in 2014 by Myriad Editions under the title Supercrash: how to hijack the global economy"--Title page verso.

We can contrast rationalising explanations of the form S φs because p with those of the form S φs because S believes that p. According the Common Kind View, the two sorts of explanation are the same. The Disjunctive View denies this. This paper sets out to elucidate the sense in which the Common Kind Theorist asserts, but the Disjunctivist denies, that the two explanations are the same. I suggest that, in the light of the distinction between kinds of explanation (...) and particular explanations, the relevant sameness thesis is ambiguous, thus giving us two distinct versions of the Common Kind View. I then argue that the only direct arguments for Disjunctivism available in the literature fail because they only succeed in undermining one version of the Common Kind View. I finish, however, by providing a fresh argument for the Disjunctive View which aims to undermine both versions of its competitor. (shrink)

"The golden rule" (Matthew 7:12) is a formulation of natural moral law, a logical way to divide good from evil. It has been attacked by J.W. Hennessey, Jr. and Bernard Gert as a "particularist preachment." On the contrary, it remains a useful, universal guide to moral conduct and cannot be considered a self-centered, subjective guide to the moral life. We must agree with Jeffrey Wattles that there are multiple possible meanings to the "rule", some legitimate and some spurious. The legitimate (...) meanings, such as the "standard of God-like behavior," all yield the same judgment on morally doubtful actions such as forgery. The so-called "platinum" rule, "Do unto others as they would have you do unto them" has face appeal, but is fatally flawed in its logic, and does not supercede "the golden rule" because part of the treatment I wish from others is a full understanding of my true needs and wishes, even when I do not judge my own needs correctly. (shrink)

Before one can construct scales of minimal complexity in the Real Core Model, K(R), one needs to develop the fine-structure theory of K(R). In this paper, the fine structure theory of mice, first introduced by Dodd and Jensen, is generalized to that of real mice. A relative criterion for mouse iterability is presented together with two theorems concerning the definability of this criterion. The proof of the first theorem requires only fine structure; whereas, the second theorem applies to real mice (...) satisfying AD and follows from a general definability result obtained by abstracting work of John Steel on L(R). In conclusion, we discuss several consequences of the work presented in this paper relevant to two issues: the complexity of scales in K(R) and the strength of the theory ZF + AD + ¬ DC R. (shrink)

In this article, I argue for an historical understanding of the relationship between ideology and utopia/utopianism that positions the latter as a specifically modern compensation for the loss of the cosmologically grounded, unitary ideology supplied by the late medieval Christian Church. This claim relies upon but revises Fredric Jameson’s early theorization of the collaboration between ideology and utopia/utopianism, which emphasizes that utopian elements allow ideology to offer subjects a ‘compensatory exchange’ for their complicity. Developing my central argument requires considering the (...) current viability of the ‘secularization thesis’, which classically associated modernization with secularization but which has undergone heavy criticism and revision by social scientists over the past half-century. These theoretical discussions, finally, are couched within a critical appraisal of the status of utopianism in contemporary politics. (shrink)

Theories of intentionality need to account for non-cognitive states like emotions as well as cognitive states like beliefs. When certain non-cognitive states are included, one can formulate a feasible physicalist account of intentionality that highlights its evolutionary roots. I argue that recent experimental data support just such a move.

Excerpt from The Gospel of Work Four Lectures on Christian Ethics These lectures, which were given to Extension Students in the Divinity School during the Cambridge Summer Meeting of 1902, are now printed in the form in which they were delivered. It seemed to me that it might be of interest to the audience, if attention were specially directed to the work of some Cambridge theologians; and illustrative quotations have been drawn chiefly, though not of course exclusively, from their writings. (...) In an appendix I have added three occasional sermons, which deal with points that are raised, but not discussed, in the lectures themselves. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

We typically think of prosecutorial ethics as encompassing a special set of obligations for prosecutors during the pretrial and trial stages of a criminal case. In the literature and in rules of professional responsibility much attention is paid to the charging function, contact with unrepresented persons, plea negotiations, discovery, and courtroom decorum. Our concern with prosecutorial ethics at these stages is rooted primarily in due process and fairness to the accused. [W]hile he may strike hard blows, the Supreme Court wrote (...) in Berger v. United States, [a prosecutor] is not at liberty to strike foul ones. Whether it is a recognition that the prosecutor acts as a representative of the sovereign or that he or she possesses extraordinary power over people's lives, we speak about the prosecutor's ethical duties as special or additional to those of ordinary lawyers. By preventing a prosecutor from litigating unfairly, the aim is to protect a criminal defendant from an unjust or unwarranted conviction. What, then, are the ethical duties of prosecutors after the defendant has had his fair shot at trial, but lost? The literature and standards are surprisingly silent, with rare exception, on the post-conviction ethics of prosecutors. Constraints on the prosecutorial function seem to reach their apex at trial. Why? Are the reasons for special or additional ethics for prosecutors non-existent on appeal? Is the vast discretion, present at the pretrial and trial stages and thought by some to justify special ethical duties, absent on appeal? As a recent case from Texas illustrates, ethical issues still abound even after a jury returns a verdict of guilty. Nevertheless, the traditional discourse on pre-conviction duties can help us determine how prosecutorial discretion should be exercised after a conviction has been obtained. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: In memory of Professor Louise Marcil, from the University of Montreal, who died prematurely in April 1995, this special issue of Dialogue is dedicated to Equality. In addition to presenting the various contributions, the Introduction traces the main strands of Louise Marcil’s work on equality. The impressive corpus of her writings on the subject is characterized throughout by sensitivity to the historical and conceptual complexity of egalitarian theories and policies and by a depth of scholarship, the richness of which (...) defies classification into traditional philosophical schools. Moreover, far from being merely abstract scholarship, this work was clearly intended to strengthen actual egalitarian social projects, to which Louise Marcil was passionately committed. The contributions to this special issue of Dialogue have been selected in large part to reflect the diversity and scholarly standards of Louise Marcil’s approach to equality as well as its engaged spirit. (shrink)

The fundamental issues raised by Gertrude Stein in her "radical language experiment" bear a remarkable resemblance to the problems posed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his later philosophy of language . Wittgenstein's philosophy is an important meta-view infusing our perception of modern and postmodern literature with his contention that philosophy is concerned most centrally with the description of the use of language, his notion of language as practice. Stein was the first writer who fully incorporated the idea of universal indeterminacy into (...) her work. Carefully utilizing such stylistic devices as repetition, her exploitation of both the axis of selection and that of combination, and rejection of logical relations and formal systems, she questioned traditional notions of meaning-making. She accepted readily the vagueness of meaning inherent in language, and by molding language through associative meaning and context, she set stage for much of the writing that we now call post-modern. For Stein meaning arises not in terms of rules of interpretation, but in ways in which language is used: in the form of her composition. ;This dissertation examines ways in which exploring connections between the work of the two can refine our understanding of each in turn. In the context of a general introduction to the conceptual connections between Stein and Wittgenstein, Chapter I concludes with a presentation of the key biblio-bigraphical facts about the careers of both and rejection of any possible direct contact or influence. Chapter II focuses on the related biographical connections of Stein and conceptual connections of Wittgenstein to Pragmatism and the ways in which relations can be demonstrated between the ideas of all three. In Chapters III, IV and V, stressing intertextuality rather than indebtedness, I give close readings of the work of Stein and Wittgenstein, identifying the major contentions that they share, and showing how Stein's creative works put Wittgensteinian theories into practice. Throughout, my major concern will be to demonstrate how connections between the two writers can help to clarify our understanding of each and enable us to appreciate their mutual contributions to notions in the philosophy of language. (shrink)

Considerations of social justice pertain to universities with respect to reserved spaces for applicants from disadvantaged groups, targeted hiring, differential student fees or faculty workloads and salaries, and similarly contested matters. This paper displaces debates over what constitutes just allocation of university resources from those over theories of justice in general to those about alternative visions of the proper goal of universities. To this end, educational and democratic theories of John Dewey are drawn on as an alternative to elitist conceptions (...) and the implications of these competing viewpoints for specific justice-related issues are explicated. (shrink)

What does it mean to wear the white coat? I began to grapple with this as an internal medicine intern. I trained at Duke, where the dress code was more formal than at my medical school. Other than...

Mark Freeman deploys insight and empathy, as well as a sense of humour, introducing ‘University Extension’ in Chapter 1 with the quizzical title of ‘Mustard left on dinner plates’. This was the inf...

The philosophical contemplation of “first philosophy” is as old as Western philosophy itself, and yet “first philosophy” is often eschewed in contemporary philosophical thought. This is because attempts at arriving at a first philosophy have often been steeped in metaphysical thinking that aims at non-finite foundations as the constitutive ground of human reality. However, in our contemporary world in which metaphysical postulates render themselves increasingly outmoded and immaterial, can we still speak of first philosophy today? This is to ask whether (...) or not it may be possible to formulate a first philosophy based on strictly finite principles. This article seeks to demonstrate that the concept of finite “existence” can be read as first philosophy in the contemporary thought of Jean-Luc Nancy (1940–2021). Firstly, a conceptual analysis on the concepts of “being” and “existence” will be carried out with the express purpose of trying to ascertain the meaningful difference between these two concepts in Nancy’s thought, if indeed such a difference exists at all. From this conceptual analysis, it will be demonstrated that Nancy consistently and effectively elevates the concept of finite existence to philosophical primacy above that of non-finite being and, as a result, brings to light the possibility of (re)thinking existence as first philosophy in Nancy’s thought. (shrink)

An important function of the self is to identify external objects that are potentially personally relevant. We suggest that such objects may be identified through mere ownership. Extant research suggests that encoding information in a self-relevant context enhances memory , thus an experiment was designed to test the impact of ownership on memory performance. Participants either moved or observed the movement of picture cards into two baskets; one of which belonged to self and one which belonged to another participant. A (...) subsequent recognition test revealed that there was a significant memory advantage for objects that were owned by self. Acting on items had no impact on memory. Results are discussed with reference to the importance of self-object associations in cognition. (shrink)

An analysis of the business ethics of the African-American church during and after Reconstruction reveals that it is a conflicted ethic, oscillating between two poles. The first is the sacralization of the business ethic of Booker T. Washington, in which self-help endeavors which valorize American capitalism but are preferentially oriented to the African-American community are advanced as the best and only options for economic uplift. The second is the “Blackwater” tradition, which rejects any racial discrimination and insists upon social justice. (...) The inability of the Washingtonian business ethic to address the needs of the Black underclass are explored. A new business ethic is called for, which would be committed to meeting the basic needs of the most disadvantaged members of American society and those of the “international poor.”. (shrink)

Researchers in the psychological sciences have put forward the thesis that various sources of psychological, cognitive, and neuroscientific evidence demonstrate that being conscious of our mental states does not make any difference to our behaviour. In this paper, I argue that the evidence marshalled in support of this view — which I call psychological epiphenomenalism — is subject to major objections, relies on a superficial reading of the relevant literature, and fails to engage with the more precise ways in which (...) philosophers understand mental states to be conscious. I then appeal to work on implementation intentions to demonstrate that an intention's being 'access conscious' enhances its functional role, which makes it more likely that we will successfully carry out our intended behaviour. The result is that consciousness in at least one relevant sense is not epiphenomenal, with further work remaining to be done to show how other kinds of consciousness cause behaviour too. (shrink)

G. E. Moore’s early essay, “The Nature of Judgment,” makes common cause with F. H. Bradley’s Principles of Logic against British empiricism’s characteristic view of judgment. But primarily it attacks positions Bradley and the empiricists share. I develop a fuller analysis of both aspects of “The Nature of Judgment” than has appeared. Bradley’s rejection of empiricist nominalism, I argue, enables him to develop what Moore considers a superior account of judgment to empiricism’s. But positions carried over from empiricism require Bradley (...) to seek all judgments’ truth conditions in existing circumstances, a result intolerable to Moore, who views mathematical and ethical judgments as being true independently of the world. Moore abandons Bradley’s vestigal empiricism, arguing that it leads invariably to self-contradiction. I reconstruct this argument, and draw out of it an unrecognized tension between the anti-empiricist and the anti-idealist themes of Moore’s early writings. (shrink)