The Kantian idea that some judgments are synthetic even in the area of a priori judgments cannot be accepted in its original version, but a modification of the notions analytic' and 'synthetic' discovers a rational core of that idea. The new definition of 'analytic' concerns concepts and makes it possible to distinguish between analytic concepts, which are effective ways of computing recursive functions, and synthetic concepts, which either define non-recursive functions, or define recursive functions in an ineffective way. To justify (...) this claim we have to construe concepts as abstract procedures not reducible to set-theoretical entities. (shrink)

In the paper we offer a logical explication of the frequently used, but rather vague, notion of point of view. We show that the concept of point of view prevents certain paradoxes from arising. A point of view is a means of partial characterisation of something. Thus nothing is a P and at the same time a non-P, because it is a P only relative to some point of view and a non-P from another point of view. But there is (...) a major, complicating factor involved in applying a logical method that is supposed to provide a formal and rigorous counterpart of the intuitively understood notion: ‘point of view’ is a homony-mous expression, and so there is not just one meaning that would explain points of view. Yet we propose a common scheme of the logical type of the entities denoted by the term ‘point of view’. It is an empirical function: when applied to the viewed object in question, it results in a evaluating proposition about the object. If there is an agent applying the criterion, the result is the agent’s attitude to the respective object. The paper is organised into two parts. In Part I we first adduce and analyse various examples of typical cases of applying a point of view to prevent paradox. These cases are examined according to the type of the viewed object: a) the viewed object is an individual and b) the viewed object is a property or an office. In Part II we then show that the method described in Part I can be applied also to the analyses of agents’ attitudes. We thus explain how an agent can believe of something that it is a P and at the same time a non-P: the agent applies different viewpoint criteria to the viewed object. The inversion of perspective consisting in the perspective shifting from the believer on to the reporter in the case of attitudes de re, and from the reporter to the believer in the case of attitudes de dicto, is also analyzed. We show that there is no smooth logical traffic back and forth between such attitudes and prove that they are not equivalent. By way of conclusion, we explicate the notion of conceptual point of view and analyze cases of viewpoints given by conceptual distinction. We show, finally, that the proposed scheme of the type of point of view can be preserved, this time, however, in its extensional version. (shrink)

Climate change is a turning point in human history, necessitating human–ecological transformation on an individual, local, and global scale. Metropolitan regions offer an opportunity for collective action that can transform individuals and communities by expanding and re-integrating our localities, while making a significant impact on global climate change. The Breakthrough Compass is a conceptual tool for navigating the transition from fragmented self toward wholeness and connection to place, while transforming our world. This article offers stories and case studies illustrating how (...) metropolitan regional climate justice coalitions can galvanize this local and global transformation. (shrink)

Autophagy and YAP1‐WWTR1/TAZ signalling are tightly linked in a complex control system of forward and feedback pathways which determine different cellular outcomes in differing cell types at different time‐points after perturbations. Here we extend our previous experimental and modelling approaches to consider two possibilities. First, we have performed additional mathematical modelling to explore how the autophagy‐YAP1 crosstalk may be controlled by posttranslational modifications of components of the pathways. Second, since analogous contrasting results have also been reported for autophagy as a (...) regulator of other transduction pathways engaged in tumorigenesis (Wnt/β‐catenin, TGF‐β/Smads, NF‐kB or XIAP/cIAPs), we have considered if such discrepancies may be explicable through situations involving competing pathways and feedback loops in different cell types, analogous to the autophagy‐YAP/TAZ situation. Since distinct posttranslational modifications dominate those pathways in distinct cells, these need to be understood to enable appropriate cell type‐specific therapeutic strategies for cancers and other diseases. (shrink)