The implicit activities of the living body in sports (such as heart rate, involuntary gestures, stress, reflex, emotional regulation and interaction expressions) emerge in the consciousness of the lived body without our voluntary control. We demonstrate physiological emersion, and how, including in dramaturgical perception, physiological flows and processes collide with the image of a whole body. In this paper, we introduce corporeal non-property as the missing (?) link between phenomenology and neuroscience, renewed by research on the cerebral unconscious and the (...) perception of their lived body. Rather than mindfulness, physical activity obliges the subject to learn the unconscious and his motor skills from his living body: a new psychoanalysis of sport is thus established by studying what emerges from the activity of the living body up to the level of the conscious description of motor action. In this paper, we explain why that awareness occurs, and why it matters for the understanding of unconscious activity of the athlete’s living body. This is potentially interesting, although it needs, as a theory, to overcome the obvious reliance of the body on unconscious or habitual/automated physiological processes. But the incorporation of body techniques forms a habitus. (shrink)

A familiar part of debates about supererogatory actions concerns the role that cost should play. Two camps have emerged: one claiming that extreme cost is a necessary condition for when an action is supererogatory, while the other denies that it should be part of our definition of supererogation. In this paper, I propose an alternative position. I argue that it is comparative cost that is central to the supererogatory and that it is needed to explain a feature that all accounts (...) agree is central to the very notion of supererogation: optionality. Perhaps because of this agreement on its importance, few attempts have been made to clarify and explain the notion of optionality. I argue that giving an account of the optionality of supererogatory requires drawing a line between doing the bare minimum permissible and going beyond the bare minimum and that this line ought to be drawn based on comparative cost of alternative permissible acts. Having outlined my account and motivated it, I discuss and reject two concerns that might be raised: firstly, that it is extreme cost, not comparative cost, that matters and, secondly, that in fact no cost is needed for an act to be supererogatory. (shrink)

Social justice is put forth as a core professional nursing value, although conceptualizations within foundational documents and among nurse educators remain inconsistent and contradictory. The purpose of this study was to explore how faculty teach social justice in theory courses in Baccalaureate programs. This qualitative study utilized constructivist grounded theory methods to examine processes informing participants' teaching. Participants utilize four overarching approaches: fostering engaging classroom climates, utilizing various naming strategies, framing diversity and culture as social justice, and role modeling a (...) critical stance. They deploy specific strategies, varying largely by race, educational background, and nursing specialty. A background in social sciences supports pedagogy that interrogates health inequities rather than merely raising awareness about disparities. Findings also reveal that faculty of color navigate institutional structures predicated upon colorblind racism and problematic views of culture, which many white faculty teaching non‐Community Health Nursing courses described doing. To enact social justice and be answerable to our communities, concerted anti‐oppression efforts are needed across education, research, practice, and policy. This includes sustained commitment to address colonialism and whiteness in every institution that defines, promotes, and claims to advance nursing so that we can fulfill our responsibility to address unjust systems and structures to serve our communities. (shrink)

Giorgio Agamben emerged in the twenty-first century as one of the most important theorists in the continental tradition. Until recently, 'continental' philosophy has been tied either to the German tradition of phenomenology or to French post-structuralist concerns with the conditions of language and textuality. Agamben draws upon and departs from both these lines of thought by directing his entire corpus to the problem of life political life, human life, animal life and the life of art. Influenced by the work of (...) Martin Heidegger, Walter Benjamin and the broader tradition of critical Marxism, Agamben's work poses the profound question for our time just how exceptional are human beings. This beautifully written book provides a systematic, engaging overview of Agamben's writings on theology, aesthetics, political theory and sovereignty. Covering the full range of Agamben's work to date Claire Colebrook and Jason Maxwell explain Agamben's theology and philosophy by referring the concepts to some of today's most urgent political and ethical problems. They focus on the audacious way in which Agamben re-conceptualizes life itself. Assessing the significance of the concepts key to his work such as bio-politics, sovereignty, the ‘state of exception’ and ‘bare life’, they demonstrate his wide-ranging influence across the humanities. They also explore the critical reactions to Agamben's thinking and his reception in philosophical and theoretical circles. This book will be essential reading for students in anthropology, politics, philosophy and related disciplines and anyone interested in finding out more about one of the influential thinkers writing today. (shrink)

In letters that Husserl and Frege exchanged during late 1906 and early 1907, when it is thought that Frege abandoned his attempts to solve Russell's paradox, Husserl expressed his views about the "paradox". Studied here are three deep-rooted differences between their approaches to pure logic present beneath the surface in these letters. These differences concern Husserl's ideas about avoiding paradoxical consequences by shunning three potentially para-dox producing practices. Specifically, he saw the need for: 1) correctly drawing the line between meaning (...) analyses and logical analyses; 2) an epistemology of pure logic; 3) a subtler under-standing of the semantics of statements than Frege proposed. This study is part of a project to lend insight into the questions that Russell's paradox raises for logic and epistemology once signaled by Gödel, an admirer of Husserl's work. (shrink)

This dissertation explores the conception and structure of the feminine in the work of Emmanuel Levinas, with an eye toward inquiring into both the continuity of Levinas's project and the political implication for the feminine that follow from his analysis. Levinas initially conceives the feminine as a transcendental structure that functions as the condition for the possibility of ethics by inaugurating the ethical relation via the birth of a son, and sustains the ethical relation by providing the intimacy of the (...) home, which is to be disrupted by the call of the other. In his later work, Levinas names the ethical relation substitution, and transforms the feminine such that it not only participates directly in the ethical relation, but, in the metaphor of maternity, it is the example of substitution par excellence. However, the history of feminist theory shows us that the maternal is not necessarily the best image within which to circumscribe the feminine, even if the image is intended positively. But to undermine Levinas's conception of the feminine is, potentially, to undermine the larger project. By revealing and then utilizing the Judaic roots at work in Levinas's philosophical thought, this dissertation offers a reading of Levinas's conception of maternity that helps to explain why Levinas would have picked such an image to convey his insight. That is, I offer a midrash1 on Levinas's work. Finally, this dissertation argues, that Levinas's work, with regard to the feminine, is not discontinuous. Rather, the dynamic movement of the feminine reveals an interesting developmental structure, whose work in Levinas's project is indispensable. ;1My intention is to employ a midrashic style of reading a text, though not necessarily line by line, in order to offer an interpretation of the images Levinas uses in his work. (shrink)

This article focuses on the concept of the secret in Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy, with specific attention to the related concepts of becoming-woman and literature. It contrasts Deleuze and Guattari's immanent mode of reading with oedipal theories of the text and hermeneutics. Whereas Deleuze and Guattari argue for the positivity of the secret, where there is content that is not disclosed and that therefore creates lines of perception and interpretation, the oedipal mode of reading regards the secret as a (negative) (...) effect of reading. (shrink)

In this article, I explore some harms that emerge from the call for charity in academic philosophy. A charitability gap, I suggest, exists both between who we tend to read charitably and who we tend to expect charitability from. This gap shores up the disciplinary status quo and (re)produces epistemic oppression, which helps preserve philosophy's status as a discipline that is, to use Charles Mills's language, conceptually and demographically dominated by whiteness and maleness (Mills 1998, 2). I am particularly interested (...) in calls for charity made in response to critiques of racist or sexist authors/texts. I suggest that in these cases, interpretive charity perpetuates epistemic violence by creating conditions for testimonial smothering (Dotson 2011); that it functions as an orientation device (Ahmed 2006) designed to bring “unruly” philosophers back in line with disciplinary practices and traditions; and that it requires resistant philosophers to remain in oppressive worlds (Lugones 2003a; Pohlhaus 2011). Although charitability is risky—and charity is disproportionately demanded from already marginalized philosophers—I am hesitant to abandon charity entirely. The outright rejection of charitable orientations toward texts or others commits philosophers to a purity politics that, following Alexis Shotwell, I suggest we resist (Shotwell 2016). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:IntroductionAnthropocene Feminisms: Rethinking the UnthinkableClaire Colebrook and Jami WeinsteinIn her recent lecture on the Anthropocene (to which she adds the Capitalocene and the Chthulucene), Donna Haraway expresses some alarm that after two major insights into what counts as thinkable, it was “anthropos” that became the term for the post-Holocene (Haraway 2014). Haraway declares, with emphasis, that it is “literally unthinkable” to work with the individual unit of “man” if (...) one is to do good intellectual work. For Haraway, the two knowledge events that ought to have precluded the use of the figure of the “anthropos” are: first, the acceptance that any seeming individual is the outcome of a series of complex relations and must be studied as such (so there would be no epoch with anything, let alone “man,” as its first cause), and, second, intellectual inquiry has acknowledged a general becoming-with, such that in order to be anything at all, “one” must be in a dynamic relation. Haraway’s work is exemplary of post-liberal feminist resistance to the figure of man—as subject, agent, and center of knowing. Terms like “Woman” or “the feminine” do not extend the field occupied by man; they instead create a different intensity. So when Haraway questions the “anthropos” of the Anthropocene she neither asks that women, too, be included in those who have scarred the planet, nor does she claim that “Woman” would occupy some innocent outside. Instead, she proposes that one think of the “anthropos” as untimely, as out of sync with an intellectual milieu that theorizes the death of the subject and the eclipse of the human, and has even begun to renounce the notion of life in itself. It is odd that in the face of this destruction of any possibility of thinking by [End Page 167] way of individualism, the epic gesture of the present deploys the figure of the “anthropos,” as it should be unthinkable today to return to the figure of man.When Haraway invokes what is literally unthinkable, and then gestures to the Anthropocene, she suggests that perhaps the figure of the Anthropocene is a form of unthinking, and that it is precisely when complexities, timescales, predictions, manageability, and any form of sustainability ought to disturb and trouble our logics that we cease to think and ask for a single cause for an entire epoch. If this is so, and the “anthropos” of the Anthropocene is a reaction formation, then we might see the skirmishes and turf wars that surround the golden spike1 as diversions. If we spend our time disputing just when it was that man started to change the planet, then we allow a contested point in time to pass itself off as thinking, all the while allowing the intensive multiplicity of what has come to be known as the Anthropocene to remain unthought. By asking when the Anthropocene began, we revive a modified version of the time of man; once again, man is placed as the agent of history, albeit unwittingly, and he can look back upon and assess the past of his own making. Haraway is not alone in suggesting that such conceptions of a single line of time, and a conception of first cause, are highly gendered and racialized. The figure of “man” who creates his own history and recognizes himself as having come into being through a time that is readable is bound up with hegemonic conceptions of modernity, and has long been the target of feminist, poststructuralist, and postcolonial critique (e.g., Foucault 1970; Amin 1989; Grosz 2004). If it is literally unthinkable to do good work from the premises of a methodological individualism, then asking who or what caused the Anthropocene, or when it began, would amount to a form of un-thinking or not-thinking. At the same time, perhaps the Anthropocene is literally unthinkable in a sense that marks a more positive and profound absurdity. Let us accept, following Haraway, that all “good work” both acknowledges the impossibility of accounting for the complexity of life by way of bounded, individual singularity, and dispenses with the exceptional man of reason as its foundation. If we do, what the Anthropocene... (shrink)

Franz Anton Mesmer (1734–1815), a physician who graduated from the University of Vienna, invented a therapy based on the concept of a universal fluid, similar to electricity, that flowed through all living things. By restoring the circulation of this fluid in the nerves of human bodies, he believed he could cure illness without resorting to medication. Few medical theories have enjoyed as great success as Mesmer's, first among French high society and then in Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, Russia, (...) Britain, and the US. Mesmerism was the circulatory phenomenon par excellence. Its success was founded not only on the hypothesis of the circulation of a fluid common to human physiology and the entire universe, but also on the scientific practices of the time—correspondence, translations, and periodicals—and some ardent and highly active supporters who ensured its spread. However, far from functioning along the lines of direct exportation–importation from one country to another, or a centre to the periphery, mesmerism's dissemination was the work of diffuse institutions and individual mobilities influenced by the modalities of communication. In seeking to reconstitute the wellsprings of these circulations, the first sources that come to mind are printed matter: the many pamphlets and especially the articles and reviews that appeared in periodicals, as well as the Romantic literature that flourished after 1810. Such documents are foundational for authoritative studies of mesmerism in Germany, which proceed from the thesis of successive “waves” of reception. Such sources, however, are somewhat misleading. Rather than taking them as our starting point, it would be better to reconstitute the channels of information by using many sources, both printed and handwritten. The complexity of the circulation of knowledge generated by mesmerism is implicitly testament to the difficulties arising from the institutionalization of this current. (shrink)

We review some 30 years of academic research on corporate philanthropy, taking stock of the current state of research about this rising practice and identifying gaps and puzzles that deserve further investigation. To do so, we examine a total of 162 academic papers in the fields of management, economics, sociology, and public policy, and analyze their content in a systematic fashion. We distinguish four main lines of inquiry within the literature: the essence of corporate philanthropy, its different drivers, the way (...) it is organized, and its likely outcomes. After reviewing the main findings of the literature, we build on several research gaps to highlight directions for future research on corporate philanthropy with an interest in strengthening our understanding of this fascinating phenomenon at the crossroads of business and society. (shrink)

COVID-19 lockdown presented a novel opportunity to study the experiences of people attempting to maintain friendships in the context of worldwide, government-enforced physical distancing and lockdown. Here we report on an experiential, idiographic qualitative project with a purposive sample of Scottish students. Data was collected via one-to-one on-line interviews with nine student participants. Data was transcribed and analyzed using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. Analysis highlighted three group-level experiential themes and associated subthemes. Participants’ shared experiences of maintaining friendships were reflected in a (...) dynamic process by which ‘changes to communication’ were associated with experiences of ‘effort and balance’ across friendships. Participants reported becoming particularly aware of the psychological processes involved in maintaining friendships, in turn, this was associated with ‘reflection and growth.’ These experiential findings resonate well with several longstanding classic theories; however, they also speak to the particularities of the context in which the study was conducted. They suggest the need for a pandemic psychology that moves beyond the typical focus on the direct impacts of infectious disease to address the wider psychosocial impacts with equal vigor. (shrink)

We present a set-theoretic model of the mental representation of classically quantified sentences (All P are Q, Some P are Q, Some P are not Q, and No P are Q). We take inclusion, exclusion, and their negations to be primitive concepts. We show that although these sentences are known to have a diagrammatic expres- sion (in the form of the Gergonne circles) that constitutes a semantic representation, these concepts can also be expressed syntactically in the form of algebraic formulas. (...) We hypothesized that the quantified sen- tences have an abstract underlying representation common to the formulas and their associated sets of dia- grams (models). We derived 9 predictions (3 semantic, 2 pragmatic, and 4 mixed) regarding people’s as- sessment of how well each of the 5 diagrams expresses the meaning of each of the quantified sentences. We report the results from 3 experiments using Gergonne’s (1817) circles or an adaptation of Leibniz (1903/ 1988) lines as external representations and show them to support the predictions. (shrink)

We present a set-theoretic model of the mental representation of classically quantified sentences (All P are Q, Some P are Q, Some P are not Q, and No P are Q). We take inclusion, exclusion, and their negations to be primitive concepts. It is shown that, although these sentences are known to have a diagrammatic expression (in the form of the Gergonne circles) which constitute a semantic representation, these concepts can also be expressed syntactically in the form of algebraic formulas. (...) It is hypothesized that the quantified sentences have an abstract underlying representation common to the formulas and their associated sets of diagrams (models). Nine predictions are derived (three semantic, two pragmatic, and four mixed) regarding people's assessment of how well each of the five diagrams expresses the meaning of each of the quantified sentences. The results from three experiments, using Gergonne's circles or an adaptation of Leibniz lines as external representations, are reported and shown to support the predictions. (shrink)

In his dialogues with Claire Parnet, Deleuze asserts that: ‘Whether we are individuals or groups, we are made of lines’ (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 124). In A Thousand Plateaus (with Guattari), Deleuze calls these kinds of ‘lifelines’ or ‘lines of flesh’: break line (or segmental line, or molar line), crack line (or molecular line) and rupture line (also called line of flight) (Deleuze and Guattari 2004a: 22). We will explain the difference between these three lines and how they are (...) related to the ‘soul’. We will also explain how a singular individual or group can arise from the play of the lines. Eventually, we will introduce the concept of ‘Creal’ to develop the Deleuzian figure of the ‘Anomal’, the so(u)rcerer. (shrink)

FEATURED IN EVENTAL AESTHETICS RETROSPECTIVE 1. LOOKING BACK AT 10 ISSUES OF EVENTAL AESTHETICS. This Collision examines photographs of Santiago Sierra’s “Line” installations, discovering in these works a unique formulation of the tension between the social and formal aspects of contemporary art. Developing the philosophical implications of this formulation, this essay connects divergent trajectories embodied by the work (i.e. trajectories initiated by the material elements of the works, the body and the line) to divergent trajectories in contemporary aesthetic theory (i.e. (...) the trajectory that emphasises the socio-political possibilities of artistic representation versus the trajectory that emphasises a distinction between the formal aspects of art and the political effects of art). Developing the socio-political approach, I draw on recent work by Claire Bishop who, emphasizing the distinction between consensus and antagonism, argues that Sierra’s work enacts a democratic politics more rigorous than that of “relational art.” Developing a specifically aesthetic understanding of Sierra’s installations, I understand the works in relation to the constructivist interrogation of the nature of the line. Drawing in part on the philosophies of Alain Badiou and Jacques Rancière, I suggest that, whereas a social aesthetic tends to limit art to a didactic function, a geometric aesthetic enables a more rigorously materialist experience of the work without reducing the potential political force of the work. (shrink)

This Collision examines photographs of Santiago Sierra’s “Line” installations, discovering in these works a unique formulation of the tension between the social and formal aspects of contemporary art. Developing the philosophical implications of this formulation, this essay connects divergent trajectories embodied by the work (i.e. trajectories initiated by the material elements of the works, the body and the line) to divergent trajectories in contemporary aesthetic theory (i.e. the trajectory that emphasises the socio-political possibilities of artistic representation versus the trajectory that (...) emphasises a distinction between the formal aspects of art and the political effects of art). Developing the socio-political approach, I draw on recent work by Claire Bishop who, emphasizing the distinction between consensus and antagonism, argues that Sierra’s work enacts a democratic politics more rigorous than that of “relational art.” Developing a specifically aesthetic understanding of Sierra’s installations, I understand the works in relation to the constructivist interrogation of the nature of the line. Drawing in part on the philosophies of Alain Badiou and Jacques Rancière, I suggest that, whereas a social aesthetic tends to limit art to a didactic function, a geometric aesthetic enables a more rigorously materialist experience of the work without reducing the potential political force of the work. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:What’s God Got to Do with It? A Response to Claire KatzDiane PerpichThe original context for the remarks that follow was a book session at the annual meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy in October 2009.1 Somewhat surprisingly, both sets of comments at the session focused on what it might mean that the Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas—variously identified by key terms like revelation and creation, (...) by God, or by reference to Levinas’s confessional writings and the texts of the Jewish tradition—appeared to be absent from my book, The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas. Now admittedly, these texts and terms and their relation to Levinas’s main philosophical works is not explicitly discussed in the book, but the fact that both respondents focused almost exclusively on this absence raises the question of whether one needs to invoke religious terms in a discussion of Levinas’s reflections on ethics and ethical life. In effect, can a reading of Levinas’s ethical thought succeed without referring to God or the texts of the Jewish tradition? While in one sense, this question is quite beside the point of what I was trying to do in the book, in another, it touches quite closely on a central concern of that work; namely, what if anything justifies or provides a warrant for the exorbitant sort of responsibility that Levinas talks about throughout his writings, philosophical and confessional alike?I will return to this point momentarily in the context of a more detailed discussion of Claire Katz’s remarks, but allow me to begin by expanding briefly on the point of departure for the analysis of Levinas offered in my book. When I first read Levinas, the two features of his thought that struck me as [End Page 118] completely fascinating and utterly perplexing were the account of an alterity so absolute that it defied conceptuality and the notion of a responsibility so infinite that it rendered “me,” the ego, a hostage to the other. What could these two phrases—“absolute alterity” and “infinite responsibility”—mean? Clearly, neither phrase could be meant literally. There simply is nothing that is wholly immune to concepts; and as Levinas himself learned from the study of Henri Bergson, even “nothingness” is, and thus ontology and conceptuality, hand in hand, seem to be fundamental. Similarly, if responsibility is infinite, where infinity is reasonably thought to designate the scope of one’s obligation, the notion becomes incoherent. If I literally cannot do something, then in what sense ought I to do it? A responsibility for everything and everyone is seemingly just the same as having no responsibility at all. And what is most perplexing in all of this is that this inconceivable alterity is said to bring about, in some manner, this impossible responsibility. Let me add that it seemed to me on that first reading (and it still does) to be completely unhelpful to identify “God” either with absolute alterity or with the force of the command that renders us infinitely responsible to the other. To substitute God for alterity, or to claim that God commands our responsibility, explains nothing; it may well be one way of admitting or signaling that explanation has come to an end, but it does not necessarily add anything to that admission. Given the perplexities that beset my first reading of Levinas, it seemed to me that the first task for anyone writing about Levinas and ethics would be to work out the relation between alterity (or transcendence, or the other) and responsibility (as infinite, irrecusable, and asymmetrical). That, effectively, is what the book sets out to do.A second set of motivations for the book intersects with this first set of problems, though in this case, it is less a problem internal to Levinas’s thought and more a problem that arises in connection with certain habits of reading that have become entrenched in the secondary literature. There is a line of interpretation about Levinas’s thought that for many years went largely unchallenged. This “standard” reading begins with the idea that, for Levinas, ethics is not one branch of philosophy among others, rather it is... (shrink)

This essay, coauthored by the editor and a member of the editorial board of Common Knowledge, introduces the fifth installment of the journal's symposium “Fuzzy Studies,” which is about the “consequence of blur.” Beginning with a review of Enlightenment ideas about ideas — especially Descartes's argument that a mind “unclouded and attentive” can be “wholly freed from doubt” (Rules III, 5) — this essay then turns to assess the validity of counter-Enlightenment arguments, mostly Russian but also anglophone and French, against (...) the association of clarity and certainty. A line of descent is drawn from the speaker of Descartes's Meditations on First Philosophy to Dostoevsky's underground man, and the latter is shown to differ from the former mainly in that the underground man sympathizes consciously with Descartes's bête noire, the “evil deceiver” (Descartes's speaker sympathizes perhaps unconsciously). Enlightenment, in other words, is not as it appears to be, for rationalists too insist on their caprice. Hyperrationality, it is argued, can be a form of madness, a mania over clarity, distinctions, rules, principles, and unquestionable truths. Examples from Russian and anglophone literature are given of how easily the distance from idée claire to idée fixe is to traverse. The end product of un-self-doubting rationality tends to be delay or stoppage of the intellect, which this essay terms noostasis (and proposes is the opposite of ekstasis). (shrink)

Il faudrait que le dialogue se fasse, non pas entre des personnes, mais entre les lignes, entre des chapitres ou des parties de chapitre. Ce seraient les vrais personnages. Perdre la mémoire : il faudrait plutôt dresser des " blocs ", les faire flotter. Un bloc d'enfance n'est pas un souvenir d'enfant. Un bloc nous accompagne, est toujours anonyme et contemporain, et fonctionne dans le présent - Oublier l'histoire : la question des devenirs, et de leur géographie. Un devenir-révolutionnaire est (...) plus important que l'avenir ou le passé de la révolution. Un devenir-femme, un devenir-animal sont plus importants que la différence des sexes et des règnes - Ne pas " faire le point " : plutôt tracer des lignes. Les lignes n'ont pas d'origine, et poussent par le milieu. On ne fait jamais table rase, on est toujours au milieu de quelque chose, comme l'herbe. Plus on prend le monde là où il est, plus on a de chance de le changer... Se séparer de l'appareil d'Etat et de tout système qui le prend pour modèle ou veut le conquérir : la présence diffuse de machines de guerre irréductibles au modèle d'Etat, toute une histoire populaire qui n'a pas été recueillie, un nomadisme même immobile. Devenir ou re-devenir marxiste : aucune analyse n'est possible si elle ne porte aussi sur les mécanismes industriels et surtout financiers dans un champ social. Non pas suprême instance, mais lignes, et régimes de signes, qui s'enchaînent avec les autres, et dont les flottaisons s'agencent avec d'autres flux. (shrink)

In what sense can bodily manifestations in psychopathology be conceived of as modes of speaking? In which ways can a patient be listened to and responded to? In this paper, we consider these questions in the framework both of phenomenology and psychoanalysis. On the one hand, a phenomenological approach helps considering the body as expressive, but, we argue, more refinement is needed, and in particular, expression ought to be differentiated from communication, in the aim of better capturing the phenomenon of (...) body language. On the other hand, a psychoanalytic approach helps considering the clinical strength of an encounter where the only vehicle is the speech one addresses another, but, we argue, this should not... (shrink)

Interpersonal coordination is a key factor in team performance. In interactive team sports, the limited predictability of a constantly changing context makes coordination challenging. Approaches that highlight the support provided by environmental information and theories of shared mental models provide potential explanations of how interpersonal coordination can nonetheless be established. In this article, we first outline the main assumptions of these approaches and consider criticisms that have been raised with regard to each. The aim of this article is to define (...) a theoretical perspective that integrates the coordination mechanisms of the two approaches. In doing so, we borrow from a theoretical outline of group action. According to this outline, group action based on a priori shared mental models is an example of how interpersonal coordination is established from the top down. Interpersonal coordination in reaction to the perception of affordances represents the bottom-up component of group action. Both components are inextricably involved in the coordination of interactive sports teams. We further elaborate on the theoretical outline to integrate a third, constructivist approach. Integrating this third approach helps to explain interpersonal coordination in game situations for which no shared mental models are established and game situations that remain ambiguous in terms of perceived affordances. The article describes how hierarchical, sequential and complex dimensions of action organization are important aspects of this constructivist perspective and how mental models may be involved. A basketball example is used to illustrate how top-down, bottom-up and constructivist processes may be simultaneously involved in enabling interpersonal coordination. Finally, we present the implications for research and practice. (shrink)

A phenomenological insight in the debate on empathy is that it is possible to directly perceive other people’s emotions in their expressive bodily behaviour. Contrary to what is suggested by many phenomenologists, namely that this perceptual skill is immediately available if one has vision, this paper argues that the perceptual skill for empathy is acquired. Such a skill requires that we have undergone certain emotional experiences ourselves and that we have had the experience of seeing the world differently, which is (...) a form of pretence. By investigating how we retain knowledge of what is real while pretending, that is, how we anchor the experience of pretence in something that is not pretended, the paper argues that we split our experiential perspective into a double perspective, which differs from the cognitive act of understanding what a perspective is. With this notion in hand, we can return to the debate on empathy. It is argued that in order to have the capacity for direct empathic perception, one must have undergone experiences involving a double perspective. (shrink)

Prompted by the development of the Theory of Challenge and Threat States in Athletes (Jones et al, 2009), recent years has witnessed a considerable increase in research examining challenge and threat in sport. This manuscript provides a critical review of the literature examining challenge and threat in sport, tracing its historical development and some of the current empirical ambiguities. In an attempt to reconcile some of these ambiguities, and utilising neurobiological evidence associated with approach- and avoidance-motivation (cf. Elliot & Covington, (...) 2001), this paper draws upon the Evaluative Space Model (ESM: Cacioppo et al., 1997) and considers the implications for understanding challenge and threat in sport. For example, rather than see challenge and threat as opposite ends of a single bipolar continuum, the ESM implies that individuals could be (1) challenged, (2) threatened, (3) challenged and threatened, or (4) neither challenged or threatened by a particular stimulus. From this perspective it could be argued that the appraisal of some sport situations as both challenging and threatening could be advantageous, whereas the current literature seems to imply that the appraisal of stress as a threat is maladaptive for performance. In drawing upon the ESM, we outline the Evaluative Space Approach to Challenge and Threat and provide several testable hypotheses for advancing understanding of challenge and threat (in sport). We also outline a number of cardiovascular and experiential measures that can be used to examine these hypotheses. In sum, this paper provides a significant theoretical, empirical and practical contribution to our understanding of challenge and threat (in sport). (shrink)

Sigmund Freud’s reflections on transience left him surprised that someone could revolt against the process of mourning. In Jonathan Lear’s interpretation of transience, the revolt is not simply a passing struggle of the mind, but a response to a difficulty of reality, that is, an existential struggle. Central to the experience of transience, according to Lear, is the disbelief in the existence of an afterlife. How might we understand the idea of an afterlife philosophically? I first consider three different philosophical (...) conceptions of the afterlife that—in different ways—underline the relation between collective memory and the process of mourning. These reflections make it clearer which aspects of the afterlife play a role in the existential struggle that Lear describes. However, a further analysis of the temporality at stake in the denial of an afterlife is needed. I therefore look at two psychoanalytic interpretations of the refusal to mourn. The first considers the refusal to mourn as a way to deny change. The second interpretation sees the refusal as a realisation of meaninglessness that prevents the flow of time. I end the paper by arguing that the afterlife can be understood as a practice of articulation, which allows a shared time to flow. Such a practice will commit us anew to a shared world in which we survive with the wounding difficulties of reality. (shrink)

The study of traumatic experiences led Freud to investigate what he termed a compulsion to repeat. The present paper takes up the idea of a tendency to repeat something that reinforces psychic pain and asks which kind of agency is possible in the light of traumatic repetitions. First, the experiential roots of repetitive doings induced by trauma are investigated. Might a compulsion to repeat belong to the sphere of the kind of tendencies which Husserl terms “generally unconscious”? And if so, (...) does this sphere bring us to the limit of phenomenology where we might need to cooperate with psychoanalysis to make sense of the manifestations of such an unconscious sphere? This is proposed in section two. In section three, Freud’s notion of the compulsion to repeat is discussed. At this point, the repetitive activity of the mind is investigated as the traumatized person’s ongoing struggle to survive with the trauma and as a struggle to understand what survival in this case even means. In section four, an attempt is made to describe the kind of agency involved in the repetitive activity of the mind. The paper concludes that weak agency is possible in traumatic repetition when understood as the person’s ongoing attempt to compose a future for what has been lost. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to reconsider and explore the ontoepistemology of student engagement in higher education as part of a democratic education, going beyond neo-liberal groundings. This is urgent as the concept of student engagement seems to be taken for granted and used uncritically in higher education. In addition, higher education is affected by, and under pressure from, different global and societal forces, which raises questions about the purpose of education. In our exploration, we mainly draw on the (...) philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and his co-writers Felix Guattari and Claire Parnet, but also Karen Barad and writers who are inspired by these theories. We present four arguments on which we elaborate: Rethinking power relations, Questioning linearity and how to use goals, Appreciating pedagogical relationships as multiple voices and becoming-multiple-others, and Considering assemblages, rhizomes and lines in student engagement. These arguments open up, as we argue, the poss... (shrink)

It has been a common belief among scientists, including mathematicians, that young scientists are especially good at bringing about scientific change. A number of studies suggest, however, that older scientists are not more resistant to change than young scientists are. It is nonetheless worth examining why a scientist’s or mathematician’s outsider status – due to age, educational background, or something else – can sometimes be effective in enabling scientific change. This paper focuses on the case of the solving of the (...) Four Color Problem by Wolfgang Haken and Kenneth Appel. Building on Donald MacKenzie’s paper ‘Slaying the kraken: The sociohistory of a mathematical proof’, I argue that Haken’s outsider status is central to understanding his success with the problem. On this basis, I offer an argument against Margaret Gilbert’s account of why a scientist’s outsider status can be effective in enabling scientific change. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Enaction as a Lived Experience: Towards a Radical Neurophenomenology” by Claire Petitmengin. Upshot: Mild” neurophenomenology does not solve the “hard problem” of consciousness; in a way it actually aggravates it. “Radical” neurophenomenology “dissolves” the hard problem. However, I suggest that it may be premature to give up on actually solving the hard problem; and indicate several lines of research that are still open.

Flax seedlings grown in the absence of environmental stimuli, stresses and injuries do not form epidermal meristems in their hypocotyls. Such meristems do form when the stimuli are combined with a transient depletion of calcium. These stimuli include the “manipulation stimulus” resulting from transferring the seedlings from germination to growth conditions. If, after a stimulus, calcium depletion is delayed, meristem production is also delayed; in other words, the meristem-production instruction can be memorised. Memorisation includes both storage and recall of information. (...) Here, we focus on information recall. We show that if the first transient calcium depletion is followed by a second transient depletion there is a new round of meristem production. We also show that if an excess of calcium follows calcium depletion, meristem production is blocked; but if the excess of calcium is in turn followed by another calcium depletion, again there is a new round of meristem production. The same stored information can thus be recalled repeatedly . We describe a conceptual model that takes into account these findings. (shrink)

1. This paper contributes to the broader debate about how elite school institutions manage to remain alert and responsive to changing education market conditions, locally and globally, by explicitl...

La peinture de Caravage occupe une position stratégique entre l'art religieux du XVIe siècle, dont le naturalisme, ainsi chez Carracci, est imprégné de présence divine, et le réalisme sécularisé qui triomphera au XIXe siècle. Aussi a-t-elle été l'objet d'incessants conflits d'interprétation, commencés déjà de son temps. Elle ne paraissait pas d'accord, en effet, avec les consignes d'orthodoxie données aux artistes par les théologiens de la Contre-Réforme, et clairement rappelées à Caravage dans le contrat qui lui avait été fixé en 1565 (...) pour représenter les scènes de la vie de S. Matthieu dans l'église S. Louis des Français à Rome. Il interpréta ce contrat selon des critères tout nouveaux et personnels. La composition de l'espace et de la lumière, la disposition des personnages et des clairs-obscurs sont significatives de la vision moderne du monde et de l'homme qui commence à se mettre en place à cette époque. Le rayon de lumière qui traverse une scène sans noblesse plongée dans l'obscurité immobilise un instant de vérité et de choix, l'événement de la rencontre de Jésus et de Matthieu, l'instant d'une communication de parole entre Dieu et l'homme, l'heure où chacun est appelé à décider du sens de son existence personnelle, sans autre intervention divine, dans la banalité de sa vie quotidienne. Ce monde n'est pas vide de Dieu, mais Dieu ne fait qu'y passer ; il se retire, pour laisser le monde à son autonomie, et l'homme à la conscience de sa liberté.Caravaggio's painting holds a strategic position between the religions art of the sixteenth century, the naturalism of which is pervaded by divine presence – e.g. in Carracci's art –, and the secularized realism which is to flourish in the nineteenth century. It has therefore been the subject of unceasing controversies in its interpretation, beginning in Caravaggio’s times already. Indeed, Caravaggio’s painting did not seem in line with the instructions given to the artists by Counter-Reformation’s theologians, urging them to follow the Orthodox line. Caravaggio had been clearly reminded of those instructions in the contract he had signed in 1565 to portray the scenes of Saint Matthew’s life in Saint Louis des Français’Church in Roma. He interpretated this contract according to very innovative and personal criteria. The composition of space and light, the layout of characters and chiaroscuros are revealing of the modern vision of the world and of the man that was emerging in those times. The light ray that crosses a scene devoid of nobleness and plunged into darkness, immobilises a moment of truth and choice : the event of Jesus meeting Matthew, the instant of an oral communication between God and man, the time when everyone is called to decide his of her personal existence in the triviality of his or her daily life, without God intervening in the process. This world is not void of God’s presence, but God only passes through it. He withdraws to let the world face its autonomy, and man face the awareness of his freedom. (shrink)

The central theme of the volume is cultural diversity, a vast subject that is highly relevant today. The particular focus here is on the many ways in which this diversity is managed within the framework of State law. The twelve contributors to this book have a special interest in how cultural traditions and their various forms of expression are handled by the law. They were all participants in the 2009 Research Programme of the Centre for Studies and Research of the (...) Hague Academy of International Law. The breadth of the subject is reflected in the wide spectrum of perspectives from which the topic has been explored. Starting in each case from the existing State and international legal frameworks, the contributors explore how the interactions between positive law and other normative orders can be placed at the service of a legal system that is as fair as possible within a plural context. Contributors were asked to choose from two alternative approaches: either they could look at cultural diversity issues in the field of private (international) law, a fairly traditional field that is especially relevant to the legal treatment of cultural diversity; or they could situate cultural diversity within the wider and more theoretical area of "legal pluralism", whether on a local or regional level or at the international (United Nations) level. Edited by Marie-Claire Foblets and Nadjma Yassari With the contribution of: M. Ben Lamine; N. Bialostozky; R. Colavitti; L.-M. Crăciunean; I. Gallala-Arndt; P. Kruiniger; V. Mainetti; S. Ouechtati; J. Ringelheim; B. Truffin; J. Verhellen; A. Vigorito. Le th me au coeur de ce volume est la diversit culturelle, vaste sujet de grande actualit. L'int r t porte ici plus particuli rement sur les mani res disparates dont cette diversit est agenc e dans le droit (formel) des Etats. Les douze auteurs portent tous un int r t particulier pour la question du sort qui est r serv, en droit, aux traditions culturelles et leurs diverses formes d'expression. L'ouvrage est le fruit des travaux du Centre d' tude et de recherche de l'Acad mie de droit international de La Haye en 2009. Le choix des sujets abord s dans ce volume est vaste. Le point de d part de chaque contribution toutefois est le cadre normatif existant, tant le cadre tatique que les instruments internationaux, pour ensuite explorer les diverses mani res dont ceuxci se positionnent par rapport d'autres logiques normatives perceptibles dans la soci t et qui tendent, chacune sa mani re, obtenir une forme de reconnaissance de la part du droit tatique. Plusieurs pistes s'offraient aux auteurs: une premi re piste consistait s'int resser surtout aux questions de droit international priv, un domaine traditionnel du droit qui regorge d'int r t pour la question du traitement juridique de la diversit culturelle. Une autre piste tait de faire le jour sur les m canismes de protection juridique de la diversit culturelle travers le prisme du pluralisme juridique et de voir jouer celui-ci divers niveaux: local, r gional, national et international. Les contributions illustrent les liens signifiants existant entre l'ordre juridique d'un Etat et les multiples ordres juridiques parall les (religieux, philosophiques, ethniques, ou autres) pr sents sur son territoire. Originally published as Colloques / Workshops - Law Books of the Academy, Volume 33. (shrink)

Fifty-five 4-year-old children took part in a study focused on children's accounts of the situations that caused happiness, anger, sadness and fear in themselves, their friends, and their mothers. Themes, agents, and adequacy of accounts were studied at two time points. Interpersonal causes of anger and happiness were cited by many children; confusion about causes of anger and sadness was not evident, although the notion of loss and controllability as factors distinguishing causes of anger versus sadness found some support. Accounts (...) for self, friend, and mother differed considerably, suggesting emotion understanding could usefully be considered in relation to specific relationships. Analysis of individual differences showed that children who scored high on deception, emotion understanding, and false belief tasks at 47 months gave more adequate and differentiated accounts of mothers' and friends' emotions seven months later. Implications for our views of children's close relationships are discussed. (shrink)

Sur la couverture des albums parus aux éditions Delcourt, on peut lire « Marcel Proust, À la recherchedu temps perdu, adaptation et illustrations de Stéphane Heuet ». En affichant ainsi son rôle avec modestie,l’adaptateur-illustrateur réussit à faire endosser à Proust la paternité littéraire d’une BD , ce qui n’est pas rien. Comble d’ironie ou de provocation, la Recherche illustrée par Heuet,c’est Tintin au pays des Guermantes. Dans les cases rectangulaires d’un strip standard au graphisme résolument« ligne claire », ceux (...) qui aiment la phrase proustienne en ses méandres, avec sa lecture au lentcours, découvrent une ligne TGV : Un amour de Swann en deux albums de 517 dessins, au lieu des200 pages en Pléiade. Cette alliance contre-nature est dénoncée par certains défenseurs de la littératurequi y voient une dénaturation de l’oeuvre et par des amoureux de la BD d’auteur qui déplorent une BDsans audace graphique. L’objet de cet article est de répondre à ces deux objections.On the cover of an album series published by Delcourt is written “Marcel Proust, À la recherche du tempsperdu, adaptation and illustrations by Stéphane Heuet”. With such an unassuming announcement of his role,the adaptor-illustrator manages to ascribe the literary paternity of a comic strip to Proust himself, which is no mean feat. And as a final irony or provocation, the “Recherche du temps perdu” illustrated by Heuet becomes “Tintin in the Land of the Guermantes”. As they peruse the rectangularframes of a classic comic strip with their “clear line” graphic style, those who enjoy a leisurely ramblethrough Proust’s meandering paragraphs may well find themselves aboard a high-speed train at full throttle:“Un amour de Swann” in two albums and 517 drawings, instead of 200 pages from the publisher Pléiade. Thisunnatural alliance has been denounced by advocates of literature as a travesty of Proust’s work, and bydevotees of authored comic strips as a work devoid of graphic boldness. This article sets out to answer both ofthese objections. (shrink)

This paper examines some of the moral panics around hyperactive children, the construction of Attention Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder, and the lure of Ritalin in turning kids identified as at risk into successful, productive individuals. Through a historicization of the child as a psychiatric subject, we try to demonstrate Ritalin's part in the uneven development of modern trends towards the pathologization of everyday life, a developing continuum between normality and abnormality, and an emphasis on the malleability of children and the importance of (...) environment in their upbringing. We conclude that Ritalin is a part of modernity's project of turning people into individuals—in this case, a kind of US transcendence fantasy—which, along with discourses and institutions, promises to transform young subjects and biocosmetically alter their futures. (shrink)

La littérature épistémologique actuelle véhicule une image caricaturale de la philosophie popperienne de la biologie. En effet, on suppose sa position suffisamment claire et univoque pour pouvoir se résumer succinctement en quelques lignes. De plus, on la suppose toujours la même tout au long de l'évolution intellectuelle de son auteur. Dans le présent article, nous voudrions contester ces deux suppositions car sa pensée est non seulement vague et ambiguë mais encore elle est loin d'être constante et homogène. De ce (...) fait, nous entendons corriger une conception eronnée et généralement répandue de sa philosophie de la biologie.Popper's philosophy of biology is generally miscon- ceived. It is supposed to be homogeneous and clearly statable in a few lines. Worse, Popper's changes of mind on these questions are not even taken into account. In this article, we will try to show why these suppositions are erroneous and how they hinder us from forming a more adequate idea of his philosophy of biology. (shrink)