What Is It Like to Be Conscious? Towards Solving the Hard Problem

Constructivist Foundations 12 (2):155-156 (2017)
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Abstract

Open peer commentary on the article “Enaction as a Lived Experience: Towards a Radical Neurophenomenology” by Claire Petitmengin. Upshot: Mild” neurophenomenology does not solve the “hard problem” of consciousness; in a way it actually aggravates it. “Radical” neurophenomenology “dissolves” the hard problem. However, I suggest that it may be premature to give up on actually solving the hard problem; and indicate several lines of research that are still open.

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