Par son rôle déterminant dans la réussite scolaire et professionnelle, ainsi que dans l’insertion sociale, l’apprentissage de l’orthographe lexicale représente un défi majeur pour les élèves du primaire. Dans ce contexte, nombreux sont les enseignants, orthophonistes et chercheurs à s’intéresser à la question des outils utiles à son enseignement et à son apprentissage, et à avoir recours notamment à des bases de données lexicales. Bien qu’elles constituent un apport considérable pour le domaine, les ressources existantes souffrent de plusieurs insuffisances. D’une (...) part, elles s’appuient sur des corpus de référence peu représentatifs du lexique scolaire auquel les élèves sont exposés au primaire, et d’autre part, elles ne permettent pas aux utilisateurs de déterminer la façon dont se développe l’acquisition de l’orthographe lexicale. À la lumière de ces constats, nous avons élaboré une ressource lexicale hybride, rendant compte à la fois de la fréquence et des caractéristiques linguistiques du lexique scolaire présent dans les manuels du primaire au Québec et, pour une partie des mots de ce lexique, de la capacité des élèves à les orthographier à chaque niveau du primaire. Dans cet article, nous revenons dans un premier temps sur la méthodologie d’élaboration de cette nouvelle base de données - nommée ÉQOL - dotée d’une Échelle Québécoise d’acquisition de l’Orthographe Lexicale, à l’origine de la création de la base de données. Dans un deuxième temps, nous évaluons l’apport de cet outil. La comparaison de notre base de données (Stanké, Royle, Rezzonico, Moreau, Dumais & Le Mené 2018) à des outils existants (trois bases de données et une échelle d’acquisition lexicale) témoigne de la pertinence de la création d’un outil propre au lexique scolaire adressé aux élèves du primaire et de la nécessité d’utiliser une nouvelle échelle d’acquisition de l’orthographe lexicale, spécifique aux compétences orthographiques des élèves québécois. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop a philosophical clarification of the statement "faith in the resurrection of Christ saves men from sin", using some of the main arguments and hypotheses of my recent book, ’The Ways of Salvation (Les Voies du salut’, Paris 2010). I begin with some remarks on the theme of salvation in contemporary language and philosophy. I then sketch a conceptual analysis of the concept of salvation, first in its general sense, then in its specifically Christian one. (...) Finally, I offer a hypothesis on the ’modus operandi’ of salvation, or at least of one aspect of salvation as understood by Christianity. (shrink)

In Pascal’s Pensées, at the very end of the so-called “wager” fragment, we find this intriguing remark intended to win once and for all the whole conviction of the “libertine” the apologist is addressing to : “I will tell you that you will win thereby in this life”. This article endeavours to reconsider this remark seriously, as it has been somewhat neglected by the canonical commentaries on the “wager”. We begin by determining the reasons that lead the apologist to this (...) final remark, then we attempt to define its meaning and scope in Pascal’s apologetic project. Next we seek to identify the “gain in this life” that is promised to the libertine who adopts a Christian lifestyle. This leads to study how Pascal analyses joy. To conclude we propose some more general thoughts about the strategies this fragment of Les Pensées suggests to today’s Christian apologetics. (shrink)

Le présent article propose de s’intéresser une nouvelle fois au document juridique romain qui est improprement qualifié d’ « Édit de Milan ». L’approche et les arguments avancés ici ne sont pas nécessairement nouveaux et originaux. Néanmoins, il a semblé qu’un énième retour sur cette question s’imposait, après que plusieurs manifestations scientifiques internationales ont été organisées à l’occasion du supposé 1700e anniversaire de la proclamation de ce document par Constantin Ier. On verra, notamment, que le qualificatif d’edictum remonte à une (...) erreur de traduction du grec vers le latin. On s’intéressera aussi à la nature juridique, de même qu’à la signification et à l’intérêt historiques du texte que nous ont livré Eusèbe de Césarée et Lactance. (shrink)

This paper intends to focus once again on the Roman legal document which is improperly called the “Edict of Milan”. The approach and arguments put forward here are not necessarily new or original. Nevertheless, it seems that this umpteenth return to this issue is useful, after several international scientific events were organised on the occasion of the supposed 1700th anniversary of the proclamation of this document by Constantine. We will see, in particular, that the title of edictum dates back to (...) an error in translating from Greek to Latin. We will also be interested in the legal nature, as well as the historical significance and interest of the text that Eusebius of Caesarea and Lactantius have given us. (shrink)

The perpetual secretary of the Berlin Academy Johann Heinrich Samuel Formey is best known as a populariser of Christian Wolff’s doctrines. As of Formey’s activity in the Berlin Academy, scholars have mostly emphasized his role in the controversy over monads with Leonhard Euler, while overlooking other interesting contributions Formey presented in the “speculative philosophy” class of the Academy. In this paper, I analyse two articles Formey published in 1747 on the Mémoires de l’Académie de Berlin, namely the Preuves de (...) l’existence de Dieu, ramenées aux notions communes and the Examen de la preuve qu’on tire des fins de la nature, pour établir l’existence de Dieu. In these texts, Formey presents some of Wolff’s methodological and metaphysical ideas, in an implicit dialogue with other members of the Academy – in particular, with the president Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis – who were also interested in metaphysics and the philosophical method. Formey reworks the Wolffian arguments as to make them more accessible, in order to promote an open confrontation over core philosophical questions. Far from adopting a controversial tone, Formey’s attitude is rather conciliatory: any disagreement, as he thinks, can be easily settled once the true method for philosophizing is made available to everybody. (shrink)

The Capitalist Schema uses marxist philosophy to explain how money frames all social relations in our capitalist world and how money regulates and conditions social references to past and future social life. Consequently, modern life becomes ever more abstract and leveled, and all human desire becomes channeled towards profit and making money.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.4 (2003) 559-560 [Access article in PDF] Elmar J. Kremer and Michael J. Latzer, editors. The Problem of Evil in Early Modern Philosophy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001. Pp. vi + 179. Cloth, $60.00. What can be added to classical defenses of the problem of evil? Did Voltairenotrelieve us from taking seriously the theodicies of early modern thinkers in Candide when Pangloss (...) avers that spectacles exist because noses were made to support them? Do we not rightfully regard Malebranche's ingenious appeal to God's simplicity and uniformity to explain malformed offspring as little more than a curiosity? Yet, the editors of this volume claim that the "theodicy problem was no mere idle puzzle of dogmatics, but a problem of immense social significance, a problem which cut to the heart of the philosophical and theological projects of the very best minds of the age" (5). Several essays in this volume bear out the editors' claim, and to a modern reader, show how the problem of evil was intricately woven into the philosophical ideas of early modern thought.The problem of evil is especially acute for many of the seventeenth-century authors surveyed in this volume who held that God is the total and efficient cause of the universe. God's constant involvement in physical events meant that defects, deformities, and natural disasters fell into the framework of the traditional problem of evil. Hence, physical evil became the preoccupation of natural philosophers and theologians alike. We learn that Leibniz, Malebranche, and Spinoza chose to limit God's will rather than His wisdom, whereas Descartes opted to limit God's wisdom. The odd man out is Bayle who crafted a third position that emphasized God's benevolence at the expense of His wisdom and will.The essays found in this volume are just a sampling of views in the period, but it is more than a good start. Freddoso's essay on Francisco Suarez sets the tone for the problem of explaining the causal origin of human evil. Freddoso shows how Suarez distinguished concurrent from original causes in order to credit God for His supreme causal role yet absolved Him of blame for the existence of moral defectiveness. Latzer, in his essay on Rene Descartes, perhaps overstates the case in attributing to Descartes a theodicy grander than that of Leibniz, but he draws on the Fourth Meditation account of error to provide a plausible and nuanced reconstruction of his views on evil.There are two essays on Baruch Spinoza. Hunter's essay lays out an argument for Spinoza as a radical Christian reformer touching on Spinoza's views on providence. Nadler notes in his essay that Spinoza ought to have rejected the whole question of theodicy as incoherent, but shows how the matter is a good deal more complicated. Nadler then introduces us to the Medieval Jewish tradition, from which Spinoza is said to have drawn his views leading to a denial of personal immortality. [End Page 559]Moreau's essay on Nicholas Malebranche is rich in historical context and philosophical interpretation. Malebranche is shown to be a critical and original thinker on the problem of evil. Moreau lauds Malebranche's philosophical and moral courage in his bold assertion that physical evil is not a negation but rather a real phenomenon requiring explanation.Larivière and Lennon argue that Bayle held a third position rarely seen in the period: that God's benevolence trumps considerations of both His wisdom and will. Bayle develops a "moral solution" to the problem of evil wherein God's benevolence requires that humans possess an autonomy of conscience whose exercise makes error and heresy morally possible and justifiable.The final three essays in the volume rightly focus on aspects of Leibniz's response to the problem of evil. Kremer shows how, in the case of Leibniz's treatment of the fate of infants who die unbaptized, Leibniz abandons the Augustinian approach to the problem of evil and calculates the fate of all creatures on the basis of what produces... (shrink)

In this paper, I will present an argument against Husserl’s analysis of picture consciousness. Husserl’s analysis of picture consciousness (as it can be found primarily in the recently translated volume Husserliana 23) moves from a theory of depiction in general to a theory of perceptual imagination. Though, I think that Husserl’s thesis that picture consciousness is different from depictive and linguistic consciousness is legitimate, and that Husserl’s phenomenology avoids the errors of linguistic theories, such as Goodman’s, I submit that his (...) overall theory is unacceptable, especially when it is applied to works of art. Regarding art, the main problem of Husserl’s theory is the assumption that pictures are constituted primarily as a conflict between perception/physical picture thing and imagination/picture object. Against this mentalist claim, I maintain, from a hermeneutic point of view, that pictures are the result of perceptual formations [Bildungen]. I then claim that Husserl’s theory fails, since it does not take into account what I call “plastic perception” [Bildliches Sehen], which plays a prominent role not only within the German tradition of art education but also within German art itself. In this connection, “plastic thinking” [Bildliches Denken] was prominent especially in Klee, in Kandinsky, and in Beuys, as well as in the overall doctrine of the Bauhaus. Ultimately, I argue that Husserl’s notion of picture consciousness and general perceptive imaginary consciousness must be replaced with a more dynamic model of the perception of pictures and art work that takes into account (a) the constructive and plastic moment, (b) the social dimension and (c) the genetic dimension of what it means to see something in something (Wollheim). (shrink)

The problem of distinguishing between willing and wishing and their significance for both the constitution of our consciousness as well as the constitution of our practical life runs all the way through the history of philosophy. Given the persuasiveness of the problem, it might be helpful to draw a sharp distinction between a metaphysical and a psychological or phenomenological approach to the problem. The first approach may be identified with the positions that Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche held, which (...) involved an identification of the will with reality/actuality in general, and which Heidegger tried to analyze in his later writings on the basis of his confrontation with Nietzsche. In this paper, however, I will not consider the metaphysical approach to the distinction; rather, I will focus on the second approach to distinguishing wishing and willing, which was initiated by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics, and of which as we will see soon – Husserl and the early Heidegger are ultimately still heirs. Hence I will begin my consideration by recalling briefly the main claim in Aristotle’s discovery of the central position of will within our life. (shrink)

Hubert L. Dreyfus has worked out a critique of what he calls “representationalism” and “cognitivism,” one proponent of which, according to Dreyfus, is Husserl. But I think that Dreyfus misunderstands the Husserlian conception of practical intentionality and that his characterization of Husserl as a “representationalist” or as a “cognitivist” is thereby wrongheaded. In this paper I examine Dreyfus’s interpretation by offering a Husserlian critique of Dreyfus’s objections to Husserl, and then by outlining Husserl’s account of practical intentionality and the practical (...) lived Body. I sketch the critique and the approach of Dreyfus in three steps. First, I deal with his objections against Husserl’s theory by arguing that Dreyfus understands neither the role of the reduction nor the function of background-awareness in Husserl’s phenomenology. Second, I elucidate the central role that the “practical lived Body” plays in practical intentionality for Husserl, and, third, I highlight the consequences that follow from the analyses offered in the previous sections. (shrink)

Hubert L. Dreyfus has worked out a critique of what he calls “representationalism” and “cognitivism,” one proponent of which, according to Dreyfus, is Husserl. But I think that Dreyfus misunderstands the Husserlian conception of practical intentionality and that his characterization of Husserl as a “representationalist” or as a “cognitivist” is thereby wrongheaded. In this paper I examine Dreyfus’s interpretation by offering a Husserlian critique of Dreyfus’s objections to Husserl, and then by outlining Husserl’s account of practical intentionality and the practical (...) lived Body. I sketch the critique and the approach of Dreyfus in three steps. First, I deal with his objections against Husserl’s theory by arguing that Dreyfus understands neither the role of the reduction nor the function of background-awareness in Husserl’s phenomenology. Second, I elucidate the central role that the “practical lived Body” plays in practical intentionality for Husserl, and, third, I highlight the consequences that follow from the analyses offered in the previous sections. (shrink)

In this paper, I will perform a "step back" by showing how Derrida's analysis of forgiveness is rooted in Kantian moral philosophy and in Derrida's interpretation of Kierkegaard's concept of decision. This will require a discussion of the distinction that Kant draws in his Groundwork between price (the economic) and dignity (the incomparable), as well as a discussion of the underlying notion of singularity in Kant's text. In addition, Derrida universalizes Kierkegaard's concept of the agent so that, with this perspective (...) in view, the interpretation of Kantian morality as something that must be described in a paradoxical way, becomes fully transparent. Whereas the interpretation of Kantian morality will provide us with a concept of morality that remains a "blind spot" for the agent, with the help of Derrida's Kierkegaard interpretation we can see that the concept of decision remains ultimately ambivalent. In conclusion, both (a) the deconstructed concept of morality and (b) the concept of decision will finally (c) let us understand Derrida's radical concept of forgiveness, which is both a non-economic act of morality in the sense explained and an unpredictable, uncontrollable decision and event. (shrink)

This essay is concerned with the central issue of philosophical anthropology: the relation between nature and culture. Although Rousseau was the first thinker to introduce this topic within the modern discourse of philosophy and the cultural sciences, it has its origin in Diogenes the Cynic, who was a disciple of Socrates. In my essay I (1) historically introduce a few aspects of philosophical anthropology, (2) deal with the nature–culture exchange, as introduced in Kant, then I (3) relate this topic to (...) the Ancient Cynic Diogenes. Surprisingly, although we usually identify Critical Theory and Freudian psychoanalysis as theories that have shown that cultural progress should not be comprehended as a development from nature to culture, and that instead it should be conceived as a development from culture against (external as well as internal) nature, I show that Cynicism can be conceived as a vivid example within the history of our culture that reveals a double sense of repression and alienation, which is part of human civilization and mankind. (shrink)

In den Cartesianischen Meditationen von Edmund Husserl heißt es: "Der Andere ist Spiegelung meiner selbst und doch nicht eigentlich Spiegelung." . Man kann den Satz nicht nur als einen Reflex der Leibniz-Lektüre Husserls auslegen, sondern ihn auch als sachlichen Hinweis auf die Erfahrung der Spiegelung verstehen. Meine Überlegungen beschränken sich auf eine Grundskizze einer Phänomenologie der Spiegelerfahrung, die die konkrete Fremderfahrung, also abgesehen von ihrer Grundlegungsdimension, genauer beleuchten hilft. Man kann die ursprüngliche Assoziation, die Husserl unter dem Titel "Paarung" anführt, (...) im Sinne einer leiblichen Spiegelung interpretieren. Mit der Bestimmung einer solchen unmittelbaren leiblichen "Übereinkunft" wäre ein erster rudimentärer Begriff des Mitmachens gewonnen, bei dessen Bestimmung kognitive Muster vermieden werden können. Die passive Fremderfahrung läßt sich verstehen als eine passive Einigung der Leiber und Bewegungssysteme, die spiegelverkehrt verläuft. Dieser Aufweis kann nicht nur helfen kann, den psychologischen Begriff der Nachahmung phänomenologisch zur reinterpretieren, sondern auch als Voraussetzung jeder intersubjektiven Erfahrung angesehen werden. (shrink)

Unter ‚Akzeptabilität‘ versteht man einerseits „gerechtfertigte Akzeptanzfähigkeit“ und andererseits „intersubjektive Angemessenheit“; Letztere wird in diesem Beitrag als praktische Kohärenz und soziale Verhältnismäßigkeit gefasst. Damit stellt das Konzept ethischer Akzeptabilität ein Angebot der praktischen Philosophie für den gesellschaftlichen Diskurs zur Akzeptabilitätsüberprüfung bereit. Als kritische Reflexionsinstanz geht es der Philosophie dabei weder um Akzeptanzbeschaffung noch um die Ermittlung möglicher oder erwartbarer Akzeptanz. Philosophische Politikberatung fokussiert als Ethik auf die Qualität der Gründe von Handlungen oder Handlungszielen von politischen Institutionen oder Personen.

„Der sittliche Wert eines Menschen beginnt erst dort, wo er bereit ist, für seine Überzeugung sein Leben zu geben.“ [The moral worth of a human being emerges when she is willing to give her life for her convictions] - Henning von Tresckows -.

In this essay, I offer thoughts on the constitution of images in art, especially as they are constituted in painting and in photography. Utilizing ideas from Gadamer, Derrida and Adorno, I shall argue that representation should be conceived as a performative concept and as an act of formation; i.e., as a process rather thanas something "fixed." My reflections will be carried out in connection with a careful analysis of Gerhard Richter's painting Reader, which is a painting of a photograph that (...) depicts a female who is reading. I demonstrate how a close analysis of this fascinating painting leads us deeper into the problem of painted images, insofar as it enacts what it is about, namely, the constitution of itself as an innige by means of a complex and enigmatic relationship between seeing, reading, memory, inner, outer, gaze and blindness. (shrink)

An essay concerning the representation of images in art, photography, and painting concerning analysis of Gerhard Richter's painting reader. It offers a debate that representation should be regarded as an act of formation and a performative concept. The author presents analysis of painting which leads the reader into the problem of painted images, such as the constitution of an image by a complex relationship among memory, reading, and blindness.

In this essay, I offer thoughts on the constitution of images in art, especially as they are constituted in painting and in photography. Utilizing ideas from Gadamer, Derrida and Adorno, I shall argue that representation should be conceived as a performative concept and as an act of formation; i.e., as a process rather thanas something "fixed." My reflections will be carried out in connection with a careful analysis of Gerhard Richter's painting Reader (1994), which is a painting of a photograph (...) that depicts a female who is reading. I demonstrate how a close analysis of this fascinating painting leads us deeper into the problem of painted images, insofar as it enacts what it is about, namely, the constitution of itself as an innige by means of a complex and enigmatic relationship between seeing, reading, memory, inner, outer, gaze and blindness. (shrink)

In this essay, I shall attempt to shed light on central practical concepts, such as action and decision, in Heidegger’s existentialism and in Fichte’s idealism. BothFichte and Heidegger, though from different philosophical frameworks and with different results, address the practical moment by developing [1] a non-epistemic concept of certainty, in connection with [2] a temporal analysis of the conditions of action, which leads to the primacy of future in their analyses. Both [1] and [2] shed light on their concept of (...) the self, and on the concept of freedom. In addition, my paper offers a further clarification of what was called before Fichte’s “proto-existentialism” (G. Zöller, D. Henrich). The ontological framework of both philosophies and their concept of the practical self, finally, leads to the proposal to merge both perspectives into what I would like to call “existential idealism.” Fichte’s and Heidegger’s practical philosophies can be taken as two sides of the same coin. (shrink)

To be sure, Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophy has received increased attention in recent philosophical debates. For although older confrontations, such as Gadamer's debate with Habermas, have receded in the background, scholars such as John McDowell, Cristina Lafont, Ruth Sonderegger, Albrecht Wellmer, and Günther Figal have revitalized some of Gadamer's main philosophical insights and demonstrated the importance of hermeneutics for contemporary philosophy. In addition, the newly-founded Society for Philosophical Hermeneutics has helped to give this recent attention a new academic forum for fresh (...) and vibrant work on Gadamer.Kristin Gjesdal's book fits neatly into this newly-discovered interest in Gadamer's philosophy, especially since it focuses on important, but less frequently discussed, historical sources of Gadamer's philosophy and their systematic impact on both hermeneutics in general and a theory of interpretation in particular. Gjesdal's book is lucidly written, paying much attention to the underlying arguments that are implied in Gadamer's critical and often reductive accounts of philosophers who belong to the tradition of "German Idealism." However, having said this, the title of her book is misleading: though the reader might expect an extensive discussion of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, the author focuses mainly on the sources of. (shrink)

This volume explores of the history of figures, issues, and debates in Continental philosophy to re-frame our understanding of how modern and recent philosophy has unfolded, especially through the investigation of understudied ideas and thinkers.

In this paper I shall present an argument against Deleuze’s philosophy of painting. Deleuze’s main thesis in Logic of Sensation is twofold: [1] he claims that painting is based on a non-representational level; and [2] he claims that this level comes out of the materiality of painting. I shall claim that Deleuze’s theses should be rejected for the following reasons: first, the difference between non-intentional life and the representational world is too strict. I submit that the non-intentional relation that painting (...) opens up is itself part of and emerges out of the representational force of painting. If this would not be the case, then the criterion for differentiating between paintings and other objects cannot be developed. Indeed, Deleuze fails to give us a criterion. Second, Deleuze’s way of dealing with materiality in painting remains unsatisfactory, insofar as he is unable to take into account how materiality is charged with an “attitude towards the world.” In sum, materiality can only be painting’s materiality if we understand it as being formed and disclosed in representation. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall present an argument against Deleuze’s philosophy of painting. Deleuze’s main thesis in Logic of Sensation is twofold: [1] he claims that painting is based on a non-representational level; and [2] he claims that this level comes out of the materiality of painting. I shall claim that Deleuze’s theses should be rejected for the following reasons: first, the difference between non-intentional life and the representational world is too strict. I submit that the nonintentional relation that painting (...) opens up is itself part of andemerges out of the representational force of painting. If this would not be the case, then the criterion for differentiating between paintings and other objects cannot be developed. Indeed, Deleuze fails to give us a criterion. Second, Deleuze’s way of dealing with materiality in painting remains unsatisfactory insofar as he is unable to take into account how materiality is charged with an “attitude toward the world.” In sum, materiality can only be painting’s materiality if we understand it as being formed and disclosed in representation. (shrink)