In this paper I will address whether the restriction on the creation of human embryos solely for the purpose of research in which they will be used and destroyed in the creation of human stem cell lines is ethically justified. Of course, a cynical but perhaps accurate reading of the new Obama policy is that leaving this restriction in place was done for political, not ethical, reasons, in light of the apparent public opposition to creating embryos for use in this (...) research. But the issue of whether the restriction is ethically justified remains important, even if only for another day in the policy arena. (shrink)

This book develops an account of the parent–child relationship in order to articulate the essential structure of intersubjectivity as fundamentally ethically-oriented, dialogical, and mutually dynamic. Drawing on the philosophical projects of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Emmanuel Levinas, as well as recent research in cognitive neuroscience and child development research, this work will be of interest to those working in the fields of continental philosophy, embodied cognition, philosophy of childhood, psychoanalysis, psychology, philosophy for children, and education.

Art and the escape from banality [by] A. Clutton Brock.--Christianity and art [by] Percy Dearmer.--The art of movement [by] A. S. Duncan--Jones.--The Puritan objection to art [by] Malcolm Spencer.--The artist and the saint [by] Alfred W. Pollard.--Literature and religion [by] J. Middleton Murry.--The doctrine of values [by] Percy Dearmer.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty not only published in the fields of phenomenology, aesthetics, politics, and linguistics, but he also lectured as professor of child psychology, which resulted in several texts specifically devoted to the child. Most notably are the works “The Child’s Relations to Others,” Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language, and Child Psychology and Pedagogy: The Sorbonne Lectures, 1949–1952. And yet the question of the child occurs throughout his entire corpus. Thus, it is quite difficult to limit Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of childhood (...) to one given text or theme. Merleau-Ponty is adamant, however, that his work in psychology and philosophy should not be viewed as separate projects. Rather, he repeatedly stresses an intertwining of philosophy and psychology, self and other, theory and praxis, and the lasting influence of childhood on adult life. In this vein, the following texts, both from his “philosophical” and “psychological” works, provide a sense of the significance the child plays in Merleau-Ponty’s overarching project, particularly in his account of intersubjectivity and the parent-child relation. (shrink)

This book explores the shapes and boundaries of the emergent field of philosophy of childhood, and its intersections with the history of philosophy, education, pedagogy, literature and film, psychoanalysis, family studies, developmental theory, ethics, history of subjectivity, history of culture, and evolutionary theory.

This book explores how white supremacy produces a racialized orientation in our lives, arguing that racism is habituated, enacting within us racialized and racist dispositions and bodily comportments that inform how we interact with others. Thus, eradicating racism requires unlearning racialized habits and cultivating new anti-racist habits.

Introduction: the problem of estrangement from Scripture in Christian ethics -- Learning about reading the Bible for ethics -- Reading self-consciously : the hermeneutic solution -- Reading together : the communitarian solution -- Focusing reading : the biblical ethics solution -- Reading doctrinally : the biblical theology solution -- Reading as meditation : the exegetical theology solution -- Listening to the saints encountering the ethos of Scripture -- Augustine's ethos of salvific confession -- Luther's ethos of consoling doxology -- Singing (...) the ethos of God -- Ethical exegesis : what have we encountered -- Exploring the place of Christian ethics in Scripture. (shrink)

Radical Orthodoxy, a growing movement among contemporary Christian theologians, argues that the prominent philosophical paradigms of modern and postmodern thought lack transcendence, are ultimately nihilistic, and are guided by an ontology of violence. Among the thinkers Radical Orthodoxy criticizes are Hegel, Nietzsche, and Hobbes, but surprisingly also the Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, whom they claim offers an ethics for nihilists. In this essay, I analyze the claims of two prominent thinkers in Radical Orthodoxy, John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, and argue (...) that their account of Levinas is not only unfounded but point out the ways in which Levinas himself is also just as critical of the prevailing ontology of violence that figures in modern accounts of intersubjectivity and politics. Indeed, in his own way, Levinas also offers an ontology of peace, making him an important dialogue partner for Radical Orthodoxy's construction of an alternative ethics and politics. (shrink)

In the current era, building more innovative teams is key to organizational success, yet there is little consensus on how best to achieve this. Common wisdom suggests that positive reinforcement through shared positive rewards builds social support within teams, and in turn facilitates innovation. Research on basic group processes, cultural rituals, and the evolution of pro-group behavior has, however, revealed that sharing adverse experiences is an alternative path to promoting group bonding. Here, we examined whether sharing an adverse experience not (...) only builds social support within teams, but also in turn enhances creativity within novel teams. Drawing on behavioral observation of an experimental group interaction we find evidence that sharing an adverse (vs. non-adverse) experience leads to increased supportive interactions between team members and this in turn boosts creativity within a novel team. These effects were robust across different indicators of creativity: objective measures of creativity, third party ratings of the creativity of group products, and participants’ own perceptions of group creativity. Our findings offer a new perspective from which to understand how best to boost innovation and creative output within teams. (shrink)

Neither of the two central moral and political obstacles to human embryonic stem cell research survives critical scrutinyThis paper argues that neither of the two central moral and political obstacles to human embryonic stem cell research survives critical scrutiny: first, that derivation of HESCs requires the destruction of human embryos which are full human persons or are at least deserving of respect incompatible with their destruction; second, that creation of HESCs using somatic cell nuclear transfer or cloning is immoral. First, (...) different sources of HESCs are distinguished and the distinct moral objections that might apply to each. Second, it is argued that none of the properties plausibly conferring personhood on an entity is possessed by human embryos, and then shown how destruction of an embryo for research with the prospect of important medical benefits can be compatible with respecting it. Third, it is shown that the main objection to human cloning is only to reproductive cloning and that the objection to creating human beings with the intention of destroying them does not apply to SCNT. Finally, the concern that acquiring human eggs for SCNT would involve exploiting women donors is addressed, and it is shown how that can be avoided.Human embryonic stem cell research has become one of the more politically and morally controversial issues of our time. There is wide variability in what HESC research, if any, is permitted in countries around the world. Within the United States HESC research was a major issue in the last presidential election and some states, such as California, are devoting substantial public monies to fund this research while others prohibit it. In this paper I will explore some of the main obstacles to reaching consensus on this issue in the hope of at least narrowing the disagreement …. (shrink)

Some medical services have long generated deep moral controversy within the medical profession as well as in broader society and have led to conscientious refusals by some physicians to provide those services to their patients. More recently, pharmacists in a number of states have refused on grounds of conscience to fill legal prescriptions for their customers. This paper assesses these controversies. First, I offer a brief account of the basis and limits of the claim to be free to act on (...) one’s conscience. Second, I sketch an account of the basis of the medical and pharmacy professions’ responsibilities and the process by which they are specified and change over time. Third, I then set out and defend what I call the “conventional compromise” as a reasonable accommodation to conflicts between these professions’ responsibilities and the moral integrity of their individual members. Finally, I take up and reject the complicity objection to the conventional compromise. Put together, this provides my answer to the question posed in the title of my paper: “Conscientious refusal by physicians and pharmacists: who is obligated to do what, and why?”. (shrink)

In this wide-ranging and engaging collection of interviews, Brian Brock discusses how Christian faith makes a difference for life in the modern world. Beginning with a discussion of teaching Christian ethics in the contemporary academy, Brock takes up environmental questions, political and medical ethics, the modern city and Christian responsibility to it, energy use, the information age, agriculture, political consensus and coercion, and many other issues. The reader is thus offered a broad and incisive discussion of many contemporary (...) topics in a brief, illuminating, but never superficial manner. The book's unusual conversational style allows strikingly clear, creative, and concrete theological connections to emerge in the spaces between moral questions rarely thought of as linked. As the titles suggests, the running theme of the interviews is being bound to Christ and placed into the contemporary world. Brock's theological readings of contemporary cultural trends are vigorous, unapologetic, and insightful, and they offer delightful surprises as well as fertile new ways through the sterile impasses of many issues currently being debated in the public square. This book provides an excellent starting point for those interested in fresh theological insights into contemporary ethical questions and an accessible introduction to Brock's previous works. (shrink)

David Miller offers us a sophisticated account of how we can reconcile global obligations and duties to co?nationals. In this article I focus on four weaknesses with his account such as the following two. First, there remains considerable unclarity about the strength of the positive duties we have to non?nationals and how these measure up relative to other positive duties, such as the ones Miller believes we have to co?nationals to implement civil, political, or social rights. Second, just how responsibilities (...) for enacting our global commitments will be assigned still needs further development. A unifying theme of my criticisms concerns Miller?s account of how we are to mediate responsibilities to fellow?nationals and the partiality we may defensibly show co?nationals. In the final section I sketch an alternative way of conceptualizing our duties to fellow?nationals and duties to non?nationals, which can give more systematic advice about the partiality we may defensibly show co?nationals. (shrink)

Atheism is a familiar kind of skepticism about religion. Moral error theory is an analogous kind of skepticism about morality, though less well known outside academic circles. Both kinds of skeptic face a "what next?" question: If we have decided that the subject matter (religion/morality) is mistaken, then what should we do with this way of talking and thinking? The natural assumption is that we should abolish the mistaken topic, just as we previously eliminated talk of, say, bodily humors and (...) unicorns. The fictionalist, however, offers a less obvious recommendation. According to the fictionalist, engaging in the topic in question provides pragmatic benefits that do not depend on its truth-in a way roughly analogous to engaging with a novel or a movie. The religious fictionalist maintains that even if we were atheists, we should carry on talking, thinking, and acting as if religion were true. The moral fictionalist maintains a similar view regarding moral talk, thought, and action. Both forms of fictionalism face serious challenges. Some challenges can be levelled at either form of fictionalism (or at any form of fictionalism), whereas others are problems unique to moral fictionalism or to religious fictionalism. There are important questions to be asked about the relationship between these two kinds of fictionalism. Could moral fictionalism be plausible even if religious fictionalism is not (or vice versa)? This is a volume of thirteen previously unpublished papers on the topics of religious fictionalism, moral fictionalism, and the relation between these views. (shrink)

In a study in Brain, Dr. Susan Harkema and her fellow researchers demonstrated that the input of an electronic epidural stimulator in the lower spinal cord of four completely paralyzed patients allowed them to regain voluntary movement in their toes, defying the longstanding scientific position regarding sensory and motor complete paralysis. Harkema herself admits that she thought this achievement was impossible at the outset, as she believed that the body is incapable of movement without receiving complex signals from the brain. (...) Many cognitive neuroscientists continue to maintain this standpoint of Cartesian dualism. In response, I argue that the insights of Maurice Merleau-Ponty provide a possible explanation of the results of this new research. Merleau-Ponty insisted that I am my body and that the body has its own kind of knowledge about the world. This framework serves as the backdrop for recent phenomenological studies in cognitive neuroscience. In this vein, this essay will consider how Merleau-Ponty’s account of embodiment provides an ample model for explaining the findings of Susan Harkema’s current spinal cord research. (shrink)

This paper elucidates Bonhoeffer's understanding of Christian ethics as a `way'. The concept is prominent in his unfinished exegesis of Psalm 119 and shapes his Ethics, written during the same time period. This reading of Bonhoeffer's ethics yields the claim that he gave a much more central role to biblical exegesis in his ethical framework than is typically granted. It concludes that much of the criticism of his concept of the mandates reveals not the weakness of the concept, but a (...) misunderstanding of both his conception of Christian ethics as a way, and the importance of theological exegesis in his thought. (shrink)

By examining the range of factors pressing on medical professionals faced with a decision in a case of late-term abortion, it becomes apparent that the theological resources ruled out of bounds by the standard account can be considered an essential part of a truly liberating and properly supple moral account of medical decision-making. Close attention to the social, political and legal context of contemporary medicine reveals that the standard account of medical ethics, Principles of Biomedical Ethics by Beauchamp and Childress, (...) despite its universalist aspirations, disempowers rather than empowers moral decision-making by medical professionals. (shrink)

This paper outlines Hans Ulrich's reworking of the Lutheran doctrine of the estates. He conceives the estates as descriptions of the new patterns of social life that God has promised to found and secure. This emphasis on the divine activity of generating social order is an expression of Ulrich's agreement with common and familiar criticisms of the doctrine, and why he nevertheless believes it indispensable for an evangelical ethic. A construal of the traditional doctrine of the estates that is unique (...) even in his native Lutheran context, it aims not at conservatism, but at a more thoroughly theological and therefore critical relationship to social order than rival theories much more inclined to revisionist rhetorical stances. In a contemporary context in which moral certainties and categories can be disputed at the most fundamental levels, Ulrich's theology seeks a form of theological reasoning that genuinely seeks the illumination of Christian beliefs about reality by taking other moral languages seriously. (shrink)

In 'Meeting Needs', Braybrooke argues that a new and improved version of utilitarianism can be constructed around making a priority of satisfying needs. In this paper I concentrate on Braybrooke's suggestion about the method for determining needs, and more generally, the method of settling issues concerning matters of need. (This emphasis is chosen since these problems are most devastating to his project as currently formulated.) I argue that Braybrooke's method is seriously flawed. Braybrooke believes that the process for settling issues (...) concerning needs guarantees consensus and fairness. I refute this claim by showing that a number of assumptions crucial to Braybrooke's method are unwarranted. In addition, I show that these and other structural defects in the method are such that Braybrooke's account is guilty of paternalism and "fraud", despite his attempts to avoid these charges. I also indicate why similar methods are unlikely to meet with success. -/- . (shrink)

Are corporations morally defensible sorts of entities? How might we go about showing that they are? Thomas Donaldson offers us the most detailed contractarian justification for the moral defensibility of corporations. In this paper I show how we can significantly develop this sort of justification to yield a more compelling contractarian justification, though one that is importantly conditional. The primary points I take up in this paper are these:1. The question Donaldson poses to generate his contract is not quite as (...) simple as may appear. The sort of transformation we need to consider is more complex than the sort Donaldson describes.2. Partly because of considerations that arise in discussing the first point, the contract we are considering is a more conditionalagreement. The terms of the agreement will vary depending on the kind of state we are assuming prevails. The sort of contract we wantto draw up is at least a three-way contract: between society, productive organizations and the state. The sort of agreement we reach will have the following form: society a agrees to allow productive organizations of type b to exist if we assume state c will do various things (d1 to dn), productive organizations will do various things (e1 to en) and members of society will do various things (f1 to fn). Importantly, if state c is not doing d1 to dn, productive organizations may not be morally defensible.3. The terms of the contract that can be derived would benefit from the introduction of some of Rawls’s apparatus.4. When we consider the right questions, with more of the background institutions filled in, and when we include some more social contract apparatus, we get a better contract which fills in for us not only the obligations of business but, importantly, many obligationsfor government as well. (shrink)

What is the significance of the Protestant Reformation for Christian ethical thinking and action? Can core Protestant commitments and claims still provide for compelling and viable accounts of Christian living. This collection of essays by leading international scholars explores the relevance of the Protestant Reformation and its legacy for contemporary Christian ethics.

John Kleinig, Paternalism Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984, xiii + 242 pp.