There used to be a time when anyone in religious circles who thought about personal identity in the tradition of Locke or Hume would quickly and firmly be silenced, not with an argument but with a kind of confession of faith: human beings are created by God with a soul and a body; the soul is immortal and the body will be restored to its original glory in the resurrection. With this sort of statement, the servants of the church obstructed (...) any rational investigation into the nature of the human person because they believed that such a topic was unsuitable for the autonomous thinking that modernity gave rise to. Whether one regrets or welcomes it, the influence of religion is on the wane and there is now a general feeling that no authority can be ascribed to what is not open to rational interrogation.If rational thought always coincided with wisdom, this would not cause any substantial problems. There would not even be anything wrong with foolish or impetuous thinking, were it not that such thinking can result in concrete political and legal measures. For instance, Francis Galton's idea that the quality of a person could be identified with the quality of their inherited characteristics would not have presented any danger were it not for the fact that, on the basis of this idea, eugenics was practised until quite recently, even in the most `civilized' of countries. Obviously there is something that can be said for a religious authority tempering over-enthusiastic declarations about such sensitive matters.The implication of the traditional dogma concerning the human person was that all human life must be respected. In borderline cases dealing with the beginning and end of life, this dogma had to be interpreted. The ability to do this, however, seems not to rest on clear and rational arguments but on the kind of wisdom that is based more on a common understanding, trust and compassion than on cold, rational principles.Whether one can ascribe authority to religious dogma will depend on the extent to which one accepts the idea that our ethical beliefs can be supported by rational arguments. Certain philosophers have doubts about this. In `Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy', Bernard Williams demonstrates that ethical convictions can only be understood as forms of confidence: we have confidence that someone or something is important, that it is advisable to be courageous in certain circumstances, that it is important to be loyal or that it is meaningful to remain faithful. If this is true, the question that must be posed is the following one: what if confidence is lacking? What if indifference or boredom take over? What if nothing appears any longer to be worthy of care or struggle? In such circumstances, being courageous or faithful is no longer so evident. In communities where it makes little difference to do one thing and to ignore others, heroes and saints are comparatively rare and philosophers feel themselves called upon to defend the credit-worthiness of ethical concepts with rational arguments and complex theories. Williams believes that in such cases they are biting off more than they can chew. It is difficult, if not impossible, to argue over moral confidence, and when we do, the results are often narrow-minded.I leave it to the reader of the present issue to judge whether Williams is correct or not. In the articles by Göran Collste, `Should Every Human Being Get Health Care?', and John Hymers, `Not a Modest Proposal: Peter Singer and the Definition of Person', we can review a series of rational considerations about the human person that could give rise to concrete political and legal measures. The two subsequent articles deal with the relevance of conceptions of the person for concrete economic practice. Rudi Visker is dealing with the problem of a multicultural society and Armin Grunwald presents some reflections on technology development between social science and philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine whether the use of artificial intelligence (AI) and automated decision-making (ADM) aggravates issues of discrimination as has been argued by several authors. For this purpose, I first take up the lively philosophical debate on discrimination and present my own definition of the concept. Equipped with this account, I subsequently review some of the recent literature on the use AI/ADM and discrimination. I explain how my account of discrimination helps to understand that the general claim in (...) view of the aggravation of discrimination is unwarranted. Finally, I argue that the use of AI/ADM can, in fact, increase issues of discrimination, but in a different way than most critics assume: it is due to its epistemic opacity that AI/ADM threatens to undermine our moral deliberation which is essential for reaching a common understanding of what should count as discrimination. As a consequence, it turns out that algorithms may actually help to detect hidden forms of discrimination. (shrink)

Ethicists tend to enjoy an extraordinary status in the scientific world, in spite of the fact that their knowledge is not based on empirical facts or logical principles. When they philosophise, they appear to be intervening in a discussion that started long before they existed and will probably continue long after they have disappeared. They are inclined, after all, to base their arguments on convictions. If you point this out, most people will more than likely admit that their ethical principles (...) are indeed based on convictions that have acquired a self-evident character in our actual day-to-day relations although they cannot be solidly founded. It is virtually impossible to strengthen or weaken the capacity of moral convictions by trying to justify them.In our everyday interactions, discussions intended to justify or defend something never start from absolute zero. All sorts of authoritative points of departure established in the course of history inevitably insinuate themselves from the very outset. Empirical scientists often believe that what they introduce into the debate is based on bare, unadulterated facts. But even here questions can be raised. Empirical scientists use language and participate in discussions in which unspoken presuppositions are just about everywhere. The very act of speaking presupposes that we already have a notion of what our addressee understands by the expressions we use. Without a perspective on what the other can be generally presumed to understand, none of us will be able to picture the kind of impression our interventions will have on others or understand their interventions in the way they are expected to be understood. Those who are unable to distinguish the items relevant for discussion from the endless stream of fragmented experiences because they have no idea of the frame of reference within which associations are ultimately established, will likewise have no idea what is going on. Without this frame of reference we are lost.One of the problems that would appear to be confronting the humanities today is the exponential numerical growth of frames of reference, which has resulted in an inevitable decline in the existence of broad-based debate. Modern methods of communication have made it possible to find enough dialogue partners within every specialised frame of reference to maintain group-specific discussions that interest no one in the external forum. This sort of compartmentalisation of academic potential tends to result in a situation in which the theoreticians and those endowed with more practical common sense are no longer on the same wavelength and no longer understand one another. It is clear to one and all that the humanities are in need of interdisciplinary debate, but are there enough scholars willing to dismantle their technical jargon in order to facilitate such debate?Theoretical and methodological plurality would appear to be even greater in the domain of ethics. The debate concerning the relationship between fundamental and applied ethics has a long history. The same discussion will no doubt have to be pursued today within the context of the fragmentation of the humanities and the social sciences, a theme that certainly deserves further reflection. (shrink)

Our research concerns political knowledge among eighteen-year-old pupils in Belgium and the variables that may cause a differential level of political knowledge.The results point out that the average level of political knowledge is really low, though some elementary items score up to 98 %. The studyreveals as the most significant independent variables : the sex, political participation of the parents, mass media, and school. Mass media are most frequently mentioned as the most important sources of political information. Moreover, respondents with (...) a high level of newsmedia exposure do indeed score best. Political education at school shows to have low impact, on the contrary, respondents that mention school as their most important source of political information tend to score worst. (shrink)

Mechanistic approaches are very common in the causal interpretation of biological and neuroscientific experimental work in today’s philosophy of science. In the mechanistic literature a strict distinction is often made between causal relations and constitutive relations, where the latter cannot be causal. One of the typical reasons for this strict distinction is that constitutive relations are supposedly synchronic whereas most if not all causal relations are diachronic. This strict distinction gives rise to a number of problems, however. Our end goal (...) in this paper is to argue that it should be given up, at least in the context of the biological and the psychological sciences. To that effect, we argue that constitutive relations in this context are diachronic, thus undermining the aforementioned reason. We offer two cases from scientific practice in which constitutive relations are regarded as both diachronic and causally efficacious, review three existing ways of dealing with the apparent diachronic nature of interlevel relations in mechanisms and propose a new account of diachronic, causal constitutive relevance. (shrink)

In this article, I present two conceptual problems for Craver's mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms. First, constitutive relevance threatens to imply causal relevance despite Craver (and Bechtel)'s claim that they are strictly distinct. Second, if (as is intuitively appealing) parthood is defined in terms of spatio-temporal inclusion, then the mutual manipulability account is prone to counterexamples, as I show by a case of endosymbiosis. I also present a methodological problem (a case of experimental underdetermination) and formulate two (...) partial, but fallible solutions based on the notions of parthood and synchronicity. (shrink)

Today, mechanisms and mechanistic explanation are very popular in philosophy of science and are deemed a welcome alternative to laws of nature and deductive‐nomological explanation. Starting from Mitchell's pragmatic notion of laws, I cast doubt on their status as a genuine alternative. I argue that (1) all complex‐systems mechanisms ontologically must rely on stable regularities, while (2) the reverse need not hold. Analogously, (3) models of mechanisms must incorporate pragmatic laws, while (4) such laws themselves need not always refer to (...) underlying mechanisms. Finally, I show that Mitchell's account is more encompassing than the mechanistic account *Received August 2008; revised January 2010. †To contact the author, please write to: Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Ghent University, Blandijnberg 2, B‐9000 Belgium; e‐mail: Bert[email protected]. (shrink)

In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that underlie social encounters are only beginning to be studied and could —paradoxically— be seen as representing the ‘dark matter’ of social neuroscience. Recent conceptual and empirical developments consistently indicate the need for investigations, which allow the study of real-time social encounters in a truly interactive manner. This suggestion is based on the premise that social cognition is fundamentally different when we are in (...) interaction with others rather than merely observing them. In this article, we outline the theoretical conception of a second-person approach to other minds and review evidence from neuroimaging, psychophysiological studies and related fields to argue for the development of a second-person neuroscience, which will help neuroscience to really go social; this may also be relevant for our understanding of psychiatric disorders construed as disorders of social cognition. (shrink)

Analyse van de crisis in de normen, waarden en gebruiken in het oude Griekenland, zoals beschreven door Plato.

In the world of academia, clearly written texts are more the exception than the rule. This is why it is so refreshing to read the work of Harry Frankfurt. His analyses of what motivates people are uncommonly clear, forthright and discerning. We all know of course that an idea does not derive its force from the fact that other wellknown academics have also formulated it, or that it can be ascribed to one or another great thinker whose authority cannot be (...) disputed; an idea is only meaningful because it reveals some meaningful phenomenon. Yet confidence in this is often lacking, and many authors feel the need to supply additional justification, as if they had doubts that a candid and lucid reasoning would testify to its own quality. In the case of Frankfurt, this supposed need for external strategies of justification is entirely absent. His ideas speak for themselves.It may seem surprising that this issue of Ethical Perspectives focuses on the ideas of Harry Frankfurt. He himself has said that he is not ultimately concerned with morality in the strict sense of the term. What interests him is rather the structure of human desire, love, care and commitment, whatever the ethical consequences of this may be. And yet, these consequences will not leave ethicists indifferent. While Frankfurt’s analyses may not be ethical in the strict sense, they open new ways of thinking about responsibility, freedom, commitment, love, altruism — concepts that can hardly be excluded from the moral universe.Since it is perhaps unlikely that everyone is familiar with Frankfurt’s work, what follows is a brief introduction to his thought by the guest editor of this issue, Stefaan E. Cuypers. (shrink)

We analyze ethical policies of firms in industrialized countries and try to find out whether culture is a factor that plays a significant role in explaining country differences. We look into the firm’s human rights policy, its governance of bribery and corruption, and the comprehensiveness, implementation and communication of its codes of ethics. We use a dataset on ethical policies of almost 2,700 firms in 24 countries. We find that there are significant differences among ethical policies of firms headquartered in (...) different countries. When we associate these ethical policies with Hofstede’s cultural indicators, we find that individualism and uncertainty avoidance are positively associated with a firm’s ethical policies, whereas masculinity and power distance are negatively related to these policies. (shrink)

In this paper, we use some elements of the philosophical theories of Wilfrid Sellars and Robert Brandom for examining the interactions between humans and machines. In particular, we adopt the concept of the space of reasons for analyzing the status of artificial intelligent agents. One could argue that AIAs, like the widely used recommendation systems, have already entered the space of reasons, since they seem to make knowledge claims that we use as premises for further claims. This, in turn, can (...) lead to a sense of alienation because AIAs do not quite play by the rules of the space of the reason. We, therefore, ask somewhat pointedly whether aliens have entered the space of reasons. A closer look reveals that it is a misconception to consider AIAs as being in the space of reasons. In fact, they should be seen as very sophisticated tools. Since these tools affect our own acting in the space of reasons, special regulations are required for their proper use. (shrink)

How do Dutch people let each other know that they disagree? What do they say when they want to resolve their difference of opinion by way of an argumentative discussion? In what way do they convey that they are convinced by each other’s argumentation? How do they criticize each other’s argumentative moves? Which words and expressions do they use in these endeavors? By answering these questions this short essay provides a brief inventory of the language of argumentation in Dutch.

The study of argumentation is prospering. After its brilliant start in Antiquity, highlighted in the classical works of Aristotle, after an alternation of ups and downs during the following millennia, in the post-Renaissance period its gradual decline set in. Revitalization took place only after Toulmin and Perelman published in the same year their landmark works The Uses of Argument and La nouvelle rhétorique. The model of argumentation presented by Toulmin and Perelman’s inventory of argumentation techniques inspired a great many scholars (...) in various ways to take up the study of argumentation in a serious manner. Nowadays there are well-established logical approaches to argumentation, but also social and socio-psychological, linguistic, juridical and other approaches. In most of these approaches traces can be found of the influence of the classical and neo-classical argumentation theories just mentioned. (shrink)

The method of reflective equilibrium is typically characterized as a process of two kinds of adjustments: hold fixed one’s current set of commitments/intuitions and adjust rules/principles to account for them, then hold fixed those rules while making adjustments to one’s set of commitments. Repeat until no further adjustments are required. Such characterizations ignore the role of precedent, i.e., information about the commitments and rules of others and how those might serve as guides in one’s own process of deliberation. In this (...) paper we develop a model that narrows in on a local part of a reflective equilibrium process in which a group of peer agents start with identical lists of commitments and work towards finding the rule that captures that set. If successful, we say they reach rest stop interpersonal convergence. The trouble is that, without precedent, reaching this convergence rests on implausible deterministic assumptions. We analyze how far the inclusion of a kind of soft precedent goes towards aiding the group in reaching said convergence when those assumptions are relaxed. (shrink)

BackgroundAdvance research directives (ARD) have been suggested as a means by which to facilitate research with incapacitated subjects, in particular in the context of dementia research. However, established disclosure requirements for study participation raise an ethical problem for the application of ARDs: While regular consent procedures call for detailed information on a specific study (“token disclosure”), ARDs can typically only include generic information (“type disclosure”). The introduction of ARDs could thus establish a double standard in the sense that within the (...) context of ARDs, type disclosure would be considered sufficient, while beyond this context, token disclosure would remain necessary.Main bodyThis paper provides an ethical analysis of ARDs, taking into account the results of numerous empirical studies that have been performed so far. It will be argued that a revised understanding of informed consent can allow for context-sensitive disclosure standards. As a consequence, ARDs that include type disclosure can be acceptable under suitable circumstances. Such an approach raises a number of objections. A thorough examination shows, however, that they are not sufficient to justify a rejection of the approach.ConclusionThe approach presented in this paper avoids introducing a double standard. It is, therefore, more suitable for the implementation of ARDs than established approaches. (shrink)

Ethicists differ considerably in their reasons for using empirical data. This paper presents a brief overview of four traditional approaches to the use of empirical data: “the prescriptive applied ethicists,” “the theorists,” “the critical applied ethicists,” and “the particularists.” The main aim of this paper is to introduce a fifth approach of more recent date (i.e. “integrated empirical ethics”) and to offer some methodological directives for research in integrated empirical ethics. All five approaches are presented in a table for heuristic (...) purposes. The table consists of eight columns: “view on distinction descriptive-prescriptive sciences,” “location of moral authority,” “central goal(s),” “types of normativity,” “use of empirical data,” “method,” “interaction empirical data and moral theory,” and “cooperation with descriptive sciences.” Ethicists can use the table in order to identify their own approach. Reflection on these issues prior to starting research in empirical ethics should lead to harmonization of the different scientific disciplines and effective planning of the final research design. Integrated empirical ethics (IEE) refers to studies in which ethicists and descriptive scientists cooperate together continuously and intensively. Both disciplines try to integrate moral theory and empirical data in order to reach a normative conclusion with respect to a specific social practice. IEE is not wholly prescriptive or wholly descriptive since IEE assumes an interdepence between facts and values and between the empirical and the normative. The paper ends with three suggestions for consideration on some of the future challenges of integrated empirical ethics. (shrink)

Recently, moral deliberation within care institutions is gaining more attention in medical ethics. Ongoing dialogues about ethical issues are considered as a vehicle for quality improvement of health care practices. The rise of ethical conversation methods can be understood against the broader development within medical ethics in which interaction and dialogue are seen as alternatives for both theoretical or individual reflection on ethical questions. In other disciplines, intersubjectivity is also seen as a way to handle practical problems, and methodologies have (...) emerged to deal with dynamic processes of practice improvement. An example is responsive evaluation. In this article we investigate the relationship between moral deliberation and responsive evaluation, describe their common basis in dialogical ethics and pragmatic hermeneutics, and explore the relevance of both for improving the quality of care. The synergy between the approaches is illustrated by a case example in which both play a distinct and complementary role. It concerns the implementation of quality criteria for coercion in Dutch psychiatry. (shrink)

This article aims at providing a framework to assess corporate social responsibility with international banks. Currently, it is mainly rating institutions like EIRIS and KLD that provide information about firms’ social conduct and performance. However, this is costly information and it is not clear how the rating institutions arrive at their conclusion. We develop a framework to assess the social responsibility of internationally operating banks. We apply this framework to more than 30 institutions and find significant differences among individual banks, (...) countries, and regions. Furthermore, it appears that social responsibility of these banks has significantly improved between 2000 and 2005. (shrink)

Finance is grease to the economy. Therefore, we assume that it may affect corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the sustainability of economic development too. This paper discusses the transmission mechanisms between finance and sustainability. We find that there is no simple one-to-one relationship between financial development and sustainable development but there are various – often indirect – linkages. It appears that most of the literature concentrates on the role of public shareholders when it comes to changing corporate policy and performance (...) in a more sustainable direction. However, this focus neglects the potential impact of the credit channel and private equity on a firm’s non-financial policies and performance. These very powerful mechanisms can govern business policies and practices. Therefore, there appears to be much more scope for finance to promote socially and environmentally desirable activities and to discourage detrimental activities than has been acknowledged in the academic literature so far. (shrink)

In clinical moral decision making, emotions often play an important role. However, many clinical ethicists are ignorant, suspicious or even critical of the role of emotions in making moral decisions and in reflecting on them. This raises practical and theoretical questions about the understanding and use of emotions in clinical ethics support services. This paper presents an Aristotelian view on emotions and describes its application in the practice of moral case deliberation.According to Aristotle, emotions are an original and integral part (...) of (virtue) ethics. Emotions are an inherent part of our moral reasoning and being, and therefore they should be an inherent part of any moral deliberation. Based on Aristotle's view, we examine five specific aspects of emotions: the description of emotions, the attitude towards emotions, the thoughts present in emotions, the reliability of emotions, and the reasonable principle that guides an emotion. We then discuss three ways of dealing with emotions in the process of moral case deliberation. Finally, we present an Aristotelian conversation method, and present practical experiences using this method. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The French chemist Louis Pasteur chose to be actively engaged in the fine arts throughout his life—yet scholarship has ignored or dismissed these pursuits. This empirical study documents his unknown, but deep involvement with art and artists from age thirteen until his death. This was no casual pastime. Art animated Pasteur. It was also at times useful to him for making political statements, cultivating status, and supporting loyal friends. This account identifies nearly twenty significant friendships with painters and sculptors (...) and uncovers over thirty other artists with whom his associations deserve examination. The narrative suggests points at which art was especially germane to his scientific career and possible junctures that merit further research. Evidence from his artistic friendships also corrects the common picture of Pasteur as a dour workaholic who never laughed or smiled. (shrink)

In their paper (‘ Morisprudence: a theoretical framework for studying the relationship linking moral case deliberation, organisational learning and quality improvement ‘),1 Kok et al addresses an important topic: how to theoretically think about studying the impact of moral case deliberations and how to conceptualise organisational learning? In this article, they aim to develop a theoretical framework that provides empirically assessable hypotheses that describe the relationship between moral case deliberation and care quality at an organisational level. The authors describe care (...) quality mostly in terms of practical wisdom which they aggregate into both individual and organisational morisprudence. Morisprudence is defined as an ongoing formulation of moral judgements. However, it remains a bit unclear how the theoretical framework of Kok et al may lead to empirically assessable hypotheses. Concepts like ‘quality’, ‘quality of care’, ‘practical wisdom’ and ‘individual and organisational morisprudence’ are not described in detail, let alone operationalised in measurable terms. How should we understand morisprudence in empirical terms? What is a good morisprudence? And how should we measure or conclude whether morisprudence has been improved (or not)? The authors rightfully focus on the need for organisational learning during and through Moral Case Deliberation (MCD). Too often, MCD is only described as the discussion of one patient’s case, thereby implicitly suggesting that the learning process only takes place at the level of an individual case. Yet, based on many years of MCD evaluation research, we know from mostly …. (shrink)

Many theories about human number representation stress the importance of a central semantic representation that includes the magnitude information of small integer numbers, and that is conceived as an abstract, compressed number line. However, thus far there has been little or no direct evidence that units and teens are represented on the same number line. In two masked priming experiments, we show that single-digit and two-digit Arabic numerals are equally well primed by an Arabic numeral with the same number of (...) digits as by an equally distant Arabic numeral with a different number of digits (e.g. the priming effect of 7 on the target 9 is the same as the priming effect of 11 on the target 9). The finding was obtained both with a number naming task and with a parity judgement task. This is in line with the hypothesis that units and teens are part of a continuous number line. (shrink)

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to develop an ethical framework for the marketing of corporate social responsibility. Methods The approach is a conceptual one based on virtue ethics and on the corporate identity literature. Furthermore, empirical research results are used to describe the opportunities and pitfalls of using marketing communication tools in the strategy of building a virtuous corporate brand. Results/conclusions An ethical framework that addresses the paradoxical relation between the consequentialist perspective many proponents of the marketing of (...) CSR adopt, and ethical perspectives which criticize an exclusive profit-oriented approach to CSR. Furthermore, three CSR strategies in relation to the marketing of CSR are discussed. For each CSR strategy it is explored how a corporation could avoid falling into the promise/performance gap. (shrink)

At the bottom of all human activities are “values,” the conviction that some things “ought to be” and others not. Science, however, with its immense interest in mere facts seems to lack all understanding of such‘requiredness.’… A science … which would seriously admit nothing but indifferent facts … could not fail to destroy itself.

The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) is an organization which seeks to identify the causes of human cancer. Per agent, such as betel quid or Human Papillomaviruses, they review the available evidence deriving from epidemiological studies, animal experiments and information about mechanisms (and other data). The evidence of the different groups is combined such that an overall assessment of the carcinogenicity of the agent in question is obtained. In this paper, we critically review the IARC’s carcinogenicity evaluations. First (...) we show that serious objections can be raised against their criteria and procedures – more specifically regarding the role of mechanistic knowledge in establishing causal claims. Our arguments are based on the problem of confounders, of the assessment of the temporal stability of carcinogenic relations, and of the extrapolation from animal experiments. Then we address a very important question, viz. how we should treat the carcinogenicity evaluations that were based on the current procedures. After showing that this question is important, we argue that an overall dismissal of the current evaluations would be too radical. Instead, we argue in favour of a stepwise re-evaluation of the current findings. (shrink)

We investigate how conventional asset managers account for environmental, social, and governance factors in their investment process. We do so on the basis of an international survey among fund managers. We find that many conventional managers integrate responsible investing in their investment process. Furthermore, we find that ESG information in particular is being used for red flagging and to manage risk. We find that many conventional fund managers have already adopted features of responsible investing in the investment process. Furthermore, we (...) argue and show that ESG investing is highly similar to fundamental investing. We also reveal that there is a substantial difference in the ways in which U.S. and European asset managers view ESG. (shrink)

Emotions play an important part in moral life. Within clinical ethics support (CES), one should take into account the crucial role of emotions in moral cases in clinical practice. In this paper, we present an Aristotelian approach to emotions. We argue that CES can help participants deal with emotions by fostering a joint process of investigation of the role of emotions in a case. This investigation goes beyond empathy with and moral judgment of the emotions of the case presenter. In (...) a moral case deliberation, the participants are invited to place themselves in the position of the case presenter and to investigate their own emotions in the situation. It is about critically assessing the facts in the case that cause the emotion and the related (moral) thoughts that accompany the emotion. It is also about finding the right emotion in a given situation and finding the right balance in dealing with that emotion. These steps in the moral inquiry give rise to group learning. It is a process of becoming open towards the perspectives of others, leading to new insights into what is an appropriate emotion in the specific situation. We show how this approach works in moral case deliberation. A physician presents a situation in which he is faced with a pregnant woman who is about to deliver multiple extremely premature infants at the threshold of viability. The moral deliberation of the case and the emotions therein leads to the participants’ conclusion that “compassion” is a more adequate emotion than “sadness”. The emotion “sadness” is pointed towards the tragedy that is happening to the woman. The emotion “compassion” is pointed towards the woman; it combines consideration and professional responsibility. Through the shift towards compassion, participants experienced more creativity and freedom to deal with the sad situation and to support the woman. The paper ends with an analysis and reflection on the deliberation process. In the conclusion we argue for more attention to emotions in clinical ethics support and offer some directions for doing this in the right way. (shrink)

The use of general and universal laws in historiography has been the subject of debate ever since the end of the nineteenth century. Since the 1970s there has been a growing consensus that general laws such as those in the natural sciences are not applicable in the scientific writing of history. We will argue against this consensus view, not by claiming that the underlying conception of what historiography is—or should be—is wrong, but by contending that it is based on a (...) misconception of what general laws such as those of the natural sciences are. We will show that a revised notion of law, one inspired by the work of Sandra D. Mitchell, in tandem with Jim Woodward’s notion of “invariance,” is indeed applicable to historiography, much in the same way as it is to most other scientific disciplines. Having developed a more adequate account of general laws, we then show, by means of three examples, that what are called “pragmatic laws” and “invariance” do in fact play a role in history in several interesting ways. These examples—from cultural history, economic history, and the history of religion—have been selected on the basis of their diversity in order to illustrate the widespread use of pragmatic laws in history. (shrink)

In this paper, we address the question of whether AI should be used for suicide prevention on social media data. We focus on algorithms that can identify persons with suicidal ideation based on their postings on social media platforms and investigate whether private companies like Facebook are justified in using these. To find out if that is the case, we start with providing two examples for AI-based means of suicide prevention in social media. Subsequently, we frame suicide prevention as an (...) issue of beneficence, develop two fictional cases to explore the scope of the principle of beneficence and apply the lessons learned to Facebook’s employment of AI for suicide prevention. We show that Facebook is neither acting under an obligation of beneficence nor acting meritoriously. This insight leads us to the general question of who is entitled to help. We conclude that private companies like Facebook can play an important role in suicide prevention, if they comply with specific rules which we derive from beneficence and autonomy as core principles of biomedical ethics. At the same time, public bodies have an obligation to create appropriate framework conditions for AI-based tools of suicide prevention. As an outlook we depict how cooperation between public and private institutions can make an important contribution to combating suicide and, in this way, put the principle of beneficence into practice. (shrink)

In the traditional African view, knowledge is not acquired by labor but "given" by the ancestors. Second, it is immediately social: not "I" know, but "we" know. Thirdly, knowledge is not universal but local tribal : other tribes have different knowledge. Knowledge has it "biological variations" like all other things in nature. The ensuing logic is worked out in this article. Modern African society, changed as it is by the advent of western thought, should be understood in the awareness of (...) the conflicting nature of the two ideas of knowledge. (shrink)

Unterschiedlichste Anwendungsformen künstlicher Intelligenz bestimmen schon heute den Alltag vieler Menschen – von Einsatz von KI-Systeme in Finanzgeschäften über die Vergabe von Studienplätzen bis hin zur Steuerung von Pflegerobotern, Autos und Waffensystemen. Diese vielfältigen neuen Möglichkeiten und Visionen wecken einerseits Hoffnungen auf persönlichen und gesellschaftlichen Nutzen und Fortschritt; andererseits rufen sie aber auch Bedenken, Ängste und gelegentlich auch grundsätzliche Ablehnung hervor. Angesichts dieser Ambivalenz sind ethische Analysen gefordert, die ausloten, wie ein verantwortungsvoller Umgang mit KI gestaltet werden sollte. Der Band (...) greift viele dieser Probleme auf und unterzieht sie einer eingehenden philosophischen Analyse. Die Auseinandersetzung ist nach klassischen Teilbereichen der Philosophie gegliedert, aus deren Perspektive heraus jeweils spezielle Teilaspekte oder einzelne Anwendungsformen von KI beleuchtet werden. Das Themenspektrum reicht entsprechend von Fragen der Handlungstheorie und Philosophie des Geistes über wissenschaftstheoretische Problemstellungen bis hin zu ethischen Fragen die beispielsweise den Einsatz von KI in der Medizin und im Wirtschafts- und Arbeitsleben betreffen. In Auseinandersetzung mit aktuellen Debatten werden eigenständige Positionen entwickelt. (shrink)