Womit beschäftigt sich die medizinische Wissenschaft? Ich verstehe ja natürlich nichts davon, aber sie beschäftigt sich doch mit dem Menschen. Und die Juristerei, die Gesetzgebung und Rechtsprechung? Auch mit dem Menschen.

Dient Kunst der Erkenntnis? Vermittelt sie Einsichten oder Wissen? Und wenn ja: auf welche Weise? Sind ästhetische Urteile wahr oder falsch? Beruht unsere Wertschätzung von Kunst auf ihren kognitiven Funktionen? Zu diesen Fragen, die zu den klassischen Themen der Kunstphilosophie gehören, beziehen zehn Philosophen aus dem deutschen Sprachraum in Originalbeiträgen Position. Der Band dokumentiert den gegenwärtigen Stand der Kontroversen zwischen kognitivistischen und nichtkognitivistischen Theorien der Kunst und der Kunstbewertung. Mit Beiträgen von Rüdiger Bittner, Sabine A. Döring, Christoph Jäger, Bernd (...) Kleimann, Dirk Koppelberg, Jens Kulenkampff, Franz von Kutschera, Alexander Piecha, Jakob Steinbrenner und Henning Tegtmeyer. (shrink)

Gemäß der üblichen Auslegung besteht Kants maßgeblicher Beitrag zur Philosophie darin, eine Position entwickelt zu haben, die das Dilemma zwischen zwei gleichermaßen unbefriedigenden Konzeptionen unseres Urteilsvermögens überwindet: der empiristischen Konzeption, der zufolge der letzte Grund des Urteilens in Akten der Empfindung zu finden ist, und der rationalistischen Konzeption, der zufolge der letzte Grund in Erkenntnissen besteht. In meinem Text konzentriere ich mich auf Kants Analyse der Schönheitsurteile und argumentiere, dass Kant in seiner Analytik des Schönen nicht einfach ein anderes Verständnis (...) vom Begriff der Schönheit entwickelt, sondern dass er eine andere Vorstellung davon hat, was es bedeutet, ein solches Verständnis zu haben. Kants sogenannter Mittelweg stellt die Annahme infrage, dass der Philosoph oder die Philosophin den Begriff der Schönheit von außerhalb desjenigen Selbstbewusstseins untersuchen kann, das derjenige hat, der kompetent über Schönheit urteilt. Nach dieser Lesart ist Kants Darstellung der Schönheitsurteile deswegen von besonderem Interesse für die Philosophie, weil Schönheitsurteile eine Form besitzen, die die Form jener philosophischen Urteile widerspiegelt, die diese Form artikulieren. According to the standard interpretation, Kant’s major contribution to philosophy consists in his position that overcomes a dilemma between two equally dissatisfying positions on how we understand our capacity for judgments: the so-called empiricist position, according to which the ultimate ground for judgment is to be found in acts of sensibility, and the so-called rationalist position, according to which its ultimate ground is to be found in cognitions. In my paper I focus on Kant’s analysis of the judgment of beauty and argue that in his analysis of beauty Kant does not simply develop another understanding of the concept of beauty, but that his understanding of beauty manifests a different conception of ›what it means to have such an understanding‹ in the first place. Kant’s so-called middle course calls into question the assumption that the philosopher can investigate the concept of beauty from outside the self-consciousness that constitutes the capacity of his competent judgment of beauty. According to this reading, Kant’s account of judgments of beauty is of special interest to philosophy because they turn out to have a form that, in a certain respect, mirrors the form of philosophical judgments which attempt to articulate this form. (shrink)

The legal logic discovered the heuristic function of the deduction decades ago. This knowledge has not spread in the dogmatic disciplines. One reason might be a lack of communication between legal theory and jurisprudence. This paper tries to locate the gap and bridge it. Some examples might prove the underestimated use of legal logic in the concrete application of law and thereby show its practical relevance.

O artigo analisa algumas questões teóricas e pesquisas recentes sobre a depressão em crianças com doenças crônicas, comparando o surgimento deste quadro nos distintos tipos de doenças crônicas. Os estudos revisados mostram que, em geral, crianças com doenças crônicas possuem maiores riscos de aprese..

Die Beiträge des vorliegenden Bandes behandeln grundlegende Lebensbereiche der Eisenzeit aus kulturwissenschaftlicher Perspektive, u.a. Sozialordnungen, die Rolle der Frauen, Waffen und Kriegerordnungen, Werkzeug, Grabbau, Religion und Rituale, Kunst.

Political philosophers often see their task in providing a justification of states, with 'justification' understood, in analogy to the theological use of the term, as an argument showing states to be right, or unobjectionable. Political philosophers disagree on what property of a state it is that is required for its being right. In fact, it is difficult to see what could give this or that property of a state its right-making power. Since there is nothing that states as such are (...) called upon to be or to do, claims to the effect that some property or other is right-making are unfounded. The task of justification falling away, then, political philosophers should rather ask what should be done now with states. (shrink)

The present reply to Peter Schaber’s critique of my paper Achtung und ihre moralische Bedeutung argues, first, that Schaber has no good grounds for maintaining that we have an obligation to respect every human being. Second, it explains why respect is not a fruitful attitude to take in the face of social divisions.

The central idea of the book is this: a reason for which people do things is a state of affairs or event in the world, and the action is a response to that state of affairs or event. The present chapter introduces this idea by means of examples. It explains the term “response” and argues that it is historical knowledge that allows us to tell what some action is a response to. It argues, moreover, that this idea makes the best (...) sense of how we ordinarily think and speak of reasons for which people do things. (shrink)

Spinoza holds that we can become free by recognizing that everything happens with necessity. His own reasons for this claim do not stand scrutiny. More promising appears the idea that he who considers things necessary is not subject to affects that deprive him of his freedom. On this line, however, recognizing necessity also destroys joy, contrary to Spinoza’s maxim ”Do good and be joyful”. More importantly, what is necessary may in fact be a reasonable object of affective reactions. Thus, Spinoza (...) fails to support the enlightenment’s hope that knowledge brings freedom. (shrink)

What selects the reasons for which people actually do things from the vast array of what could be such a reason? The chapter argues that it depends on the qualities of the agent, on things like her eagerness, belief, and expectation, and what is the reason for which she does something. It does not follow, though, and typically it is not true that such qualities of an agent as eagerness, belief, and expectation themselves are the reasons for which she does (...) something. We are reason selectors, but the reasons are still “out there”; they are not mental entities. A serious problem is presented by the case of the agent in relevant error, but such an agent does not in fact do for a reason what he does; he only took himself, mistakenly, to be acting for a reason. (shrink)

Gesellschaftskritik ist Kritik an der Struktur einer Gesellschaft. Ein solches Unternehmen ist praktisch betrachtet nicht sinnvoll. Denn jedenfalls nach Marx steht die Struktur einer Gesellschaft zu ändern nicht in der Macht der in ihr lebenden Menschen, sie hängt vom Stand der Produktivkräfte ab. Tatsächlich hat die Kritische Theorie, bei Horkheimer, Adorno und Habermas, die Maßstäbe ihrer Gesellschaftskritik nicht als objektiv begründet ausweisen können. Diese Kritik blieb bloße Unmutsäußerung.Statt den Bau einer Gesellschaft insgesamt zu kritisieren empfiehlt sich, besondere Missstände aufzuweisen und (...) Wege zu ihrer Beseitigung anzugeben. Die Kritische Theorie hat diesen „Reformismus“ verachtet, und es ist wahr, eine solche Kritik und die ihr folgende Politik bleiben Stückwerk, sind zudem irrtums- und fehleranfällig. Aber sie können helfen, das Leben von Menschen zu verbessern. (shrink)

We compare the reasons one has in terms of strength, and the task of the present chapter is to explain what it is for one reason to be stronger than another. Raz offered a criterion, but that is shown to yield unsatisfactory results. The explanation proposed here is this: stronger reasons are states of affairs or events more important to the agent, the notion of importance deriving from Frankfurt's explication of what we care about. This proposal does not reduce the (...) strength of reasons to the strength of the relevant desires. Contrary to Frankfurt's view, however, it does away with the difference between the order of reasons and the order of caring. (shrink)