Among the numerous conceptions of autonomy, three are particularly important: Kant's notion of humans' being subject, and subject only, to moral laws they gave themselves, Frankfurt's idea of persons' willing and acting deriving from the essential character of their wills, and the popular conception of persons' being master over whether others do or do not certain things to them. Kant's moral conception of autonomy, it is argued, is untenable because the moral character of a law and its self-givenness are incompatible. (...) Frankfurt's idea suffers from the fact that we cannot give substance to talk of the essential character of one's will. The third conception is practically irrelevant: there is no principle requiring people to be master over what others do to them. Thus autonomy may have to be dropped from our self-conception. To some this will appear a grave loss. In fact it is not. (shrink)

Recent philosophy has developed an overblown concept of autonomy. In fact we do not have moral autonomy, and personal autonomy we only have in the sense of being able to decide some things that affect the course of our lives, not in the sense of shaping these lives and being master over them; nor ought we to have autonomy in the latter sense, or come closer to having it. As for our political institutions, they do not presuppose, as prevailing doctrines (...) claim they do, citizens’ autonomy in a more demanding sense. Freedom and democracy as understood for instance in the German constitution only assume subordinates capable of deciding some matters on their own. Current talk of autonomy is just gilding people’s real dependence. (shrink)

Why does world hunger hold an inferior place on the contemporary moral agenda? Proposed answer: because it is a political, not a moral problem. It is not a moral problem, because morality needs two conditions fulfilled: that those be in some way close to the agent unto whom that agent is doing something that is to be morally assessed; and that the relevant good or bad states or events can be clearly credited to some particular agent or agents. Neither condition (...) is fulfilled in the case of world hunger. This explains morality's failure to come to grips with it. Yet, while lacking morality's endorsement, the abolition of world hunger may still be a political goal. (shrink)

Two broad views on how agents are related to their actions are distinguished, agents as origins and agents as rulers. This paper focusses on the second. First it argues that a view of agents as rulers is attractive because a view of agents as origins seems incapable of accounting for the difference between actions and mere doings. Second, various attempts to spell out the idea of agents as rulers are examined, none of them proving successful. Thus the final suggestion is (...) to renounce the search for a basic pattern of how agents are related to their actions and settle for the historically ascertainable significance of individual actions in the context of individual lives. (shrink)

Was genau sind die Gründe für unser Handeln, und wie hängen sie zusammen mit den Resultaten dieses Handelns? Gegen die gängige Lehre, wonach Gründe geistige Zustände des Handelnden wie Wollen und Meinen sind, wird hier eine neue These entwickelt: Unser Handeln begründet sich nach Bittner in Zuständen oder Ereignissen in der Welt. Diese Antwort, im Detail ausgearbeitet und gegen Einwände verteidigt, führt zu einer radikalen Neu-Konzeption von uns selbst als Handelnden. Verkaufsargumente: - dt. übersetzung des viel gerühmten "Doing Things for (...) Reasons" - Originalfassung fand viel Beachtung unter Philosophen - radikaler Neuansatz der philosophischen Handlungstheorie. (shrink)

Political philosophers often see their task in providing a justification of states, with 'justification' understood, in analogy to the theological use of the term, as an argument showing states to be right, or unobjectionable. Political philosophers disagree on what property of a state it is that is required for its being right. In fact, it is difficult to see what could give this or that property of a state its right-making power. Since there is nothing that states as such are (...) called upon to be or to do, claims to the effect that some property or other is right-making are unfounded. The task of justification falling away, then, political philosophers should rather ask what should be done now with states. (shrink)

The present reply to Peter Schaber’s critique of my paper Achtung und ihre moralische Bedeutung argues, first, that Schaber has no good grounds for maintaining that we have an obligation to respect every human being. Second, it explains why respect is not a fruitful attitude to take in the face of social divisions.

Spinoza holds that we can become free by recognizing that everything happens with necessity. His own reasons for this claim do not stand scrutiny. More promising appears the idea that he who considers things necessary is not subject to affects that deprive him of his freedom. On this line, however, recognizing necessity also destroys joy, contrary to Spinoza’s maxim ”Do good and be joyful”. More importantly, what is necessary may in fact be a reasonable object of affective reactions. Thus, Spinoza (...) fails to support the enlightenment’s hope that knowledge brings freedom. (shrink)

For much of his adult life, Nietzsche wrote notes on philosophical subjects in small notebooks that he carried around with him. After his breakdown and subsequent death, his sister supervised the publication of some of these notes under the title The Will to Power, and that collection, which is textually inaccurate and substantively misleading, has dominated the English-speaking discussion of Nietzsche's later thought. The present volume offers, for the first time, accurate translations of a selection of writings from Nietzsche's late (...) notebooks, dating from his last productive years between 1885 and 1889. Many of them have never before been published in English. They are translated by Kate Sturge from reliable texts in the Colli-Montinari edition, and they are edited by Rüdiger Bittner, whose introduction places them in the context of Nietzsche's philosophy as a whole. (shrink)

For much of his adult life, Nietzsche wrote notes on philosophical subjects in small notebooks that he carried around with him. After his breakdown and subsequent death, his sister supervised the publication of some of these notes under the title The Will to Power, and that collection, which is textually inaccurate and substantively misleading, has dominated the English-speaking discussion of Nietzsche's later thought. The present volume offers, for the first time, accurate translations of a selection of writings from Nietzsche's late (...) notebooks, dating from his last productive years between 1885 and 1889. Many of them have never before been published in English. They are translated by Kate Sturge from reliable texts in the Colli-Montinari edition, and they are edited by Rüdiger Bittner, whose introduction places them in the context of Nietzsche's philosophy as a whole. (shrink)