AbstractConditionals are omnipresent, in everyday life as well as in scientific environments; they represent generic knowledge acquired inductively or learned from books. They tie a flexible and highly interrelated network of connections along which reasoning is possible and which can be applied to different situations. Therefore, conditionals are important, but also quite problematic objects in knowledge representation. This book presents a new approach to conditionals which captures their dynamic, non-proportional nature particularly well by considering conditionals as agents shifting possible worlds in order to establish relationships and beliefs. This understanding of conditionals yields a rich theory which makes complex interactions between conditionals transparent and operational. Moreover,it provides a unifying and enhanced framework for knowledge representation, nonmonotonic reasoning, belief revision,and even for knowledge discovery.
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Citations of this work
Conditionals and the Hierarchy of Causal Queries.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen, Simon Stephan & Michael R. Waldmann - 2021 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 1 (12):2472-2505.
Learning From Conditionals.Benjamin Eva, Stephan Hartmann & Soroush Rafiee Rad - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):461-508.
Structural Inference From Conditional Knowledge Bases.Gabriele Kern-Isberner & Christian Eichhorn - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (4):751-769.
Qualitative Probabilistic Inference with Default Inheritance.Paul D. Thorn, Christian Eichhorn, Gabriele Kern-Isberner & Gerhard Schurz - 2015 - In Christoph Beierle, Gabriele Kern-Isberner, Marco Ragni & Frieder Stolzenburg (eds.), Proceedings of the Ki 2015 Workshop on Formal and Cognitive Reasoning. pp. 16-28.
Formal Nonmonotonic Theories and Properties of Human Defeasible Reasoning.Marco Ragni, Christian Eichhorn, Tanja Bock, Gabriele Kern-Isberner & Alice Ping Ping Tse - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (1):79-117.