This chapter discusses attempts by Dinello, Kamm, Kagan, Bentham, Warren Quinn, and others to explain the making/allowing distinction. In each case, it is shown that if the proposed account can be tightened up into something significant and defensible, that always turns it into something equivalent to the analysis of Bennett or, more often, that of Donagan. It is argued that on either of the latter analyses, making/allowing certainly has no basic moral significance, though it may often be accompanied by factors (...) that do have such significance. (shrink)

Gideon Yaffe presents a ground-breaking work which demonstrates the importance of philosophy of action for the law. Many people are serving sentences not for completing crimes, but for trying to. Yaffe's clear account of what it is to try to do something promises to resolve the difficulties courts face in the adjudication of attempted crimes.

A 62-year-old female with Huntington’s disease presented after a suicide attempt. Her advance directive stated that she did not want intubation or resuscitation, which her family acknowledged and supported. Despite these directives, she was resuscitated in the emergency department and continued to state that she would attempt suicide again. Her suicidality in the face of a chronic and advancing illness, and her prolonged consistency in her desire to take her own life, left careproviders wondering how to provide ethical, (...) respectful care to this patient. Tension between the ethical principles of autonomy and beneficence is central in this case. The patient’s narrative demonstrated that her suicide was an autonomous decision, free from coercion or disordered thinking from mental illness. Beneficence then would seem to necessitate care aligned with the patient’s desire to end her life, which created ethical uneasiness for her family and careproviders. The case highlights several end-of-life ethical considerations that have received much recent attention. With ongoing discussions about the legalization of aid in dying across the country, caregivers are challenged to understand what beneficence means in people with terminal illnesses who want a say in their death. This case also highlights the profound moral distress of families and careproviders that arises in such ethically challenging scenarios. (shrink)

이 글의 시발점은 해러웨이에게 ‘사이보그 페미니즘’의 상상력을 제공했던, 70년대 페미니스트 SF에 대한 관심이었다. ‘소년들의 과학적 오락물’이라는 게토에서 출발한 SF가 페미니스트 문학의 대안적 서사 전략, 새로운 페미니스트 정치학의 단초가 되기까지, 여성작가들은 장르적 관습에 부응하여 글을 쓰고 또 그것을 변형하면서 활용해 왔다. 이 글은 70년대 그가 사실은 앨리스 셸던(Alice B. Sheldon)이라는 중년여성이었다는 사실이 밝혀지기 전까지, ‘남성적 스타일’로 사랑받았던 ‘제임스 팁트리 주니어(James Tiptree, Jr.)’를 읽어 보려고 한다. 팁트리 주니어는 지금 페미니스트 SF의 대표작가 중 하나다.BR ‘남성적 스타일’과 ‘페미니스트 SF’라는 평가 사이에 놓인 팁트리 주니어의 (...) SF를 읽으면서, 먼저 장르적 글쓰기와 젠더의 관계에 대해, 글을 쓰는 몸의 성(sex)과 쓰여진 텍스트 스타일에 대한 젠더적 평가 사이의 관계에 대해 생각해 보려고 한다. 이것은 팁트리의 글쓰기 양식(style)에 대한 분석이자, 그의 SF가 보여준 세계관과 페미니스트 상상력에 대한 분석이기도 하다. 또한 조금 뒤늦게 앨리스 셸던의 또 다른 분신으로 등장한 라쿠나 셸던(Raccoona Sheldon)의 SF를 팁트리 주니어의 것과 비교하면서, 젠더 정체성의 경계에 대해, 그리고 글쓰기를 통한 ‘젠더하기(performing gender)’에 대해 살펴 볼 것이다. 이를 통해, 팁트리의 SF는 해러웨이가 주장하는 ‘사이보그 글쓰기’의 한 사례가 될 수 있다는 사실이 드러날 것이다. 해러웨이에게 SF는 정치적 의미와 지향을 담은 글쓰기로, 미래를 향하지만 지금을 성찰하는 도구로 이해된다. 그녀는 페미니스트 SF를 위계적 이분법을 교란하고 정체성의 경계를 문제 삼는 새로운 페미니스트 정치학의 ‘사이보그 테크놀로지’로 받아들인다. 팁트리의 글쓰기는 자연과 문화의 관계를 재설정하고 ‘자연의 재발명’을 상상한다는 점에서, 그리고 또 주체와 타자 사이의 경계를 물으며 이분법적 질서를 교란한다는 점에서, 해러웨이가 말하는 사이보그 글쓰기의 실천으로 읽을 수 있다. (shrink)

This book reflects the belief that a careful study of the Law of Attempts should be both interesting in itself, as well as being a productive route into a number of larger and deeper issues in criminal law theory and in the philosophy of action. By identifying the legal doctrines which courts and legislatures have developed or adopted, the author goes on to ask whether and how they can be rationalized or rendered persuasive. Such an approach involves paying detailed attention (...) to cases. The book is also unusual in that it grapples with English, Scots and US law, showing great breadth of research as well as philosophical sophistication. This is a work which is likely to become a seminal study and a major contribution to the study of law and legal philosophy. (shrink)

시몽동은 생성과 존재를 결합하는 존재론적 기획 속에서 인간과학의 기초를 세우고자 한다. 선험적 주관을 거부하는 생성적 존재론에서 인간과학의 정당성근거를 도출하는 것은 특이하고도 모험적인 시도이다. 시몽동은 우선 에너지학과 정보이론의 기초 위에서 인간과 사회의 역동적 과정을 설명하는 ‘인간적 에너지학’이라는 개념을 확립한다. 그에게 인식은 존재의 발생과 동시적이고 따라서 인간과학의 정초의 정당성근거는 발생적 근거로 연결된다. 시몽동은 기술철학 저서에서 인간이 마술적 세계로부터 기술성을 통해 점차 스스로를 객관화해 온 과정을 서술한다. 이는 기술공학을 통한 인간과학의 통일성의 재조직화라는 문제로 이어진다. 오늘날 인간의 거부할 수 없는 존재조건이 된 기술적 우주에서 (...) 우리는 기술, 자연, 인간의 새로운 관계맺음을 시도할 수밖에 없다. 시몽동에 의하면 기술적 대상이 개체와 사회를 넘어서는 인간집단의 개체초월적 관계를 통해 이러한 소통과 관계맺음을 가능하게 할 수 있다. (shrink)

Anti-racist education within the Academy holds the potential to truly reflect the cultural hybridity of our diverse, multi-cultural society through the canons of knowledge that educators celebrate,...

It is argued that the main problem with "the problem of the direction of time" is to figure out what the problem is or is supposed to be. Towards this end, an attempt is made to disentangle and to classify some of the many issues which have been discussed under the label of 'the direction of time'. Secondly, some technical apparatus is introduced in the hope of producing a sharper formulation of the issues than they have received in the (...) philosophical literature. Finally, some tentative suggestions about the central issues are offered. In particular, it is suggested that entropy and irreversibility are much less crucial to the central issues than most philosophers would have us believe. This suggestion is not made because of any firm conviction of its correctness but rather because it helps to focus the discussion on some basic but long neglected assumptions which underlie traditional approaches. (shrink)

The standard of care in the United States favors stabilizing any adult who arrives in an emergency department after a failed suicide attempt, even if he appears decisionally capacitated and refuses life‐sustaining treatment. I challenge this ubiquitous practice. Emergency clinicians generally have a moral obligation to err on the side of stabilizing even suicide attempters who refuse such interventions. This obligation reflects the fact that it is typically infeasible to determine these patients’ level of decisional capacitation—among other relevant information—in (...) this unique setting. Nevertheless, I argue, stabilizing suicide attempters over their objection sometimes violates a basic yet insufficiently appreciated right of theirs—the right against bodily invasion. In such cases, it is at least prima facie wrong to stabilize a patient who wants to die even if they lack a contrary advance directive or medical order and suffer from no terminal physical illness. (shrink)

This paper explores Saidiya Hartman's undertheorized account of 'redress' in conversation with the extensive uptake of her work on Black fungibility, subjection, and critiques of emancipation. Although Hartman uses the term in nearly all of her writing, little work has been done to clarify how Hartman conceptualizes redress as a response to the constitution of Black lives as abstract, exchangeable, and disposable. This paper offers an account of how Hartman theorizes redress, showing how it both resists, and acts as a (...) mechanism for, the constitution of Blackness as fungible. Consequently, I argue that Hartman's readers fundamentally skew her thinking in divorcing redress from her other key concepts. (shrink)

Whether attempts should be punished as severely as the completed crime poses fundamental problems concerning the proper goals of the criminal law and the philosophy of punishment. An answer to this question would require an assessment of the significance of the fact that harm occurs as a result of conduct. Does the occurrence of harm give us any reason for distinguishing between completed offenses and attempts? Contemporary theory is almost united in the view that the occurrence of harm does not (...) mark a moral distinction. Yet, there does seem to be a common intuition that a person is somehow more blameworthy if his conduct results in harm than if it does not. This distinction in gravity between attempts and the completed crime is also recognized in the law; most United States’ jurisdictions provide a lesser punishment for attempts. (shrink)

Western philosophers have made significant contributions to the establishment of government around the world. Philosophers like Plato, Locke, Hobbes, and Machiavelli dramatically influenced the government system not just in foreign countries but also in the Philippines. Hence, this seminar paper explored the political notions of four Western philosophers and positioned them in Duterte’s six years of presidency. In pursuit of this study, the researcher employed a systematic literature review. A systematic review process is used to collect articles, and then a (...) qualitative approach is used to assess them. The researcher came up with four major themes in this study particularly (1) Duterte is a Dictator, not a Philosopher-King, (2) Violators of natural rights, (3) the Sea-monster of Davao, and lastly (4) Love, fear, cruelty, and Duterte. Thus, the researcher concurred that all of the philosophical ideas of the four Western philosophers did not fit or even violated during Duterte’s six years of presidency in the Philippines. (shrink)

Attempting art: an essay on intention-dependenceIt is a truism among philosophers that art is intention-dependent—that is to say, art-making is an activity that depends in some way on the maker's intentions. Not much thought has been given to just what this entails, however. For instance, most philosophers of art assume that intention-dependence entails concept-dependence—i.e. possessing a concept of art is necessary for art-making, so that what prospective artists must intend is to make art. And yet, a mounting body of anthropological (...) and art-historical evidence and philosophical argument suggests that not only is such a criterion unsatisfied by most of the art-historical canon, but it also rests on a false premise: concepts of 'art' are not shared between cultures, nor even in the same culture across time. My dissertation aims to rectify this error by first exploring what our commitment to art's intention-dependence actually entails, and then showing that, properly understood, intention-dependence sets a number of important constraints on theories of art with respect to explanatory desiderata such as the success- and failure-conditions of art-attempts, the cross-cultural identification of art, and the reference of 'art' and art-kind terms. I begin by situating art's intention-dependence in the philosophical literature on intentional action, arguing that, properly conceived, intention-dependence is a weak criterion which can be satisfied either directly or indirectly. It therefore does not necessarily entail concept-dependence. I then use this distinction to motivate a new treatment of the success- and failure-conditions for art-attempts, arguing that the extant model's emphasis on compliance with 'the manner intended' is far too restrictive to capture actual artistic practices. I go on to show that Ruth Millikan's model of linguistic conventions supplies an independently plausible explanation of art's concept-independent origins in terms of the development of a system of indirectly intention-dependent conventions called an 'artworld'. I argue that this account of artworld development supplies us with the tools we need to distinguish art-kinds from other artifactual kinds. Finally, I turn my attention to methodological issues, arguing that even though 'art' is a social kind with its roots in arbitrary and historically-contingent networks of conventions, the philosophy of art is not merely an exercise in bare conceptual analysis. In fact, there is now a great deal of evidence to show that the ways we think about 'art' are inconsistent, incomplete, imperialistic, and largely unprincipled. Yet I argue that this does not mean that the artworld data have no bearing on theories of art. Instead, I argue that our best reflective understanding of our artworld practices sets the constraints on the reference of 'art' and art-kind terms. I argue that we have no privileged epistemic access to the ontology of social kinds; our only privilege lies in our ability to determine the proper subject of our inquiries. (shrink)

This chapter attempts to analyse the shift in the Adriatic policy of the Ottoman Empire in the Napoleonic period. The focus is on the formation of the Republic of the Seven United Islands — the Ionian islands of Corfu, Paxos, Leucada, Cephalonia, Ithaca, Zante and Cythera — through active Ottoman and Russian intervention. Ottoman-Russian quarrels over the status of the Republic as well as the conflict between imperial realities versus local interests are integral to the understanding of the delicacies of (...) running the Adriatic frontier in the Napoleonic period. When the Russo-Ottoman alliance shattered and the Ionian Islands were abandoned to the French together with the four coastal towns, the Ottomans once again resorted to the good old policy of cautious diplomacy; that is to say, the provisioning of the occupying force in Corfu. (shrink)

Third in a cognitive science series, this peer-reviewed textbook critically surveys historical, current and futuristic attempts to expand the human mind. Areas covered include artificial intelligence, health and medicine, mystical experiences and spirituality, eugenics, brain-computer interfaces, Eastern versus Western psychological approaches and brain studies, virtual reality and implants. The book covers key philosophical, psychological and practical issues.

In most penal systems, success is punished more than failure. For example, murder is punished more severely than attempted murder. But success or failure is often determined by luck. It thus appears that punishment is allotted on the basis of arbitrary factors. The problem of criminal attempts is the question of how to best resolve this apparent tension. One particularly sophisticated attempt at resolution, first developed by David Lewis, holds that such differential punishment is not unjust when understood as (...) a natural penal lottery. What is most interesting about this view is that it does not appear to involve a commitment to resultant moral luck. I argue that the natural penal lottery fails to deliver justice. Upon analysis, it carries the same implication that it sought to avoid—namely, a commitment to resultant moral luck. I then argue that there can be, in principle, no penal lottery that delivers justice, natural or otherwise. (shrink)

R. A. Duff, Criminal Attempts Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, xxvii + 420 pp.

The only English translation of a crucial interpretation of Nietzsche.

Transcript of papers presented in a seminar and meetings.

This blog post begins by showing the pejorative connotations inherent in the term 'Hindu' and goes on to lay bare the differences between Hinduism and other religions including Jainism and the Abrahamic religions. So that this necessary project of dialogues is not hijacked by celibates of various traditions; the post ends with these reflections: "The Hare Krishna movement, and all other prominent movements within the Sanatana Dharma including the various well known cults of hero-worship are all structured around centralised superstructures (...) which we acquired during our long history of colonisation. Many of these movements appeal to the Western mind because they are authoritarian with strict rules. But these rules have been negated within the Sanatana Dharma by thinkers ranging from Sri Utpaladeva to Sri Abhinavagupta to Sri Kshemraja. The Sanatana Dharma stresses marriage over celibacy not because it is akin to Protestantism. There is none to protest against. Nor is it better to marry than to burn. It is simply this; marriage is not a lower state than other choices in life. It is a first step towards recognising that one can indeed be two who form a monad.". (shrink)

Couples should not be allowed to select either for or against deafnessRecently, a US couple deliberately attempted to ensure the birth of a deaf child via artificial insemination.1 In opposing this action, I wish to focus on one argument they employ to support it, namely that in trying to have a deaf child, the women see themselves as no different from parents trying to have a girl. Girls can be discriminated against the same as deaf people and “black people have (...) harder lives”, one of them argues. They compare themselves to a minority group.2In using this argument to justify their attempt to secure the birth of a deaf child, they make four claims: It is not wrong to deliberately try to have a child who is expected to experience harm when the harms the child will experience are socially imposed. As a group experiencing socially imposed harms, the deaf are to be understood as a minority group. Women and people of colour also experience social harms, and are to be understood as minority groups. Because the deaf, women, and people of colour are all groups experiencing socially imposed harms, distinctions should not be made between attempts to have a child who will be a member of one of these groups.In reply, I will advance two arguments. First, I will argue that this couple’s decision is inherently just. Here I will acknowledge that this couple’s position draws a great deal of strength from its appeal to the experiences of women. My second argument will contend, however, that despite the reasonableness of this choice, the intentional selection of deaf children is indefensible. Granting this couple’s contestable assertion that the deaf ought to be understood as a minority cultural group, allowing individuals to secure the birth of deaf …. (shrink)

Rather, in all the texts of this period Marx tries to mount a compelling critique of the present while altogether avoiding the dilemmas central to philosophy in ...

It’s generally assumed that, if an agent x acts by ϕ-ing, then there occurs an event which is x’s ϕ-ing. But what about when an agent tries to do something? Are there such things as attempts? The standard answer is ‘Yes’. But in a series of articles, and now a book, David-Hillel Ruben has argued that the answer is ‘No’: what happens when x tries to ϕ isn’t that an attempt occurs; rather, what happens is simply that a certain (...) subjunctive conditional fact obtains; x tries to ϕ just in case, had all the necessary conditions for success obtained, x would have intentionally ϕ-ed. I defend the existence of attempts. Following Ruben, I frame the issue in terms of the logical form of trying sentences. Against Ruben’s view that such sentences express subjunctive conditionals, I argue that they express existential quantifications over attempts qua events. Thus, trying sentences are true only if attempts qua events exist. (shrink)

This paper reports some attempts undertaken in Poland in the 1930s to modernize Thomism by means of modern logic. In particular, it concerns J.M. Bocheski and J. Salamucha, the leading members of the CracowCircle. They attempted to give precise logical form to the Five Ways of Thomas Aquinas. Other works concerned the concept of transcendentals, the levels of abstraction, and the concept of essence.