The justice considered here is social justice, specifically the justice of the fundamental institutions of civil society. Rawls presents a theory in the sense that he tries to construct a model to account for the facts of our judgments about justice; theoretical proposals may lead us to alter our judgments, but the theory is justified if and only if it and the facts come to reflective equilibrium. The theory proposed is an alternative to utilitarianism and is in the contract tradition (...) with particular affinity for the social and political philosophy of Kant, though without the latter’s metaphysics. The book has three parts. In the first, Rawls outlines his theory. Imagining free and equal contractors in an original position involving a veil of ignorance to ensure impartiality, Rawls argues that the contracting parties would choose principles of justice as fairness. There are two main principles: equality of liberty for all in the society, and arrangement of social and economic inequalities to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. Equal liberty is argued to take priority in such a way that it cannot be compromised for other advantages. The second part of the book deals with a number of topics such as freedom of conscience, civil disobedience, and economic distribution in an effort to show that the theory can handle these problems and yield results congruent with our intuitive judgments of justice. (shrink)

The expression "fundamental change" in the title was chosen as wider and less laden with connotation than "revolution." The study, which was originally a Yale Ph.D. dissertation, compares the views of fundamental change in H. L. A. Hart's Concept of Law and in J. P. Sartre's Critique de la raison dialectique. The two authors studied offer opportunity for interesting contrasts between analytic and dialectical methodologies. Hart's philosophy of law is considered in the first part in contrast with the less convincing (...) theories of Kelsen and of several contemporary Scandinavian legal philosophers. The central place of rules in Hart's thinking is suitably emphasized; fundamental change is considered in this legal philosophy under the heading, "The Pathology of a Legal System." In Sartre, the notions of totalization and the oath are as central as the notions of rules and acceptance are in Hart. McBride's treatment of the two authors is even-handedly critical, void of partisan polemics. Both approaches are seen to have some strengths and also some limitations. McBride feels that the two methods should somehow be complementary, but he has not yet developed an adequate framework for bringing them into dynamic and fruitful relationship. Nevertheless, this study contains a wealth of useful information regarding two very important works; it suggests important points of comparison and contrast; and it raises many important and often-neglected questions. The author has done a careful job of research which indicates that he has very considerable potential as a scholar, perhaps especially in the continental materials which he handles with assurance.--G. G. G. (shrink)

This study of the relationships of the concept of freedom to other allied notions is written from the libertarian point of view. It is based upon the author's Ph.D. dissertation at Emory University in 1962. While the present version is a revised and improved one, it remains somewhat narrow in the scope of historical materials used, concentrating on works available in English, and giving particular attention to Sir David Ross, Hastings Rashdall, C. A. Campbell, P. Nowell-Smith, and Charles Hartshorne. The (...) author locates freedom primarily in choice and argues that the key to choice-making is the ability actively to focus attention. Theories that argue for psychological determinism on the basis of motives are found to conflict with the phenomena of paying attention and trying. At the same time, Campbell's sharp distinction between the freedom of moral and non-moral choices is rejected, and also denied is the metaphysical grounding of freedom in a personality or self as agent distinct from the activity. The author is at his best in dealing with arguments of determinists concerning particular points; many of the distinctions and clarifications proposed are serious objections often overlooked by those defending determinism. Edwards is especially helpful in showing that determinist arguments generally assume universal determinacy of action on the ground of particular and/or partial determinacy, which libertarians need not deny. The examination of the relations between freedom and responsibility is intended to show that the "plain man's" views on moral responsibility cannot be adequately accounted for by a utilitarian theory of praise and blame and a determinist theory of action. The weakness of this study is its lack of an integrated metaphysical position. Thus, while Edwards rightly argues that nothing can be chosen unless it is first desired, he confusingly suggests that the function of choice is to supplement the strength of desires too weak to make themselves effective. An integrated metaphysical study might have raised questions about the commensurability of desires and goods. Again, the process-theory of agency is assumed too easily. Still, this is a useful study, and those interested in the problem will find much of value in it.--G. G. G. (shrink)