Ethical networks are an emerging form of social alliance based on collaboration between organizations that share a common ethical commitment. Grounded in a theoretical framework of virtue-based business ethics and focusing on nonprofit alliances, this study investigates the virtuousness of ethical networks; that is, how they trigger virtuous practices in their member nonprofit organizations. Adopting a qualitative grounded theory approach, the study focuses on one of the largest Italian ethical networks of nonprofit organizations operating in the social care sector. The (...) findings show that shared ethical values and religious beliefs are positively associated with ethical network building. Based on these findings, a circular model of virtuousness is proposed in which ethical networks foster virtuous practices among their members at four levels: (1) the strategic orientation level, (2) the institutional level, (3) the organizational level, and (4) the relational level. At each of these levels, ethical networks foster a habituation to virtues and the propagation of virtuous behaviors among their members. Theoretical, practical, and social implications of the research findings are discussed. (shrink)

This volume provides discussions of both the concept of responsibility and of punishment, and of both individual and collective responsibility. It provides in-depth Socratic and Kantian bases for a new version of retributivism, and defends that version against the main criticisms that have been raised against retributivism in general. It includes chapters on criminal recidivism and capital punishment, as well as one on forgiveness, apology and punishment that is congruent with the basic precepts of the new retributivism defended therein. Finally, (...) chapters on corporate responsibility and punishment are included, with a closing chapter on holding the U.S. accountable for its most recent invasion and occupation of Iraq. The book is well-focused but also presents the widest ranging set of topics of any book of its kind as it demonstrates how the concepts of responsibility and punishment apply to some of the most important problems of our time. “This is one of the best books on punishment, and the Fourth Edition continues its tradition of excellence. The book connects punishment importantly to moral responsibility and desert, and it is comprehensive in its scope, both addressing abstract, theoretical issues and applied issues as well. The topics treated include collective responsibility, apology, forgiveness, capital punishment, and war crimes. Highly recommended.”—John Martin Fischer, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside. (shrink)

Given the hundreds of articles and books that have been written in epistemology over the span of just the past few decades, relatively little has been written specifically on epistemic responsibility. What has been written rarely considers the nature of epistemic responsibility and its possible role in epistemic justification or knowledge. Instead, such work concerns philosophical analyses and arguments about related concepts such as epistemic virtues or duties, rather than epistemic praiseworthiness and blameworthiness.2 It is epistemic responsibility in the blameworthiness (...) and praiseworthiness senses that is the primary concern of this paper, though the duty sense of epistemic responsibility is explored in terms of its pertinence to epistemic virtue. What is epistemic responsibility? And what, if anything, is its relationship to justification and knowledge? (shrink)

This essay provides a critical philosophical assessment of “offensiphobia,” which is the belief that higher educational academic freedom ought to be to some important extent censured because of the mere offensiveness of certain kinds of expressions, whether those expressions are perceived as being racist, sexist, etc., effectively holding that the offensiveness of such expressions is a sufficient condition to justify its prohibition. This paper concisely sets forth the general legal parameters of the United States constitutional First Amendment right to freedom (...) of expression. Subsequently, it follows Joel Feinberg in distinguishing between harms and offenses and explains why the law should only protect against harms and not mere offenses. Following this, logical and moral considerations are brought to bear in order to further assess the implicitly supporting view of offensiphobia that faculty and students in higher educational contexts have a claim right to not be offended correlated with a duty of others to not offend them. For example, the use-mention distinction is discussed in order to explain why linguistic intent is crucial for the determination of what genuinely counts as being racist, sexist or otherwise offensive discourse. In the end, there are a variety of reasons for thinking that there is no moral right to not be offended correlated with a moral duty of others to not offend in higher educational contexts and that the law and public policy ought to track this fact. Without a right to not be offended, those who seek to curtail higher educational academic freedom rights by way of censorship stand on unreasonable ethical grounds to do so, though the law seems to permit private institutions to delimit offensive expressions. Offensiphobia ought to be rejected as it is unsupported by the balance of reason. (shrink)

This essay provides a critical philosophical assessment of “offensiphobia,” which is the belief that higher educational academic freedom ought to be to some important extent censured because of the mere offensiveness of certain kinds of expressions, whether those expressions are perceived as being racist, sexist, etc., effectively holding that the offensiveness of such expressions is a sufficient condition to justify its prohibition. This paper concisely sets forth the general legal parameters of the United States constitutional First Amendment right to freedom (...) of expression. Subsequently, it follows Joel Feinberg in distinguishing between harms and offenses and explains why the law should only protect against harms and not mere offenses. Following this, logical and moral considerations are brought to bear in order to further assess the implicitly supporting view of offensiphobia that faculty and students in higher educational contexts have a claim right to not be offended correlated with a duty of others to not offend them. For example, the use-mention distinction is discussed in order to explain why linguistic intent is crucial for the determination of what genuinely counts as being racist, sexist or otherwise offensive discourse. In the end, there are a variety of reasons for thinking that there is no moral right to not be offended correlated with a moral duty of others to not offend in higher educational contexts and that the law and public policy ought to track this fact. Without a right to not be offended, those who seek to curtail higher educational academic freedom rights by way of censorship stand on unreasonable ethical grounds to do so, though the law seems to permit private institutions to delimit offensive expressions. Offensiphobia ought to be rejected as it is unsupported by the balance of reason. (shrink)

Recently, there have been discussions about whether or not inter-collegiate football should be eliminated in the US. This article philosophically assesses the arguments for its elimination as well as the arguments proffered against its elimination. While a variety of arguments are discussed, a new one is brought into the foray of philosophical investigation, one that combines the unfairness and economic arguments: the health care and medical costs to others argument. It is believed that this argument is sufficient to justify the (...) elimination of inter-collegiate football. (shrink)

This paper explicates and challenges John Rawl's argument concerning a rule-utilitarian theory of punishment. In so doing, it argues in favour of a retributivist theory of punishment, one that seeks to justify, not only particular forms of punishment, but the institution of punishment itself. Some crucial objections to retributivism are then considered: one regarding the adverse effects of punishment on the innocent, another concerning proportional punishment, a third pertaining to vengeance and retribution, a Marxian concern with retributive punishment, and a (...) concern with the concept of desert. Each objection is deflected in order to ward-off what seem to be the most serious criticisms of a retributivist view of punishment and to clarify the depth of the retributivist position. (shrink)

In some recent articles, Dr. Leigh Turner [Doffing the Mask: Why Manuscript Reviewers Ought to Be Identifiable,” Journal of Academic Ethics, 1 (2003), pp. 41–48; “Promoting F.A.I.T.H. in Peer Review: Five Core Attributes in Effective Peer Review,” Journal of Academic Ethics, 1 (2003), pp. 181–188.] makes some rather critical observations regarding the processes of peer-review in academic journals. I shall note them in turn, note wherein I concur and wherein I disagree, and discuss some of Turner's suggestions to resolve such (...) difficulties. It is hoped that my comments on Turner's much-appreciated points will engage readers of this august and well-edited journal to take more seriously Turner's arguments for the sake of the betterment of academic research. (shrink)

This paper challenges Professor Myles Brand’s position on the role and value of intercollegiate athletics in U.S. colleges and universities on the ground that it fails to account for considerations of deep fiscal responsibility. It presents both a philosophical and ethical criticism of his position that broadens the discussion beyond athletics to include a particular kind of higher educational institution more generally.

Equality and Liberty: Analysing Rawls and Nozick is an indispensable source for those seriously interested in some rigorous assessments of the ideas of America's two most popular political philosophers. The essays in this volume cover a wide range of topics, some engaging each other in their analyses of particular Rawlsian or Nozickian themes. This collection of recent essays brings the student up-to-date concerning some of the more recent developments and assessments of Rawlsian and Nozickian ideas.

This paper investigates philosophically the question of whether or not college and university athletes in the USA are doing something morally wrong should they terminate their college or university experience prior to graduation and enter the professional athletic ranks. Various moral arguments are brought to bear in order to attempt to shed light on this issue. One reason why such athletes ?turn professional? before they graduate is the perceived economic exploitation they experience as essentially underpaid workers earning much revenue for (...) their respective institutions. But who is exploiting whom here? Is it just student athletes who are exploited by the system? I expand the reasoning about the exploitation of intercollegiate athletics to include not just student athletes, but their supporting colleges and universities. In the end, it is proposed that the National Collegiate Athletic Association and similar academically related athletic agencies should permit and encourage each of their constituent institutions as a matter of policy to protect themselves (and their supporting taxpayers, in the cases of public institutions) contractually from economic exploitation by professional sports franchises. Thus the question of student athletes leaving college for professional sports contracts has hidden beneath it questions of private professional sports franchises? exploitation of the institutions with which such student athletes are affiliated. (shrink)

This article is a critical philosophical assessment of John Searle’s theory of human rights as it is articulated both in his earlier book, The Construction of Social Reality and especially in his more recent book, Making the Social World.

This paper examines philosophically the nature and possible moral justification of racial profiling in terms of color profiling. Precisely what is such profiling, and can it ever be morally justified? If so, under what conditions is it morally justified?

Introduction : approaching Plato's dialogues -- The mouthpiece interpretation -- The anti-mouthpiece interpretation -- A Socratic interpretation of the concept of art as mimesis -- Conclusion : appreciating Plato's dialogues.

A philosophical assessment of Richard Dawkins' The God Delusion, exposing some errors of reasoning that undermine part of the foundation of his atheism. Distinctions between theism, atheism and agnosticism are also provided and explored for their significance to Dawkins' argument.

Digital contact tracing is used in different countries to help contain the COVID-19 pandemic. It raises challenging empirical and ethical questions due to its complexity and widespread effects calling for a broader approach in ethical evaluation. However, existing approaches often fail to include all relevant value perspectives or lack reference to empirical data on the artifact in question. In this paper, we describe the development of an interdisciplinary framework to analyze digital contact tracing from an empirical and ethical perspective. Starting (...) with an analysis of methodological tensions in the attempt to analyze digital contact tracing, we, firstly, set out three methodological premises regarding (a) a specific view of technology, (b) a fruitful normative perspective, and (c) ways to gather empirical knowledge about the object under investigation. Secondly, we inspect consequences of these premises to develop our research methodology. In doing so, we argue for a postphenomenological perspective on technology, solidarity as an important concept to guide the ethical perspective, and an empirical approach based on qualitative social science research and the concept of affordances. We illustrate these considerations by referring to our analysis of the German Corona-Warn-App as an instance of contact tracing based on the Exposure Notification Framework by Google and Apple. We then discuss the implications of using such a framework, including considerations concerning future developments of technologies similar to or inspired by the current concepts of contact tracing. (shrink)

The history of scholarship, philosophical or otherwise, about Plato and his writings reveals a quandary pertaining to the interpretation of the contents of Plato's dialogues. To understand Plato one must come to terms with this problem: how ought Plato's writings to be interpreted?

This paper summarizes some of the major concepts of Raimo Tuomela’s social ontology as it is articulated and defended in his most recent major works and provides a set of objections to it. It also suggests some ways to plausibly revise Tuomela’s analysis of social groups in order to evade our concerns.

It has recently been argued that there is probably no theory of punishment to be found in Immanuel Kant’s writings, but that “if one selects carefully among the many remarks and insights that Kant has left us about crime and punishment, one might even be able to build such an edifice from the bricks provided.” In this paper, I seek to provide part of a foundation of a Kantian theory of punishment, one which is consistent with many, if not all, (...) of Kant’s own insights on justice. Finally, I assess the plausibility of Kant’s view. (shrink)

In his famous essay, "A Puzzle About Belief," Saul Kripke poses a puzzle regarding belief. In this paper I shall first describe Kripke's puzzle. Second, I shall introduce and examine five positions one might take in attempting to solve Kripke's Puzzle. In so doing, I shall show why each of these attempts fails to solve Kripke's Puzzle. The significance of this analysis is that if Kripke's Puzzle remains unresolved, then (as Kripke himself claims) the normal apparatus for belief ascription needs (...) rethinking. (shrink)

Herbert Fingarette [1] argues that alcoholism is not a disease and that the alleged alcoholic under certain circumstances has the power to control his or her drinking disorders. I shall analyze Fingarette's argument and show that his position rests on some logical and conceptual confusions.In analyzing Fingarette's argument for the self-control theory of drinking disorders I conclude that it is problematic for the following reasons: (1) his argument assumes that the identification of a single cause of alcoholism is a necessary (...) condition of its being a disease; (2) unless it is already assumed (a priori) that persons with drinking disorders possess freedom and self-control to the extent that Fingarette assumes they do, then such persons are likely to suffer from apathy or defeatism regarding their condition; (3) even if Fingarette is correct in his criticism of certain health care programs for those with drinking disorders, it does not follow from this that certain theories about the possible causes of such disorders are false; (4) Fingarette's claim that those with drinking disorders are morally responsible for their actions that result from their disorders is problematic, that is, unless it can be shown that such persons act freely; and (5) Fingarette attempts to support the self-control theory of alcoholism by refuting a straw man conception of the disease model of alcoholism. (shrink)

This essay argues that Alvin I. Goldman's truth-linked theory of group knowledge (veritism) omits individual components of social cognition, that all group based theories of knowledge lead to scepticism, and that if any sense is to be made of social knowledge, it must be done on individualist lines. I argue that Goldman's veritism can be reconstructed by adopting a reliabilist theory,social reliabilism. And I argue that Goldman's objections to a particular sort of consensualism are not telling. So there are now (...) two plausible and competing theories of social knowledge-social reliabilism and consensualism. (shrink)

This paper describes and assesses the arguments offered both \nagainst closed borders and in favor of a more open borders approach to U.S. \nimmigration reform as those arguments are set forth in R. Pevnick’s book, \nImmigration and the Constraints of Justice. We find numerous problems \nwith Pevnick’s reasoning on both counts.

This article presents philosophical-ethical arguments concerning the extent to which NCAA inter-collegiate football is a public good and some implausible implications of the claim that it constitutes a public good and ought to be publicly subsidized as part of a component of U.S. higher education generally as is currently the case. Underlying this main argument is one concerning who or what should have the responsibility for subsidizing the necessary costs of the sport, including its associated healthcare and medical costs.

In recent years, there has been a great deal of philosophical discussion about the alleged moral right to die. If there is such a moral right, then it would seem to imply a moral duty on others to not interfere with the exercise of the right. And this might have important implications for public policy insofar as public policy ought to track what is morally right.

A educação do homem interior: O cultivo da vontade em Agostinho de Hipona Resumo: O estudo aqui apresentado tem como objetivo principal a investigação da formação humana nas obras filosóficas Comentários Literal ao Gênesis, A Trindade e O livre-arbítrio, de Agostinho de Hipona. Para isso, aborda-se a noção da antropologia do referido autor; a sua compreensão de corpo e alma (dimensão humana no homem animal) e, por último, objetiva-se explicitar alguns pressupostos de uma educação do ser humano orientada a uma (...) boa formação da vontade. Trata-se de uma pesquisa bibliográfica, exploratória e de caráter hermenêutico. Agostinho concebe a ideia de homem como um ser dotado de corpo e alma. A alma, quando bem formada, pode conduzir os indivíduos à vida com sabedoria e, portanto, a uma beata vita. A vontade é o que movimenta toda as outras dimensões do ser humano e, por isso, ela deve ser bem formada. A educação da vontade, para o pensador, consiste em realizar o jogo de utilizar os objetos que servem de meio para algo e fruir ou contemplar aquilo que é fim em si mesmo. A vontade humana difere do que se passa no reino animal e é capaz de guiar bem o homem, concedendo-lhe minimamente uma relação de desprendimento com a matéria. Conclui-se, a partir dessas linhas mestras do pensamento do autor, que a ética agostiniana ao mesmo tempo que estabelece princípios para o bem agir e lograr uma vida feliz, exige, para isso, um processo formativo que consiste na educação da vontade, uma vez que Agostinho compreende-a como livre em si, isto é, como autodeterminante, ela pode voltar-se por si àquilo que é presença constante, isto é, a objetos de foro contemplativo e afastar-se, tanto quanto possível, dos ditames de uma vida submetida ao mundo material. Palavras-chave: Formação; Vontade; Cultivo; Santo Agostinho; Alma. La educación del hombre interior: el cultivo de la voluntad en Agostinho de Hipona Resumen: El estudio aquí presentado tiene como objetivo principal la investigación de la formación humana en las obras filosóficas Comentarios Literal al Génesis, La Trinidad y El Libre-Arbitrio, de Agostinho de Hipona. Así, se trata la noción y antropología del referido autor, su comprensión de cuerpo y alma (dimensión humana en el hombre animal) y, por último, se objetiva explicitar algunos supuestos de una educación del ser humano orientada a una buena formación de la voluntad. Es una investigación bibliográfica, exploratoria y de carácter hermenéutico. Agostinho concibe la idea de hombre como un ser dotado de cuerpo y alma. El alma, cuando bien formada, puede conducir los individuos a la vida con sabiduría y, por lo tanto, a una beata vita. La voluntad es lo que conduce todas las otras dimensiones del ser humano y, de esta manera, ella debe de ser bien formada. La educación de la voluntad, para el pensador, supone realizar el juego de utilizar los objetos que sirven como medio para algo y fruir o contemplar aquello que tiene fin en sí mismo. La voluntad humana es distinta de lo que se pasa en el reino animal y es capaz de guiar bien el hombre, le permitiendo mínimamente una relación de desprendimiento con la materia. Se concluye, desde esas líneas maestras del pensamiento del autor, que la ética agostiniana al tiempo que establece principios para el bien actuar y lograr una vida feliz, exige, para eso, un proceso formativo que consiste en la educación de la voluntad, una vez que Agostinho la comprende como libre en sí, es decir, como auto determinante, ella puede volverse a lo que es presencia constante, o sea, volverse a objetos de foro contemplativo y aislarse, tanto como sea posible, de los dictados de una vida sometida al mundo material. Palabras-clave: Formación; Voluntad; Cultivo; Santo Agostinho; Alma. The education of the inner-man: The cultivation of will in Augustine of Hippo Abstract: This study is aimed at investigating human formation in the philosophical works On the literal meaning of Genesis, On the Trinity and On free choice of the will, by Augustine of Hippo. To meet that aim, the author’s notion of anthropology is addressed; his understanding of body and soul (human dimension in the human animal) and, finally, we explain some assumptions related to the education of the human being as leading to the good formation of will. This is a bibliographical, exploratory and hermeneutical study. Augustine conceives the idea of man as a being with body and soul. The soul, when well formed, can lead individuals to life with wisdom and, therefore, to a beata vita. Will moves all the other dimensions of the human being and, thus, it must be well formed. For Augustine, the education of the will consists of performing the game of using objects that work as means for something and enjoy or contemplate what is an end in itself. Human will differs from that of the animal kingdom and is capable of guiding man well, granting him a minimal relation of detachment from the material. The conclusion, based on such guidelines from Augustine’s thought, is that Augustinian ethics establishes principles for acting well and reaching a happy life and, at the same time, demands, for those aims, a formative process that consists of the education of the will, as Augustine understands it as free in itself, i.e., as self-determining, for it can turn by itself to what is a constant presence, i.e., to objects of contemplative scope and move away, as far as possible, from the dictates of a life submitted to the material world. Keywords: Formation; Will; Cultivation; Saint Augustine; Soul. Data de registro: 07/03/2020 Data de aceite: 22/09/2021. (shrink)

Adotei uma abordagem experimental para essa questão. Atos de vontade livre são precedidos por uma mudança elétrica específica no cérebro 3, que inicia 550 milissegundos antes do ato. As pessoas tomaram consciência da intenção de agir 350-400 milissegundos depois do início do RP e 200 milissegundos antes do ato motor. O processo volitivo é, portanto, iniciado inconscientemente. Mas a função consciente ainda poderia controlar o resultado; pode vetar o ato. O livre-arbítrio não é, portanto, excluído. Essas descobertas impõem restrições às (...) visões de como o livre-arbítrio pode operar; não faria iniciar um ato voluntário, mas poderia controlar a realização. As descobertas também afetam perspectivas de culpa e responsabilidade. (shrink)

Resenha acadêmica de: RAMOS, Marcos Vinícius. O Apocalipse Siríaco de Daniel. São Paulo: Paulus, 2017. 120 pp. ISBN 978-85-349-4496-0.

Resenha crítica do livro: OSBORNE, Grant R. Apocalipse: Comentário Exegético. São Paulo: Vida Nova, 2014.999 pp. ISBN 978-85-275-0562-8. Título original: Revelation.

This paper is an elaboration of my previous paper published in Philosophy, ‘Making Sense of retributivism,’ which was a criticism of John Rawls' attempt in ‘Two Concepts of Rules’ to develop a rule utilitarian theory of punishment wherein utilitarianism is best construed as a justificatory basis for the institution of punishment and retributivism is best construed as serving as a justificatory basis for particular forms of punishment. I challenge this claim, arguing that retributivism must and can provide a justification both (...) for the institution of punishment and for particular forms of punishment. In the end, I develop an analysis of the nature of desert as responsibility and proportionality. This notion of desert makes the best sense of retributivism. (shrink)