The development of genomic technologies has seemed almost magical. Excitement about it, both in medicine and among the public, stems from the belief that genomic techniques will illuminate the causes of health and disease, will lead to effective interventions for both rare and common genetic conditions, and will inform reproductive decision‐making. Novel diagnostic tools, however, are often deployed before targeted therapies are developed, tested, or available and before their psychosocial implications are explored. Newer technologies such as prenatal whole exome screening (...) are seen as offering “decisional autonomy” to expectant parents, although such technologies identify information about genetic sequencing that may not have clear meaning. The “therapeutic gap” between the ability to conduct genetic sequencing and the ability to fully understand what the test results mean, much less what treatments to offer, leaves families with complex and unclear information they cannot act upon with confidence during pregnancy. In this essay, we will consider the psychosocial and ethical implications of such assumptions—and of the uncertain information produced by these technologies—for individuals and families and for societal aspects such as medical service usage and demographic inequities. (shrink)

As social media becomes increasingly popular, human subjects researchers are able to use these platforms to locate, track, and communicate with study participants, thereby increasing participant retention and the generalizability and validity of research. The use of social media; however, raises novel ethical and regulatory issues that have received limited attention in the literature and federal regulations. We review research ethics and regulations and outline the implications for maintaining participant privacy, respecting participant autonomy, and promoting researcher transparency when using social (...) media to locate and track participants. We offer a rubric that can be used in future studies to determine ethical and regulation-consistent use of social media platforms and illustrate the rubric using our study team’s experience with Facebook. We also offer recommendations for both researchers and institutional review boards that emphasize the importance of well-described procedures for social media use as... (shrink)

The shortage of organs for transplantation by its nature prompts ethical dilemmas. For example, although there is an imperative to save human life and reduce suffering by maximising the supply of vital organs, there is an equally important obligation to ensure that the process by which we increase the supply respects the rights of all stakeholders. In a relatively unexamined practice in the USA, organs are procured from unrepresented decedents without their express consent. Unrepresented decedents have no known healthcare wishes (...) or advance care planning document; they also lack a surrogate. The Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 2006 sends a mixed message about the procurement of organs from this patient population and there are hospitals that authorise donation. In addition, in adopting the RUAGA, some states included provisions that clearly allow organ procurement from unrepresented decedents. An important unanswered question is whether this practice meets the canons of ethical permissibility. The current Brief Report presents two principled approaches to the topic as a way of highlighting some of the complexities involved. Concluding remarks offer suggestions for future research and discussion. (shrink)

In the 3rd Analogy, Kant claims that I can perceive that things coexist by synthesizing my perceptions in an order-indifferent way. Reigning orthodoxy holds that I first successively perceive different things, and then (through some further act) determine that the things I perceive coexist. Focusing on prominent examples of this approach, I argue that these accounts fail to do justice to the order-indifferent synthesis that Kant describes: Strawson explains the synthesis in a way which renders Kant’s argument in the 3rd (...) Analogy obviously unconvincing, Watkins makes the synthesis irrelevant to Kant’s argument, while Longuenesse and Allison make the unity of the synthesis obscure. The problems with these views, I contend, show that Kant thinks the rule for synthesizing my perceptions is already operative in the successive perceptions, such that the fundamental act of perception already involves ‘objective time-determinations.’ This connects with the recent dispute about whether Kant is a conceptualist: my argument provides additional evidence that Kant is a conceptualist, while also extending the conceptualist reading to the 3rd Analogy in a novel way. For those who think conceptualism is wrong, my argument serves as a critical notice that non-conceptualists have yet to offer a satisfying interpretation of the 3rd Analogy. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: In this commentary, I focus on several issues concerning the notion of presentation. I argue that Fultot, Nie and Carello do not pay sufficient attention to these problems, despite the fact that Gibson, compared here with Husserl, may be regarded as one of those thinkers who made an important contribution to this.

Spinoza’s conatus doctrine, the main proposition of which claims, “[e]ach thing, to the extent it is in itself, strives [conatur] to persevere in its being” (E3p6), has been the subject of growing interest. This is understandable, for Spinoza’s psychology and ethics are based on this doctrine. In my paper I shall examine the way Spinoza argues for E3p6 in its demonstration which runs as follows: "For singular things are modes by which God’s attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate (...) way (by 1p25c), i.e. (by 1p34), things that express, in a certain and determinate way, God’s power, by which God is and acts. And no thing has anything in itself by which it can be destroyed, or which takes its existence away (by p4). On the contrary, it is opposed to everything which can take its existence away (by p5). Therefore, to the extent it can, and is in itself, it strives to persevere in its being." This argument has been severely criticized for being defective in many ways. E3p6d contains four items, E1p25c, 1p34, 3p4, and 3p5. Most often, only the two last mentioned are regarded as doing any real work in the demonstration. However, I shall argue that having a proper grasp of Spinoza’s concept of power enables us see that the demonstration’s beginning, built on E1p25c and 1p34, brings forth a certain dynamic framework in which finite things are centers of causal power, capable of producing effects in virtue of their essences. My examination of this framework shows the beginning of the demonstration to be irreplaceable: in the end, conatus is one form of power, and E1p25c and 1p34 not only bring the notion of power into play, but also inform us on how finite things’ power should be understood in the monistic system. So, I disagree with such commentators as Jonathan Bennett, Edwin Curley, Daniel Garber, Michael Della Rocca, and Richard Manning, who see Spinoza as trying to derive the conatus doctrine from E3p4 and 3p5 alone; and I agree with Alexandre Matheron, Henry Allison, and Martin Lin, who stress the importance of E1p25c and 1p34. -/- However, this still leaves us the task of reconstructing the whole derivation and showing how its various ingredients fit together. If E1p25c and 1p34 are so important, could E3p6 not be derived from them alone, as Martin Lin has argued? In other words, why are E3p4 and 3p5 needed at all? To answer these questions I shall provide an interpretation of E3p6d that explains how the argument is supposed to work. E1p25c and 1p34 say that finite things are, in essence, dynamic causers, which, in case of opposition, truly resist opposing factors with their power and do not simply cease their causal activities whenever facing obstacles; in other words, they strive against any opposition. However, this is not enough to guarantee that they could not act self-destructively or restrain their own power, which would make them incapable of self-preservation. But this would go against E3p4, “No thing can be destroyed except through an external cause,” and Spinoza uses it to claim, “no thing has anything in itself by which it can be destroyed, or which takes its existence away.” So all this allows Spinoza to hold that finite things are consistent causers, that is, entities endowed with power and, insofar they cause effects solely in virtue of their essence, they never use their power self-destructively. The significance and role of the final item in the demonstration, E3p5 (“Things are of a contrary nature, i.e., cannot be in the same subject, insofar as one can destroy the other”), still needs to be determined. Indeed, considering its content and the way it is used in the demonstration, it seems to be a surprisingly decisive ingredient in the argument. Namely, what “each thing, to the extent it is in itself,” that is, insofar as any thing is considered disregarding everything external to it, strives to preserve, is its being (esse), not simply its present state. This together with E3p5’s view of subjecthood – which I shall explicate in my paper – suggests that we should rethink what kind of “being” or “existence” is meant in E3p6. Indeed, for Spinoza, each subject has a definable essence from which, as far as the subject in question is in itself, certain properties or effects necessarily follow; consequently a subject’s full being involves not only instantiating a certain essence, but also those properties inferable from the essence-expressing definition. Thus, E3p5 is meant to bring forward that things are not merely non-self-destroyers but subjects from whose definitions properties follow; and as Spinoza thinks to have shown (by E1p25c and 1p34) that finite modifications are entities endowed with power, any subject has true power to produce the properties or effects derivable from its definition, which, Spinoza claims, implies opposing everything harmful. In other words, things exercise power as their definition states, i.e. according to their definitions, and thus bringing in the idea of things as expressers of power enables Spinoza to convert logical oppositions (of E3p5) into real ones (of E3p6). To summarize, Spinoza reasons that each true finite thing is, in itself, an expresser of power (E1p25c, 1p34) that never acts self-destructively (E3p4) but instead strives to drive itself through opponents to produce effects as they follow from the definition of the thing in question (E1p25c, 1p34, and 3p5). Therefore, “each thing, to the extent it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being.” The demonstration of E3p6 has its roots deep in Spinoza’s ontology, and since its concept of power is supposed to provide the metaphysical grounding for real opposition, the importance of E1p25c and 1p34 should not be underestimated just because Spinoza – as often happens – puts his point exceedingly briefly. Moreover, the derivation is basically valid and contains no superfluous elements. Finally, all this tells us something decisive about the meaning of Spinoza’s doctrine: according to it, things are active causers whose “power to exist and act” has conatus character in temporality, amounting not only to striving to prolong the duration of one’s actualization but also to striving to be as active or autonomous as possible, that is, to attain a state determined by the striving subject’s essence alone. (shrink)

Ivan Efimovič Orlov’s paper “The calculus of the compatibility of propositions”, published in Russian in 1928, is fascinating for anyone interested in the early history of relevance, modal or intuitionistic logic. This is a guide that outlines Orlov's life and work, analyses the content of the paper, and relates it to work of his contemporaries and successors.

This article revisits the theme of the feminine in Levinas's writings and the Daodejing. First it addresses the question why the feminine as thematized through eros in Levinas's early work loses her centrality in his later texts. Second it explores the feminine water metaphor and the Dao of ci 雌 in the Daodejing. On the basis of these interpretations, it attempts at an analysis of relevant ambiguities and problematics concealed in Levinas's philosophical enterprise, and urges for the exigency of an (...) intercultural perspective, instead of remaining within a singular intellectual tradition. (shrink)

English Summary: Although most religions claim peace as a goal to pursue, religions have been used as justification for violence again and again. Since September 11th, 2001 the Western and Eastern world has been confronted again with violence in the name of religion. As a fundamentalist understanding of religion is a fruitful basis for war and terror, it is essential to empower the liberal movements in the world religions, to support a peaceful community of people from different cultures and religions. (...) Therefore, it is of central importance for our own religious self-concept how faith and reason can be combined to make it possible to feel at home in our own religion and to welcome a pluralistic society. German description: Obwohl in den meisten Religionen Frieden als anzustrebendes Ziel gilt, wurden Religionen immer wieder zur Legitimation von Gewalt genutzt. Seit den Ereignissen des 11. September 2001 ist die westliche und ostliche Welt erneut konfrontiert mit der Gewalt im Namen der Religion. Insofern ein fundamentalistisches Religionsverstandnis den Nahrboden fur Krieg und Terror bildet, kommt es darauf an, die liberalen Krafte und Stromungen in den Weltreligionen zu starken, um ein friedliches Zusammenleben von Angehorigen verschiedener Kulturen und Religionen zu fordern. Fur das eigene religiose Selbstverstandnis ist daher von zentraler Bedeutung, wie Glaube und Vernunft so aufeinander bezogen werden konnen, dass es moglich ist, sowohl in der eigenen Religion beheimatet zu sein als auch die pluralistische Gesellschaft zu bejahen. Mit Beitragen von Michael Grossmann, Rabeya Muller, Wolfgang Pfuller, Andreas Rossler, Arnulf von Scheliha, Christian Wiese, Hans-Georg Wittig, Werner Zager und Ingo J. Zollich. (shrink)

According to Kant, as far as the realisation of humanity is concerned, man is dependent on knowledge. But which science guarantees him an insight into what it means to be a human being? Philosophy? Anthropology? Philosophical anthropology? This study’s problem-oriented development of the question: ‘What is man?’ deals with the anthropological concepts of Scheler, Plessner, Portmann and Gehlen, drawing on the insights of classical philosophy. The focus of its critique is the biologism that is symptomatic of the failure of the (...) attempt to clarify the nature of man in comparative distinction to the form of existence of the animal. With reference to Herder, who understands man as a linguistic being, this book outlines the first steps on the path to overcoming the programme of modern anthropology through a form of ‘philosophy from language’. (shrink)

Sind wir in unserem Denken, Entscheiden und Handeln frei? Diese Frage beschäftigt Menschen nicht erst seit der neueren Hirnforschung. Bereits die Römer kennen die Vorstellung eines willentlich handelnden Subjekts und haben daher den Begriff des Willens (voluntas) geprägt. Und auch die biblische Tradition von den Geboten Gottes, die der Mensch befolgen soll, legte einen solchen Gedanken nahe. Aus diesen Überlieferungssträngen schöpfend, verfasste der Kirchenvater Augustin seine Schrift De libero arbitrio (Über den freien Willen). Durch die weitere Theologie- und Philosophiegeschichte zieht (...) sich dann die Auseinandersetzung darüber, in welchem Mass der menschliche Wille frei bzw. unfrei ist. So bestritt etwa Luther gegen Erasmus die Willensfreiheit in Fragen des Heils. Die Beiträge des Bandes bedenken das Thema der Willensfreiheit jedoch nicht nur in theologischer und philosophischer Hinsicht, sondern beziehen auch biologische, psychologische und ethische Perspektiven mit ein, die den gegenwärtig geführten Debatten verpflichtet sind."-- Back cover. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Die bürgerliche Welt" verfügbar.

"Rastafari practitioners have continually resisted social sciences definition of what outsiders called a millenarian movement. They maintained against these efforts of categorization that Rastafari as a lived and living philosophy combines ancient roots with ever emerging routes. These historical, dynamic and creative dimensions challenge any homogenizing attempts to freeze the 'movement' in time and space. African origins are as important as Diasporean experiences for Rastafari in the manifold struggles to downstroy slavery and oppression. But the strong universal appeal towards the (...) realization of equal rights and justice implodes analytical and practical limitations of a Black Atlantic culture. This volume brings together contributions from well-known Rastafari practitioners and social scientists as a counter to the unilateral politics of outside definition, identification, and misrepresentation. They discuss Rastafari as an experimental philosophy; its historical and contemporary global culture dimensions and its contribution to issues such as decolonization, reparation and repatriation. ". (shrink)

Why should interpretation of conceptual schemes and practices across traditions work at all? In this paper we present the following necessary conditions of possibility for interpretation in comparative and Chinese philosophy: the interpreter must presuppose that there are mutually recognizable human practices; the interpreter must presuppose that “the other” is, on the whole, sincere, consistent, and right; the interpreter must be committed to certain epistemic virtues. Some of these necessary conditions are consistent with the fact that interpretation is not thwarted (...) by the “danger” of relativism or of incommensurability. Some other conditions are suggestive of reorientations of methodologies of comparative and Chinese philosophy. (shrink)

FOR hundreds or even thousands of years posterity saw in Aristotle only the impersonal intellectual majesty of the philosophical system. When awakening humanism began everywhere to seek in the works of the classic writers the impress of their personality, this new interest met in Aristotle with the most stubborn resistance. His was a very different case from that of Plato or Demosthenes. The few notices preserved of his life and person remained in merely external relation to the body of his (...) works. In recent times we have begun, however, to discern the intellectual history of the man Aristotle, and in this regard his relations to Plato naturally acquire special significance. In the various phases of his life these relations took various forms; but in view of late gossip about the pupil's ingratitude to the master, it is as well to say that never was Aristotle^s attitude to Plato other than one of the deepest possible veneration. It has a special psychological fascination to see how this veneration expressed itself at the time when Aristotle found himself committed to philosophical opposition to his master; and it is significant that the only documentary proofs of Aristotle's attitude that we possess belong to these years. Evidently his veneration found this compensating expression when he was forced to publish his philosophical critisma. (shrink)

We generalize Ripley’s results on the transitivity of consequence relation, without assuming a logic to be monotonic. Following Gabbay, we assume nonmonotonic consequence relation to be inclusive and cautious monotonic, and figure out the implications between different forms of transitivity of logical consequence. Weaker frameworks without inclusiveness or cautious monotonicity are also discussed. The paper may provide basis for the study of both non-transitive logics and nonmonotonic ones.

in press, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review.

The COVID-19 pandemic gave rise to social and economic problems and pose a threat to most of enterprise. Faced with crisis and challenge, effective leaders and devoted employees are important factors for enterprises to overcome difficulties. We propose a moderated mediation model wherein narcissistic leader predicts subordinate’s followership through leader self-interest behavior perceived by subordinates, with organizational identification of leader acting as the contextual condition. Two-wave data collected from 303 employees in the manufacturing and technology industry in China supported our (...) hypothesized model. We found that narcissistic leader has negative impact on subordinates’ followership due to their perception of leader’s self-interest behavior. Further, organizational identification of leader plays a moderate role in the relationship between narcissistic leader and subordinates’ followership. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. We also offer several promising directions for future research. (shrink)

Studies have shown that narcissistic individuals are more likely to become leaders in uncertain situations, while few studies paid attention to the relational mechanism, linking a narcissistic leader with subordinates and team attitudes and behaviors. Based on the “guanxi” and dominance complementarity theory, we examined the influencing mechanism of narcissistic leaders on subordinates and team followership. Two-wave data collected from 326 employees in the manufacturing and technology industry in China supported our hypothesized model. We have found that narcissistic leaders have (...) a negative impact on followership and TF of subordinates; Supervisor–subordinate guanxi and team leadership relationship identity play a partial mediating role between narcissistic leadership and subordinates and team followership. Furthermore, individual and team values play a moderating role in the process of influencing a mechanism. In other words, the higher the individual tradition and team power distance, the less negative impact of leader narcissism on SSG and team leadership relationship identity. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. We also offer several promising directions for future research. (shrink)