The English Franciscan philosopher and theologian, Adam of Wodeham (d. 1358), was a disciple and friend of William of Ockham; he was also a student of Walther Chatton. Nevertheless, he was an independent thinker who did not hesitate to criticize his former teachers - Ockham sporadically and benevolently, Chatton, frequently and aggressively. Since W odeham developed his own doctrinal position by a thorough critical examination of current opinions, the first part of this introduc tion briefly outlines the positions (...) of the chief figures in the English controversy over indivisibles. The second part of the introduction pre sents a summary of Wodeham's views in the Tractatus de indivisibilibus, lists the contents of the treatise, and considers the question of its date and its chronological position in the context of Wodeham's other works. In the third part, the editorial procedures used here are set forth. 1. THE INDIVISIBILIST CONTROVERSY In the literature of the 13th and 14th centuries, the term 'indivisible' refers to a simple, un extended entity. Consequently, these indivisibles are not physical atoms but either mathematical points, temporal instants or indivisibles of motion, usually called mutata esse. I THOMAS BRADWARDINE (d. 1349), roughly contemporary with Wodeham, classified the positions it was possible to take regarding indivisibles. He described his own view as the common view, that of "Aristotle, A verroes, and most of the moderns," according to which a "continuum was not composed of atoms (athomis) but of parts divisible without end. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION Adam Wodeham, OFM (d.) has received only passing mention in the textbooks on the history of medieval philosophy. Although recognized as a major ...

The present paper examines the trinitarian theology of Adam Wodeham and Walter Chatton through an examination of the filioque, i.e., the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and Son. The paper argues that the strong emphasis on divine simplicity that emerged in the early fourteenth century had a subtle influence on how Wodeham and Chatton understood the intra-trinitarian distinctions between the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

This paper looks at the critical reception of two central claims of Peter Auriol’s theory of cognition: the claim that the objects of cognition have an apparent or objective being that resists reduction to the real being of objects, and the claim that there may be natural intuitive cognitions of nonexistent objects. These claims earned Auriol the criticism of his fellow Franciscans, Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham. According to them, the theory of apparent being was what had led (...) Auriol to allow for intuitive cognitions of nonexistents, but the intuitive cognition of nonexistents, at its turn, led to scepticism. Modern commentators have offered similar readings of Auriol, but this paper argues, first, that the apparent being provides no special reason to think there could be intuitions of nonexistent objects, and second, that despite his idiosyncratic account of intuition, Auriol was no more vulnerable to scepticism than his critics. (shrink)

As its modern edition appears in the Synthese Historical Library, Adam WodehamThis book is an important contribution to the history of philosophy.It will be of interest to all medievalists, particularly to those concerned with medieval science, philosophy, and logic. Theologians and historians of mathematics will also find it useful.Whether charity or [any] other incorruptible form is composed of indivisible forms.Because this difficulty is the same for all composite divisible things, whether intensive or extensive, which are of one and the (...) same species or homogeneous, therefore I will briefly inquire indifferently concerning the former and the latter.” 3 The solutions Wodeham then proposes to the questions he asks rely nearly always on logic. (shrink)

This paper presents an original interpretation of the fourteenth-century debate over whether every volitio is a cognitio. This debate, I argue, was at its heart a debate about what constitutes the mark of occurrent mental states. Three participants in this debate – Adam Wodeham, Richard FitzRalph, and John of Ripa – articulated three distinct accounts of the mark of the mental. In doing so, they also developed several philosophical accounts of the intentionality of occurrent affective states.

As its modern edition appears in the Synthese Historical Library, Adam Wodeham’s Tractatus de indivisibilibus does not appear to belong to any one discipline. With regard to its intended audience, the notice of the book appearing on the back cover states that “This book is an important contribution to the history of philosophy.” But it continues, “It will be of interest to all medievalists, particularly to those concerned with medieval science, philosophy, and logic. Theologians and historians of mathematics (...) will also find it useful.”Adam de Wodeham, Tractatus de indivisibilibus. A Critical Edition with Introduction, Translation, and Textual Notes, ed. Rega Wood (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988). In its medieval context as well, Tractatus de indivisibilibus had ambiguous disciplinary status. It begins with the question, “Whether charity or [any] other incorruptible form is composed of indivisible forms.”Wodeham, Tractatus de indivisibilibus, p. 33. Such a reference to charity signals a connection to the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Book I, dist. 17. In introducing his answer to this question, however, Wodeham states, “Because this difficulty is the same for all composite divisible things, whether intensive or extensive, which are of one and the same species or homogeneous, therefore I will briefly inquire indifferently concerning the former and the latter.”Wodeham, Tractatus de indivisibilibus, pp. 34–35. Here and elsewhere, I occasionally modify Rega Wood’s translation in the interests of exactness. The solutions Wodeham then proposes to the questions he asks rely nearly always on logic. (shrink)

As its modern edition appears in the Synthese Historical Library, Adam Wodeham’s Tractatus de indivisibilibus does not appear to belong to any one discipline. With regard to its intended audience, the notice of the book appearing on the back cover states that “This book is an important contribution to the history of philosophy.” But it continues, “It will be of interest to all medievalists, particularly to those concerned with medieval science, philosophy, and logic. Theologians and historians of mathematics (...) will also find it useful.”Adam de Wodeham, Tractatus de indivisibilibus. A Critical Edition with Introduction, Translation, and Textual Notes, ed. Rega Wood (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988). In its medieval context as well, Tractatus de indivisibilibus had ambiguous disciplinary status. It begins with the question, “Whether charity or [any] other incorruptible form is composed of indivisible forms.”Wodeham, Tractatus de indivisibilibus, p. 33. Such a reference to charity signals a connection to the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Book I, dist. 17. In introducing his answer to this question, however, Wodeham states, “Because this difficulty is the same for all composite divisible things, whether intensive or extensive, which are of one and the same species or homogeneous, therefore I will briefly inquire indifferently concerning the former and the latter.”Wodeham, Tractatus de indivisibilibus, pp. 34–35. Here and elsewhere, I occasionally modify Rega Wood’s translation in the interests of exactness. The solutions Wodeham then proposes to the questions he asks rely nearly always on logic. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Norwich Lectures The Oxford Lectures Lost works by Wodeham Conclusion Note.

Complexe significabilia are the significate of whole sentences, irreducible to what is signified by categorematic sub-sentential components. It has been propounded firstly by Adam Wodeham. Wodeham construes his argument for the postulation of complexe significabilia as a middle way between William of Ockham and Walter Chatton. According to Wodeham, Ockham’s view implies a reflexive theory of mental acts, which goes against the phenomenology of the act of assent. Moreover, it leads to an anti-realist epistemology. We need (...) therefore things outside the mind to be object of the act of assent, which is also the conclusion reached by Chatton. However, against Chatton, Wodeham argues that things signified by the categorematic component of sentences cannot be the object of assent. In effect, sentences with different syncategorematic structures, but with the same categorematic components, would correspond to the same propositional attitude in Chatton’s framework, which is an unwelcome consequence. The result is that we need to postulate that the objects of assent are outside the mind, contra Ockham, that are not signified by sentential categorematic components, contra Chatton, but are irreducibly signified by the whole sentences. (shrink)

Adam of Wodeham and William of Ockham ascribe different properties to intuitive apprehensions. The properties that Wodeham ascribes to intuitive cognitions concur with his reading of one of the four scenarios that Ockham proposes in order to test the idea that an intuitive apprehension serves as an epistemic warrant. In this article, I explain that Wodeham avoids skepticism through his account of intuitive cognitions; even though, like Ockham, he accepts that God can cause us to undergo (...) various sorts of mental acts in virtue of which we could believe that something exists when really it does not exist. (shrink)

New Tenth Anniversary edition of this classic text with a new preface by the author, compares myths about meat-eating with myths about manliness, and seeks to ...

The Significance Argument (SA) for the irreducibility of consciousness is based on a series of new puzzle-cases that I call multiple candidate cases. In these cases, there is a multiplicity of physical-functional properties or relations that are candidates to be identified with the sensible qualities and our consciousness of them, where those candidates are not significantly different. I will argue that these cases show that reductive materialists cannot accommodate the various ways in which consciousness is significant and must allow massive (...) vagueness in conscious experience. I also will argue that a nonreductive theory of the conscious-of relation can easily provide a very satisfying, unified explanation of the ways in which this relation is significant. (shrink)

Though the vegetarian movement sparked by Peter Singer’s book Animal Liberation has achieved some success, there is more animal suffering caused today due to factory farming than there was when the book was originally written. In this paper, I argue that there may be a technological solution to the problem of animal suffering in intensive factory farming operations. In particular, I suggest that recent research indicates that we may be very close to, if not already at, the point where we (...) can genetically engineer factory-farmed livestock with a reduced or completely eliminated capacity to suffer. In as much as animal suffering is the principal concern that motivates the animal welfare movement, this development should be of central interest to its adherents. Moreover, I will argue that all people concerned with animal welfare should agree that we ought to replace the animals currently used in factory farming with animals whose ability to suffer is diminished if we are able to do so. (shrink)

Ulrich Beck's best selling Risk Society established risk on the sociological agenda. It brought together a wide range of issues centering on environmental, health and personal risk, provided a rallying ground for researchers and activists in a variety of social movements and acted as a reference point for state and local policies in risk management. The Risk Society and Beyond charts the progress of Beck's ideas and traces their evolution. It demonstrates why the issues raised by Beck reverberate widely throughout (...) social theory and covers the new risks that Beck did not foresee, associated with the emergence of new technologies, genetic and cybernetic. The book is unique because it offers both an introduction to the main arguments in Risk Society and develops a range of critical discussions of aspects of this and other works of Beck. (shrink)

Fieldwork in Familiar Places challenges the misconceptions about morality, culture, and objectivity that support these skepticisms, to show that we can take ...

Thus Plotinus (what is his status in the history of metaphysics and in the "Platonic" era, if one follows Heidegger's reading?), who speaks of presence, that is, also of morphē, as the trace of nonpresence, as the amorphous (to gar ikhnos tou amorphous morphē). A trace which is neither absence nor presence, nor, in whatever modality, a secondary modality.In his reading of Heidegger in his 2003 seminar, published as The Beast and the Sovereign, Derrida is particularly troubled by one particular (...) aspect of Heidegger: Heidegger's "superabundant use" of the language of Walten.1 "As you see," Derrida writes of Heidegger's use of Walten, "late in my life of reading Heidegger, I have just discovered a word that seems to .. (shrink)

What makes your life go well for you? In this paper, we give an account of welfare. Our core idea is simple. There are impersonally good and bad things out there: things that are good or bad period, not (or not only) good or bad for someone. The life that is good for you is the life in contact with the good. We’ll understand the relevant notion of ‘contact’ here in terms of manifestation: you’re in contact with a value either (...) when it is manifest in parts of your life or parts of your life are manifest in it. So, the more the good is manifest in your life, or your life manifest in the good, the better for you. The more the bad is manifest in your life, or your life manifest in the bad, the worse for you. We’ll argue that this account is extensionally adequate: it explains the welfare value of achievements, friendships, knowledge, pleasures and virtues. Moreover, it has a number of explanatory virtues: it’s unified, elegant and explanatorily powerful. So, we’ll suggest, it’s an excellent account of welfare, and in many ways superior to its main competitors. (shrink)

Recent progress in artificial intelligence (AI) has drawn attention to the technology’s transformative potential, including what some see as its prospects for causing large-scale harm. We review two influential arguments purporting to show how AI could pose catastrophic risks. The first argument — the Problem of Power-Seeking — claims that, under certain assumptions, advanced AI systems are likely to engage in dangerous power-seeking behavior in pursuit of their goals. We review reasons for thinking that AI systems might seek power, that (...) they might obtain it, that this could lead to catastrophe, and that we might build and deploy such systems anyway. The second argument claims that the development of human-level AI will unlock rapid further progress, culminating in AI systems far more capable than any human — this is the Singularity Hypothesis. Power-seeking behavior on the part of such systems might be particularly dangerous. We discuss a variety of objections to both arguments and conclude by assessing the state of the debate. (shrink)