El conocimiento intuitivo como garante epistémico según William of Ockham y Adam of Wodeham

Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale 60:47-66 (2018)
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Adam of Wodeham and William of Ockham ascribe different properties to intuitive apprehensions. The properties that Wodeham ascribes to intuitive cognitions concur with his reading of one of the four scenarios that Ockham proposes in order to test the idea that an intuitive apprehension serves as an epistemic warrant. In this article, I explain that Wodeham avoids skepticism through his account of intuitive cognitions; even though, like Ockham, he accepts that God can cause us to undergo various sorts of mental acts in virtue of which we could believe that something exists when really it does not exist.



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