A group is small if it has only countably many complete n-types over the empty set for each natural number n. More generally, a group G is weakly small if it has only countably many complete 1-types over every finite subset of G. We show here that in a weakly small group, subgroups which are definable with parameters lying in a finitely generated algebraic closure satisfy the descending chain conditions for their traces in any finitely (...) generated algebraic closure. An infinite weakly small group has an infinite abelian subgroup, which may not be definable. A small nilpotent group is the central product of a definable divisible group with a definable one of bounded exponent. In a group with simple theory, any set of pairwise commuting elements is contained in a definable finite-by-abelian subgroup. First corollary: a weakly small group with simple theory has an infinite definable finite-by-abelian subgroup. Secondly, in a group with simple theory, a solvable group A of derived length n is contained in an A-definable almost solvable group of class at most 2n — 1. (shrink)

The main result is Vaught's conjecture for weakly minimal, locally modular and non-ω-stable theories. The more general results yielding this are the following. THEOREM A. Suppose that T is a small unidimensional theory and D is a weakly minimal set, definable over the finite set B. Then for all finite $A \subset D$ there are only finitely many nonalgebraic strong types over B realized in $\operatorname{acl}(A) \cap D$ . THEOREM B. Suppose that T is a small, (...) unidimensional, non-ω-stable theory such that the universe is weakly minimal and locally modular. Then for all finite A there is a finite $B \subset \mathrm{cl}(A)$ such that a ∈ cl(A) iff a ∈ cl(b) for some b ∈ B. Recall the property (S) defined in the abstract of [B1]. THEOREM C. Let T be as in Theorem B. Then, if T does not satisfy (S), T has 2 ℵ 0 many countable models. Combining Theorem C and the results in [B1] we obtain Vaught's conjecture for such theories. (shrink)

Theorem A. Let M be a left R-module such that Th(M) is small and weakly minimal, but does not have Morley rank 1. Let $A = \mathrm{acl}(\varnothing) \cap M$ and $I = \{r \in R: rM \subset A\}$ . Notice that I is an ideal. (i) F = R/I is a finite field. (ii) Suppose that a, b 0 ,...,b n ∈ M and a b̄. Then there are s, r i ∈ R, i ≤ n, such that (...) sa + ∑ i ≤ n r ib i ∈ A and $s \not\in I$ . It follows from Theorem A that algebraic closure in M is modular. Using this and results in [B1] and [B2], we obtain Theorem B. Let M be as in Theorem A. Then Vaught's conjecture holds for Th(M). (shrink)

Small forcing always ruins the indestructibility of an indestructible supercompact cardinal. In fact, after small forcing, any cardinal κ becomes superdestructible--any further <κ--closed forcing which adds a subset to κ will destroy the measurability, even the weak compactness, of κ. Nevertheless, after small forcing indestructible cardinals remain resurrectible, but never strongly resurrectible.

Small forcing always ruins the indestructibility of an indestructible supercompact cardinal. In fact, after small forcing, any cardinal $\kappa$ becomes superdestructible--any further <$\kappa$--closed forcing which adds a subset to $\kappa$ will destroy the measurability, even the weak compactness, of $\kappa$. Nevertheless, after small forcing indestructible cardinals remain resurrectible, but never strongly resurrectible.

Economists and biologists have proposed a distinction between two mechanisms – “strong” and “weak” reciprocity – that may explain the evolution of human sociality. Weak reciprocity theorists emphasize the benefits of long-term cooperation and the use of low-cost strategies to deter free-riders. Strong reciprocity theorists, in contrast, claim that cooperation in social dilemma games can be sustained by costly punishment mechanisms, even in one-shot and finitely repeated games. To support this claim, they have generated a large body of evidence concerning (...) the willingness of experimental subjects to punish uncooperative free-riders at a cost to themselves. In this article, I distinguish between a “narrow” and a “wide” reading of the experimental evidence. Under the narrow reading, punishment experiments are just useful devices to measure psychological propensities in controlled laboratory conditions. Under the wide reading, they replicate a mechanism that supports cooperation also in “real-world” situations outside the laboratory. I argue that the wide interpretation must be tested using a combination of laboratory data and evidence about cooperation “in the wild.” In spite of some often-repeated claims, there is no evidence that cooperation in the small egalitarian societies studied by anthropologists is enforced by means of costly punishment. Moreover, studies by economic and social historians show that social dilemmas in the wild are typically solved by institutions that coordinate punishment, reduce its cost, and extend the horizon of cooperation. The lack of field evidence for costly punishment suggests important constraints about what forms of cooperation can or cannot be sustained by means of decentralised policing. (shrink)

The theory of weak measurements developed by Aharonov and coworkers has been applied by them and others to several interesting problems in which the system of interest is both pre- and post-selected. When the probability of successful post-selection is very small the prediction for the weak value of the measured quantity is often “bizarre” and sometimes controversial, lying outside the range of possibility for a classical system or for a quantum system in the absence of post-selection (e.g. negative kinetic (...) energies associated with particles found immediately after the weak measurement deep inside a classically forbidden region). In Bohmian mechanics a quantum particle is postulated to be a point-like particle which is always accompanied by a wave which probes its environment and guides its motion accordingly. Hence, from the point of view of this theory, it is natural to ask whether the measured weak value under consideration is a property of the point-like particle or of the wave (or of both) and what, if anything, it is that is actually being measured. In this paper, weak measurements of position, momentum and kinetic energy are considered for very simple case studies with these questions in mind. (shrink)

Economists and biologists have proposed a distinction between two mechanisms – “strong” and “weak” reciprocity – that may explain the evolution of human sociality. Weak reciprocity theorists emphasize the benefits of long-term cooperation and the use of low-cost strategies to deter free-riders. Strong reciprocity theorists, in contrast, claim that cooperation in social dilemma games can be sustained by costly punishment mechanisms, even in one-shot and finitely repeated games. To support this claim, they have generated a large body of evidence concerning (...) the willingness of experimental subjects to punish uncooperative free-riders at a cost to themselves. In this article, I distinguish between a “narrow” and a “wide” reading of the experimental evidence. Under the narrow reading, punishment experiments are just useful devices to measure psychological propensities in controlled laboratory conditions. Under the wide reading, they replicate a mechanism that supports cooperation also in “real-world” situations outside the laboratory. I argue that the wide interpretation must be tested using a combination of laboratory data and evidence about cooperation “in the wild.” In spite of some often-repeated claims, there is no evidence that cooperation in the small egalitarian societies studied by anthropologists is enforced by means of costly punishment. Moreover, studies by economic and social historians show that social dilemmas in the wild are typically solved by institutions that coordinate punishment, reduce its cost, and extend the horizon of cooperation. The lack of field evidence for costly punishment suggests important constraints about what forms of cooperation can or cannot be sustained by means of decentralised policing. (shrink)

The study of intrapersonal economic relations, or economics , is still at the programmatic stage. There is no generally accepted paradigm, or even as well-defined set of problems that constitute it as a subdiscipline within economics. Some questions are, however, emerging as foci of interest for a small but increasing number of writers, not just in economics, but also in psychology and philosophy. The writings of Thomas Schelling on self-management, of George Ainslie on self-control, and of Derik Parfit on (...) personal identity testify to this convergence. (shrink)

Recent work in computability theory has focused on various notions of asymptotic computability, which capture the idea of a set being “almost computable.” One potentially upsetting result is that all four notions of asymptotic computability admit “almost computable” sets in every Turing degree via coding tricks, contradicting the notion that “almost computable” sets should be computationally close to the computable sets. In response, Astor introduced the notion of intrinsic density: a set has defined intrinsic density if its image under any (...) computable permutation has the same asymptotic density. Furthermore, introduced various notions of intrinsic computation in which the standard coding tricks cannot be used to embed intrinsically computable sets in every Turing degree. Our goal is to study the sets which are intrinsically small, i.e. those that have intrinsic density zero. We begin by studying which computable functions preserve intrinsic smallness. We also show that intrinsic smallness and hyperimmunity are computationally independent notions of smallness, i.e. any hyperimmune degree contains a Turing-equivalent hyperimmune set which is “as large as possible” and therefore not intrinsically small. Our discussion concludes by relativizing the notion of intrinsic smallness and discussing intrinsic computability as it relates to our study of intrinsic smallness. (shrink)

In 1995, a Swedish pilot study of Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT) was launched to investigate its therapeutic efficacy and cost-effectiveness as treatment for Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) in suicidal women. In the same year, a sweeping reform of psychiatric care commenced, dramatically reducing the number of beds by the end of the decade. The psychiatry reform was presented as an important factor prompting the need for a community-based treatment for Borderline patients. This article suggests that the introduction of DBT in (...) Sweden, and its relationship to the reform, can only be adequately explained with reference to the wider political shift occurring at the time, whereby the Swedish welfare state and its guiding ethos of egalitarianism were abandoned in favour of a neoliberal ‘choice revolution’. With the new liberalism, hard work and individual responsibility replaced the idea of a Swedish ‘people’s home’, a nationwide community and social support network. This language was reflected in DBT, which sought to teach patients the ‘skills’ necessary ‘to create a life worth living’. In this context, therapy was constituted as a form of ‘work’ that the patient had to undertake to improve. Moreover, DBT rejected the prevailing view of Borderline patients as ‘manipulative’ and ‘aggressive’, suggesting instead that they were ‘helpless’, ‘weak’ and unable to regulate their emotions. This new Borderline persona fit neatly into the new liberal discourse: she could be taught to become a rational and independent person able to cope in a society that valued individual responsibility over social support. (shrink)

Weakly interacting lattices of coupled maps can be modeled as ordinary coupled map lattices separated from each other by boundary regions with small coupling parameters. We demonstrate that such weakly interacting lattices can nevertheless have unexpected and striking effects on each other. Under specific conditions, particular stability properties of the lattices are significantly influenced by their weak mutual interaction. This observation is tantamount to an efficacious information flow across the boundary.

In combination with post-selection, weak measurements can lead to surprising results known as anomalous weak values. These lie outside the bounds of the spectrum of the relevant observable, as in the canonical example of measuring the spin of an electron (along some axis) to be 100. We argue that the disturbance caused by the weak measurement, while small, is sufficient to significantly affect the measurement result, and that this is the most reasonable explanation of anomalous weak values.

The notion of countable well order admits an alternative definition in terms of embeddings between initial segments. We use the framework of reverse mathematics to investigate the logical strength of this definition and its connection with Fraïssé’s conjecture, which has been proved by Laver. We also fill a small gap in Shore’s proof that Fraïssé’s conjecture implies arithmetic transfinite recursion over $\mathbf {RCA}_0$, by giving a new proof of $\Sigma ^0_2$ -induction.

It is relatively consistent with the existence of two supercompact cardinals that a special Aronszajn tree of height ${\aleph_{\omega_1+1}}$ is introduced by a cofinality-preserving forcing of size ${\aleph_3}$.

Clinical ethics support, including ethics consultation, has become established in the field of medical practice throughout the world. This practice has been regarded as useful, most notably in the UK and the USA, in solving ethical problems encountered by both medical practitioners and those who receive medical treatment. In Japan, however, few services are available to respond to everyday clinical ethical issues, although a variety of difficult ethical problems arise daily in the medical field: termination of life support, euthanasia and (...) questions about patient autonomy. In light of these conditions, a group of 17 volunteer educators and researchers from the area of biomedical ethics, including the authors, have formed the Clinical Ethics Support and Education Project, and began providing Japan’s first small team clinical ethics consultation service in October, 2006. Members include scholars of biomedical ethics, scholars of philosophy and ethics, legal professionals and legal scholars, nurses and doctors, consisting of five women and 12 men. Consultation teams, made up of a small number of members, were organised each time a request for consultation was received. Over approximately 15 months (October 2006–December 2007), the programme received 22 consultation requests from medical practitioners and medical institutions, and three from the families of patients. In this paper, we will discuss the status of our consultation service and examples of consultation cases we have handled. In addition, we will examine the process of evaluating small team clinical ethics consultation services, as well as the strengths and weakness of such programmes. (shrink)

One result of this note is about the nonconstructivity of countably infinite lotteries: even if we impose very weak conditions on the assignment of probabilities to subsets of natural numbers we cannot prove the existence of such assignments constructively, i.e., without something such as the axiom of choice. This is a corollary to a more general theorem about large-small filters, a concept that extends the concept of free ultrafilters. The main theorem is that proving the existence of large-small (...) filters requires a nonconstructive axiom like AC. (shrink)

Theorem A. Let T be a small superstable theory, A a finite set, and ψ a weakly minimal formula over A which is contained in some nontrivial type which does not have Morley rank. Then ψ is contained in some nonalgebraic isolated type over A. As an application we prove Theorem B. Suppose that T is small and superstable, A is finite, and there is a nontrivial weakly minimal type p ∈ S(A) which does not have (...) Morley rank. Then the prime model over A is not minimal over A. (shrink)

When two agents of unequal strength compete, the stronger one is expected to always win the competition. This expectation is based on the assumption that evaluation of performance is complete, hence flawless. If, however, the agents are evaluated on the basis of only a small sample of their performance, the weaker agent still stands a chance of winning occasionally. A theoretical analysis indicates that, to increase the chance of this happening the weaker agent ought to give up on enough (...) occasions so that he or she can match the stronger agent on the remaining ones. We model such a competition in a game, present its game‐theoretic solution, and report an experiment, involving 144 individuals, in which we tested whether players (both weak and strong) are actually sensitive to their relative strengths and know how to allocate their resources accordingly. Our results indicate that they do. (shrink)

We propose an approach for texture segmentation based on weak supervised learning. The weak supervision implies that the user marks only a single small patch for each class in the input image. These patches are used for training. We employ the method of graph cuts for the segmentation task. Our work demonstrates that even under such weak training, texture segmentation can be achieved efficiently and with good accuracy via graph cuts. Moreover, our approach uses a simpler feature representation than (...) that in similar contemporary segmentation approaches. We also provide a brief discussion indicating the good performance of our approach. We validate our method on various standard texture mosaics and also on segmentation of natural images with large texture variations. (shrink)

After satisfying their quantitative and qualitative needs as regards nutrition, consumers in developed countries are becoming more involved in the ethical aspects of food production, especially when it relates to animal products. Social demands for respecting animal welfare in housing systems are increasing rapidly, as is social awareness of human responsibility towards farm animals. Many studies have been conducted on animal welfare measurement in different production systems, but the available information for small ruminants remains insufficient. In this study, a (...) 75 criteria-evaluation tool has been set up on the basis of the five freedoms concept. Animal welfare considerations have been analyzed in 25 documents, including labeling schemes, regulations, and recommendations from different European countries. The results show many differences between regular and organic small ruminant farming standards. Emergency measures are generally lacking. A weak representation of psychological aspects of animal welfare, especially by the current European legislation, is highlighted. (shrink)

In line with recent efforts to empirically study the folk concept of weakness of will, we examine two issues in this paper: (1) How is weakness of will attribution [WWA] influenced by an agent’s violations of best judgment and/or resolution, and by the moral valence of the agent’s action? (2) Do any of these influences depend on the cognitive dispositions of the judging individual? We implemented a factorial 2x2x2 between–subjects design with judgment violation, resolution violation, and action valence as independent (...) variables, and measured participants’ cognitive dispositions using Frederick’s Cognitive Reflection Test [CRT]. We conclude that intuitive and reflective individuals have two different concepts of weakness of will. The study supports this claim by showing that: a) the WWA of intuitive subjects is influenced by the action’s (and probably also the commitment’s) moral valence, while the WWA of reflective subjects is not; b) judgment violation plays a small role in the WWA of intuitive subjects, while reflective subjects treat resolution violation as the only relevant trait. Data were collected among students at two different universities. All subjects (N=710) answered the CRT. A three-way ANOVA was first conducted on the whole sample and then on the intuitive and reflective groups separately. This study suggests that differences in cognitive dispositions can significantly impact the folk understanding of philosophical concepts, and thus suggests that analysis of folk concepts should take cognitive dispositions into account. (shrink)

“Political” corporate social responsibility involves businesses taking a political role to address “regulatory gaps” caused by weak or insufficient social and environmental standards and norms. The literature on political CSR focuses mostly on how large multinational corporations can address environmental and social problems that arise globally along their supply chains. This article addresses political CSR of small- and medium-sized enterprises. SMEs represent a major share of economic value creation worldwide and are increasingly exposed to regulatory gaps. Although SMEs differ (...) substantially from MNCs in terms of organizational characteristics, behavioral guiding principles, and financial and human resources, they should still tackle such regulatory gaps by accepting a political role. Drawing on Zadek’s model of CSR-based organizational learning and Young’s concept of social connection, this study develops a conceptual framework as the basis for discussing why SMEs should become involved in political CSR, how they can manage political CSR internally and systematically, and how their progress can be assessed by third-party observers externally. (shrink)

There is little doubt that the development and commercialisation of nanotechnologies is challenging traditional state-based regulatory regimes. Yet governments currently appear to be taking a non-interventionist approach to directly regulating this emerging technology. This paper argues that a large regulatory toolbox is available for governing this small technology and that as nanotechnologies evolve, many regulatory advances are likely to occur outside of government. It notes the scientific uncertainties facing us as we contemplate nanotechnology regulatory matters and then examines the (...) notion of regulation itself, suggesting new ways to frame our understanding of both regulation and the regulatory tools relevant to nanotechnologies. By drawing upon three different conceptual lenses of regulation, the paper articulates a wide range of potential regulatory tools at hand. It also focuses particularly on the ways various tools are currently being used or perhaps may be employed in the future. The strengths and weaknesses characterising these tools is examined as well as the different actors involved. The paper concludes that we will increasingly face debate over what is likely to work most effectively in regulating nano technologies, the legitimacy of these different potential approaches, and the speed at which these different regimes may be employed. (shrink)

Recent research on agricultural innovation has outlined social networks’ role in diffusing agricultural knowledge; however, so far, it has broadly neglected the socio-spatial dimensions of innovation processes. Against this backdrop, we apply a spatially explicit translocal network perspective in order to investigate the role of migration-related translocal networks for adaptive change in a small-scale farming community in Northeast Thailand. By means of formal social network analysis we map the socio-spatial patterns of advice sharing regarding changes in sugarcane and rice (...) farming over a period of five years. We find that, in translocally connected and mobile rural communities, a substantial share of advice originates from translocal levels. Translocal advice is dominantly provided through weak and formal ties with extension agencies and shared by few highly central larger-scale farmers within sparse local networks. This draws the picture of top-down translocal innovation flows driven by extension agencies and brokered through elite farmers. A closer look on institutional context and key actors of particular changes, however, suggests the potential of migration-related translocal networks and migration experience in fostering bottom-up innovations. Migration-related innovations transfers can promote adaptive capacity also among less favorably connected actors, especially if changes are geared towards limited household resources and are compatible with social practices of small-scale farming. We conclude that a translocal network perspective is instructive for research and extension interested in leveraging more inclusive agricultural innovation. (shrink)

The ability to understand the mental states of others has sometimes been attributed to a domain‐specific mechanism which privileges the processing of these states over similar but nonmental representations. If correct, then others’ beliefs should be processed more efficiently than similar information contained within nonmental states. We tested this by examining whether adults would be faster to process others’ false beliefs than equivalent “false” photos. Additionally, we tested whether they would be faster to process others’ true beliefs about something than (...) their own (matched) personal knowledge about the same event. Across four experiments, we found a small but reliable effect in favor of the first prediction, but no evidence for the second. Results are consistent with accounts positing specialized processes for (false) mental states. The size of the effect does, however, suggest that alternative explanations such as practice effects cannot be ruled out. (shrink)

With small to modest sample sizes and complex models, maximum likelihood estimation of confirmatory factor analysis models can show serious estimation problems such as non-convergence or parameter estimates outside the admissible parameter space. In this article, we distinguish different Bayesian estimators that can be used to stabilize the parameter estimates of a CFA: the mode of the joint posterior distribution that is obtained from penalized maximum likelihood estimation, and the mean, median, or mode of the marginal posterior distribution that (...) are calculated by using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods. In two simulation studies, we evaluated the performance of the Bayesian estimators from a frequentist point of view. The results show that the EAP produced more accurate estimates of the latent correlation in many conditions and outperformed the other Bayesian estimators in terms of root mean squared error. We also argue that it is often advantageous to choose a parameterization in which the main parameters of interest are bounded, and we suggest the four-parameter beta distribution as a prior distribution for loadings and correlations. Using simulated data, we show that selecting weakly informative four-parameter beta priors can further stabilize parameter estimates, even in cases when the priors were mildly misspecified. Finally, we derive recommendations and propose directions for further research. (shrink)

Global climate change is likely to become a major cause of future migration. Small Island States are particularly vulnerable since territorial destruction caused by sea level rise poses a threat to their entire existence. This raises important issues concerning state sovereignty and self-determination. Is it possible for a state to remain self-determining even if it lacks a stable population residing on a specific territory? It has been suggested that migrants from disappearing Small Island States could continue to exercise (...) sovereign control over their abandoned territory. Such an arrangement would allow them to retain a measure of self-determination. The question posed in this paper is whether this ?deterritorialized state proposal? is conceptually plausible and normatively acceptable. It is argued that the proposal is conceptually plausible if we adopt a gradual understanding of ?self-determination?, but that its normative acceptability is weak even if it is supplemented with compensatory measures. (shrink)

Despite a wide range of restorative practices in use around the world, most recent research has been focused on one model, family group conferencing. In part due to the salience and appeal of Braithwaite’s reintegrative shaming theory, this important emphasis on the role of structured dialogue with family and intimates privileges an emotional connection that elicits reintegrative shame on the part of the offender, accompanied by group support. In this paper, I argue that reintegrative shaming as practiced in family group (...) conferencing in the youth justice context is based on a theory of “strong ties” associated with the extended families of Gemeinschaft societies. This important emphasis on the family/extended family unit as an affective focus, however, may have inadvertently diverted attention from the importance in Gessellschaft societies of “weak ties.” In modernity, such ties provide instrumental support that leads to connections that link offenders and victims to broader “bridging” relationships associated with social and human capital. This paper briefly considers two ostensibly “weak” restorative practices that effectively engage these broader connections for young offenders and families that may be fundamental to reintegration and other prosocial outcomes, while also mobilizing and strengthening the parochial controls and social support of neighbors and other adults. Ultimately, the sustainability of restorative justice will require an openness to practices that accomplish restorative goals, while also facilitating a more flexible, problem solving, and community-building focus. (shrink)

Formal codes of ethics are not the best way of addressing ethical issues arising in educational research. Philosophers have often exaggerated the importance of such codes, although philosophy has little to contribute to them. What we need rather is a closer attention to the ways in which ethical decisions about research are actually made. Moral theory can contribute here by clarifying this process and identifying helpful procedures and strategies, such as those used by institutional review committees in arriving at good (...) judgements. New and unfamiliar situations require us to extend our existing abilities, not to return to first principles and set up formal codes. (shrink)

It is a commonplace in philosophy of action that there is and must be teleologically basic action: something done on an occasion without doing it by means of doing anything else. It is widely believed that basic actions are exercises of skill. As the source of the need for basic action is the structure of practical reasoning, this yields a conception of skill and practical reasoning as complementary but mutually exclusive. On this view, practical reasoning and complex intentional action depend (...) on skill and basic action, but the latter pair are not themselves rationally structured: the movements a basic action comprises are not intentional actions, and they are not structured as means to an end. However, Michael Thompson and Douglas Lavin have argued that action that bears no inner rational structure is not intentional action at all, and that therefore there can be no such thing as basic action. In this paper, I argue that their critique shows that standard conceptions of basic action are indeed untenable, but not that we can do without an alternative. I develop an alternative conception of skill and basic action on which their basicness is not to be equated with simplicity: like deliberation and non-basic action, they are teleologically complex, but their complexity takes a different form. On this view, skill contrasts with deliberation—not because it is not a manifestation of practical reason, but because the two are specifically different manifestations of practical reason. (shrink)

Contemporary discussions of knowledge how typically focus on the question whether or not knowing how to do ϕ consists in propositional knowledge, and divide the field between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists. This way of framing the issue is said to derive from Gilbert Ryle. I argue that this is a misreading of Ryle, whose primary interest in discussing knowledge how was not epistemological but rather action-theoretical, whose argument against intellectualism has for this reason been misunderstood and underestimated, and whose positive view (...) aims to chart a middle course between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism. (shrink)

Constructivism comes in a number of forms. Some are models of learning which involve few, if any, startling epistemological claims. On the other hand, what has been promoted as ‘radical constructivism’ holds that our concepts cannot be related directly to an external reality, and that claims for the objectivity of knowledge are therefore unjustified. This standpoint is an anti-realist version of evolutionary epistemology. I argue that it relies on a mistaken interpretation of the Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection, (...) and that its application of this model to the relation between knowledge and the world is also mistaken. (shrink)

Nietzsche and Re is about the intellectual partnership of Friedrich Nietzsche and Paul Re . Robin Small combines biography with philosophy to give the first full-length account of a friendship that made major contributions to modern thought before it ended in intellectual differences and a painful breakdown of personal relations. Drawing on a wealth of original scholarship, Small presents an absorbing and often dramatic story, shedding valuable new light on of one of the most important of modern thinkers.

I argue that there is a cognition condition on intention and intentional action. If an agent is doing A intentionally, she has knowledge in intention that he is doing A. If an agent intends to do A, she has knowledge in intention that she is going to do A. In both cases, the agent has knowledge of eventual success, in this sense: she knows that it will be no accident if she ends up having done A. In both cases, the (...) agent’s knowledge is of what is happening, or what is going to happen, in the world; it is not knowledge merely of her state of mind. This knowledge is practical: it the cause of what it understands; without it what is happening, or what is going to happen, is not an intentional action, and any practical thought of the agent’s about what is happening, or what is going to happen, does not hit the heights of intention. I demonstrate that famous examples (from Davidson and Bratman) purporting to show that the cognition condition should be rejected (or its content or scope weakened) are ineffective, because they trade on confusions about the different kinds of failure to which intentional action may be susceptible, confusions remedied via reflection on the structure of intentional action. I show that the cognition condition is grounded not in reflection about the directions of fit and guidance of different kinds of mental states, nor in the indicative content of linguistic expressions of intention, but in the calculative and temporal structure of intentional action itself. (shrink)

Though everyday life accords a great deal of significance to practical abilities—such as the ability to walk, to speak French, to play the piano—philosophers of action pay surprisingly little attention to them. By contrast, abilities are discussed in various other philosophical projects. From these discussions, a partial theory of abilities emerges. If the partial theory—which is at best adequate only to a few examples of practical abilities—were correct, then philosophers of action would be right to ignore practical abilities, because they (...) could play no fundamental role in an account of human agency. For the idea that practical abilities *do* play a fundamental role in human agency to be worth considering, an alternative conception of them is needed. As a first step, I attempt some of the necessary ground-clearing work. (shrink)

Julia Annas proposes to shed light on the intelligence of virtue through an analogy with the intelligence of practical skills. To do so, she first aims to distinguish genuine skills and skillful actions from mere habits and routine behaviour: like skills, habits are acquired through habituation and issue in action immediately (i.e. unmediated by reasoning about what to do), but the routine behaviour in which habit issues is mindless and unintelligent, and cannot serve to establish or illuminate the intelligence of (...) virtuous action. In a second step, she argues that virtue has the same kind of intellectual structure—and is acquired through the same kind of habituation—as skill. I argue that Annas’s proposal fails at the first step: her conceptions of the rational articulacy of skill and the immediacy that characterizes its exercise in action cannot be squared. I offer an alternative conception of the intelligence of skill and its exercise that draws on Aristotle’s conception of rational capacities as two-way powers. But as a virtue is not a two-way power, virtues and skills do not share a common intellectual structure. (shrink)

The ideas (i) that skill is a form of knowledge and (ii) that it can be taught are commonplace in both ancient philosophy and everyday life. I argue that contemporary epistemology lacks the resources to adequately accommodate them. Intellectualist and anti-intellectualist accounts of knowledge how struggle to represent the transmission of skill via teaching and learning (§II), in part because each adopts a fundamentally individualistic approach to the acquisition of skill that focuses on individual practice and experience; consequently, learning from (...) an expert’s teaching is rendered at best peripheral (§III). An account of the transmission of skill that focuses on guided practice is shown to be immanent in an anti-individualist account of skill (§IV) that takes seriously the Aristotelian ideas that skills are rational capacities and second natures by developing the thought that doing, teaching, and practising are three moments of an a priori unity: the life-cycle of a skill (§V). (shrink)

Education aims at more than supplying learners with information, or knowledge of facts. Even when the transmission of information is at stake, abilities relevant to using that information are among the things that teachers aim, or ought to aim, to inculcate. We may think that abilities for critical reflection on knowledge, and critical thinking more generally, are central to what teachers should cultivate in their students. Moreover, we may hope that students acquire not merely the ability to (e.g.) think critically, (...) but the propensity or habit of doing so. We hope that critical thinking will be something they *do* do, not something they merely *can* do; that they will become, not merely capable of inquiry, but inquisitive; and so on. If education aims at more than the inculcation of propositional knowledge, are these other aims non-cognitive, or non-epistemic? This essay aims to make progress on this question by critically examining Gilbert Ryle's conceptions of skill and habit. (shrink)

We respond in this paper to various counter arguments advanced against our stance on conscientious objection accommodation. Contra Maclure and Dumont, we show that it is impossible to develop reliable tests for conscientious objectors' claims with regard to the reasonableness of the ideological basis of their convictions, and, indeed, with regard to whether they actually hold they views they claim to hold. We demonstrate furthermore that, within the Canadian legal context, the refusal to accommodate conscientious objectors would not constitute undue (...) hardship for such objectors. We reject concerns that refusing to accommodate conscientious objectors would limit the equality of opportunity for budding professionals holding particular ideological positions. We also clarify various misrepresentations of our views by respondents Symons, Glick and Jotkowitz, and Lyus. (shrink)

In The Value of the Humanities prize-winning critic Helen Small assesses the value of the Humanities, eloquently examining five historical arguments in defence of the Humanities.

In Intention, Anscombe says that practical reasoning is practical, not by virtue of its content, but rather by virtue of its form. But in her later essay ‘Practical Inference’, she seems to take this back, claiming instead that (1) the practicality of practical reasoning (or inference) resides in the distinctive use it makes of the premises, and (2) ‘it is a matter of indifference’ whether we say that it exemplifies a distinctive form. I aim to show that Anscombe is right (...) about (1) but wrong about (2): the distinctive use (or teleology) of practical reasoning explains its distinctive formal features, and when the former is thought through, the latter are revealed to be more numerous and significant than Anscombe seems to recognize. (shrink)

Preface -- Introduction -- Absolute becoming -- From becoming to time -- The time-atom theory -- Motion, ways, and time -- Gateway and lanes -- Linear and circular time -- The eternal perspective -- The way of greatness.

Recent work on testimony has raised questions about the extent to which testimony is a distinctively second-personal phenomenon and the possible epistemic significance of its second-personal aspects. However, testimony, in the sense primarily investigated in recent epistemology, is far from the only way in which we acquire knowledge from others. My goal is to distinguish knowledge acquired from testimony (learning from being told) from knowledge acquired from teaching (learning from being taught), and to investigate the similarities and differences between the (...) two with respect to the interpersonal dimensions of their structures. (shrink)