_A fresh, new translation of Augustine’s third work as a Christian convert__ "The 'Cassiciacum dialogues'... are of a high literary and intellectual quality, combining Ciceronian and neo-Platonic philosophy, Roman comedy and Vergilian poetry, and early Christian theology. They are also, arguably, Augustine’s most charming works, exhibiting his whimsical levity and ironic wryness."—_Credo__ The first four works written by St. Augustine of Hippo after his conversion to Christianity are dialogues that have influenced prominent thinkers from Boethius to Bernard Lonergan. Usually called (...) the “Cassiciacum dialogues,” these four works are of a high literary and intellectual quality, combining Ciceronian and neo-Platonic philosophy, Roman comedy and Vergilian poetry, and early Christian theology. They are also, arguably, Augustine’s most charming works, exhibiting his whimsical levity and ironic wryness. _On Order_ is the third work in this tetralogy, and it is Augustine’s only work explicitly devoted to theodicy, the reconciliation of Almighty God’s goodness with evil’s existence. In this dialogue, Augustine argues that a certain kind of self-knowledge is the key to unlocking the answers to theodicy’s vexing questions, and he devotes the latter half of the dialogue to an excursus on the liberal arts as disciplines that will help strengthen the mind to know itself and God. (shrink)

_A fresh, new translation of Augustine’s fourth work as a Christian convert_ The first four works written by St. Augustine of Hippo after his conversion to Christianity are dialogues that have influenced prominent thinkers from Boethius to Bernard Lonergan. Usually called the Cassiciacum dialogues, these four works are of a high literary and intellectual quality, combining Ciceronian and neo-Platonic philosophy, Roman comedy and Vergilian poetry, and early Christian theology. They are also, arguably, Augustine’s most charming works, exhibiting his whimsical levity (...) and ironic wryness. _Soliloquies_ is the fourth work in this tetralogy. Augustine coined the term “soliloquy” to describe this new form of dialogue. _Soliloquies__,_ a conversation between Augustine and his reason, fuses the dialogue genre and Roman theater, opening with a search for intellectual and moral self-knowledge before converging on the nature of truth and the question of the soul’s immortality. Foley’s volume also includes _On the Immortality of the Soul__,_ which consists of notes for the unfinished portion of the work. (shrink)

In this new translation the brilliant and impassioned descriptions of Augustine's colourful early life are conveyed to the English reader with accuracy and art. Augustine tells of his wrestlings to master his sexual drive, his rare ascent from a humble Algerian farm to the edge of the corridors of high power at the imperial court of Milan, and his renunciation of secular ambition and marriage as he recovered the faith that his mother had taught him. It was in a Milan (...) garden that Augustine finally achieved the act of will to Christian conversion, which he compared to a lazy man in bed finally deciding it is time to get up and face the day. ABOUT THE SERIES: For over 100 years Oxford World's Classics has made available the widest range of literature from around the globe. Each affordable volume reflects Oxford's commitment to scholarship, providing the most accurate text plus a wealth of other valuable features, including expert introductions by leading authorities, helpful notes to clarify the text, up-to-date bibliographies for further study, and much more. (shrink)

Santo Tomás de Aquino comenzó a redactar estos Comentarios a las correspondientes obras de Aristóteles en Roma (1268) y los terminó en París (1269). Son un complemento al tratado "Del alma" y dan por supuesto lo que este tratado explica sobre la esencia, las facultades y los actos del alma, especialmente los actos de los sentidos, tanto externos como internos. Aunque a lo largo de sus "Comentarios" Santo Tomás repite algunos rasgos básicos de la sensación expuestos en "Del alma", su (...) preocupación es explanar la psicofísica de tales actos en relación con sus objetos respectivos. Por lo que a la secuencia de estos libros se refiere, se aprecia un avance vital desde el comentario esquivo al "De sensu et sensato" al cautivante comentario al "De memoria et reminiscentia". Al traspasar la raya ideal que divide el mundo exterior y el interior, penetramos en un ámbito de luz orientadora y de ejercicio persuasivo. (shrink)

Root, branch, and blossom, attention is intertwined with epistemology. It is essential to our capacity to learn and decisive of the evidence we obtain, it influences the intellectual connections we forge and those we remember, and it is the cognitive tool whereby we enact decisions about inquiry. Moreover, because it is both an epistemic practice and a site of agency, attention is a natural locus for questions about epistemic morality. This article surveys the emerging epistemology of attention, reviewing the existing (...) literature and sketching avenues for future investigation. It also argues for a reorientation of epistemology itself. This argument is the focus of Section 1. Section 2 briefly reviews philosophical accounts of attention, Section 3 focuses on issues in traditional, individualistic epistemology, and Section 4 turns to social epistemology. (shrink)

Sarah is a young deaf woman in revolt, refusing to speak. She marries James, an orthophonist who works in a special school for the deaf. However, what gradually emerges in the course of their relationship is the latent suffering caused by what each of the partners isn't getting. James, tired of acting as Sarah's interpreter, frustrated by the limits of what they can share, shouts out:You want to be independent of me, you want to be a person in your own (...) right, you want people not to pity you … then you [must] learn to read my lips and you [must] learn to use that little mouth of yours for something besides eating and showing me you're better than hearing girls in bed! Come on! Read my lips? What am I saying? Say what I'm saying … You always have to be dependent on someone, and you always will for the rest of your life until you learn to speak. Now come on! I want you to speak to me. Let me hear it. Speak! Speak! Speak! …. (shrink)

After Aquinas, Anselm is the most significant medieval thinker. Utterly convinced of the truth of the Christian religion, he was none the less determined to try to make sense of his Christian faith, and the result is a rigorous engagement with problems of logic which remain relevant for philosophers and theologians even today. This translation provides the first opportunity to read all of Anselm's most important works in one volume.

Sarah is a young deaf woman in revolt, refusing to speak. She marries James, an orthophonist who works in a special school for the deaf. However, what gradually emerges in the course of their relationship is the latent suffering caused by what each of the partners isn't getting. James, tired of acting as Sarah's interpreter, frustrated by the limits of what they can share, shouts out:You want to be independent of me, you want to be a person in your own (...) right, you want people not to pity you … then you [must] learn to read my lips and you [must] learn to use that little mouth of yours for something besides eating and showing me you're better than hearing girls in bed! Come on! Read my lips? What am I saying? Say what I'm saying … You always have to be dependent on someone, and you always will for the rest of your life until you learn to speak. Now come on! I want you to speak to me. Let me hear it. Speak! Speak! Speak! …. (shrink)

These new translations of two treatises dealing with the possibility and nature of knowledge in the face of skeptical challenges are the first to be rendered from the Latin critical edition, the first to be made specifically with a philosophical audience in mind, and the first to be translated by a scholar with expertise in both modern epistemology and philosophy of language.

INTRODUCTION1 ARELY HAS A GREAT AND INFLUENTIAL THINKER taken pains to let others look at his previous literary career through his very own eyes....

Nous examinons ici comment Merleau-Ponty, en lien étroit avec sa conception personnelle de l’être, aborde certaines thématiques frayées par Levinas – désir, transcendance, altérité, responsabilité… Marquée par une grande attention au monde perçu, son ontologie met en valeur la négativité de l’être comme ressort de notre naissance et de notre coexistence. Indéfini et relatif, résistant et porteur, l’être travaille notre chair dans une dialectique de limitation et d’ouverture, jusqu’à nous libérer de l’ambivalence qui entrave nos relations et nos concepts. Riche (...) de virtualités éthiques, cette ontologie se veut opposée à Sartre, se pense incompatible avec Heidegger, et contraste fortement avec Levinas – y compris avec la lecture que celui-ci a pu en faire. (shrink)

“To see is to imagine. And to imagine, is to see.”Perception and Imaginary in Merleau-PontyMerleau-Ponty accords such a phenomenological and ontological priority to perception that this privilege might lead him to minimize the importance of theimaginary in our relationship with the world. In fact, in the work published during his life, the theme of the imaginary does not occupy a large place, and its conceptual elaboration remains little visible. A reading of his posthumous publications and of his unpublished papers leads (...) to a more subtle landscape, inwhich the philosopher destabilizes our common oppositions between real and imaginary, as well as those between the imaginary and truth. From themanuscripts from the end of the 1940s on, Merleau-Ponty expands his inquiry into perception in two complementary directions: the intuition of a form of coextensivity between perceptive life and imaginary life, but also between perception and expression. These intuitions, never disavowed, would continueto deepen up through the late unpublished ontological works. They find a guiding thread in the contestation of Sartre’s separation between the real andthe imaginary, and they open out onto the outline of a complex link between truth, imagination, and expression. Merleau-Ponty pretended to approve of thework of The Imaginary all that which is actually moving beyond it, in the direction most opposite to this essay’s own aims: “To see is to imagine. And toimagine is to see.” This split with Sartre finds one of its pivots in the phenomenological characterization of vision as a surpassing of the observable, a surpassing that would touch on an essential dimension of being and of truth.“Vedere è immaginare. E immaginare, è vedere”.Percezione e immaginario in Merleau-PontyMerleau-Ponty accorda alla percezione una tale priorità, fenomenologica e ontologica, che questo privilegio potrebbe condurre a minimizzare l’importanzadell’immaginario nel nostro rapporto al mondo. Di fatto, nell’opera pubblicata in vita, il tema dell’immaginario non occupa un grande spazio, e la suaelaborazione concettuale resta poco visibile. La lettura delle pubblicazioni postume e degli inediti conduce a un disegno più sottile, che vede il filosofo destabilizzare le nostre comuni opposizioni fra reale e immaginario così come quelle fra immaginario e verità. A partire dai manoscritti della fine degli anniQuaranta, Merleau-Ponty allarga la sua indagine sulla percezione in due direzioni complementari: verso l’intuizione di una forma di co-estensività fravita percettiva e vita immaginaria, ma altresì fra percezione e espressione. Mai smentite, queste intuizioni vanno approfondendosi fino ai tardi inediti“ontologici”. Esse trovano un filo conduttore nella messa in causa della separazione operata da Sartre fra reale e immaginario, e sfociano nell’abbozzodi un legame complesso fra verità, immaginario e espressione. Merleau-Ponty finge di “ratificare” il lavoro de L’Immaginario, in realtà sorpassandolo nelladirezione il più possibile opposta allo sforzo compiuto da questo stesso saggio: «edere è immaginare. E immaginare è vedere». Questo distanziarsi da Sartretrova uno dei suoi “cardini” nella caratterizzazione fenomenologica della visione come superamento dell’osservabile, un superamento che riguarderebbeuna dimensione essenziale dell’essere come della verità. (shrink)

“To see is to imagine. And to imagine, is to see.”Perception and Imaginary in Merleau-PontyMerleau-Ponty accords such a phenomenological and ontological priority to perception that this privilege might lead him to minimize the importance of theimaginary in our relationship with the world. In fact, in the work published during his life, the theme of the imaginary does not occupy a large place, and its conceptual elaboration remains little visible. A reading of his posthumous publications and of his unpublished papers leads (...) to a more subtle landscape, inwhich the philosopher destabilizes our common oppositions between real and imaginary, as well as those between the imaginary and truth. From themanuscripts from the end of the 1940s on, Merleau-Ponty expands his inquiry into perception in two complementary directions: the intuition of a form of coextensivity between perceptive life and imaginary life, but also between perception and expression. These intuitions, never disavowed, would continueto deepen up through the late unpublished ontological works. They find a guiding thread in the contestation of Sartre’s separation between the real andthe imaginary, and they open out onto the outline of a complex link between truth, imagination, and expression. Merleau-Ponty pretended to approve of thework of The Imaginary all that which is actually moving beyond it, in the direction most opposite to this essay’s own aims: “To see is to imagine. And toimagine is to see.” This split with Sartre finds one of its pivots in the phenomenological characterization of vision as a surpassing of the observable, a surpassing that would touch on an essential dimension of being and of truth.“Vedere è immaginare. E immaginare, è vedere”.Percezione e immaginario in Merleau-PontyMerleau-Ponty accorda alla percezione una tale priorità, fenomenologica e ontologica, che questo privilegio potrebbe condurre a minimizzare l’importanzadell’immaginario nel nostro rapporto al mondo. Di fatto, nell’opera pubblicata in vita, il tema dell’immaginario non occupa un grande spazio, e la suaelaborazione concettuale resta poco visibile. La lettura delle pubblicazioni postume e degli inediti conduce a un disegno più sottile, che vede il filosofo destabilizzare le nostre comuni opposizioni fra reale e immaginario così come quelle fra immaginario e verità. A partire dai manoscritti della fine degli anniQuaranta, Merleau-Ponty allarga la sua indagine sulla percezione in due direzioni complementari: verso l’intuizione di una forma di co-estensività fravita percettiva e vita immaginaria, ma altresì fra percezione e espressione. Mai smentite, queste intuizioni vanno approfondendosi fino ai tardi inediti“ontologici”. Esse trovano un filo conduttore nella messa in causa della separazione operata da Sartre fra reale e immaginario, e sfociano nell’abbozzodi un legame complesso fra verità, immaginario e espressione. Merleau-Ponty finge di “ratificare” il lavoro de L’Immaginario, in realtà sorpassandolo nelladirezione il più possibile opposta allo sforzo compiuto da questo stesso saggio: «edere è immaginare. E immaginare è vedere». Questo distanziarsi da Sartretrova uno dei suoi “cardini” nella caratterizzazione fenomenologica della visione come superamento dell’osservabile, un superamento che riguarderebbeuna dimensione essenziale dell’essere come della verità. (shrink)

L'histoire du sublime, presque aussi ancienne que la philosophie, concerne, de nos jours, la plupart des disciplines qui la constituent esthétique, politique, éthique, anthropologie. Les philosophes ont d'abord pensé le sublime dans la sphère du discours. Ils ont étendu ensuite son domaine aux différents arts et aux grands phénomènes de la nature,- pour étudier, enfin, son apparition dans diverses formes d'activité humaine, comme les sciences et les techniques. Le sublime confronte la philosophie aux limites de son pouvoir, en vue de (...) la mettre en échec ou de lui permettre d'aller plus loin. Il opère à la fois comme principe de connaissance et comme principe de métamorphose. D'une part, il subvertit les valeurs du beau, du vrai et du bon, d'autre part, il me transcende ou me sublime, au sens très général où la sublimation est dépassement de soi. Le présent livre vise à redonner au sublime la place qu'il mérite dans notre système éducatif et dans nos vies : celle d'une épreuve initiatrice, susceptible d'insuffler la vie à des connaissances qui resteraient sinon formelles et tronquées. Il cherche également à nous orienter vers une science possible du sujet qui prenne en compte la vocation de l'homme à se transcender lui-même. (shrink)

La relecture des pratiques d’un tel Service, pour le diocèse de Coutances et dans les dix dernières années, révèle l’importance d’une situation sociale et ecclésiale ainsi que des interprétations et réorientations engagées. Reprenant successivement les termes désignant ce Service, l’article évoque plusieurs exigences d’articulation : entre communautés et diocèse, entre requêtes spécifiques selon les ministères et requêtes communes à tous les acteurs pastoraux, enfin entre la diversité des demandes de formation et le souci d’un projet pastoral de formation.

‘Feminist logic’ may sound like an impossible, incoherent, or irrelevant project, but it is none of these. We begin by delineating three categories into which projects in feminist logic might fall: philosophical logic, philosophy of logic, and pedagogy. We then defuse two distinct objections to the very idea of feminist logic: the irrelevance argument and the independence argument. Having done so, we turn to a particular kind of project in feminist philosophy of logic: Valerie Plumwood's feminist argument for a relevance (...) logic. Plumwood's work serves as our primary case study as we turn to the project of considering three different ways we might understand her argument and revisionist arguments like it: as a priori theorizing, as ameliorative conceptual engineering, or as instances of anti-exceptionalist approaches to logic. After arguing that the anti-exceptionalist approach seems to provide the most promising means of understanding the kind of project undertaken in a feminist challenge to classical logic, we briefly address the consequences that this might have for logic instruction. Here, we argue for the perhaps unexpected conclusion that feminist programs ought to offer more, not less, instruction in logic for those who take interest. (shrink)

Premier volet d'une relecture transversale de l'œuvre de Merleau-Ponty à la lumière d'une connaissance d'ensemble de ses inédits, cet ouvrage se consacre à une période encore mal connue de l'évolution du philosophe, les années 1945 ...

The idea that our epistemic practices can be wrongful has been the core observation driving the growing literature on epistemic injustice, doxastic wronging, and moral encroachment. But, one element of our epistemic practice has been starkly absent from this discussion of epistemic morality: attention. The goal of this article is to show that attention is a worthwhile focus for epistemology, especially for the field of epistemic morality. After presenting a new dilemma for proponents of doxastic wronging, I show how focusing (...) on attention not only allows us to defuse that dilemma, but also helps to substantiate accounts of what goes wrong in cases of doxastic wronging. (shrink)

New translations of two treatises by the fourth-century Christian thinker dealing with the possibility and nature of knowledge. Intended specifically for philosophical readers and suitable as a text for a course in medieval philosophy, Augustine, or church history. No subject index. Paper edition, $12.95. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

In the Proslogion, St. Anselm presents a philosophical argument for the existence of God. Anselm's proof, known since the time of Kant as the ontological argument for the existence of God, has played an important role in the history of philosophy and has been incorporated in various forms into the systems of Descartes, Leibniz, Hegel, and others. Included in this edition of the Proslogion are Gaunilo's "A Reply on Behalf of the Fool" and St. Anselm's "The Author's Reply to Gaunilo." (...) All three works are in the original Latin with English translation on facing pages. Professor Charlesworth's introduction provides a helpful discussion of the context of the Proslogion in the theological tradition and in Anselm's own thought and writing. (shrink)

In these three dialogues, renowned for their dialectical structure and linguistic precision, Anselm sets out his classic account of the relationship between freedom and sin--its linchpin his definition of freedom of choice as the power to preserve rectitude of will for its own sake. In doing so, Anselm explores the fascinating implications for God, human beings, and angels of his conclusion that freedom of choice neither is nor entails the power to sin. In addition to an Introduction, notes, and a (...) glossary, Thomas Williams brings to the translation of these important dialogues the same precision and clarity that distinguish his previous translation of Anselm's _Proslogion_ and _Monologion_, which Professor Paul Spade of Indiana University called "scrupulously faithful and accurate without being slavishly literal, yet lively and graceful to both the eye and ear. (shrink)

The Monologion (Latin: Monologium, "Monologue"), originally entitled A Monologue on the Reason for Faith (Monoloquium de Ratione Fidei) and sometimes also known as An Example of Meditation on the Reason for Faith (Exemplum Meditandi de Ratione Fidei), was written in 1075 and 1076.The Proslogion (Latin: Proslogium, "Discourse"), originally entitled Faith Seeking Understanding (Fides Quaerens Intellectum) and then An Address on God's Existence (Alloquium de Dei Existentia), was written over the next two years (1077-1078).

It has been pointed out that Gettier case scenarios have deviant realizations and that deviant realizations raise a difficulty for the logical analysis of thought experiments. Grundmann and Horvath have shown that it is possible to rule out deviant realizations by suitably modifying the scenario of a Gettier-style thought experiment. They hypothesize further that the enriched scenario corresponds to the way expert epistemologists implicitly interpret the original one. However, no precise account of this implicit enrichment is offered, which makes the (...) proposal somewhat ad hoc. Drawing on pragmatic theory, I argue that the content of Grundmann and Horvath’s modified scenario corresponds to the default interpretation of the original scenario and that epistemological expertise is not required to access the deviance-proof interpretation. This Default Interpretation proposal offers thus a more general and independently motivated solution to the Problem of Deviant Realizations. (shrink)

How does being a woman affect one’s epistemic life? What about being Black? Or queer? Standpoint theorists argue that such social positions can give rise to otherwise unavailable epistemic privilege. “Epistemic privilege” is a murky concept, however. Critics of standpoint theory argue that the view is offered without a clear explanation of how standpoints confer their benefits, what those benefits are, or why social positions are particularly apt to produce them. For this reason, many regard standpoint theory as being out (...) of step with epistemology more broadly. But this need not be so. This article articulates a minimal version of standpoint epistemology that avoids these criticisms and supports the normative goals of its feminist forerunners. This account serves as the foundation for developing a formal model in which to explore standpoint epistemology using neighborhood semantics for modal logic. (shrink)

_A fresh, new translation of Augustine’s inaugural work as a Christian convert_ The first four works written by St. Augustine of Hippo after his conversion to Christianity have influenced prominent thinkers from Boethius to Bernard Lonergan. Usually called the Cassiciacum dialogues, these four works are a “literary triumph,” combining Ciceronian and neo-Platonic philosophy, Roman comedy and Vergilian poetry, and early Christian theology. They are also, arguably, Augustine’s most charming works, exhibiting his whimsical levity and ironic wryness. In this first dialogue, (...) Augustine and his interlocutors have retreated to a quiet country villa north of Milan to explore the history and teachings of Academic Skepticism. Augustine is both sympathetic to and critical of the Skeptics, eventually hypothesizing that they could not possibly have believed everything they taught. The dialogue serves as a fitting launch point for a knowledge of God and the soul, the overall subject of the Cassiciacum tetralogy. Michael Foley’s clear, precise and playful translations are accompanied by his brief, illuminating commentaries. (shrink)