Getting Gettier straight: thought experiments, deviant realizations and default interpretations

Synthese 198 (2):1783-1806 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX


It has been pointed out that Gettier case scenarios have deviant realizations and that deviant realizations raise a difficulty for the logical analysis of thought experiments. Grundmann and Horvath have shown that it is possible to rule out deviant realizations by suitably modifying the scenario of a Gettier-style thought experiment. They hypothesize further that the enriched scenario corresponds to the way expert epistemologists implicitly interpret the original one. However, no precise account of this implicit enrichment is offered, which makes the proposal somewhat ad hoc. Drawing on pragmatic theory, I argue that the content of Grundmann and Horvath’s modified scenario corresponds to the default interpretation of the original scenario and that epistemological expertise is not required to access the deviance-proof interpretation. This Default Interpretation proposal offers thus a more general and independently motivated solution to the Problem of Deviant Realizations.

Similar books and articles

Counterfactual Thinking and Thought Experiments.Josh Turkewitz - 2014 - Florida Philosophical Review 14 (1):85-96.
The Naturalization of Intentionality.Jonathan Peter Wilcock - 2001 - Dissertation, City University of New York
Thought experiments without possible worlds.Daniel Dohrn - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):363-384.
The Deviance in Deviant Causal Chains.Neil McDonnell - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):162-170.
Defaultness Reigns: The Case of Sarcasm.Rachel Giora, Shir Givoni & Ofer Fein - 2015 - Metaphor and Symbol 30 (4):290-313.
Using Defaults to Understand Token Causation.J. E. Wolff - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (1):5-26.
What Do Deviant Causal Chains Deviate From?Geert Keil - 2007 - In Christoph Lumer & Sandro Nannini (eds.), Intention, Deliberation and Autonomy. Ashgate. pp. 69-90.


Added to PP

304 (#43,573)

6 months
75 (#20,117)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Pierre Saint-Germier
Université Catholique de Louvain

References found in this work

Studies in the way of words.Herbert Paul Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

View all 50 references / Add more references