Starting from Kant's striking question 'What is orientation in thinking?', this book argues that the main challenge facing global normative theorising lies in its failure to acknowledge its conceptual inadequacies. We do not know how to reason globally; instead, we tend to apply our domestic political experiences to the global context. Katrin Flikschuh argues that we must develop a form of global reasoning that is sensitive to the variability of contexts: rather than trying to identify a uniquely shareable set (...) of substantive principles, we need to appreciate and understand local reasons for action. Her original and incisive study shows how such reasoning can benefit from the open-ended nature of Kant's systematic but non-dogmatic philosophical thinking, and from reorientation from a domestic to a non-domestic frame of thought. It will appeal to all those interested in global moral issues, as well as to Kant scholars. (shrink)

This essay investigates, via the concepts of the philosophy of orientation, Annie Duke’s decision-making theory in "Thinking in Bets" and scrutinizes as to what extent one can universalize the 'orientation skill' of decision-making with regard to our everyday and professional life.

In this presentation I take a close look at Kant’s notion of “orientation” as it arises in a minor essay of 1786 in order to show how this relatively obscure moment forces us to reconsider the central division between epistemology and aesthetics. What makes Kant’s notion orientation difficult to place in a critical system that separates conceptually grounded cognition from the affective nature of aesthetics is that orientations turn out to be claims to knowledge which can not be had without (...) an irreducible aesthetic or “felt” discrimination. So what is philosophically at issue in examining Kant’s notion of orientation is the question of whether there are indeed some features of objects or states of affairs which are not properly recognized prior to or independently of feeling a certain way about them. In other words, are our feelings epistemologically relevant? The official Kantian answer is, of course, a resounding “no”. By reconstructing the logic of “orientation” as deployed in the 1786 essay I show where the attempt to separate cognition from feelings leads into a vicious “Kantian Circle”. This logical circularity anticipates similar problems in the third critique’s explanation of beauty and life. I end by returning to the notion of “orientation” in order to suggest a way out of this “Kantian Circle”. (shrink)

The rapid development of computers and technology affects modern daily life. Individuals in the digital age need to develop computational thinking skills. Existing studies have shown that programming teaching is conducive to cultivating students’ CT, and various learning models have different effects on the cultivation of CT. This study proposed a problem-oriented learning model that is closely related to programming and computational thinking. In all, 60 eighth-grade students from a middle school in China were divided into an (...) experimental group which adopted the POL model, and a control group which adopted the lecture-and-practice learning model. The results showed that the students who were instructed using the POL model performed better than those who were instructed using the LAP model on CT concepts, CT practices, and CT perspectives. Significant differences were found for CT concepts and CT perspectives, but not for CT practices. Findings have implications for teachers who wish to apply new learning models to facilitate students’ CT skills, and the study provides a reference case for CT training and Python programming teaching. (shrink)

Against the tide of philosophers committed to this view this book presents a naturalistic view of human thinking, arguing that computers are merely...

Translation from German to English by Daniel Fidel Ferrer -/- What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking? -/- German title: "Was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren?" -/- Published: October 1786, Königsberg in Prussia, Germany. By Immanuel Kant (Born in 1724 and died in 1804) -/- Translation into English by Daniel Fidel Ferrer (March, 17, 2014). The day of Holi in India in 2014. -/- From 1774 to about 1800, there were three intense philosophical and theological controversies underway (...) in Germany, namely: Fragments Controversy, the Pantheism Controversy, and the Atheism Controversy. Kant’s essay translated here is Kant’s respond to the Pantheism Controversy. During this period (1770-1800), there was the Sturm und Drang (Storm and Urge (stress)) movement with thinkers like Johann Hamann, Johann Herder, Friedrich Schiller, and Johann Goethe; who were against the cultural movement of the Enlightenment (Aufklärung). Kant was on the side of Enlightenment (see his Answer the Question: What is Enlightenment? 1784). -/- What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking? / By Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). [Was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren? English]. (shrink)

While situation theory and situation semantics provide an appropriate framework for a realistic model-theoretic treatment of natural language, serious thinking on their 'computational' aspects has only recently started. Existing proposals mainly offer a Prolog- or Lisp-like programming environment with varying degrees of divergence from the ontology of situation theory. In this paper, we introduce a computational medium (called BABY-SIT) based on situations. The primary motivation underlying BABY-SIT is to facilitate the development and testing of programs in domains ranging from (...) linguistics to artificial intelligence in a unified framework built upon situation-theoretic constructs. (shrink)

This article critically extends Kant's 1786 discussion of “orientation in thinking” to ask what it means to “orient oneself in thinking” around the concepts of race and sex, addressed in the context of 1) the central place and historical importance of Kant in Western philosophy; and 2) Kant's theory of race and its relation to his critical philosophy. As presumptions about race and sex are already built into the history of philosophy, taking these concepts as an explicit orientation (...) is not the expression of subjective interests, but a reflection and criticism of some of the objective forces that shape the world and have shaped the history of philosophy. An intellectual orientation around the concepts of race or sex can thus be understood as a critical position in relation to the problematic “historical universality” of these concepts, with the aim of transforming the false universality of biological race thinking, in particular, into the historical universality of critical social analysis. (shrink)

In this paper, we offer two further issues or questions for consideration in thinking about orientation in or stance about technology. We do this in the light of the Zhuangzi’s Primitivist attitude towards technology. The Primitivist is one of the five authorial voices identified in the Zhuangzi. The Zhuangzi is a Chinese philosophical classic named after Zhuang Zhou or Zhuangzi (399?-295? B.C.E.). Fundamentally, we suggest that the Primitivist attitude of resistance towards technology might be said to highlight the point (...) that effects of technology to xing 性 (nature; human nature), thus to individual self, and the natural environment are important considerations in thinking about stance regarding technology. We hold that a reflection on technological orientation would on the whole benefit from a recognition and consideration of two more issues. (shrink)

This article considers the meaning of the ancient Chinese magic square Luoshu. It is known that this square is the most ancient of this type of squares. The importance of the magic square in the philosophical tradition and in the whole culture of China is large. The ancient understanding of number differs from the modern one by its dual character, combining the features of philosophical symbolism and mathematical constructions. Unfortunately, modern interpretations of the Luoshu as well as other numerical constructions (...) preserved by the Chinese tradition are too often limited to a superficial statement of their symbolic, “numerological” nature, ignoring the effects of the mathematical structure represented by them. At the same time, some scholars strongly emphasize the intuitive aspects of numerology, which do not presuppose accuracy. On the contrary, Leibniz saw in the Chinese binary system of thinking the beginning of an exact universal language. The author, appealing to the concept of A.A. Krushinskiy, analyzes the arithmetic laws of the structure of the square. The article shows that the magic square Luoshu is not a numbers game. Without any doubt, its main meaning lies in the application of arithmetic. Chinese magic square is an illustrative implementation of one of the main features of Chinese language and traditional thinking – its rational and mathematical basis. The Luoshu square is a vivid example of visual constructivism in the Chinese style of thinking. By means of the magic square’s scheme, the procedure of generalization that is a basis of concepts formation is carried out. This procedure uses a mathematical magic square algorithm based on the numerical codes of the five elements. The quinary spontaneous symbolism is rooted in the Chinese traditional culture of thinking and life order. (shrink)

This essay explores the relation between worldly orientation and rational comprehension in Kant. Both require subjective grounds of differentiation that were eventually developed into a contextualizing principle for reflective judgement. This kind of judgement can proceed either inductively to find new universals or by analogy to symbolically link different objective spheres. I will argue that the basic orientational function of reflective judgement is to modally differentiate the formal horizonal contexts of field, territory, domain and habitat laid out in the Introduction (...) to theCritique of the Power of Judgement. Assessing which context takes priority will be important in making aesthetic judgements and for applying practical reason to comprehend human affairs. (shrink)

We humans tend to believe that things are only real in as much as we perceive them, an idea reinforced by modern philosophy, which privileges us as special, radically different in kind from all other objects. But as Graham Harman, one of the theory's leading exponents, shows, Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) rejects the idea of human specialness: the world, he states, is clearly not the world as manifest to humans. "To think a reality beyond our thinking is not nonsense, (...) but obligatory." At OOO's heart is the idea that objects--whether real, fictional, natural, artificial, human, or non-human--are mutually autonomous. This core idea has significance for nearly every field of inquiry which is concerned in some way with the systematic interaction of objects, and the degree to which individual objects resist full participation in such systems. In this brilliant new introduction, Graham Harman lays out OOO's history, ideas, and impact, taking in art and literature, politics and natural science along the way. From Sherlock Holmes, unicorns, and videogames to Dadaism, Voltaire, and string theory, this book will change the way you understand everything. (shrink)

Critical thinking has come to be defined as and aligned with ‘good’ thinking. It connects to the value placed on rationality and agency and is woven into conceptions of what it means to become a person and hence deserve respect. Challenges to the supremacy of critical thinking have helped to provoke richer and fuller interpretations and critical thought is prevalent in talk of what it is to become a person and more fundamentally to educate. The capacity for (...) critical thought may indeed be one significant aspect of developed personhood; however an emphasis on critical thought as the main source of respect for persons raises a number of issues about what might therefore be excluded or neglected. A number of alternative views that try to retrieve a more ‘humanised’ view of how we exist in the world are examined and are found to suggest that human consciousness as a mark of personhood should be seen as rooted in bodily senses and a more aesthetic orientation towards the world that moves us away from critical thought and rationality as the single indicators of ‘good’ thinking. (shrink)

‘Historical thinking’ has a central role in the theory and practice of history education. At a minimum, history educators must work with a model of historical thinking if they are to formulate potential progression in students’ advance through a school history curriculum, test that progression empirically, and shape instructional experiences in order to maximize that progression. Where do they look, and where should they look, in order to construct such models? Over the past several decades, three major strands (...) have developed, one based in the empirically minded and instruction-oriented British Schools Council History Project, a second through the more philosophically oriented German field of history didactics and historical consciousness, and a third in the US. All three had roots in the historiography and philosophy of their own national traditions. Canadian history educators have been working with a pragmatic hybrid defined around six ‘historical thinking concepts.’ While this model has both been highly influential in the reform of Canadian history curricula and prompted adaptations elsewhere, there has been only minimal theoretical discussion exploring the relationship of these concepts to each other or to the three traditions which helped to shape them. This article is a contribution towards filling that gap. (shrink)

Political conspiracy theories—e.g., unsupported beliefs about the nefarious machinations of one’s cunning, powerful, and evil opponents—are adopted enthusiastically by a great many people of widely varying political orientations. In many cases, these theories posit that there exists a small group of individuals who have intentionally but secretly acted to cause economic problems, political strife, and even natural disasters. This group is often held to exist “in the shadows,” either because its membership is unknown, or because “the real nature” of its (...) members’ allegiances, motives, and methods has been concealed from the public at large. Paradigmatic examples of these political conspiracy theories include anti-Semitic beliefs of the sort associated with The Protocols of the Elder of Zion, the “Red Scare” of the 1950s, claims about the “New World Order,” and many others. -/- Why do these theories attract so many adherents? In this essay, I’ll attempt to spread some light on this issue by applying Kahneman and Tversky’s highly influential work on reasoning under uncertainty. I’ll proceed by first providing a brief introduction to Kahneman and Tversky’s work on reasoning under uncertainty, and the way in which this relates to standard economic and philosophic accounts of rational behavior, as well as philosophical ideas about the role of intuition. Next, I’ll move onto some specific interconnected aspects of this work that are relevant to understanding conspiracy theories, including errors involving probabilistic reasoning (“Prospect Theory”), those involving the inappropriate use of heuristics, and those related to the “framing” of certain outcomes as losses from a baseline. This essay will conclude by making two related points. First, some of the most important reasoning errors committed by adherents of conspiracy theories are errors that many of us regularly commit. Given that self-awareness of these errors provides only minimal protection from committing them, this suggests that many of use may be more vulnerable to conspiratorial reasoning than we may like to believe. Second, in the light of this danger, I will outline a few steps that might be taken to help inoculate ourselves against the appeal of these theories, and to help respond to the conspiratorial arguments of others. (shrink)

In this article, I intend to underscore the importance of critical thinking in rendering invaluable positive contributions and impact within professional organizations in the developing world. I argue that critical thinking treated as a normative principle and balanced with a pragmatic orientation provides a rational framework for resolving conflicts that oftentimes ensue from the incoherence between Western-based organizational theories and the actual circumstances of a developing country. In order to optimize the benefits of critical thinking, I also (...) argue that it should not be expected only among leaders and managers, but also and more importantly, among organizational members and associates. It is for this reason that I introduce Matthew Lipman’s Community of Inquiry as a model for cultivating critical thinking within professional environments. (shrink)

Theological materialism, it is argued, provides an important ethical orientation towards climate change. Following the tradition of practical materialism inaugurated by Karl Marx, materialism is here interpreted in a non-reductive sense that includes a stress on human praxis. Such a materialism is comprehensive in the sense that it identifies the sources of climate change as twofold: as rooted in a capitalist crisis and as rooted in a crisis in our conditions of life. Such a materialism is also theological: it is (...) ‘flesh made word’ (Nicholas Lash). One implication of this theological materialism is that creation is to be understood as good. This theme is explored by way of the ‘revolt of nature’: this trope provides a theological way of exploring nature in a changing climate. At the conclusion, critical issues raised by the title, Thinking like an animal, are addressed. (shrink)

Critical thinking has come to be defined as and aligned with ‘good’ thinking. It connects to the value placed on rationality and agency and is woven into conceptions of what it means to become a person and hence deserve respect. Challenges to the supremacy of critical thinking have helped to provoke richer and fuller interpretations and critical thought is prevalent in talk of what it is to become a person and more fundamentally to educate. The capacity for (...) critical thought may indeed be one significant aspect of developed personhood; however an emphasis on critical thought as the main source of respect for persons raises a number of issues about what might therefore be excluded or neglected. A number of alternative views that try to retrieve a more ‘humanised’ view of how we exist in the world are examined and are found to suggest that human consciousness as a mark of personhood should be seen as rooted in bodily senses and a more aesthetic orientation towards the world that moves us away from critical thought and rationality as the single indicators of ‘good’ thinking. (shrink)

Emmanuel Levinas is one of the most important figures of twentieth-century philosophy. Exerting a profound influence upon such thinkers as Derrida, Lyotard, Blanchot, and Irigaray, Levinas's work bridges several major gaps in the evolution of continental philosophy -- between modern and postmodern, phenomenology and poststructuralism, ethics and ontology. He is credited with having spurred a revitalized interest in ethics-based philosophy throughout Europe and America. _Entre Nous_ is the culmination of Levinas's philosophy. Published in France a few years before his death, (...) it gathers his most important work and reveals the development of his thought over nearly forty years of committed inquiry. Along with several trenchant interviews published here, these essays engage with issues of suffering, love, religion, culture, justice, human rights, and legal theory. Taken together, they constitute a key to Levinas's ideas on the ethical dimensions of otherness. Working from the phenomenological method of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, Levinas pushed beyond the limits of their framework to argue that it is ethics, not ontology, that orients philosophy, and that responsibility precedes reasoning. Ethics for Levinas means responsibility in relation to difference. Throughout his work, Levinas returns to the metaphor of the face of the other to discuss how and where responsibility enters our lives and makes philosophy necessary. For Levinas, ethics begins with our face to face interaction with another person -- seeing that person not as a reflection of one's self, nor as a threat, but as different and greater than self. Levinas moves the reader to recognize the implications of this interaction: our abiding responsibility for the other, and our concern with the other's suffering and death. Situated at the crossroads of several philosophical schools and approaches, Levinas's work illuminates a host of critical issues and has found resonances among students and scholars of literature, law, religion, and politics. _Entre Nous_ is at once the apotheosis of his work and an accessible introduction to it. In the end, Levinas's urgent meditations upon the face of the other suggest a new foundation upon which to grasp the nature of good and evil in the tangled skein of our lives. (shrink)

The essays in Object-Oriented Feminism explore OOF: a feminist intervention into recent philosophical discourses--like speculative realism, object-oriented ontology (OOO), and new materialism--that take objects, things, stuff, and matter as primary. Object-oriented feminism approaches all objects from the inside-out position of being an object too, with all of its accompanying political and ethical potentials. This volume places OOF thought in a long history of ongoing feminist work in multiple disciplines. In particular, object-oriented feminism foregrounds three significant aspects (...) of feminist thinking in the philosophy of things: politics, engaging with histories of treating certain humans (women, people of color, and the poor) as objects; erotics, employing humor to foment unseemly entanglements between things; and ethics, refusing to make grand philosophical truth claims, instead staking a modest ethical position that arrives at being "in the right" by being "wrong." Seeking not to define object-oriented feminism but rather to enact it, the volume is interdisciplinary in approach, with contributors from a variety of fields, including sociology, anthropology, English, art, and philosophy. Topics are frequently provocative, engaging a wide range of theorists from Heidegger and Levinas to Irigaray and Haraway, and an intriguing diverse array of objects, including the female body as fetish object in Lolita subculture; birds made queer by endocrine disruptors; and truth claims arising in material relations in indigenous fiction and film. Intentionally, each essay can be seen as an "object" in relation to others in this collection. Contributors: Irina Aristarkhova, University of Michigan; Karen Gregory, University of Edinburgh; Marina Gržinic, Slovenian Academy of Science and Arts; Frenchy Lunning, Minneapolis College of Art and Design; Timothy Morton, Rice University; Anne Pollock, Georgia Tech; Elizabeth A. Povinelli, Columbia University; R. Joshua Scannell, CUNY Graduate Center; Adam Zaretsky, VASTAL. (shrink)

In his 1786 essay, What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?, Kant characterizes the business of reasoning by referring to the use of the spatial orientations ‘right’ and ‘left’; he, then, extents his analysis to mathematical and logical ways of orientation. The following paper will start off by analyzing the Kantian standard account of orientation to, eventually, amend that account by deepening and correcting it in three respects: the indexical character of orientation that is due to the (...) particular standpoint of the subject who is oriented by a particular cluster of available reference points; the twofold comparative procedure of orientation in which a situation is assessed by virtue of a practically justified and indexically structured net of orientation; and the receptive modes of orientation, mirroring the ‘existential’ fact that the subject is already oriented to a situation by established institutions. The paper ends in briefly considering the pitfalls and benefits of being disoriented. (shrink)

The rapid rise in interest in geoengineering the climate as a response to global warming presents a clear and significant challenge to environmental ethics. The paper articulates what I call the 'presumptive argument' against geoengineering from environmental ethics, a presumption strong enough to make geoengineering almost 'unthinkable' from within that tradition. Two rationales for suspending that presumption are next considered. One of them is a 'lesser evil' argument, the other makes connections between the presumptive argument, ecofacism, and the anthropocentrism/non-anthropocentrism debate. (...) The discussion is designed to prompt reflection on how environmental ethicists should orient themselves to the rapidly moving geoengineering debate and what they should think about the moral significance of the earth's large-scale biogeochemical processes compared to the moral significance of individuals, species, and ecosystems. (shrink)

In order to be able to provide informed, effective and responsive mental health care and to do so in an evidence‐based, collaborative and recovery‐focused way with those who use mental health services, there is a recognition of the need for mental health professionals to possess sophisticated critical thinking capabilities. This article will therefore propose that such capabilities can be productively situated within the context of the work of the French philosopher Michel Foucault, one of the most challenging, innovative and (...) influential thinkers of the 20th century. However, rather than focusing exclusively upon the content of Foucault's work, it will be suggested that it is possible to discern a general methodological approach across that work, a methodological approach that he refers to as “the history of the present.” In doing so, Foucault's history of the present can be understood as a productive, albeit provisional, framework in which to orientate the purpose and process of critical thinking for mental health professionals by emphasizing the need to both historicize and politicize the theoretical perspectives and therapeutic practices that characterize contemporary mental health care. (shrink)

The term ‘environment’ is not uniformly defined in the public health sciences, which causes crucial inconsistencies in research, health policy, and practice. As we shall indicate, this is somewhat entangled with diverging pathogenic and salutogenic perspectives (research and policy priorities) concerning environmental health. We emphasise two distinct concepts of environment in use by the World Health Organisation. One significant way these concepts differ concerns whether the social environment is included. Divergence on this matter has profound consequences for the understanding of (...) health and disease, for measures derived from that understanding targeting health promotion and disease prevention, and consequently, for epistemic structures and concept development in scientific practice. We hope to improve the given situation in public health by uncovering these differences and by developing a fruitful way of thinking about environment. Firstly, we side with the salutogenic conception of environment as a _health resource_ (as well as a source of health risks). Secondly, we subdivide the concept of environment into four _health-oriented environmental categories_ (viz., natural, built-material, socio-cultural, and psychosocial) and we link these with other theoretical notions proposed in the health sciences literature. Thirdly, we propose that in public health ‘environment’ should be understood as consisting of all extrinsic factors that influence or are influenced by the health, well-being, and development of an individual. Consequently, none of the four categories should be excluded from the concept of environment. We point out the practical relevance and fruitfulness of the conception of environment as a health source and frame this in causal terms, representing _individual health environments_ as causal networks. Throughout, we side with the view that for the design of human health-promoting settings, increased attention and consideration of environmental resources of salutogenic potential is particularly pressing. (shrink)

In her essay, “After de Brosses” (2017), Rosalind C. Morris briefly considers the historical importance of the concept of the fetish on the relatively recent movements of new materialism, but she does not engage with Speculative Realism and Object-Oriented Ontology. This essay addresses this gap and focuses on the influence of the fetish on Speculative Realism and Object-Oriented Ontology by focusing on Graham Harman’s conception of objects and Quentin Meillassoux’s theory of arche-fossils. In short, I am offering a (...) posthumanist theorization of the fetish in order to argue that Object-Oriented Ontology can be considered, at points, to be a fetish-oriented ontology and that this notion of the fetish allows us to think about philosophical considerations of objects in a new light. (shrink)

People often make less risky decisions for themselves than others. We examined how people allocated risks (i.e., determining the ratio of uncertain outcomes to certain outcomes) between themselves and others. We also investigated gain (vs. loss) domain and social value orientation as predictors of risk allocations. The results of three experiments demonstrated that participants were more likely to share their risks equally between themselves and others than distribute risk unequally. In the gain (vs. loss) domain, participants allocated fewer risks to (...) themselves and more risks to the other person for unequal risk allocations. Compared to proselfs, prosocials were more likely to allocate risks equally. We also found stronger domain effects on unequal risk allocations for proselfs than for prosocials. Therefore, our findings clarify the effects of risk distribution, domain, and social value orientation on interpersonal allocation decisions and highlight equal risk distribution between oneself and others. (shrink)

_Thinking for Clinicians_ provides analysts of all orientations with the tools and context for working critically within psychoanalytic theory and practice. It does this through detailed chapters on some of the philosophers whose work is especially relevant for contemporary theory and clinical writing: Emmanuel Levinas, Martin Buber, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Orange presents the historical background for their ideas, along with clinical vignettes to help contextualize their theories, further grounding them in real-world experience. With a hermeneutic sensibility (...) firmly in mind, _Thinking for Clinicians_ rewards as it challenges and will be a valuable reference for clinicians who seek a better understanding of the philosophical bases of contemporary psychoanalytic theory. (shrink)

Children’s future-oriented cognition has become a well-established area of research over the last decade. Future-oriented cognition encompasses a range of processes, including those involved in conceiving the future, imagining and preparing for future events, and making decisions that will affect how the future unfolds. We consider recent empirical advances in the study of such processes by outlining key findings that have yielded a clearer picture of how future thinking emerges and changes over childhood. Our interest in future (...) thinking stems from a broader interest in temporal cognition, and we argue that a consideration of developmental changes in how children understand and represent time itself provides a valuable framework in which to study future-oriented cognition. (shrink)

Dialogic or dialogical education is an umbrella term that encompasses a myriad of different and at times conflicting approaches. As there is no agreed-upon definition of ‘dialogue’ (not that there is or should be one unified definition), and even fewer clear and systematic guidelines for application, researchers and practitioners in the DE field are faced with countless questions and dilemmas. My aim in this paper is therefore to offer some ideas for a general outline of how to employ systematic (...) class='Hi'>thinking on DE. This outline can serve as a basis for the development of a methodological tool that can enable researchers and practitioners to think about and apply dialogical practices with greater clarity, coherency and consistency. Following a normatively oriented (rather than instrumental) systematic line of reasoning, this paper will begin by discussing the basic values of three central dialogical approaches and then move on to discuss more practical parameters that surpass strictly pedagogical and didactic concerns. (shrink)