Results for 'Substance Dualism'

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  1. Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and the Problem of Mental Causation.E. J. Lowe - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (1):5-23.
    Non-Cartesian substance dualism maintains that persons or selves are distinct from their organic physical bodies and any parts of those bodies. It regards persons as ‘substances’ in their own right, but does not maintain that persons are necessarily separable from their bodies, in the sense of being capable of disembodied existence. In this paper, it is urged that NCSD is better equipped than either Cartesian dualism or standard forms of physicalism to explain the possibility of mental causation. (...)
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    Substance Dualism : A Non-Cartesian Approach.E. J. Lowe - 2009 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
  3.  67
    Substance Dualism and the Argument From Self-Awareness.J. P. Moreland - 2011 - Philosophia Christi 13 (1):21-34.
    There are two tasks for any adequate philosophy of mind: articulate one’s position and explain why dualism is the commonsense view; defend one’s position. I believe that there is an argument that simultaneously satisfies both desiderata in a non–ad hoc way and, thus, the argument can thereby claim the virtue of theoretical simplicity in its favor. In what follows, I shall present the argument and defend its most crucial premise, respond to three criticisms that have been raised against it, (...)
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  4.  54
    Substance Dualism and its Rationale.Howard Robinson - 2011 - In Richard Swinburne (ed.), Free Will and Modern Science. Oup/British Academy.
    Substance dualism is the view that humans are essentially immaterial souls, and that conscious events are events in that soul. This chapter considers the arguments for and against this view. It argues that such questions as ‘Would I have existed if my mother's egg had been fertilized by a different though genetically identical sperm from my father?’ must have a sharp yes-or-no answer, but that they would not have a sharp answer if being me consisted simply of being (...)
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  5. Substance Dualism.Richard Swinburne - 2009 - Faith and Philosophy 26 (5):501 - 513.
    Events are the instantiations of properties in substances at times. A full history of the world must include, as well as physical events, mental events (ones to which the substance involved has privileged access) and mental substances (ones to the existence of which the substance has privileged access), and, among the latter, pure mental substances (ones which do not include a physical substance as an essential part). Humans are pure mental substances. An argument for this is that (...)
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  6. A Moral Argument for Substance Dualism.Gerald K. Harrison - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association (1):21--35.
    This paper presents a moral argument in support of the view that the mind is a nonphysical object. It is intuitively obvious that we, the bearers of conscious experiences, have an inherent value that is not reducible to the value of our conscious experiences. It remains intuitively obvious that we have inherent value even when we represent ourselves to have no physical bodies whatsoever. Given certain assumptions about morality and moral intuitions, this implies that the bearers of conscious experiences—the objects (...)
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  7. Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism Without Reductionism.Eleonore Stump - 1995 - Faith and Philosophy 12 (4):505-531.
    The major Western monotheisms, and Christianity in particular, are often supposed to be committed to a substance dualism of a Cartesian sort. Aquinas, however, has an account of the soul which is non-Cartesian in character. He takes the soul to be something essentially immaterial or configurational but nonetheless realized in material components. In this paper, I argue that Aquinas’s account is coherent and philosophically interesting; in my view, it suggests not only that Cartesian dualism isn’t essential to (...)
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  8. Substance Dualism and the Unity of Consciousness.Igor Gasparov - 2013 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 18 (1):109-123.
    n this paper I would like to defend the three interconnected claims. The first one is based on that fact that the definition of substance dualism proposed recently by Dean Zimmerman needs some essential adjustments in order to capture the genuine spirit of this doctrine. In this paper I will formulate the conditions for the genuine substance dualism in contrast to quasi-dualisms and provide the definition for the genuine substance dualism which I consider to (...)
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  9. Descartes's Substance Dualism and His Independence Conception of Substance.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2008 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (1):69-89.
    Descartes maintained substance dualism, the thesis that no substance has both mental and material properties. His main argument for this thesis, the so-called separability argument from the Sixth Meditation (AT VII: 78) has long puzzled readers. In this paper I argue that Descartes’ independence conception of substance (which Descartes presents in article 51 of the Principles) is crucial for the success of the separability argument and that Descartes used this conception of substance to defend his (...)
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  10.  39
    Substance Dualism and Theological Anthropology.Joshua R. Farris - 2015 - Philosophy and Theology 27 (1):107-126.
    Currently, there remains an aversion for substance dualism in both philosophical and theological literature. However, there has been a renewed interest in substance dualism within philosophical literature. In the present article, I advance substance dualism as a viable position that persuasively accounts for the Scriptural and theological data within Christian thought. I make a specific argument in favor of a metaphysically simple substance. Along the way, I note the overlap between the philosophical and (...)
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  11. Substance Dualism and Disembodied Existence.Nicholas Everitt - 2000 - Faith and Philosophy 17 (3):333-347.
    In a number of places, Richard Swinburne has defended the logical possibility of perception without a body; and has inferred from this logical possibility that substance dualism is true. I challenge his defence of disembodied perception by arguing that a disembodied perceiver would not be able to distinguish between perceptions and hallucinations. I then claim that even if disembodied perception were possible, this could not be used to support substance dualism: such an inference would be either (...)
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  12. There Are No Good Objections to Substance Dualism.Jos’E. Gusmão Rodrigues - 2014 - Philosophy 89 (2):199-222.
    This article aims to review the standard objections to dualism and to argue that will either fail to convince someone committed to dualism or are flawed on independent grounds. I begin by presenting the taxonomy of metaphysical positions on concrete particulars as they relate to the dispute between materialists and dualists, and in particular substance dualism is defined. In the first section, several kinds of substance dualism are distinguished and the relevant varieties of this (...)
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  13. Property Dualism Without Substance Dualism?Robert Francescotti - 2001 - Philosophical Papers 30 (2):93-116.
    Substance dualism is widely rejected by philosophers of mind, but many continue to accept some form of property dualism. The assumption here is that one can consistently believe that (1) mental properties are not physical properties, while denying that (2) mental particulars are not physical particulars. But is this assumption true? This paper considers several analyses of what makes something a physical particular (as opposed to a non-physical particular), and it is argued that on any plausible analysis, (...)
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  14. Free Will and Substance Dualism: The Real Scientific Threat to Free Will?Alfred Mele - 2014 - In W. Sinnot-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 4: Free Will and Responsibility. MIT Press.
    Mele uses survey methods of experimental philosophy to argue that folk notions of freedom and responsibility do not really require any dubious mind–body dualism. In his comment, Nadelhoffer questions Mele's interpretation of the experiments and adds contrary data of his own. Vargas then suggests that Mele overlooks yet another threat to free will—sourcehood. Mele replies by reinterpreting Nadelhoffer's data and rejecting Vargas’ claim that free will requires sourcehood.
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  15.  77
    Substance Dualism Fortified: N. M. L. Nathan.N. M. L. Nathan - 2011 - Philosophy 86 (2):201-211.
    You have a body, but you are a soul or self. Without your body, you could still exist. Your body could be and perhaps is outlasted by the immaterial substance which is your soul or self. Thus the substance dualist. Most substance dualists are Cartesians. The self, they suppose, is essentially conscious: it cannot exist unless it thinks or wills or has experiences. In this paper I sketch out a different form of substance dualism. I (...)
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  16. Lonely Souls: Causality and Substance Dualism.Jaegwon Kim - 2001 - In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
     
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  17. Descartes' Mistake: How Afterlife Beliefs Challenge the Assumption That Humans Are Intuitive Cartesian Substance Dualists.K. Mitch Hodge - 2008 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 8 (3-4):387-415.
    This article presents arguments and evidence that run counter to the widespread assumption among scholars that humans are intuitive Cartesian substance dualists. With regard to afterlife beliefs, the hypothesis of Cartesian substance dualism as the intuitive folk position fails to have the explanatory power with which its proponents endow it. It is argued that the embedded corollary assumptions of the intuitive Cartesian substance dualist position (that the mind and body are diff erent substances, that the mind (...)
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  18. Property Dualism and Substance Dualism.Penelope Mackie - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):181-199.
    I attempt to rebut Dean Zimmerman's novel argument (2010), which he presents in support of substance dualism, for the conclusion that, in spite of its popularity, the combination of property dualism with substance materialism represents a precarious position in the philosophy of mind. I take issue with Zimmerman's contention that the vagueness of ‘garden variety’ material objects such as brains or bodies makes them unsuitable candidates for the possession of phenomenal properties. I also argue that the (...)
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    Substance Dualism and the Unity of Consciousness.Igor Gasparov - 2013 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 18 (1):109-123.
    In this paper I would like to defend three interconnected claims. The first stems from the fact that the definition of substance dualism recently proposed by Dean Zimmerman needs some essential adjustments in order to capture the genuine spirit of the doctrine. In this paper I will formulate the conditions for genuine substance dualism, as distinct from quasi-dualisms, and provide a definition for genuine substance dualism that I consider more appropriate than Zimmerman’s. The second (...)
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    Lonely Souls: Causality and Substance Dualism.Jaegwon Kim - 2001 - In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.). Cornell University Press.
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  21.  49
    Descartes's Substance Dualism and His Independence Conception of Substance.Gonzalo Rodríguez Pereyra - 2008 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (1):69-89.
    Descartes maintained substance dualism, the thesis that no substance has both mental and material properties. His main argument for this thesis, the so-called separability argument from the Sixth Meditation has long puzzled readers. In this paper I argue that Descartes’ independence conception of substance is crucial for the success of the separability argument and that Descartes used this conception of substance to defend his argument for substance dualism from an important objection.
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  22. Is Property Dualism Better Off Than Substance Dualism?William G. Lycan - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):533-542.
    It is widely thought that mind–body substance dualism is implausible at best, though mere “property” dualism is defensible and even flourishing. This paper argues that substance dualism is no less plausible than property dualism and even has two advantages over it.
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  23.  71
    The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism.Jonathan J. Loose, Angus John Louis Menuge & J. P. Moreland - 2018 - Oxford, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell.
  24.  59
    Interactive, Inclusive Substance Dualism.Jeff Engelhardt - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1149-1165.
    This paper argues that a certain kind of substance dualism can adopt the ‘Compatibilist’ solution to the problem of causal exclusion. After sketching a non-Cartesian substance dualism akin to E.J. Lowe’s account, 5-23, 2006, 2008) and considering its shortcomings with respect to mental causation in section one, section two outlines an alternative account of mental causation and argues that this account solves the exclusion problem. Finally, section three considers a challenge to the proposed solution. With the (...)
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    Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and the Problem of Mental Causation. E. Lowe - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (1):5-23.
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  26. I—Dean Zimmerman: From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism.Dean Zimmerman - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):119-150.
    Property dualism is enjoying a slight resurgence in popularity, these days; substance dualism, not so much. But it is not as easy as one might think to be a property dualist and a substance materialist. The reasons for being a property dualist support the idea that some phenomenal properties (or qualia) are as fundamental as the most basic physical properties; but what material objects could be the bearers of the qualia? If even some qualia require an (...)
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  27. Solitude Without Souls: Why Peter Unger Hasn’T Established Substance Dualism.Will Bynoe & Nicholas K. Jones - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (1):109-125.
    Unger has recently argued that if you are the only thinking and experiencing subject in your chair, then you are not a material object. This leads Unger to endorse a version of Substance Dualism according to which we are immaterial souls. This paper argues that this is an overreaction. We argue that the specifically Dualist elements of Unger’s view play no role in his response to the problem; only the view’s structure is required, and that is available to (...)
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  28. Substance Dualism Substantially Duelled.Substantially Duelled - 2008 - In Nicola Mößner, Sebastian Schmoranzer & Christian Weidemann (eds.), Richard Swinburne. Christian Philosophy in a Modern World. Ontos. pp. 11--113.
     
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  29. The Contours of Locke’s General Substance Dualism.Graham Clay - 2022 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 4 (1):1-20.
    In this paper, I will argue that Locke is a substance dualist in the general sense, in that he holds that there are, independent of our classificatory schema, two distinct kinds of substances: wholly material ones and wholly immaterial ones. On Locke’s view, the difference between the two lies in whether they are solid or not, thereby differentiating him from Descartes. My way of establishing Locke as a general substance dualist is to be as minimally committal as possible (...)
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    Rethinking Descartes’s Substance Dualism.Lynda Gaudemard - 2021 - Springer.
    This monograph presents an interpretation of Descartes's dualism, which differs from the standard reading called 'classical separatist dualism' claiming that the mind can exist without the body. It argues that, contrary to what it is commonly claimed, Descartes’s texts suggest an emergent creationist substance dualism, according to which the mind is a nonphysical substance (created and maintained by God), which cannot begin to think without a well-disposed body. According to this interpretation, God’s laws of nature (...)
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  31. The Road to Substance Dualism.Geoffrey Madell - 2010 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67:45-60.
    The common materialist view that a functional account of intentionality will eventually be produced is rejected, as is the notion that intentional states are multiply realisable. It is argued also that, contrary to what many materialists have held, the causation of behaviour by intentional states rules out the possibility of a complete explanation of human behaviour in physical terms, and that this points to substance dualism. Kant's criticism of the Cartesian self as a substance, endorsed by P. (...)
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  32.  15
    Beyond "Traditional" Substance Dualism: A Hindu Soul.Sarju Patel - 2022 - Philosophy East and West 72 (1):166-187.
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  33. Swinburne on Substance Dualism.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (2):5--15.
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  34.  69
    Can Western Monotheism Avoid Substance Dualism?Dennis Bielfeldt - 2001 - Zygon 36 (1):153-177.
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  35. Imagination, Geometry, and Substance Dualism in Descartes's Rules.Michael Barnes Norton - 2010 - Gnosis 11 (3):1-19.
    In his Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Descartes elevates arithmetic and geometry to the status of paradigms for all the sciences, because of the potential for certainty in their results. This emphasis on certainty is present throughout the Cartesian corpus, but in the Rules and other early works the substance dualism characteristic of Cartesian philosophy is not as obvious. However, when several key concepts from this early work are considered together, it becomes clear that Cartesian (...) necessarily follows. The most important of these concepts are: Descartes’s rejection of the Scholastic theory of sense data in favor of a telecommunicative theory of perception; his innovative reconceptualization of mathematics in which he treats number and magnitude as interchangeable, making use of the symbolism of algebra; his frequent use of visual metaphors to describe perception in general, as well as other cognitive activity. It is in consideration of this third point that Descartes’s treatment of the imagination shows its importance, for the relationship of the imagination to the intellect parallels that of geometric figures to algebraic formulae. Though the role of the imagination in the Rules seems to make the status of a dualist ontology in this work more ambiguous, this paper will argue that in fact it is precisely in the treatment of imagination that one can find the traces of a fully developed substance dualism. (shrink)
     
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  36.  25
    The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism.Eric Yang - 2019 - Philosophia Christi 21 (1):221-225.
  37. Descartes’s Independence Conception of Substance and His Separability Argument for Substance Dualism.Robert K. Garcia - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Research 39:165-190.
    I critically examine the view that Descartes’s independence conception (IC) of substance plays a crucial role in his “separability argument” for substance dualism. I argue that IC is a poisoned chalice. I do so by considering how an IC-based separability argument fares on two different ways of thinking about principal attributes. On the one hand, if we take principal attributes to be universals, then a separability argument that deploys IC establishes a version of dualism that is (...)
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    Descartes’s Conception of Mind Through the Prism of Imagination: Cartesian Substance Dualism Questioned.Lynda Gaudemard - 2018 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie:146-171.
    The aim of this article is to clarify an aspect of Descartes’s conception of mind that seriously impacts on the standard objections against Cartesian dualism. By a close reading of Descartes’s writings on imagination, I argue that the capacity to imagine does not inhere as a mode in the mind itself, but only in the embodied mind, that is, a mind that is not united to the body does not possess the faculty to imagine. As a mode considered as (...)
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  39.  31
    Immaterialist, Materialist, and Substance Dualist Accounts of Incarnation.Andrew Loke - 2012 - Neue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 54 (4).
  40. Not Properly a Person: The Rational Soul and ‘Thomistic Substance Dualism’.Christina Van Dyke - 2009 - Faith and Philosophy 26 (2):186-204.
    Like Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas holds that the rational soul is the substantial form of the human body. In so doing, he takes himself to be rejecting a Platonic version of substance dualism; his criticisms, however, apply equally to a traditional understanding of Cartesian dualism. Aquinas’s own peculiar brand of dualism is receiving increased attention from contemporary philosophers—especially those attracted to positions that fall between Cartesian substance dualism and reductive materialism. What Aquinas’s own view amounts (...)
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    The Revival of Substance Dualism.Howard Robinson - 2021 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 69 (1):33-43.
    I argue in this essay that Richard Swinburne’s revised version of Descartes’ argument in chapter 5 of his Are We Bodies or Souls? does not quite get him to the conclusion that he requires, but that a modified version of his treatment of personal identity will do the trick. I will also look critically at his argument against epiphenomenalism, where, once again, I share his conclusion but have reservations about the argument.
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  42. The Modal Argument for Substance Dualism.Richard Swinburne - 1997 - In The Evolution of the Soul. (Revised Edition).
     
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    Is N. T. Wright Right About Substance Dualism?Stewart Goetz - 2012 - Philosophia Christi 14 (1):183-192.
    According to N. T. Wright, anyone who is a Christian should at least think twice before he or she speaks about the soul, especially as an entity that is distinct from its physical body and can survive death in a disembodied intermediate state until the resurrection and reembodiment. In Wright’s mind, talk of the soul is talk about soul-body substance dualism, which is the villain in Christian anthropological thought. As far as Wright is concerned, it is time for (...)
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  44. When a Problem for All is a Problem for None: Substance Dualism, Physicalism, and the Mind-Body Problem.Kenneth E. Himma - 2005 - American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (2):81-92.
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  45. Pure or Compound Dualism? Considering Afresh the Prospects of Pure Substance Dualism.Joshua Ryan Farris - 2013 - Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 3 (1):151-160.
    Substance dualism has received much attention from philosophers and theologians in contemporary literature. Whilst it may have been fashionable in the recent past to dismiss substance dualism as an unviable and academically absurd position to hold, this is no longer the case. My contention is not so much the merits of substance dualism in general, but a more specified variation of substance dualism. My specific contribution to the literature in this article is (...)
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  46. From Mental/Physical Identity to Substance Dualism.Richard Swinburne - 2007 - In Peter van Inwagen & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Persons: Human and Divine. Clarendon Press.
  47.  22
    Can a Post-Galilean Science of Consciousness Avoid Substance Dualism?R. S. Weir - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (9-10):212-228.
    In Galileo's Error, Philip Goff sets out a manifesto for a post-Galilean science of consciousness. Article four of the manifesto reads: 'Anti-Dualism: Consciousness is not separate from the physical world; rather consciousness is located in the intrinsic nature of the physical world.' I argue that there is an important sense of ‘dualism’ in which Goff’s arguments are not only compatible with but entail dualism, and not only dualism but substance dualism. Substance dualism, (...)
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    Human Nature and the Possibility of Life After Death: Why Christian Orthodoxy Requires Compositional Substance Dualism.Christopher H. Conn - 2008 - Philosophy and Theology 20 (1/2):129-149.
    In part one of this paper I argue that there are three possible accounts of human nature: we are either purely material beings, purely spiritual beings, or body/soul composites. In parts two and three I assess the relative merits of these positions both from a broadly secular perspective and also from the perspective of Christian orthodoxy. While both perspectives are mostly strongly opposed to the thesis that we are souls, and while a secular perspective is likely to favor some form (...)
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    Not Just a Terminological Difference: Cartesian Substance Dualism Vs Thomistic Hylomorphism.Jeremy W. Skrzypek - 2021 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 69 (1):103-117.
    In Are We Bodies or Souls? Richard Swinburne presents an updated formulation and defense of his dualist theory of the human person. On this theory, human persons are compound substances, composed of both bodies and souls. The soul is the only essential component of the human person, however, and so each of us could, in principle, continue to exist without our bodies, composed of nothing more than our souls. As Swinburne himself points out, his theory of the human person shares (...)
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    A Free Will Needs a Free Mind: Belief in Substance Dualism and Reductive Physicalism Differentially Predict Belief in Free Will and Determinism.Matthias Forstmann & Pascal Burgmer - 2018 - Consciousness and Cognition 63:280-293.
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